

Indian Thought

A QUARTERLY

Devoted to Sanskrit Literature

EDITED BY

GANGANATHA JHA

Vol. VII. ————— Nos. 2 & 3.

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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.

CHAPTER I.

In my *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*.¹ I put forth the hypothesis that the *Bhagavad Gītā* was the result of "an ancient synthesizing movement in which was attempted a higher standpoint than the monism of the Upaniṣads, the pluralism of the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiṣeṣika and the three Tattvas (triple reality) of the Āgama schools, a standpoint from which all the three can be reconciled and treated as different aspects of the higher point of view." In this book I attempt to separate the three different strands of which the Gītā is woven and discuss how far in it the aim of reconciling the three different schools of thought has been attained.

Around the name of the "teacher of the Gītā," (Gītā-chārya, as Rāmānuja calls him), numerous legends have twined themselves. We first meet with Kṛṣṇa in the mantras of the Ṛg Veda as a demon-enemy of Indra. He was probably the spring god of a pastoral tribe, called the Kṛṣṇas, who lived on the banks of the Jumnā. Indra claims to have defeated him² (and extinguished his worship). The Viṣṇu and other Purāṇas inform us that Kṛṣṇa on the other hand put an end to the fire-worship sacred to Indra on the banks of the Jumnā and re-established the old ritual of the cow-herds round Mathurā. The Mahabhārata glorifies Kṛṣṇa as Dwārakā, the king of the Yālava tribe, and the ideal statesman of the age that preceded Chāṇakya. The Bhāgavata and the Harivamśa have enshrined stories of the primitive love-making of an ancient god. There is lastly Kṛṣṇa Devakiputra³ to whom Ghora Āṅgīrasa taught the mystic mantras 'akṣitam asi,' acyutam asi, prāṇa saṁcitam asi' ('imperishable thou art,' 'unchangeable thou art,' 'subtle prāṇa thou art'). It was perhaps this Kṛṣṇa that first

¹ P. 130.

² R. V. iv.—16, viii, 85.

³ *Mad. Up.* iii—17-6.

essayed to weld into one the three systems of spiritual emancipation—the Bhāgāvata, the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta—and whose work got incorporated in the Mahābhārata.

Another part of the Mahābhārata also contains one more attempt to unify these three systems. This is the Mokṣadharmā Parva, which may be called the encyclopedia of the religion and ethics of Prebuddhistic India. In saying this, I do not mean that the Mokṣadharmā Parva existed in its present form before the birth of Gautama Buddha, but I mean that the Mokṣadharmā Parva contains a correct representation of the religious beliefs and practices, the problems and the discussions of the Brahmanas and Kṣatriyas of the VI century B. C. There, in Section cccxlix, Janamejaya asks Vaiṣampāyana “O Brahmaṛṣi, Sāṅkhya-yoga, Pāñcarātra, and the Vedāranyaka—these three schools of philosophy are prevalent in the world. O Muni, do these form one path or different paths ?” The Ṛṣi’s answer to this question is found in the previous section (82-84). “Sāṅkhya-yoga, Vedāranyaka and Pāñcarātra—these are one, they are said to be mutually related as limbs. These (*i.e.*, the totality of practices inculcated in these systems) is the dharma of the Ekāntis, (the dharma) which is based on Nārāyaṇa. As from the ocean flow the waves and thereinto, O King, they flow back, so these waves of the ocean of knowledge re-enter Nārāyaṇa, verily. This Sāttvata dharma has been declared to you, O son of Kuru”. The first thing to be noticed in these extracts is that the Karma Kāṇḍa—the Vedic fire-rite called *grāta*—is not referred to as a dharma leading to emancipation, thus showing that it had died on account of its elaborateness. In the Bhagavadgītā, too, the fire-rite is referred to but once, and that in terms of contempt, as a more or less obsolete method of worship.

“ This flowery speech will fools speak, those who delight in discoursing on the Vedas, O Pārtha; those who argue that

Bhag. 2

nothing more exists (than the enjoyment provided in future life for the followers of the fire-rite), men who are rooted in desire for pleasure, who aim at obtaining life in Svarga; (they argue so) in order to reach the life where there is plenty of pleasures to be enjoyed, which involves innumerable kinds of rites and which gives us the (final) fruit of sacrifices, rebirth (among the world of men). The mind that is resolutely attached to the enjoyment of pleasures and is overwhelmed by them, never reaches mental peace. The Vedas have for their object the attainment of (the pleasures) dependent on the play of the three Guṇas; be above the three Guṇas, Arjuna"⁴. While this treatment of the Vedic rites as a negligible factor in the life of a man "who is beyond pleasure and pain, is free from taking what belongs to others and keeping to himself what is his and is self-controlled" and this neglect to include the Vedic rites in the dharma prevalent in the world indicates remoteness from the Vedic age, the fact that the Jaina and the Bauddha systems are not referred to in Janamējaya's question may be held to indicate a pre-buddhistic epoch. In the life of Buddha there is plenty of proof that numerous paths of spiritual development existed then, some of which Buddha himself tried. So we

4 B. G. ii 42—45.

The next gloeka, which apparently refers to the same subject, is very obscure. It runs as follows :—

Yāvān artha udapāne sarvataḥ samplutodake

Tāvān sarveshu vedeshu brāhmaṇasya vijanataḥ.

The commentators interpret this as usual each in accordance with the special beliefs he holds. Literally translated it is, "What use in a well, in water flowing from all sides, that in all the Vedas to a wise Brāhmaṇa." Sankara makes this mean 'what a well is to an ocean, that is Vedic rite to the knowledge of reality.' Ramanuja makes it, 'what (little quantity of water is taken by a) man for his use from a well that is overflowing with water, so little part must a wise Brāhmaṇa take from all the vedas for his use'. From the context it is clear that Kṛṣṇa condemns the Vedas without reservation. He apparently regards the Vedas as a well giving little enjoyment and the paths of spiritual development that he teaches for attaining endless bliss as infinite, like the broad ocean. Bliss in Svarga is short-lived; the bliss of Samādhi is eternal.

can well believe that in that age, the best minds were exercised about inventing some form of reconciliation of these distractingly differing systems. The use of the word 'vedāraṇyakas,' in the above extracts from the *Mahābhārata*, for what, in later ages, was more properly called the Upaniṣads indicates that the extracts belong to a time when the Upaniṣads were still not clearly separated from the Āraṇyakas where they are deposited, when the Veda had not been clearly divided into the Karmakāṇḍa, including the Mantras, the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas *minus* the Upaniṣads and the Jñānakāṇḍa, containing the Upaniṣads alone. Hence one need not hesitate to conclude that the exposition of the Sāttvata dharma to Janamejaya by Vaiṣampāyana was made or composed in the VI century B. C.

I have remarked that the Mokṣadharmā parva, like the Bhagavad Gitā, attempts to weld these three systems into one. It expounds each, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga in Sections ccc—cccx, Vedantic ideas from ccexi—cccxixiii; then follows the stories of the expeditions to the White Island, and the exposition of the doctrines of the Sāttvatas (also called Bhāgavatas, and Pañcarātras) and lastly the statement referred to above that all three form members of one organic whole which leads to the attainment of Nārāyaṇa. It will thus be seen that the Mokṣadharmā parva makes but a feeble attempt to reconcile the three conflicting Schools. The Bhagavad Gitā much more successfully combines them. But before discussing this, we must consider what were the chief doctrines of each of these.

CHAPTER II.

THE BHĀGAVATA DHARMA.

Some European scholars have attempted to prove, or rather wished to believe that the Bhāgavata Dharma was

Bhag. 4

an offshoot of the Christian religion brought to India in the middle of the I Century A. D. by the Apostle Thomas. Their only reason for doing so is their belief that devotion to a God, was first taught to the world by Jesus Christ. If by devotion be meant the readiness to sacrifice all that a man has, this idea existed in India from the days of the *Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, where the 'sacrifice of all things' (sarvamedha) is taught as a means to the attainment of superiority, self-effulgence and supreme dominion (çraiṣṭyam, svārājyam ādhipatyam).¹ But if by devotion be meant the Christian faith in a God for the purpose of cancellation of sins, this is a doctrine quite foreign to all forms of Hindu thought. Moreover the discovery in Besnagar, near Bhilsa in the extreme South of Gwalior, of a Garuḍadhvaja set up in honour of Vāsudeva by the Greek Bhāgavata Heliiodorus, son of Dion, is sufficient proof that the Bhāgavata Dharma comes down from pre-Christian times.²

An early exposition of this Dharma is found in the Mokṣadharmā Parva. The authoritative scriptures of the Ekāntīs, as the Sanyāsīs among the Bhāgavatas were called, are the *Pāñcarātra Āgamas*, said to be 108 in number, for an account of which, *vide* pp. 118—135 and 175—176 of my *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. But they are of no use to us, for those of them that have been recovered are of much later date than the *Mahābhārata*. Even the part of the *Mokṣa Dharma Parva* that deals with the Bhāgavata doctrine is a mixture of late and early ideas. The prophecies of Nārāyaṇa about his future avatāras in section cccxxxix, must be a later interpolation, because the avatāras of Viṣṇu are not referred to in any of the early works. Setting aside these, the fundamental tenets of the Bhāgavatas can be extracted from this part of the *Mokṣa Dharma parva*, called the *Nārāyaṇīya*.

1 I. C. B. xiii—7-1-1.

2 J. R. A. S. 1909, p. 1053.

The chief Bhāgavata doctrines were taught by the Supreme Deity of the Bhāgavatas, Nārāyaṇa, to Nārada, who went on a pilgrimage to the White Island on purpose to see the god face to face. The chief tenet of the Bhāgavatas is that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme God. "Nārāyaṇa, the Great Being, the creator of all. To him go all offerings made to the Gods and the pitṛs. He has no beginning and no end. He is unmanifest. He is worshipped by the Gods and demons."³ Nārada greets Nārāyaṇa as the God of Gods, the witness of the Universe, the great Puruṣa, the Infinite, Manifest as individual Soul and matter, unmanifest, the author of all creation which begins with Brahmā, the destroyer of all creation, who bears the great illusion, who has the universe as His form.

This Nārāyaṇa, who has the Universe as his form has yet another form which mortals can rarely see. Nārada, a Ṛṣi who is claimed as the first promulgator of the Bhāgavata doctrine, alone could perform enough austerities and could hymn Him sufficiently well to induce Him to show Himself in His secret form. "A little clearer than the moon, a little greater than the moon, a little of the colour of fire, a little of the shape of Viṣṭi⁴ A little like the feathers of the parrot, a little like a crystal, a little like a heap of blue collyrium, in some places of a golden lustre, in some places of the colour of the coral sprout and likewise of white colour, in some places like the colour of gold, in some places like the cat's eye (vaidūrya). In some places like the blue cat's eye, like sapphire, in some places like the colour of the neck of the peacock, like a string of pearls. The eternal diffused these various colours, the resplendent one had a thousand eyes, a hundred heads, a thousand feet, a thousand bellies, arms, in some places as if unmanifest, with one mouth singing out

³ Nārāyaṇo mahābhūtam viśvasīk havyakavyabhuk
anādinidhanavyakto devadānava pūjitaḥ.

⁴ I cannot find out what viṣṭi means.

‘Om’ and the Gāyatrī born from it and with the other mouths singing the four Vedas, in many tunes”.⁵

The first part of this description is a really fine attempt to describe the Supreme Effulgence of God, perhaps the best possible way of figuring Him, and of course much superior to the anthropomorphising of Him resorted to by most poets, including Milton. The latter part is a symbolization of His relation to the Universe, an attempt to figure the fundamental pantheistic conception of the Bhāgavatas. Neither full pantheism nor the doctrine of the transmigration of souls is found in the Mantras of the Rig Vedas. These doctrines seem not to have arisen among the Brahṃavādīs, those who performed the fire-sacrifices and discussed the mystic meaning of these rites, but were apparently evolved among the followers of the indigenous Indian rites and ousted the Vedic conceptions of the relations of God and man. One Vedic hymn, alone, the *Puruṣa Sūkta*, embodies the pantheistic concept and contains phrases which recall the above description. But it must be remembered that this hymn is attributed to Nārāyaṇa; it is, probably, a hymn composed by the Bhāgavatas and grudgingly given a place in the final book of the R̥g Veda, when the redactor of the Vedic hymns, found the Bhāgavata dharma had become more popular than the Vaidika dharma. At any rate the *Puruṣa sūkta*, as has been proved, from its language, is a very late

5 Kiñcidcandrādvīḍhātṃ kiñcidcandrādvīḍhātṃ,
 Kṛcānavarṇaḥ kiñcicca kiñcidviṣṭyākṛitīḥ prabhuḥ.
 Cūkapatranibhaḥ kiñcit kiñcit spāṭhika saṃnibhaḥ,
 Nilāñjanacayaprakhyo jātarūpaprabhaḥ kvacit,
 Pravālāṅkura varṇaḥ cvetavarṇas tathā kvacit,
 Kvacit suvarṇavarṇābho vaidūrya sadṛṣaḥ kvacit.
 Nīla vaidūryasadṛṣa indranīlanibhaḥ kvacit,
 Mayūragṛivavarṇābho muktāhāranibhaḥ kvacit.
 Etān bahuvidhān varṇān rūpāirvibhṛat sanātanaḥ,
 Sahasranayanaḥ ṣṇimāñcātāṣṭṛṣaḥ sahasrapāt,
 Sahasrodarabāhuḥ cāvyakta iti ca kvacit,
 Akāramudgiran vaktrāt sāvitṛṇīca tadanvayān
 bhayaḥ caiva vaktrebhyaḥ ca tur vedāṅgiran bahū.

hymn, later than the genuine Mantras composed when the fire-rite held sway in ancient India. When the composition of the bulk of the Vedic Mantras was ended, the Brāhmaṇas began to collect them into Samhitās, to compose *Brāhmaṇas* forming a running commentary on the application of the Mantras to the fully elaborated fire-rite and to regulate the performance of the rites by means of *Ṇrauta sūtras*. When this age ended, probably about the VII century B. C., we find that the fire-rite had shrunk in public estimation, and the Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the Bhāgavata, Pāṇupata, and other non-ṇrauta systems had begun to prevail. Hence we may reasonably infer that during the age of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Sūtras* there must have been a severe competition between the ṇrauta and the non-ṇrauta systems. We cannot, of course, hope to find an echo of this fight in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Ṇrauta sūtras*, for they deal only with the details of the ṇrauta karma—the fire-rite. But the quiet inclusion of the *Puruṣa Sūkta* and numerous other mantras incompatible with the fire-rite, in the Veda, especially in the Taittirīya Veda, which was in an inchoate state for a long time, is testimony that systems like the Bhāgavata and the Pāṇupata were making headway during the period. The Ṇatarudriya hymn and the Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upanishad, both of the Taittirīya Veda are instances of such.

The following extracts from the Mahā-Nārāyaṇa Upanishad describes the same Bhāgavata conception of the Deity, a very clear-cut pantheism, characteristically different from the vascillating, self-contradictory ideas of the Upanishads, which lend themselves to be interpreted in various ways by various commentators.

“(I laud) the thousand-headed God, eyes everywhere, the author of all auspicious things, who is all things, Nārāyaṇa, the Changeless God, Supreme Lord, Supreme over all things, Eternal, Omnipresent, Nārāyaṇa, Hari; verily, all this is the Puruṣa; this universe is supported on the
Bhag. 8

Lord, Lord of the Universe, the Deathless, the Blessed, the Changeless, Nārāyaṇa, the Great Being to be attained by the mind, the Soul of the World, the Supreme Goal; the nature of Brahmā depends on Nārāyaṇa; Nārāyaṇa is supreme; the light that is the ātmā is dependent on Nārāyaṇa; Nārāyaṇa is Supreme. Whatever in this world is seen or heard, objective or subjective, is pervaded by Nārāyaṇa.”⁶ This conception of Nārāyaṇa certainly belongs to the same school as the Bhāgavata, as expounded in the *Mokṣa Dharma Parva*.

After these attempts to picture the Absolute, Nārāyaṇa lets Nārada see his esoteric form, but cautions him with “what form thou beholdest in me is but an illusion created by me, O Nārada”. This supreme Nārāyaṇa is hard to see and though the Cause of the world works by deputy. It is a peculiarity of the Bhāgavata and Pācupata systems that the Supreme manifests himself in four easy stages before the work of creation is commenced. Thus according to the Pācupata, the highest Īvatatva manifests as Sadāśiva, Īvara, and Īddha Vidyā before objectivity is reached. So, too, in the Bhāgavata, Nārāyaṇa is generally remote and inactive and the manifestation of him as Vāsudeva is the active god. Of Vāsudeva, it is said, Him Sattva, Rajas and Tamas do not touch, who is the Omnipresent witness and is called the Soul of the world. He is called the Puruṣa, unaffected by deeds and fit to be seen by the eye of knowledge, one whom the best of Brahmanas

6 Sahasra gīṣam devam viṣvā kṣam viṣva śambhavam ;
 viṣvam nārāyaṇam devam akṣuram paramam prabhum ;
 viṣvataḥ paramam nityam viṣvam nārāyaṇam hariṁ ;
 viṣvam evedam puruṣaḥ tad viṣvam upajivati ;
 patiṁ viṣvasyātmeḥ varam śāśvatam śivamacyutam ;
 nārāyaṇam mahājñeyam viṣvātmānam parāyaṇam ;
 nārāyaṇa param brahma tatvam ; nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ ;
 nārāyaṇa paro jyotiḥ ātmā nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ ;
 yaccha kīñc jagatyasmin dṛṣyate cṛyatepivā ;
 antarbahiṣa tatsarvam vyāpya nārāyaṇasthitaḥ.

enter and become emancipate. He is to be known as Vāsudeva, the Supreme Soul, the Eternal. Vāsudeva is the active aspect of Nārāyaṇa and, therefore, proceeds towards creation by limiting himself. He enters the totality (saṅghāta) of the five elements, and thus becomes a Kṣetrajña, (Jīva) a soul. He then informs this body with life and becomes the Saṅkarṣaṇa or Ṣeṣa. When Saṅkarṣaṇa acts he becomes Pradyumna or Sanatkumāra, in whom all creatures merge when universal dissolution comes. He is the Universal Mind. From him arises Aniruddha who is the actor, the cause and the effect. From Aniruddha all creation springs. He is also called Īgāna and he is manifest in all acts. He is self-consciousness.⁷ From Aniruddha's navel, at the dawn of creation, springs Brahmā, the creator of all creatures; when dissolution nears, from Aniruddha's forehead springs Rudra, the destroyer. Though these are great gods and can grant boons on their account, yet in their respective duties of Creation and Destruction they are but instruments in Aniruddha's hands.⁸

The worship of Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva consisted in lauding him with uttering his many names, offering cooked rice to him not according to the bloody rites of the Veda but according to the bloodless Sāttvata or Pañcarātra ritual, the essential parts of which rite even now obtains in Vaiṣṇava temples and homes, to distribute the consecrated food to dependants and finally eat what remained thereof. This is the daily ārādhana. To this was coupled abstention from killing animals. This latter principle clashed with the Vedic rites, which necessitated so much slaughter. Those⁹ of the Bhāgavatas that followed the fire-rite also, sacrificed not goats but seeds and lulled their conscience by the pun, 'seeds are *ajā* like the goat', for they felt that that could not be dharma in which the slaughter of animals was laid

7 M. D. P. cccxxxix, 24-40.

8 *Ib.* cccxli, 16-19.

9 *Ib.* cccxxxv, 20.

down.¹⁰ This was the path of the householder, the pravṛtti mārga; but when he turned to nivṛtti mārga he became an ascetic and was called an ekāntī. He resorted to the forest, underwent austerities, recited mantras containing His names, meditated on the various forms in which Vāsudeva manifested himself and “endued with great devotion, hearts full of reverence, worshipped Him with mind, word and deed”¹¹ for “those that are devoid of devotion can never see that God. Those who have led the life of ekāntīs for a very long time can alone see the lord whose effulgence dazzles the eye.”¹²

The final end of the Ekāntī is thus described. “Those who in the world are stainless, O best of Brahmins, devoid of (fruit-bearing) merit or demerit, shall go on the auspicious path. The sun, who is the dispeller of darkness in all the world, is called the gate; all their limbs being burnt by the Sun, they become invisible to all beings and all times. They become embodied in the ultimate atom, they then enter the God. Passing out from him, they rest in the body of Aniruddha. They thence become embodied in (cosmic) Mind and, then, enter Pradymuna. Passing out of Pradymuna also, then into Saṅkaraṇa, the (Cosmic) Life (jīva) enter the best of Brahmins, along with the Wise and the Devoted (Sāṅkhyabhāgavataiḥ saha). Then they lose the three guṇas, these best of Brahmins quickly enter the Supreme Soul (paramātmā), the Kṣetrajñā, who is beyond the guṇas. Know that Vāsudeva is indeed the abode of all, the Kṣetrajñā. Those whose mind has reached peace (samādhi), who are restrained (niyatāḥ), whose organs (of sensation and action) are under control, and who follow the life of the ekāntīs enter Vāsudeva.”¹³

10 *Ib.* cccxxvii, 4-5.

11 *Ib.* cccxxvi, 45.

12 *Ib.* 53.

13 *Ib.* P. cccliv, 13-19.

We thus see that Vāsudeva is according to the Bhāgavatas related to the world of individual souls and material objects, otherwise called *Sanghāta*, the totality of objective existences, as the human soul to his body. He is the Kṣetrajña of the Universe ; when he enters the Universe which is his body, it becomes informed with jīva (life). He endows it with mind ; and by the loving worship of Him will the man reach him.

Such a definition would be highly improper,* we reply. Because as a matter of fact the critic actually accepts four things; when propounding a criticism, the critic accepts—(1) the presence of the view criticised, (2) the fact that the conception of the other party represents a wrong idea, (3) the presence of the propounder of that other view, and (4) the presence of himself, as the person to whom the other view is propounded;—and all this would be impossible if you said that the critic accepts and states *the criticism only*. “Even if we mention *the criticism*

Vār. P. 165.

only, all the rest (of the above four) would be naturally implied by it.” In that case, (if mere implication were accepted) it would be just as well to define Wrangling as ‘Wrangling’;—the idea that it attacks the view of the other party being implied by the etymological signification of the name ‘*Viṭanḍā*’, ‘Wrangling’ itself,—which means ‘that whereby (a certain view) is wrangled’ (*viṭanḍyaṭē yayā*).

For these reasons we conclude that it is best to accept the definition as stated in the *Sūtra*.

ADHYĀYA I.

Daily Discourse II.

Section (2).

Of the Fallacious Probans.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 51, L. 8.]

The ‘*Ilṭvābhāsa*’, ‘Fallacious Probans’, are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans, and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to *appear* as such. And these—

- (1) THE SAVYABHICHĀRA (INCONCLUSIVE),
- (2) THE VIRUPPA (CONTRADICTION), (3) THE
- PRĀKARAṆASAMA (NEUTRALISED), (4) THE SĀDHYA-

* ‘अयुक्तं’ of the Benares edition is the right reading.

SAMA (UNKNOWN), AND THE KĀLĀTĪA (MISTIMED)
—ARE THE FALLACIOUS PROBANS. * (SŪTRA 4).

Vārtika on Sūtra (4).

[P. 165, L. 7 to P. 171, L. 14.]

The 'Fallacious Probans' are so called because they do not possess all the characteristics of the true Probans and yet they are sufficiently similar to the Probans to appear as such—says the Bhāṣya; and such Fallacious Probans are the following:—(1) *Inconclusive*, (2) *Contradictory*, (3) *Neutralised*, (4) *Unknown*, and (5) *Mistimed* (or *Annulled*).

“Wherein lies the ‘similarity’ of what are not true Probans to the true Probans, in virtue of which they appear as Probans?”

The following are the points of *similarity*:—(a) *Being put forward after the Proposition*: Just as the true Probans is put forward after the Proposition, so also is the Fallacious Probans; and this constitutes a ‘similarity’. (b) *Possessing of any one of the characteristics of the Probans*; i. e. the true Probans that is put forward in proof of the Proposition is endowed with three characteristics [(1) it is concomitant with the Probandum, (2) it subsists in a substratum where the Probandum is acknowledged to subsist, and (3) it is acknowledged not to subsist where the Probandum is known to be absent]; and if what is put forward happens to possess any one of these three, this constitutes a ‘similarity’ to the true Probans; or according to the view that the Probans need fulfil only two conditions (the first two of the three mentioned), the ‘similarity’ may be said to consist in the possessing of any one of the *two* characteristics of the Probans.† [While their ‘similarity’ consists in the above] their

* The name of the fifth is कालातीत in the Bhāṣya edition (Vizianagram Series); and also in the न्यायसूचीनिबन्ध and the Tātparya; it is अतीतकाल in both editions of the Vārtika and in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण

† The former similarity is *formal*, and the latter *real*, says the Tātparya; and it proceeds to add that though the true Probans should fulfil *five* conditions—it should not be *annulled* and it should not be *neutralised*, in addition to the three conditions

difference lies in the fact that while one proves, the other does not prove; *i. e.* the true Probans actually proves the Proposition and the Fallacious Probans does not. "To what is this difference due?" It is due to the fact that while the true Probans fulfills all the conditions, the Fallacious Probans fulfills only a few of them.

"What is the purpose of this *Sātra*?"

It has been explained that it serves the purpose of restricting (the actual number of the Fallacious Probans) by means of the classification put forward. "What is it that has to be restricted by the classification?" As a matter of fact, the extent of the Probans, right and wrong, is vast, appearing in numerous ways; and it is necessary to curtail or restrict this vast extent. "In what numerous diverse ways do the Probans, right and wrong, appear?" Well, as a matter of fact, if we take into consideration the diversities of time, of person, and of the thing to be proved, their number cannot be counted; but in a general way, if we take into consideration only the diversity due to the relation of the Probans to the Probandum, the number of Probans, right and wrong, on being computed, comes to be 176. *B. g.* the diversity in a character concomitant with the Probandum is *sixteen-fold*; so also is the diversity of that character which subsists in only a part of the Probandum; and so also that of the character which does not subsist in the Probandum; and

in both of these cases the Probans may be put forward in a qualified form, which will admit of a further twofold diversity due to the fact of either the *qualifying* factor or the *qualified* factor being unknown; and this would afford 64 diversities; the further diversity caused by the fact of the *qualifying* factor

Var. P. 166.

mentioned in the text,—yet the Author has mentioned only three; it being immaterial how many are mentioned, as all that the Author means to point out here is that the Fallacious Probans should fulfil *some*, not all, conditions of the true Probans.

or the *qualified* factor being inapt*, yields another 64 [and these 64 and 64, along with the former three, 16, 16 and 16, make up 176].

Out of these, we are going to cite examples of those sixteen kinds of Probans (right and wrong) that are concomitant with the Probandum†:—(1) That which is concomitant with the Probandum, and also with things homologous to it (*i. e.* in which the predicated character is known to subsist) and with things not similar to it—*i. e.* with the *Reverse*, (that wherein the predicated character is known not to subsist); *e. g.* ‘sound is eternal (or non-eternal), because it is *knowable* (where *knowability* subsists in sound, in all *eternal* things and also in all *non-eternal* things); [this is too wide];—(2) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue (that which is similar to the Probandum in possessing the predicated character), and which subsists in a part of the Reverse (that wherein the predicated character is known to be absent)‡; *e. g.* ‘this is a cow, because *it has horns*’ (where

* Both editions read **समर्थोपपत्त्यर्थ** &c. But the correct reading apparently should be only **अवपत्त्यर्थ**. This is clear from P. 169, l. 13 below.

† It is necessary to bear in mind the fact that among older writers, the terms ‘*pakṣa*’ and ‘*sādhya*’ are used promiscuously. Later writers use the term ‘*pakṣa*’ for the *subject* of the Proposition, and ‘*sādhya*’ for the predicate of the Proposition, *i. e.* that which is asserted of the *subject*. But no such restriction of usage is found among older writers. For instance, in the present context, ‘*sādhya*’ is the same as ‘*pakṣa*’; as is clear from the text of l. 2, on next page. In fact the term ‘*sādhya*’ is used in its literal sense of *what is to be proved*; and the confusion in usage is due to the diversity of opinion as to the exact nature of what is actually *proved* by the Inference. This has been discussed in detail by the *Vārṭika* on Su. 1-1-5 (*Translation*, pp. 172-174.) Bearing this in mind, the next sentence exemplifying the (1) of the 16, may be rendered according to modern usage as—‘that which subsists in (is concomitant with) the Subject, and also in things where the predicated character is known to subsist, and also where the predicated character is known not to subsist’;—and so throughout in the present context; but we prefer to use the term ‘*probandum*’, as it means *what is to be proved*, and as such is an exact equivalent to the original term ‘*sādhya*’, so that it lends itself to the same uses as the original term.

‡ With a view to guard against having to insert the parenthetical explanation at each step, it may be stated here that the term ‘Homologue’ will, in the present context, stand for what the text calls ‘*sajātīya*’, by which is meant the ‘*sapakṣa*’ of the

it is found that *horns* are present in the animal present, and is present in all *cows* and also in some *non-cows*); [this is too wide];—(3) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue, and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘Sound is non-eternal, because *it is a product*’ [where the character of product subsists in sound, and in its homologues, the non-eternal jar etc.; and it does not subsist in the *eternal* Soul]; [this is *valid*];—(4) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.*, ‘sound is eternal, because *it is a product*’ (where the character of *product* subsists in sound, but in no other eternal thing, and it is found in all non-eternal things); [this is contradictory];—(5) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, which does not subsist in the Homologue, and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘sound is eternal, because *while being possessed of generality and individuality it is perceptible by our external sense-organ*’ (where the character stated is found to be present in sound, it is not present in any eternal thing, and it subsists in *some* non-eternal things); [this is contradictory];—(6) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, and does not subsist in either the Homologue or the Reverse; *e. g.*, ‘sound is eternal, because *while possessed of generality and individuality, it is perceptible by the auditory organ, like the jar*’ (where the character mentioned is one that subsists in sound, but not in any other thing, eternal or non-eternal; [this is too specific];—(7) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in a part of the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse also;—*e. g.* ‘this is a non-cow, because *it has horns*’ (horns are found in non-cows and in cows also); [this is too wide];—(8) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in the Homologue and in a part of the Reverse;—*e. g.* ‘Sound is eternal because it

later writers, that in which the predicated character is admitted by both parties to subsist; and the term ‘Reverse’ will stand for ‘*vipakṣa*’, that in which the predicated character is admitted by both parties to be non-subsistent.

is *intangible*' (intangibility subsisting in all eternal things and also in some non-eternal things); [this is too wide];—(9) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, subsists in a part of the Homologue, and also in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because having generality and individuality, it is perceptible to us by our external sense-organs*'; here the qualifying term 'having generality and individuality' is added with a view to exclude Generality (which has no generality), Inherence (which also has no generality) and Individuality (which has no further individuality); the term 'perceptible to us' serves to exclude atoms; and 'perceptible by external organs' excludes the Soul; [this reasoning is valid];—(10) that which is concomitant with the Probandum and the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* when a person states the following reasoning entirely on the basis of his own doctrine—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product' [which is *valid* if the man holds that sound is actually *produced*; and yet the reasoning to the contrary also would be valid—'Sound is eternal *because it is not a product*'—when put forward by the man on the basis of his own doctrine that Sound is never *produced*, it is only *manifested*]; [this is *valid*];—(11) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal, *because it is perceptible by external sense-organs*'; [this is contradictory];—(15) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the living body is not without soul, as (if it were) it would not be the receptacle of the sense-organs'; [this is *valid*];—(16) that which is concomitant with the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse; *e. g.* 'all things are eternal because they are knowable'; [this is too specific]. These are the sixteen kinds of Probans concomitant with the Probandum; out of these, five (3, 9, 10, 11 and 15) are true Probans,

and the rest are only *apparent* (fallacious) Probans. Of the former five, two, the *third* and the *ninth*, are affirmative-negative, not subsisting in the Reverse at all; the *tenth* and *eleventh*, as propounded by a person entirely on the basis of his own doctrines, are universal-affirmative; and the *fifteenth* is negative.

The following are the sixteen kinds of Probans subsisting in a part of the Probandum (the second group of sixteen, mentioned in the *Text* at the bottom of p. 165):—(1) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and is concomitant with the Homologue and the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘Earth, Water, Fire and Ākāsha are non-eternal, *because they are inodorous*’;—(2) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind have generality and individuality and are perceptible by our external sense-organs, *because they are non-eternal*’;—(3) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind are non-eternal *because they are products*’;—(4) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind are eternal, *because they are products*’*;—(5) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, does not subsist in the Homologue and subsists in a part of Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind are possessed of generality and individuality and are perceptible by our external sense-organs, *because they are eternal*’;—(6) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and does not subsist in either the Homologue or the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘Sound is non-eternal *because it has for its non-constituent cause a disjunction born of disjunction*’;—(7) that which subsists in part of the Probandum and

* This subsists in a part of the Probandum, as *Dhamsa* is an eternal thing and is a product. The reading *अनित्ये* is wrong; as the reasoning with this word would be perfectly valid.

in a part of the Homologue, and is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘atoms are non-eternal *because they are inodorous*’;—(8) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, in a part of the Homologue and in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal*’;—(9) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum and in a part of the Homologue, and does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* ‘speech and mind are non-eternal, because possessed of generality and individuality they are perceptible by our external sense-organs’*;—(10) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* ‘Colour and Cognition are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal, like sensation*’; when this reasoning would be put forward on the basis of a definite (Bandha) doctrine [according to which the *skandhas* of Sensation, Name and Impression, which are different from the *skandhas* of Colour and Cognition, are non-eternal, and as such constitute the Homologue with which the ‘incorporeality’ is concomitant];†—(11) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and in whose case there is no Homologue‡; *e. g.* ‘the eye and cognition are non-eternal, *because they are incorporeal, like Colour &c.*’;—(12)

Var : P. 168.

that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, which does not subsist in the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* ‘sound and mind are non-eternal, *because they are audible*’;—(13) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum §, in whose case there is no Homologue and which is concomitant with the Reverse;

* The Benares Edition reads *सामान्यवत्ता* for *सामान्यतो*; neither is satisfactory; the former gives better sense; but the syntax is not clear.

† The words enclosed within brackets in the Benares Edition are not wanted.

‡ *साध्यतत्त्वतोऽर्थैकदेश* of the *Bib. Ind.* edition is wrong reading. The correct reading is supplied by the Benares edition—*साध्यैकदेश*.

§ In several places in this para. the Benares edition reads *साध्यैकदेशावृत्ति* but the original reading at the very outset is *साध्यैकदेशवृत्ति*; and *ex-hypothesi* every one of these sixteen is *साध्यैकदेशवृत्ति*.

e. g. 'sound and mind are eternal*', *because they are products*' ;—(14) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the eye and cognition are eternal, *because they are corporeal*' ;—(15) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'the body† is not without Soul, because (if it were) it would not be the receptacle of the sense-organs' ;—(16) that which subsists in a part of the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse;—*e. g.* 'All things are non-eternal *because they are incorporeal*.' All these sixteen kinds of Probans, subsisting as they do in only a part of the Probandum, are all fallacious.

The following are the sixteen kinds of Probans not subsisting in the Probandum (the third group of sixteen mentioned in the *Text*, bottom of p. 165) :—(1) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, and which is concomitant with the Homologue and the Reverse; *e. g.*, 'the Earth is non-eternal, *because it is inodorous*' ;—(2) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which is concomitant with the Homologue and subsists in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is not audible*' ;—(3) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, is concomitant with the Homologue and does not subsist in the Reverse‡; *e. g.* 'Sound is a thing (*i. e.* a Substance, a Quality or an Action), *because it is inaudible and is possessed of a generality*' ;§—(4) that which

* The reading अनित्ये would make the reasoning quite valid, which it is not.

† The reasoning with the term 'शरीर' 'body' is invalid; if it were 'जीवशरीर', 'living body', it would make it valid.

‡ विषयवृत्तिः and विषयवृत्ति, both readings will suit here; but the *Tātparya* favours विषयवृत्ति :

§ If mere 'inadmissibility' were put forward, that would apply to Generality etc. also, which are not 'artha'; so that the Probans, in that case, will not be विषयवृत्ति; hence the further qualification of *possessing generality* is added; which excludes Generality and the rest, which have no generality at all.—*Tātparya*. 'The name *artha* applies to Substance, Quality and Action'—says the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 8-2-3.

does not subsist in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and which is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is a *thing*, because it has no generality';—(5) that which does not subsist either in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and which subsists in the Reverse;* *e. g.* 'Sound has a cause, *because it is not a thing*';—(6) that which subsists neither in the Probandum, nor in the Homologue, nor in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal, *because it is a nonentity*';—(7) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue and which is concomitant with the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is intangible, *because it is a substance*';—(8) that which does not subsist in the Probandum and which subsists in a part of the Homologue and also in a part of the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound has a cause *because it is corporeal*';—(9) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound has a receptacle *because it is visible*'; this reasoning fulfilling the said conditions according to the doctrine of the Vaishēṣikas†;—(10) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which is concomitant with the Homologue and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal *because it is not audible*'; this reasoning being urged on the basis of a particular doctrine (of the *Sautrāntikas*, for whom nothing is eternal, whence no 'Reverse' in the said reasoning would be possible);—(11) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, which subsists in a part of the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is corporeal*';—(12) that which does not subsist in the Probandum or in the Homologue, and in whose case there is no Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is non-eternal, *because it is a non-entity*';—(13) that which does not

* विपक्षवृत्ति is the correct reading; विपक्षावृत्ति would make this identical with (6).

† This has been added with a view to meet the objection that Inherence is visible and yet without a receptacle, and so *visibility* is not non-subsistent in the Reverse. According to the Vaishēṣikas however Inherence is *not visible*, being beyond the reach of the Senses, and knowable only by Inference (see *Prashastapūṭa*, P. 329).

subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which is concomitant with the
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Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal *because it is inaudible*';—(14) that which not does subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue and which subsists in a part of the Reverse; 'Sound is eternal *because it is incorporeal*';*—(15) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, in whose case there is no Homologue, and which does not subsist in the Reverse; *e. g.* 'Sound is eternal *because it is a non-entity*';—(16) that which does not subsist in the Probandum, and in whose case there is neither Homologue nor Reverse; *e. g.* 'All things are non-eternal *because they are non-entities*.' All these sixteen, not subsisting in the Probandum, are *Fallacious Probans*.

"It has been said above (p. 166, l. 1), that the two groups of sixteen will afford 64 varieties,† through the diversity caused by either the qualifying factor or the qualified factor being unknown [when the Probans is stated in a qualified form];—now how does this come about?" This comes about from the fact of both the concomitant and the non-concomitant Probans being stated in a qualified form; that is to say, the sixteen that are concomitant with the Probandum (the first group of 16 described above) and also those that subsist in part of the Probandum (the second group of 16 described above),—these 32 become 64 when we take into consideration the diversity caused by the fact of either the qualifying factor or the qualified factor being *unknown*. Of these we shall give examples of the concomitant Probans first—(1) 'Sound is non-eternal, *because being undenotable it is knowable*'; where the qualifying factor (*being undenotable*) is unknown (sound being known to be something

* The Benares edition reads अद्वैतत्वात् for असत्त्वत्; and (15) has dropped out of the *Bib. Ind.* edition. It is supplied by the Benares edition thus—वाक्याद्वैत-रविव्यक्तसंज्ञातिः विषयः दृष्टिः नित्यः शब्दोऽपस्त्वात्.

† The *Bib. Ind.* reading is corrupt. The correct reading is supplied by the Benares edition 'चतु.षष्टि' for 'द्वत्तयः षष्टिम्'.

quite denotable by words);—(2) ‘Sound is non-eternal *because being knowable, it is undenotable*’; where *being undenotable* is the qualified factor and is unknown. We can find similar varieties in regard to every one of the 16 Probans concomitant with the Probandum; and the same examples will serve in both cases (by reversing the qualified and qualifying factors, as just shown). As examples of similar varieties of the Probans that subsists in a part of the Probandum, we have the following:—(1) ‘Earth, Water, Fire, and Ākāśha are non-eternal, because *being undenotable they are inodorous*’, where the qualifying factor (*being undenotable*) is unknown;—(2) ‘the same, Earth etc., are non-eternal, because *being inodorous they are undenotable*’, where ‘undenotability’ is the qualified factor and is unknown. Similarly with all other Probans subsisting in a part of the Probandum.

Similarly we may trace the 64 varieties due to the diversity caused by the fact of the qualified or the qualifying factor being inapt. *E. g.*, ‘Sound is non-eternal, *because being a product it is knowable*’ [where the qualified factor, *knowability*, is inapt, being absolutely incapable of proving what it is put forward to prove], and ‘Sound is non-eternal, *because being knowable it is a product*’ [where *knowability* is the qualifying factor, and is inapt]. Similarly with every one of the examples.

Similar 64 varieties would be available, due to the diversity caused by the qualifying or the qualified factor being doubtful; *e. g.* ‘this is the peacock’s sound, because while containing the *ṣadja* and the other notes of the musical scale, it does not consist of distinct letter-sounds,’ [where the qualifying factor, the presence of the other notes besides *ṣadja*, is doubtful, the peacock’s voice being held to consist almost entirely of the ‘*ṣadja*’ note alone]; and ‘this is the peacock’s sound, *because while not consisting of distinct letter-sounds, it contains the ṣadja and other notes of the musical scale*’ [where the presence of the other notes is the qualified factor, which is doubtful].

The (3 times 64, 192) instances enumerated above are those in which both parties admit of the *unknown* and *doubtful* characters of the qualifying and qualified factors entering into the nature of the Probans subsisting in the Probandum. Those instances again where only one or the other of the two parties admits of the *unknown* character, will be 128, made up of those that are concomitant with the Probandum and those that are not concomitant with it (subsisting in only a part of it)*. The same 64 varieties again become 192 (3 times 64) through the diversity caused by—(1) the fact of the qualified and qualifying factors being *not co-existent*, (2) the fact of the qualified and qualifying factors being *doubtful*, and (3) the fact of the qualifying and qualified factors being *inapt*. Again there are 128 varieties caused by the diversity due to the qualified and the qualifying factors having unknown substrata,—unknown to one or to both parties. These again, as before, lead on to another group of 192†. For example—‘This place is fiery because it is smoky’ [where the qualified factor, the *place*, is held by both parties to be not the substratum of *fieriness*‡]; and ‘the Soul exists because it has the qualities of Desire and the rest’ [where the *Soul*, as the substratum of *existence* or of the *qualities*, is not accepted by one of the parties, the Bauddha or the Vedāntin, for instance.]

Var : P. 170.

Following is an instance where the qualifying factor is *inapt*, *not-concomitant* and *unknown* :—‘Sound is non-eternal, because while following after effort it is a product’ [where the qualified factor, *being a product*, is itself apt to prove *non-eternality*, and the qualification ‘following after effort’ is

* द्वाविंशकं शतम् would be 132; but as the number will be only twice 64, the *Tātparya* rightly interprets it as 128, expounding the compound द्वाविंशकं as ‘thirty less than 2’.

† A whole line is wanting in the *Bib. Ind.* edition—after द्वाविंशकं शतम् :—एवमप्रतिद्वयः श्रयोभयः च यतरपक्षः प्रतिद्वयः द्वाविंशकं शतम् ते पुनः पञ्चवर्गदेव द्वाविंशकं शतम्

‡ It having been shown above (*Text*, P. 52) that what is proved by the Inference is not the *place* as being fiery,—but the *Fiery Place*.

entirely superfluous, and hence inapt].* The following is an instance where the qualified factor is not-concomitant, and inapt :—‘Sound is non-eternal, because while differing with the difference in its cause, it is apprehended.’†

The following is an instance where the qualified factor is not co-existent :—‘Primordial Matter exists, because there is uniformity among its diverse modifications’‡ The following is an instance where the qualifying factor is not co-existent—‘The words *colour, taste, odour, touch* and *sound* have denotations entirely different from that of the word *sandal*, because, while not bearing (to the sandal,) the relation of compound and component, they are referred to by means of that word’.§ The same reason when stated inversely affords the instance of the non-existent qualified factor.||

An instance where the Probans put forward is actually known to be otherwise, we have in the following argument as put forward by others (the Mīmāṃsakas)—‘Word is eternal, because it is repeated (by several persons).’ [Where, as a matter of fact it is known that repetition proves, not only eternity, but non-eternity also, as will be shown below. in Adhyāya II]. The following again is an instance

* The same reasoning, when stated in the form ‘because while being a product, it follows after effort’, would also be an instance of the qualified factor being inapt etc., etc.

† ‘Being apprehended’ is the qualified factor ; and as it belongs to eternal things also, it is *inapt*, unable to prove *non-eternity*, which is proved by the other character, of ‘differing with difference in the cause’.

‡ What is meant by this reasoning is that every modification of matter—in the shape of the several things of the world—shows this uniform character that it is of the nature of pleasure, pain and stupefaction. The fallacy of this lies in the fact that the ‘uniformity’ found in the modifications is put forward to prove the existence of Primordial Matter ; so that the Probans is in a substratum other than that of the Probandum.—*Tātparya*.

§ We have the assertion ‘colour &c. of the sandal’, which shows that the things, colour &c., belong to the sandal and are not its component parts. So that the absence of this relation subsists in the *things*, colour &c. ; while what are referred to by means of the word ‘sandal’ are the words ‘colour’ &c.

|| i. e. when stated in the form—‘because while they are referred to by means of the word *sandal*, they do not bear the relation of compound and component.’

Up to this, we have had 832 varieties.

where the qualifying factor is doubtful and unknown—‘ This place is fiery, because while being smoky it gives light ’,—this reasoning being urged while the presence of smoke is merely suspected.* When the same reasoning is put forward in the inverse form (‘ because while giving light it is smoky ’) we have an instance of the doubtful qualified factor.

Thus then we find that the *doubtful*, the *unknown*, and the *non-concomitant*, (which have been shown to be 32 in number) become sixty-four, through the diversity caused by its being unknown to both or one of the two parties.† And these, by the computation indicated above, make up the number 384. The same number we have in connection with those Probans that are known to be otherwise. The same computation applies to those in whom the qualifying factor is contradictory, and also to those in whom the qualified factor is contradictory. And examples of these are to be found under the *Vārṭika* dealing with the individual Fallacious Probans (on the next five Sūtrās), and may also be observed by the student himself.

Thus then, by the several computations detailed above, the number of Probans, right and wrong, through due distinction being drawn between the diversities attending the qualifying and qualified factors, comes to be 2032. And if we take into consideration the diversities due to *being unknown* and other defects of the Probans, the variety becomes innumerable. As for the Probans not subsisting in the Probandum, inasmuch as they are absolutely non-existent (in the Probandum) they could not be qualified by any qualifications; and as such they are not mentioned under the defects attending the qualified and qualifying factors.

* The *Tāṭparya* reads पूनःदिभावे for पूनादिभावे which is found in both editions. The translation follows the reading of the *Tāṭparya*.

† The reading in both editions is corrupt. The translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Tāṭparya*, in the following words—ये सन्दिग्धासिद्धा-
व्यापकमेवेन द्वैतमित् उभयाप्यतरासिद्धया चतुःषष्टिर्भवन्ति.

Thus have been described in full detail those Probans that are concomitant and non-concomitant with the actually existing Probandum. Of these the sixteen principal varieties of the 'unknown' Probans are such as do not subsist in the Probandum. The Inconclusive Probans have only six main varieties; among those concomitant with the Probandum, the number of the Contradictory Probans is only four; and the last of them, subsisting in every possible Probandum, is *too universal*. The other Fallacious Probans, which are *Unknown, Inconclusive* and *Contradictory*, are, each of them, diversified through being non-concomitant and unknown; * and the examples of these are to be found among those we have already cited.

Some people assert that the Inconclusive Probans is the same as that which is not unconcomitant with the contradictory. But this is not right; simply because it is an impossibility; we have already explained that '*avyabhichāra*', *absence of non-concomitance*, is not possible in reference to two contradictory things (*i. e.* nothing can be concomitant with two contradictories). If however we do admit of such concomitance, then the number of varieties of such a Probans becomes 25; there are five Probans; and each of these being opposed (or contradicted) by similar and dissimilar Probans, give rise to five pentads. Examples of every one of these twenty-five varieties are not possible; hence they are not illustrated.†

* The Benares edition reads नैऋदिहानैकान्तिकविरुद्धा अथवाऽवकाशित्वाभेदेन सङ्कीर्णा । The passage as read in the *Bib. Ind* edition would mean—'the other Fallacious Probans, which are Inconclusive, become, diversified through being non-concomitant—contradictory and well known-non-concomitant'. The former reading is decidedly better.

† The 'five pentads' are thus explained in the *Tātparyā* :—There are two kinds of the universal affirmative Probans, that which is concomitant with the Homologue and that which is not so concomitant; the negative Probans is only one; and the positive-negative Probans is of two kinds, that which is concomitant with the Homologue and that which is not concomitant with it. These five are opposed by similar and dissimilar Probans; *i. e.*, the universal affirmative Probans is contradicted by another universal affirmative Probans; as also by the other four kinds; similarly

Such are the Fallacious Probans, whose varieties have been briefly described as above; and with a view to include all these varieties, the Author has put forward the Sūtra, which sets out the divisions of the Fallacious Probans. “We find that the fact that the number of Fallacious probans is five is implied by the definitions provided (in the next five Sūtras); *i. e.* that the number of Fallacious Probans is five is clearly indicated by the five Sūtras that propound the definitions of the five Fallacious probans; so that the present Sūtra, if it were simply meant to restrict the number to five, would be entirely superfluous.” It is certainly not superfluous; as all that the definition does is to differentiate (a thing from like and unlike things); that is, all that the definitions (provided in the next five Sūtras) do is to differentiate the Fallacious Probans from one another; and they do not restrict the number to five; the definitions do not indicate that the number of Fallacious Probans is five only.

SŪTRA (5).

The Inconclusive Probans (1).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 51, L. 11 to P. 52, L. 5].

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans—

‘THE INCONCLUSIVE* IS THAT WHICH IS TAINTED
BY INDECISION.’—Sū. 5.

The term ‘*vyabhichāra*’, ‘indecision’, means *non-fidelity on any one point*†; and that which is accompanied by this ‘indecision’ is the ‘indecisive’. As for example, in the reasoning

with each of the other four kinds; so that with each of the five there are five contradictions; thus giving the number 25, which is the number of those that are concomitant with contradictions.

*The term, अनेकान्तिक is explained by the व्याख्यानविवरण as follows—‘एकस्य, साध्यस्य साध्याभावस्य वा ‘अन्ते’ अधिकरणमस्ति यद्विद्युति स एकान्तः। तदभ्यः ‘अनेकान्तः’। एकस्मिन् अन्ते यो नियतः स एकान्तः— says the *Bhāṣya* below (P. 52, l. 4). On this Sū. the *Tātparyā* remarks that the terms ‘inconclusive’ and ‘indecisive’ being synonymous—which is the term defined and which the defining term should vary with the student. If he knows the meaning of ‘inconclusive’ and not that of ‘indecisive’ then the latter shall be for him the defined term, and the former the defining term, and so *vice versa*.

†*I. E.*, When a Probans is found to be concomitant with neither the probandum only, nor the negation of the probandum only,—but with both—then it is said to be ‘tainted by *vyabhichāra* or indecision’.

‘Sound is eternal, *because it is intangible*,—the jar which is *tangible* has been found to be non-eternal,—and Sound is *not tangible*,—therefore, being intangible, Sound must be eternal’,—we find that the character of *intangibility* has been put forward as proving the character of *non-eternality*; while as a matter of fact the two characters do not bear to each other the relation of *proof and proved* (Probans and Probandum); [as all non-eternal things are not tangible, *e.g.* *Buddhi* is non-eternal and yet it is intangible]; for we find that the *Atom* is tangible and yet eternal*. If the Soul and such other things (which combine *eternality* with *intangibility*) be cited as the instance (supporting the reasoning), then,—inasmuch as the Probans has been defined (above, in Sū. 1-1-3 †) as ‘that which establishes the Probandum through similarity to the instance’,—‘intangibility’ will have to be regarded as the Probans; and this would be found to be not necessarily concomitant with *eternality*,—*e.g.* in the case of *Buddhi*, which is *intangible* and yet *non-eternal*. So that in both kinds of instance [in that of dissimilarity, in the case of *jar* cited before, which is tangible and non-eternal,—and in that of *similarity*, as in the case of *Soul*, which is intangible and eternal], there is ‘indecision’, non-concomitance, (between *intangibility* and *non-eternality*); and thus they cannot be accepted to be related as *probans and probandum*; and thus, not fulfilling the conditions of the Probans, what is cited in the above reasoning cannot be a true Probans.

[If the term ‘अनैकान्तिकः’ be taken as embodying the definition, and ‘सव्यभिचारः’ as the term defined, in that case the word अनैकान्तिकः, should be explained as follows :]—In the reasoning cited, eternality is one *anta*’, *point*, and ‘non-eternality’ is another one *anta*’, *point*; that which subsists in—is concomitant with—one *point* would be ‘*ekānta*’, *one-pointed*; and the contrary (that is not concomitant, with one) would be ‘*āṇaikānta*’, *not one-pointed*; as this would be concomitant with both (the Probandum, *eternality*, and its contrary, *non-eternality*).†

Vārṭika on Sūtra 5.

[P. 171, L. 16 to P. 173, L. 16].

From among the aforesaid five Fallacious Probans, the Inconclusive is that which is indecisive—says the Bhāṣya. The

* So that we cannot deduce *intangibility* from *eternality*.

† In this case the definition of this Fallacious Probans will be ‘that which is positively or negatively concomitant with (*i.e.* whose presence or absence is concomitant with) both, the probandum as well as the reverse’; and this will be a true definition, as serving to exclude all the other Fallacious Probans, the *Contradictory* etc.

term 'Ēkāṇṭa' means *that which is fixed on one point (Ēkasmin antṛniyaṭaḥ)*.

"What is *indecisiveness*?"

Indecisiveness consists in the Probans subsisting in the Probandum, in the Homologue and also elsewhere; hence that Probans is called 'indecisive' which, while subsisting in the Probandum and its Homologue, subsists in other things also; and such subsisting constitutes 'indecision' (or non-concomitance, with the Probandum). In connection with every individual thing, except *Knowability* (which belongs to all things), there are two aspects (positive and negative); e. g. 'eternality'—'non-eternality', 'pervading'—'non-pervading', and so on; and if it is found that what is put forward as the Probans applies to both these aspects, it is called 'Inconclusive.'

[The Bauddha urges the following objection]:—

"The term 'inconclusive' being a negative term (*not-conclusive*), does the negative particle con-

Var : P. 172.

note Paryudāsa, *exclusion* (so that 'not-conclusive', denoting *exclusion* of something, which implies the inclusion of others, stands for that something *positive*, which is *other than conclusive*)? or merely *prasaṅgyapratīṣēdha*, preclusion (so that 'non-conclusive,' denoting mere preclusion which does not imply inclusion, stands for a simple negation or non-existence, the *absence of the conclusive*)?*" 'What does this mean?' It means that if *exclusion* is meant, then every Fallacious Probans can be called 'Inconclusive': If 'Inconclusive' stands for *what is non-conclusive*, then every kind of Fallacious Probans becomes included in the term; [as it is only the true Probans that is 'conclusive', every Fallacious Probans would be *not-conclusive*]; and this would mean that there is only one kind of Fallacious Probans (the Inconclusive). If, on the other hand, the negative particle means *simple* preclusion or non-existence, the term 'inconclusive' would mean the *non-existence of the conclusive*; and certainly this *non-existence*

* As a rule, in negative compounds the former connotation is accepted.

could not stand for *indecision* or *non-concomitance*: [as *concomitance* and *non-concomitance* are properties belonging to positive things; and they can never subsist in mere *non-existence*, which, by its very nature, is something with regard to which nothing can be predicated]; so that in this case it would be wrong to call any Fallacious Probans 'inconclusive.'"[†]

Our answer to the above is that we do not admit the view that the negative particle (in 'Inconclusive') connotes *exclusion*; we hold that it connotes *Preclusion*. "But *Preclusion* (implying only *non-existence* of certain things) would be mere *negation* (with regard to which nothing could be predicated)." *Non-existence* is not mere negation; as it serves to qualify a positive character; the term 'inconclusive' means *that character which is possessed of this qualification that it does not subsist in only one aspect of a thing*; where the *non-subsisting* appears as a definite qualification of the character; and as such it cannot be regarded as a mere negation; as a matter of fact, no relation of qualification and qualified can belong to a mere negation; no mere negation could ever be spoken of as 'subsisting in one aspect of a thing' or 'not subsisting in one aspect of the thing.' "Why so?" Because we find this true in the case of the negative compound '*Non-Brāhmaṇi*'; in this compound word '*non-brāhmaṇa*' we find that the negative particle connoting *preclusion*, serves to preclude what follows in the next term ('*brāhmaṇi*'); and certainly it does not signify mere *negation*; and exactly similar is the case with the term under consideration ('*Inconclusive*', which also is negative compound.[‡]

[†] For a discussion as to the signification of the negative particle, our reader is referred to the writer's *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, P. 237.

[‡] In connection with this discussion the *Tatparya* makes the following observation:—The orthodox Naiyāyika view is that the negative particle in a negative compound always connotes *exclusion*; and this also is the most reasonable view. But the answer given by the author of the Vārtika to the Bauddha objection is put forward in the other way, because the Bauddha himself is very fond of *preclusion*, and employs this to criticise everything; so that our author, in order to make his answer all the more effective, offers it on the basis of the Bauddha's own view. So

The example of the 'Inconclusive' Probans (cited in the *Bhāṣya*) is—'Sound is eternal, *because it is tangible.*' [When Sound is called '*asparśavān*', the possessive affix in this term is explained as '*śabdasya asparśatvam*,' where] the Genitive ending (in '*śabdasya*') indicates a difference between 'Sound' and 'intangibility'. Now what is this ('intangibility' as different from 'Sound')? The 'intangibility' (of Sound) may *mean* either that *it enjoys its own existence* while not being the receptacle of *tangibility*, or that it is *related to existence* while not being the receptacle of *tangibility*;—in both cases it would be something different from the *Sound* itself; so that the Genitive ending would be fully significant. "How can this be? [How can the meaning of 'intangibility' be as explained?]" It must be accepted to have the said meaning, on the ground that the term 'intangible' is used when the said idea is present, and it is not used when it is not present; that is to say, when a certain thing enjoys its existence while being *tangible*, the term 'intangible' is not used with regard to it,—nor is it used in connection with what is an absolute non-entity; it is used however in connection with a thing which enjoys its existence while being *intangible*. And further, we can learn the exact meaning of the term 'intangible' by following the exact signification of the sentence that expresses the same idea; and we find that the word 'intangible' means exactly what is meant by the sentence 'the thing is related to existence while not being the receptacle of tangibility'. [So that it is clear that we may take the term 'intangibility' in either of the two senses mentioned above].

[The *Bhāṣya*, p. 52, l. 4, has indicated the possibility of the Sūtra being interpreted in such a manner as to make

that what our text means is that 'even admitting your view that the negative compound connotes *preclusion*, we hold that what is precluded is not a mere insignificant non-entity, but a positive entity qualified by the non-existence of another positive entity'.

‘*savyabhichārah*’, ‘indecisive’, the name of the thing defined, and to take the term ‘*anaikāntikah*’, ‘inconclusive’, as embodying the definition; the Opponent takes objection to this]—“The transference (of the term ‘inconclusive’, ‘*anaikāntikah*’ to the position of the definition) is not possible; as it would not be proper. [If you define *Savyabhichāra* as ‘*anaikāntika*’, your definition being in the form ‘the Indecisive is that which is inconclusive’, then there would be this difficulty that] as a matter of fact the term ‘inconclusive’ has nowhere been explained, with the help of which explanation we could understand the exact nature of the ‘Indecisive’ Probans. So that it is not right to define the Indecisive Probans by the word ‘inconclusive’.”

Such a definition would not be at all improper, we reply;
 Var : P. 173. as what is meant by the term ‘inconclusive’ is known from ordinary usage; there is need for an explanation, in a scientific treatise, of only such things as are not known from ordinary usage; it would be absolutely futile to provide explanations of things that can be known from ordinary experience; and we know it from ordinary experience that the word ‘inconclusive’ signifies *that which subsists in both aspects of a thing*. If you think that it is improper to make use of terms that have not been explained in the treatise itself, then it would become necessary to provide adequate explanations of such ordinary words as ‘pain’ and the like! The conclusion thus is that the view expressed by the *Bhāṣya* is quite reasonable.

“Such a definition as has been propounded in the *Sūtra* would not be a correct definition, as it would not be comprehensive.”

What you mean is that the definition of the Inconclusive Probans provided by the *Sūtra* does not include all kinds of Inconclusive Probans,—such for instance as the *Too Specific* Probans [which, as subsisting in neither of the two aspects of the Probandum, could not be said to *subsist in*

both aspects]*. But what you say is not right; as the *Too Specific* Probans is actually included in the definition. "How?" [When we speak of *subsisting in both aspects*, we mean subsisting either positively or negatively; *i. e.* what is meant is that when it is found that the Probans put forward is such as can either be *affirmed* or *denied* in reference to *both aspects*, *i. e.* to the Probandum as well as its Reverse, it is called 'inconclusive'; and certainly] the *Too Specific* Probans also, when taken negatively, is actually found to be such as has its negation common to both aspects; and thus is capable of being called 'Inconclusive'.

Some philosophers have included the 'Neutralised' Probans under the 'Inconclusive'. They argue thus—"An example of the Neutralised Probans we have in the reasoning—'The Soul is non-eternal, because it is something different from the Body'; and here we find that *Difference from the Body* is something that subsists in eternal as well as non-eternal things (*e. g.* in the Atom and in Buddha); and thus it fulfils the conditions of the 'Inconclusive' Probans." These philosophers have failed to grasp the exact signification of diversity of definitions and diversity of examples; when we assert that 'the Inconclusive is that which is indecisive', we provide a definition of the Inconclusive or non-concomitant Probans; and if the characteristics mentioned in this definition were found in the 'Neutralised Probans', then alone could the definition be said to be too wide, (as including a Fallacious Probans other than the Inconclusive); but the fact that a certain example of the Inconclusive Probans is found to fulfil the conditions of some other kind of Fallacious Probans, does not

* An example of the *Too Specific* Probans we have in the reasoning—'the Earth is eternal, because it is odorous'; here it is found that 'odorousness' would fulfil the conditions of the definition if it subsisted in *both* eternal and non-eternal things; as a matter of fact it subsists in neither; as belonging to *Earth* alone, it subsists in no other eternal or non-eternal things.

constitute a defect in the definition of the 'Inconclusive' Probans; as the only circumstances that make a definition defective are—the non-inclusion of what is meant to be defined and the inclusion of what is not meant to be defined; and certainly neither of these defects is shown (by the fact of a certain concrete example fulfilling the conditions of more than one definition) *. In this connection it would be well if you looked into the definition of the 'Neutralised' Probans, which follows later on.

—————”—————
Sūtra (6).

The Contradictory Probans (2).

A CERTAIN DOCTRINE (OR VIEW) HAVING BEEN
ACCEPTED, THE PROBANS THAT IS CONTRADICTORY
TO IT IS CALLED THE 'CONTRADICTORY.'—(Sū. 6).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 52, L. 7 to L. 16.]

The term 'tadāirodhi', 'contradictory to it', means *that which contradicts it, i. e.* that which contradicts (sets aside, renders impossible†) the doctrine that has been accepted. *E. g.* [When the author of the *Yogabhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* III-13 ‡ makes the two statements]—'This world, being a modification, ceases from manifestation, because its eternality is denied'—and—'Even when thus ceasing, it continues to exist, because its utter destruction is denied.' Here we find that what the Probans in the former reasoning—'because its eternality is denied'—means is that 'no modification can be eternal'; and this is certainly contradictory to the doctrine enunciated in the second statement, that 'even when ceasing, the modification continues to exist.' "How?" Well, the 'manifestation' of a thing is only the *attaining of existence*, and 'ceasing' is *falling off*; so that if the modification, when *fallen off* (*apṛāṇa*, ceasing) *from its existence* (*vyakṛāṇa*, from manifestation), does 'continue to exist', then it is not possible to deny its eternality; because the very fact that the modification continues to exist even after manifestation

* 'न लक्ष्यस्य' is the reading in both editions; the Benares edition puts the न within brackets; but without the न the sentence remains incomplete and meaningless.

† In *Bhāṣya* on Su. 5-2-4, 'is contradicted' has been explained as 'is rendered impossible'.

‡ The real words of the योगभाष्य are सदेतत् सैवेत्यर्थं विहायो &c. as quoted in the *Vārtika*.

should constitute its *eternality*; and 'denial of its eternality' should necessarily imply the possibility of the modification falling off from its existence; as it is only what actually falls off from existence that has been found to be non-eternal; while that which *still exists* does not fall off from existence;—so that 'continuing to exist' and 'falling off from existence' are two mutually contradictory concepts; and as such can never co-exist. Thus it is found that the Probans put forward ('denial of eternality') actually rejects the very doctrine (of *continuity of existence*) on whose basis it is put forward.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 6.

[P. 173, L. 18 to P. 175, L. 3.]

A certain doctrine having been accepted, the Probans contradictory to it is called 'Contradictory'—says the Sūtra. Now what is the real meaning of the Sūtra? Its meaning is that the Contradictory Probans is that which is contradictory to something that has been admitted. When thus interpreted, it includes all the different kinds of the 'Contradictory Probans' which would otherwise remain unnoticed; that is to say, the definition is made to include all the general kinds of the Contradictory Probans; as thus interpreted, the definition

* There is a marked difference between the Bhāṣya's account of the Contradictory Probans and that given by the later Logicians. It is clear from the Bhāṣya that what is meant is that the Probans is contradictory to some doctrine that its propounder has already accepted. The later Logicians define it as *that which proves the contradictory of the proposition which it is put forward to prove*. The earliest mention of this later view is found in the *Vārṭika*, which puts it forward as an alternative explanation of the definition given in the Sūtra. The words of the Sūtra afford directly the meaning assigned to them in the Bhāṣya; but how the words may be made to yield the later view is thus explained in the न्यायसूत्रविवरण—वादिना न्यायः दिवैधिवसिद्धान्तम् -तत्प्रतिज्ञातवाच्यरूपम् अभ्युपेत्य—अत्रम्—तद्द्रवणाय प्रयुक्तः तद्विरोधी वाच्यः भावव्याप्यप्रकृतहेतुः विरुद्धः । [when the opponent repeats the view he is going to refute and then propounds the refuting reason, this reason is contradictory] अथवा वाच्यम् अभ्युपेत्य उद्दिश्य तत्सिद्धनाय प्रयुक्तो यो वस्तुतया वाच्यः भावव्यप्यो हेतुः [That which really happens to prove a conclusion contrary to what it is meant to prove]. The former of these two explanations is not right; the latter represents the generally accepted view.

The *Parishuddhi* thus distinguishes '*Virodha*' from '*Apasiddhānta*'—'We have *Apasiddhānta* when the assertion made goes against what the speaker himself has declared previously on the basis of a more authoritative pramāṇa; while there is *Virodha* when the assertion itself contains within itself the elements of contradiction, when one part of it asserts one thing and another part a totally contradictory thing.'

means 'that which contradicts or sets aside an admitted fact, and that which is contradicted or set aside by an admitted fact'.*

"In that case [if the Probans is 'Contradictory' when it sets aside or is set aside by an admitted fact], there would be only one kind of 'Fallacious Probans', the *Contradictory* only [as all the five kinds fulfil the conditions herein laid down as pertaining to the *Contradictory*]."

It is quite true that the *Contradictory Probans* is the only one kind of Fallacious Probans. The
Vār: P. 174.

fact is that all the varieties of Fallacious Probans *are* included in the common name 'Contradictory', on the ground of every one of them having the common character of being 'contradictory' in the above-mentioned sense (that it is set aside by or sets aside an admitted fact); but though similar, they are subdivided into five sub-classes; just as though all things are included in the name 'knowable', yet they are divided into sixteen classes. "In that case the *Contradictory* itself should not be mentioned (as one of the five sub-classes)" It would not be right to omit it †; as it is necessary to mention that also for the purpose of indicating the special features of what has been comprehended in a general way; just as in the case of 'knowable' (where 'knowable' is mentioned as one of the 16 classes also); (the special feature meant to be indicated is that) while the other four kinds of Fallacious Probans, the *Inconclusive* and the rest, have a two-fold character—that of being *contradictory* and that of being *inconclusive*, or *mistimed*, or the rest,—the *Contradictory* has the single characteristic of being *contradictory* only; so that being of a kind different, in this respect, from the other four, it is necessary to mention it separately; just as in the common expression of '*trīṇolapa*' [where though the '*ulapa*', *soft grass*, is already included in '*trīṇa*', *grass*, yet it is mentioned apart from the latter because it is distinguished from

* The *Tātparya* adds—That which so sets aside or is set aside, either in its own form, or in its character of Probans. That is either the Probans that is put forward embodies in itself a conception opposed to an admitted fact; or it, *as a Probans*, proves a conclusion that is opposed to an admitted fact.

† The *Bib. Ind.* edition omits 'न न कर्तव्यम्' which is necessary.

the other kinds of grass by being *soft*]. Thus then, inasmuch as the Inconclusive and the other three Fallacious Probans fulfil a two-fold condition, it is only right that they should have a two-fold name ('Inconclusive-Contradictory', 'Mis-timed-Contradictory' and so on);—e. g. the *Inconclusive Probans* is 'inconclusive' because it subsists in the Probandum, and also in its Homologue and its Reverse, and it is 'contradictory', as it makes impossible the form of the Probans as it puts it; and similarly with the other three kinds of Fallacious Probans.

The example (cited in the Bhāṣya, of the Contradictory Probans) is—'*This threefold world ceases from manifestation, because of the denial of its eternity*',—'*though ceasing, it continues to exist, because of the denial of its destruction*';—here we find that the 'denial of destruction' (put forward in the second statement) implies that the *eternity* of the world is an *admitted fact**; and this is 'contradicted' by the 'denial of eternity' (in the first statement); so that the two statements are found to nullify each other; and this nullification of each other constitutes their 'contradiction.'†

* The 'नित्यत्व' is wrong; there should be no न

† It might be urged against this view that the Probans 'denial of eternity, in contradicting the 'denial of destruction', contradicts a doctrine laid down in the *Shāstra* of the Sāṅkhyas; and as the authority of the *Shāstra* is unimpeachable, the said Probans may be said to be *annulled* by the more authoritative statement of the *Shāstra*; so that this should be an instance of the *annulled*, rather than of the *contradictory*, Probans. This is the objection that is sought to be met by the *Vārṭika* by indicating that the two statements are 'contradictory' (and not *annulled*) because they upset each other, and there is no upsetting of only one by the other (as there is in *annulment*). That is to say, when a Probans is found to be rejected by a more authoritative proof, then alone is there an 'annulment' of it; while in the two statements in question, neither is really more authoritative than the other; both are found in the *Shāstra*; so that there is no superiority and inferiority; both are of equal authority; and hence they upset each other; wherein lies their *contradiction*.—*Tātparyā*. It seems however that the *Vārṭika* does see some force in the objection that might be urged; and therefore proposes another interpretation of the definition; and it is interesting to note that it is this second interpretation that has been accepted by the later Logicians.

Or, the 'contradiction' may be said to be that between the Proposition and the Probans; *i. e.* when there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans, we have what is called the 'Contradictory' Fallacious Probans. * "But the 'Contradiction of the Proposition' has been dealt with separately, among the Clinchers; where then could it appear as a Fallacious Probans (as distinct from being a Clincher)? For this reason it is not right to define the Contradictory as that wherein there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans." There is no force in this objection; inasmuch as the 'contradiction' subsists in both (the Proposition as well as the Probans), we may speak of it as belonging to the one or the other, according as we choose. When we speak of 'the contradiction of the Proposition and the Probans', it is clear that the *contradiction* subsists in both; so that if we choose to speak of the *contradiction* (simply) as *in the Proposition* †, then we call it the 'contradiction of the Proposition' (which is mentioned among the Clinchers); while if we choose to speak of the contradiction as *in the Proposition by the Probans*,—or *in the Probans, by the Proposition*—then we call it a case of the 'Contradictory Probans' (which is mentioned among the Fallacious Probans); so that there is nothing wrong in making use of the two terms, 'Contradiction of the Proposition' and 'Contradiction of the Probans'.‡ As an example of 'Contradiction

* The example cited in the *Bhāṣya* will fit in with this definition also: 'ceases from manifestation' means that there is 'ceasing' from *manifestation only*, and not from *existence*; while 'denial of eternality' implies *cessation from existence*, complete destruction; as what is meant by a thing being non-eternal is that it is liable to cease entirely from existence; and thus the 'denial of eternality', which is the Probans *contradicts* the Probandum, 'ceases from manifestation'.

† The reading of this whole passage is defective in both editions. The *Bib. Ind.* reads प्रतिषेधः in both places; the Benares edition reads प्रतिषेधः in the first sentence and प्रतिषेधःया in the second. But from the explanations given by the *Tātparyā*, it appears better to read प्रतिषेधःया : in both places.

‡ In the first the contradiction subsists *in the Proposition*,—this contradiction being by any other part of the five factors of the reasoning; it may be that the Proposition contains a contradiction in its own terms, or that it is contradicted by the Probans, or by the Example, or by any other well-ascertained fact; so that the 'contradiction of the Proposition' is a very much wider term; as is made clear by the *Tātparyā* on Su. 5-2-4;—while in the second, the contradiction is *of the Proposition* (it is true), but (particularly) *in the Probans and by the Probans*.

of the Probans' (where the contradicting is done *by* the Probans) we have the reasoning—'Sound is eternal, *because it is a product*' [where the character of *being a product*, which is admitted by both parties, as subsisting in Sound, and which is what is ascertained by Direct Perception, contradicts—*i. e.* renders impossible—the Proposition that Sound is eternal];—an example of the 'Contradiction of the Proposition' (where there is contradiction involved in the terms of the Proposition itself) we have in the reasoning where the Proposition is stated in the form—'the ever-existent Soul does not exist'* [Here we have a Clincher, and not a Fallacious Probans];—as an example where there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Probans [where the Probans not being one that is universally acknowledged, is not authoritative enough to render the Proposition impossible and absurd; and both thus being of equal strength, there is mutual rejection] we have the reasoning—'Substance is something different from

Vār : P. 175.

Quality, because no such different thing (different from the Qualities) is ever found to exist'

[Here also we have a Clincher, and not Fallacious Probans]. † Another example of 'Contradiction of the Probans' we have in the reasoning—'there is no single entity, because the word *entity* is used in reference to a group', where the very use of the word 'group' implies the admission of the existence of a *single entity*; as the group is certainly a single entity. ‡ [This is a Fallacious Probans].

* The contradiction lies in the literal signification of the word '*ātmanā*'; literally the word means the *ever-existent*, being explained as *atāti-sāṭalyeṇa varṇatāḥ*.

† This is precisely the example that has been cited by the Bhāṣya under Sū. 5-2-4, where the following explanation is added, to show that no superiority attaches either to the Proposition or to the Probans. 'If it is true that Substance is something different from Quality (as the Proposition puts it), then it is absurd to say that nothing different from Colour and other Qualities is ever found to exist (as the Probans puts it); on the other hand, if it is true that no such different thing is perceived, then it is absurd to say that Substance is something different from Qualities.

‡ The point in which this second example of 'Contradiction of Probans' differs from the former example—'Sound is eternal because it is a product'—is this:—the character of *being a product* is such an universally acknowledged and hence authoritative Probans that it would render the Proposition of eternity absurd, even if it were (for the time being) not admitted by one of the two parties: as its truth can be easily brought home to him; while the Probans in the second example—'because the word *entity* is used in reference to a group'—is one that is based entirely on usage, and as such cannot have its truth brought home to the man not accepting that usage; so that it would contradict, or render absurd, the Proposition, only if both parties acknowledged its truth.—*Tatparya*.

Sūtra (7).

The Neutralised Probans—the Third Fallacious Probans.

THE NEUTRALISED PROBANS IS THAT WHICH IS PUT FORWARD TO ESTABLISH A DEFINITE CONCLUSION, WHILE IT IS ONE THAT ONLY GIVES RISE TO SUSPENSE (AND VASCILLATION) IN REGARD TO THE POINT AT ISSUE.

Sūtra (7).

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 53, L. 2 to L. 12.]

The term '*prakaraṇa*', 'point at issue', stands for the two opposite views on a doubtful question, neither of which is definitely ascertained;—the '*chinā*', 'suspense', in regard to such point at issue, consists in that desire to ascertain the truth, that whole process of investigation, which, starting with the doubt, ends with the definitive cognition;—now that Probans which really only gives rise to the said suspense, if put forward as leading to definitive cognition, does not differ (in point of being doubtful) from the point at issue; as both sides would be equal (equally doubtful); and thus being *similar to (sama) the point at issue* (*prakaraṇa*), it does not lead to any definite conclusion.* Example—'Sound is non-eternal, because we do not find in it the properties of the eternal thing; and we have found, in the case of such things as the Dish and the like, that what is not found to possess the properties of an eternal thing is non-eternal.'

* The two opposite views, which constitute the 'point at issue', have been here called '*prakaraṇa*' in the sense that these views are what are *made the probandum* (*śābhyatṛ na prākriyātē*) by the two parties.....The 'suspense' in regard to these views, is due to the real truth on the point being not known; e. g. when a man puts forward the fallacious reasoning—'Sound is *non-eternal* because the properties of an eternal thing are not found in it'—the person to whom this is addressed falls into a suspense, as he does not find, in Sound, either such properties as are invariably concomitant with *eternality*, or such as are inseparable from *non-eternality*; having therefore his doubts thus aroused, he proceeds to enquire and investigate. So that the urging of *the non-finding of the properties of an eternal thing*, as brought forward to prove *eternality*,—while it leads only to a doubt as to *eternality* and *non-eternality*,—constitutes the Fallacious Probans called '*Prakaranaṣama*'.....'Both sides would be equal'—i. e. just as the *not finding of the properties of the eternal thing* would indicate *non-eternality*, exactly in the same manner would *the not finding of the properties of a non-eternal thing* indicate *eternality*.....The explanation of the term as '*similar to the point at issue*' (*prakaraṇasya samaḥ*) is only by way of indicating what the etymology of the word signifies; it is not meant that *similarity to the point at issue* constitutes the denotation of the term; in fact what the term really denotes is only *being neutralised* (having an opponent equally strong).—*Tātparyā*.

That reasoning, in which what is put forward as the Probans is the character that is admitted (by both parties) to be common (to the Probandum and its Reverse), is 'equal to doubt' (in not leading to a certain conclusion); and such a Probans, therefore, has been called 'Indecisive';—[in the case of the *Prakaranaśama*], on the other hand, what gives rise to the '*prakaraṇa*', the *point at issue*, is (not *Doubt*, but) only that factor of Doubt which consists in the fact of there being found nothing which could favour either of the two opposite views; *e. g.* in regard to the reasoning cited, we find that in *Sound*, properties of an *eternal* thing are not found, just as properties of a *non-eternal* thing are not found; and this not finding of peculiarities favouring either of the two views gives rise to 'suspense in regard to the point at issue'. "How?" Because in the contrary case (*i. e.* in the case of our finding peculiarities favouring either of the two views), there would be an end to the 'point at issue' (one of the views being definitely ascertained); for example, if we actually found, in *Sound*, properties of the *eternal* thing, it would no longer be a 'point at issue'; or if we found in it properties of the *non-eternal* thing, then also it would cease to be a 'point at issue'. Thus then we find that, inasmuch as such a Probans gives rise to (lends support to) both the opposite views, it cannot lead to a definitive cognition in regard to either one of them. *

Vārtika on Sū. 7.

[P. 175, L. 6 to P. 176, L. 7].

The Neutralised Probans is that which &c. &c.—says the Sūtra; now the question arises—From what does the 'suspense in regard to the point at issue' arise? It arises, we reply, from the real truth not being known. Inasmuch as when the real truth in regard to a thing becomes known, all suspense with regard to it ceases, the conclusion is that what gives rise to the suspense in regard to the point at issue is the not

* The difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised probans, as brought out in the Bhāṣya, is thus explained in the *Tātparyā*—The Probans in the reasoning 'Sound is non-eternal, because properties of an eternal thing are not found in it' would be called 'Inconclusive', only if the *not-finding of the properties of a eternal thing* were known to subsist in a thing which is admitted by both parties to be *eternal*; or *e. g.* the not-finding of the properties of the non eternal thing were known to subsist in a thing admitted by both parties to be *non-eternal*. As it is however, neither of these two conditions is fulfilled by the case cited, in which all that we have is that in *Sound*, there is *not-finding of the properties of the eternal thing*, and also the *not-finding of the properties of the non-eternal thing*; that is all; and these two circumstances neutralising one another, we call the Probans 'neutralised.'

knowing of the special features of a thing, which is known in a vague general way. For example, in the reasoning—‘Sound is eternal because it is not found to possess the properties of a non-eternal thing’—we find that because there is ‘non-perception’ (of the real character, and of the properties of the eternal as well as of the non-eternal thing), there is doubt (*i. e.* there are two opposite views); so that what is put forward as the Probans is not a true Probans.

An objection is raised—“This Probans does not in any way differ from the *Unknown* Probans; because the *non-perception of the properties of the non-eternal thing* in Sound is as much *unknown* (lit. *to be proved*) as the *Eternality* itself [so that the reasoning cited affords the example of only the *Unknown* Probans ; which shows that the *Neutralised* Probans should not be mentioned apart from the *Unknown*].” *

It is by no means the same as the ‘Unknown’ Probans; as in the case of the ‘Neutralised’ Probans what is put forward as the Probans is that which only gives rise to doubt (diversity of views); that is to say, when the character put forward as the Probans is as much ‘unknown’ and (‘to be proved’) as the Probandum itself, it is called the ‘Unknown’; while when the character put forward as the Probans is only such as gives rise to doubt and suspense (and diversity of views), it is called the ‘Neutralised’ Probans.†

* The case of the reasoning cited is held to be one of neutralised Probans, in view of the fact that just as there is *non-perception of the properties of the eternal thing*, so there is also the *non-perception of the properties of the non-eternal thing*; hence both are neutralised by each other. It is contended by the opponent that under the circumstances, both the non-perceptions would be uncertain, unascertained; and as such this should fall under the ‘unknown’ Probans. The *Tūṭparya* adds—Both the opposite views are ‘Sādhya’ *to be proved*; and it is these that constitute ‘*prakaraṇa*’, according to the Bhāṣya; so that ‘*prakaraṇa*’ and ‘*sādhya*’ being synonymous, ‘*prakaraṇasama*’ comes to be only another name for the *sādhya*sama, the ‘unknown’ Probans, defined in the next Sūtra.

† So that even though the etymological signification of the two names ‘*sādhya-sama*’ and ‘*prakaraṇasama*’ is the same, their actual meanings are entirely different: the ‘Unknown’ being that which is uncertain and still to be ascertained; while the ‘neutralised’ is that which is thwarted by an equally doubtful contrary.

There are some people who hold that there is no difference between the 'neutralised' Probans and the 'inconclusive' Probans, as both of them give rise to doubt. But for these people there would be no difference between Perception, the Inconclusive Probans and the Neutralised Probans; as Perception also is a cause of doubt! "[In the case of Perception, it is not Perception alone that produces doubt, but] Doubt is produced by a group or composite (of three factors); so that the said absurdity cannot arise in connection with Perception. That is to say, Doubt is brought about by a composite cause, consisting of the following three factors—the perception of similarity, uncertainty in regard to the peculiar features, and the remembrance of the peculiar features (as shown above, under Sū. 1-1-23); and it is not brought about by *perception* alone; hence (not being a cause of Doubt) Perception could not be regarded as non-different from the Inconclusive Probans and the Neutralised Probans." The assertion that Doubt is brought about by a composite or group does not set aside the fact urged; *i. e.* when you say that Doubt is brought about by a group (of causes), you do not deny the fact of Perception being a cause of Doubt; so that what we have urged against you still remains in force.*

Then again (there is a further difference between the Inconclusive and the Neutralised Probans)—What is meant by a reasoning having a 'neutralised' Probans is that the character that it puts forward (as the Probans) is one of two contrary characters, both of which are equally unperceived; that is to say, when both the peculiar characters of a thing are equally not-perceived, if one of them is put forward for the removing of the doubt, it is a case of the
Vār : P. 176. 'neutralised' Fallacious Probans; specially as it is impossible to regard the non-perception of both peculiar features as a 'neutralised' Probans; that is to say, it is not

* When you say that the cause consists of a group, it follows that every component of this group is itself a cause, as a group of non-causes could not be a cause.

possible to indicate (as *neutralised* Probans) the non-perception of both peculiarities. *

Some writers have cited (as an example of the Neutralised Probans) the character of *being different from the body* (as put forward to prove the eternality of the Soul) ; but this example does not fall within the scope of the Sūtra ; because if the man knows the truth (in regard to the Soul's eternality),—then, even though he perceives its being different from the body,—he does not proceed to enquire into the matter ; while, if he does not know the said truth,—if he perceives its being different from the body,—he proceeds with the enquiry ; so that 'being different from the body' is an 'Inconclusive' Probans ; and as such does not fall within the scope of the present Sūtra. †

Sūtra (8).

(4) *The Unknown Probans.*

THE UNKNOWN PROBANS IS THAT WHICH, BEING STILL TO BE PROVED, IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE PROBANDUM. ‡

Bhāṣya.

[P. 53, L. 14, to L. 19.]

[As an example of this Fallacious Probans, we have the reasoning]—'Shadow is a substance',—the Probandum, to prove which is put forward the Probans 'because it has motion' ;

* This is added with a view to meet the objection that the *non-perception of two contrary characters* would be common to both the opposite views ; so that such a Probans would fall within the 'Inconclusive' or 'Indecisive' Probans ; that the 'Neutralised' would be included in the 'Inconclusive'. What is meant by the text is that in the case of 'Neutralised' Probans, the *non-perception of both characters* cannot be put forward ; it is the non-perception of only one of the two characters that is put forward ; and as such, each non-perception is thwarted by the other.

† 'In the case in question, as shown both negatively and affirmatively, what gives rise to doubt and consequent enquiry and suspense is, not the perception of the character of being different from the body, but the not-knowing of the truth ; and as such it does not fulfil the conditions of the 'neutralising' Probans as laid down in the Sūtra. It does, on the other hand, fall within the 'Inconclusive' Probans ; as the character of *being different from the Body* is found to belong to eternal as well as non-eternal things.

‡ 'That whose subsistence in the Subject is as unsettled as that of the Probandum'—says the न्यायसूत्रविवरण. The Tātparyā has the following notes on the text of the Sūtra :—The definition here provided is meant to include all the four kinds of असिद्ध—स्वभावासिद्ध एकदेशसिद्ध अ.असिद्ध असम्यक्सिद्ध as every one of them is still to be

and this Probans does not differ from the Probandum, inasmuch as it is still to be proved ; and hence it is an 'Unknown' Probans. Because that Shadow 'has motion' is not known, and it has got to be made known, just as much as the Probandum (that Sound is a substance). What has got to be 'known' or ascertained is the following—'Does the shadow move, like the man ? or is it that as the object obstructing the light moves along, there is a continuity of the obstruction, which leads to the continuity of the *absence of the light*, and it is this *absence of light* which is perceived (as the shadow) ?' What actually happens is that as the object moves along, it obstructs certain portions of light, and what is perceived as 'shadow' is only the continued absence of those portions of light that are obstructed (by the moving object) ; as 'obstruction' is only *negation of approach*.*

Vārtika on Sū 8.

[P. 176, L. 9 to P. 177, L. 6.]

The Unknown Probans is that which, being still to be proved, is not different from the Probandum,—says the Sūtra. The meaning of this is that when the character put forward by way of proof is such that it does not differ from the Probandum,—i. e., which is such as has still got to be made known, just as the Probandum,—it is that Fallacious Probans which has been called the 'Unknown.' We have an example of this in the reasoning—'Shadow is a substance *because it has motion*' ;

proved and as such similar to the Probandum. If the definition had been stated simply as—'the *sādhya* Probans is that which is unknown' , then, we could not include in this that Probans which is unknown to only one of the parties (and *known* to the other) ; while this becomes included when we add *साध्याविशिष्ट*, as the Probandum also is unknown to only one of the two parties. And if we had only the term *साध्याविशिष्ट* then this would apply to the *अव्यक्तराविद्ध* only ; as it is only this that is exactly similar to the Probandum,—in that both are unknown before proof (by one party only) and both become known after proof ; and all the other kinds of unknown would become excluded. Hence the Sūtra has added the term '*sādhya* *trāṭ*', *being still to be proved* ; the Probandum also is *still to be proved* ; or else it would not be a 'probandum' at all ; hence the Probans is called 'unknown' because it is *still to be proved* ; and some of the unknown are such as wanting in proof only temporarily (such as *अव्यक्तराविद्ध*) , while others have this want permanently, not being capable of being proved at all ; and to this latter class belong the *स्वरूपाविद्ध* and the *अज्ञवाविद्ध*. It might seem that the definition applies to all *that is to be proved*, and hence it applies to the Probandum also. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the definition has to be taken as subject to the general definition of 'Fallacious Probans' ; so what the definition means is that the 'Unknown' is that *probans* which &c. &c. ; and this cannot apply to the Probandum.

* In the last sentence, the readings adopted in the body of the text are defective ; the correct readings are supplied in the footnotes ; and these are supported by the two Puri Mss. also.

where we find that the *moving* of the shadow requires proof exactly as its *substantiality* does. [In this manner the reasoning provides us with an example of the Probans which is itself *absolutely Unknown*, which is the first kind of 'unknown' Probans, the *Svarūpāsiddha*.] "But its *mobility* follows from its being seen in different places. That is to say [in support of the *mobility* of the shadow we have the following five-factored reasoning]—'Shadow is mobile, because it is found in a different place,—everything that is found in a place other than where it has been before is found to be a *moving* object, as for instance, the Jar,—shadow is found in a place different from its former place,—hence shadow has motion.'" This argument is not right; as the Probans herein put forward is one whose *substratum* or *basis* is *unknown* [which is the second kind of the Unknown Probans, the *āshrayāśiddha*]; that is to say, even as you put it, your Probans is one *whose substratum is unknown*; the perceiving of the shadow in a different place would be possible (and apt) only if the shadow had *substantiality* [as it is only a substantial thing that can be seen in different places]; as a matter of fact however the *substantiality* of the shadow is still unknown (unsettled and unproved);* so that the Probans (*being found in different places*) comes to be one *whose very substratum or basis* is unknown (and unsettled). Even admitting that there is *perception of the shadow in different places*, we find that it is still tainted by the fallacy of being 'unknown', in the sense that it is capable of being otherwise explained; that is to say when one perceives the shadow in a place other than it occupied before, this is due to other causes than the *moving* of the shadow [*i. e.*, it is purely circumstantial]; and being due to other causes it does not prove † what it is meant to prove. {Thus providing us with an example of the third kind of the 'Unknown Probans' that which is 'otherwise known,' *Anyathāśiddha*, circumstan-

* The *Tatparya* supplies a series of arguments against the substantiality of Shadows. The Mīmāṃsaka Bhāṭṭa admits *Tamas* as a substance; but the Prābhākara holds it to be mere *absence of light*. (See *Prābhā Mim.* pp. 266—268).

† Read अथर्वि for अथर्वि

tial.] * “But how otherwise can the perception of the shadow in different places be explained?” We can explain it as due to the continuity of the absence of light following from the continuity of the object obstructing the light; that is to say, as the object obstructing the light moves along, we perceive things (the spot of earth for instance) qualified by the absence of light; and it is to this ‘absence of light’ that we give the name ‘shadow.’

Thus it is shown that there are three kinds of the *Unknown* Probans—(1) the *absolutely unknown*, which is exactly similar (in this respect) to what is sought to be proved by it, (2) that *whose basis is unknown*, and (3) that which is *otherwise known* (the circumstantial). †

The reasoning—‘Sound is eternal, because it is intangible’—is not a right example of the *Unknown* Probans; as the *intangibility* of sound is neither *to be proved*, nor is it one *whose substratum is unknown*, nor is it capable of being *otherwise*

* It is only when the relation of the Probans to the Probandum is *natural* that the former can prove the latter; and not when it is circumstantial or accidental. The well-known example of this circumstantial Probans is provided by the reasoning—‘this child must be dark because he is Maitra’s child,’ where the darkness of the other children of Maitra is due to causes other than that of being Maitra’s child; it is due to such causes as the eating of a particular kind of food by their mother. So that the relation between ‘Maitra’s child’ and ‘darkness’ is purely accidental; and as such the one is possible without the other. In cases of valid Probans, the Probans is such that it cannot be explained except on the basis of the Probandum, which it therefore establishes; but here the Probans being capable of being explained otherwise than on the basis of the Probandum, it does not necessarily prove this latter. This is what is meant by the Probans being ‘*anyaḥśiḍḍha*’, ‘Otherwise known.’

† The *Varṭika* has deduced examples of all three from the single reasoning cited in the *Bhāṣya*; the *Tātparyā* supplies distinct examples:—(a) In the reasoning ‘Sound is eternal because it is visible,’ the *visibility* of Sound is something *absolutely unknown*; (b) in the reasoning ‘there can be no God, because he has no body,’ the *bodilessness* put forward has no basis or substratum if there is no God; and (c) ‘He is dark because he is Maitra’s child’ has a Probans, ‘being Maitra’s child,’ which is one whose relation to the Probandum is purely accidental. The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds—‘Where the Subject is unknown we have *Āśhrāyaśiḍḍha* (b); where the Probans itself is unknown we have *Svarāpīśiḍḍha* (a); and where the concomitance it unknown we have *Vyāpīśiḍḍha*. By ‘unknown,’ is meant either *uncertainty* or *conviction to the contrary*.

explained. We have already provided proper examples of the Unknown Probans in accordance with our explanation of the definition provided by the Sūtra. So that the objection urged (by the Bauddha) on the basis of the said example ('Sound is eternal because it is intangible') is entirely beside the mark; in fact it only shows that the objector has understood neither the meaning of the Sūtra, nor the literal meaning of the words, nor the exact nature of the Fallacious Probans, nor the exact nature of the wrong Example. *

Sūtra (9).

(5) The Belated or Mistimed Probans.

THE BELATED OR MISTIMED PROBANS IS THAT WHICH, AS
ADDUCED, IS BEHIND TIME.

(Sā. 9.)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 54, L. 1, to P. 55, L. 5.]

When one factor of the thing adduced as Probans is found to be affected by lapse of time, it is said to be adduced behind time; and it is then called 'Belated.' Example—'Sound is eternal, *because it is manifested by conjunction*, like Colour; the Colour that is *manifested by the conjunction* of light with the jar is one that was in existence before, as well as after, its *manifestation*; similarly the Sound also that is *manifested*

* A Bauddha writer has tried to find fault with the definition provided by the Sūtra; and he has done this on the basis of an example that he has cited. He says that the reasoning—'Sound is eternal because it is intangible, like, Buddhi'—provides an example of the Unknown Probans; and yet it does not fulfil the conditions of the definition. Because, he argues, the term '*sādhāvishistah*' in the Sūtra can only mean that *whose example is not different from the Probandum*; and yet the example in the said reasoning, *Buddhi*, is one that is known to be *not eternal*; so that it is *not* 'not different from the Probandum,' which is *eternality*. The Vārtika admits all this and meets it by simply pointing out that the example taken up by the objector is not the right example;—and that by selecting the example that he has the objector has shown that—(a) he has not understood the meaning of our Sūtra; the present Sūtra is meant to provide a definition of the Unknown Probans, while the reasoning cited by him provides an instance of the Indecisive Probans, which has been defined in a preceding Sūtra;—(b) that he has not understood the literal signification of the term '*sādhāvishistah*,' which was never meant to be taken as a Bahuvrīhi compound as the objector has taken it;—(c) that he does not understand the difference between the *wrong probans* and the *wrong example*; as what he should have pointed out in the reasoning was the defect in the '*Probans*,' 'intangibility'; while what he has done is to point out a defect in '*Buddhi*' which is only an *Example*.

by the conjunction of the drum and the stick, or by the conjunction of the wood and the axe, is one that is in existence before and after its *manifestation*; so that, being *manifested by conjunction*, Sound must be regarded as *eternal*.' This is not a valid *Probans*; because *when adduced, it is behind time*. *

°It is clear from this passage and from the explanation of the कालातीत इत्युक्त as given here and in the *Vārtika*, that the conception of this fallacy has undergone a complete change at the hands of the later logicians. The latter regard that *Probans* as कालात्ययापदिष्ट which is found to be opposed to a well-ascertained fact; when, for instance, the *coolness* of fire is adduced as *Probans*; in accordance with this view they have given to their fallacy the name of बाधित, 'annulled'; while what the *Bhāṣya* means is that we have the कालातीत fallacy when one part of the *Probans* is found to be such as is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is put forward; e.g. 'manifested by conjunction,' as adduced to prove the eternity of sound, is found to be a *Probans* of which one part, *conjunction*, is not present at the time that Sound appears, though it was there *before* that appearance; so that it is *behind time*, 'belated'. The name कालातीत—Belated—can rightly be applied to only this; the बाधित of the moderns was never *true*; so that the name 'belated' cannot apply to it. With a view to meet this discrepancy between the two views, the *Tātparyya* has adopted the method of a very forced interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. It says that the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* states both views—the '*svamaṇa*,' his own view, as also the '*paramaṇa*,' the view of others; the *Tātparyya* taking care to brand what clearly is the *Bhāṣya* view as '*paramaṇa*,' and the modern view as '*svamaṇa*'; and it gets the two views out of the two meanings of the word *artha*, 'thing,' in the *Bhāṣya*. According to the view of the *Tātparyya*, 'thing' stands for the *Subject* of the Proposition, in which the *Probans* should subsist; and the *Subject*—like every other thing—has two factors, the thing itself and its qualities; and when one of these factors—the quality—is found to be affected by lapse of time, we call it 'belated'; e.g. when *coolness of fire* is urged as proving its eternity, we find that the *coolness*, which is adduced as a quality of the subject, *Fire*, is 'belated,' because its contrary has been already definitely ascertained. By the view of the *Bhāṣya* itself the 'thing' is the *Probans* itself; and it is called 'belated,' when not the whole of it, but only a part of it is found to be *behind time*; as in the case of the *Probans* 'manifested by conjunction'; where it is found that though the *manifestation* is true, the *conjunction* has passed off when the Sound appears. And when the *Tātparyya* finds the example given in the *Bhāṣya* not fitting in with its own view, it seeks to meet this difficulty by saying that the example according to the true view has not been given in the *Bhāṣya*, because several examples of it have already been given; when for instance it has been said that no conclusion can be deduced from what is contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception or to scripture; so that the *Bhāṣya* cites an example only according to the *paramaṇa*. This method however is not quite in keeping with the practice of *Bhāṣyas*. All *Bhāṣyas*—that of *Vātsyāyana* among them—err more on the side of diffuseness than of conciseness.

The *Bhāṣya* view really does not lend support to the modern view of the fallacy of Annulment; if only a *part* of the *Probans* is 'behind time,' it cannot be said to be contrary to, and hence *annulled* by, well-ascertained facts of perception etc.; so in order to remove this difficulty, the *Tātparyya* has taken the term 'one part' of the *Bhāṣya* to refer to the *Subject*, and not to the *Probans*. As regards the objection that might be urged against the *Bhāṣya* that it does not—if its own explanation of the Sūtra is accepted—mention the 'annulled' at all among the Fallacious *Probans*,—it has to be borne in mind that a true *Fallacious Probans* is that which has some semblance of being a valid *Probans*, and as a matter of fact, anything so absurd as the *coolness of fire* cannot be said to have any 'semblance' to a valid *Probans*. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that we can apply the term 'behind time' or 'belated' to only what was true before, but is not true at the time in connection with that with which it is adduced; and this also can never apply to anything so absurd as *coolness of fire*. So that the modern view would appear to be unsupported, not only by the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika*, but also by the *Sūtra*.

In the case of Colour, the time at which the manifesting *conjunction* appears does not go beyond (*i. e.* does not differ from) that at which the manifested *colour* exists; as it is only during the time at which the conjunction of the light and jar is present that colour is perceived; while Colour is not * perceived when the conjunction has ceased to exist. The case of Sound however is entirely different; for instance, it is only after the conjunction of the drum and stick has ceased that Sound is heard by the man at a distance; in fact it is heard at the time of the Disjunction (*i. e.* at the time that the stick has ceased to touch the drum); so that the manifestation of Sound is *beyond the time* of the conjunction; and as such it cannot be *caused* by that conjunction; because as a rule when the *cause* has ceased to exist, the *effect* does not appear [so that if conjunction were the cause of the manifestation of Sound, the latter should cease after the former has ceased]. Thus then, it is found that what is adduced as the Probans is not 'similar to the example'; and as such it cannot prove the Proposition; hence it is a Fallacious Probans. †

[The Baudḍha logician has defined the 'Belated Probans' as that which is adduced at a time other than that at which it should be adduced; *e. g.* when one party has urged the reasoning simply as 'Sound is eternal, like the jar', and he adduces the Probans, 'because it is a product', only *after* he has been asked 'Why?' Having thus explained and exemplified the *Sāṅkhya*, the Baudḍha has found fault with it as follows:—'The question—'Why?'—that the Opponent puts—is it put *after* the first party has completed his say, or *before* that? If the former, then the first party is open to the clincher of 'Deficiency', his reasoning being *deficient* in that it does not state the *Probans* at all, and hence it cannot be a case of Fallacious Probans being urged. If on the other hand the question is put *before* the first party has completed his say, then the *Probans* does not cease to be a truly valid Probans, simply because it is urged after some time; if it fulfills all the condi-

* This is absolutely necessary. It is found in the Puri Mss.

† The *Tātparyā* remarks that the Fallacious Probans as here explained would only be a form of the *Unknown* Probans, and as such the 'Belated' should be the same as the 'Unknown'; and the fact that, even though this objection should have been brought forward by the *Bhāṣya* if the explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* was really *paramārśa*, yet it has not been urged—has been met by the specious reasoning that the defect was so apparent that the *Bhāṣya* did not think it worth while to urge it. But we have to remember that the 'Belated' as explained by the *Bhāṣya*, is not included in any of the three kinds of 'Unknown' accepted by the older logicians स्वयं गतिदुःखं, विदुः and अन्यथा विदुः (see above); it falls under what the later logicians have called the *नानाविदुः* the *parly* 'unknown', of which however no mention is found either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Vārtika*.

tions of the valid Probans, it does not lose its validity simply because of the interruption by the over-zealous Opponent. This is met by the *Bhāṣya* by rejecting the suggested interpretation of the *Sūtra*]—The *Sūtra* does not mean that ‘belatedness’ consists in the reversing of the order of the Factors of Reasoning. Why? Because we have the general law that—‘when one thing is by its inherent capability connected with another thing, the connection subsists also when they are remote from one another, and on the contrary when the two things are not connected at all, mere proximity is ineffective’;—and according to this law even when the Probans is stated in an order other than the usual one, it does not lose its character of the ‘Probans’—which consists in its *similarity* or *dissimilarity* to the Example (Sū. 4-1-34 and 35); and so long as it does not lose the character of the ‘Probans’, it cannot be called a ‘Fallacious’ Probans. And further, the ‘reversing of the order of the Factors’ is what has been stated (in Sū. 5-2-11) as constituting the *Clincher* of ‘Inopportune’; so that if the same were mentioned here (as a ‘Fallacious Probans’), that would be a needless repetition. Thus we conclude that such is not the meaning of the *Sūtra*.*

Ārṇika on Sn. 9.

[P. 177, L. 8 to P. 178, L. 8.]

The ‘*Be-lat-d*’ Probans is that which, as adduced, is behind time—says the *Sūtra*. That is to say, that Probans which, as adduced, has one factor of it affected (tainted) by lapso of time, and is thereby partially vitiated, is said to be ‘behind time’, and this is what is called ‘Belated.’ Example—‘Sound is eternal, because it is manifested by conjunction.’ As a matter of fact, at the time that Sound is heard, the Conjunction is not there; so that ‘Conjunction’, which is adduced as the Probans, is one that is beyond the time of the hearing (of the Sound); that is, there is no Conjunction at the time

* The examples of ‘annulment’ by the more authoritative contrary cognition of the Subject are thus supplied by the *Parishuddhi*—(1) ‘The jar is all-pervading, because it is an entity, like Ākāśa’—where the all-pervadingness of the jar is opposed to what we know of the jar by perception;—(2) ‘the atom is made of component parts, because it is corporeal, like the jar’—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the atom by Inference;—(3) ‘the Meru consists of stone, because it is a mountain, like the Vindhyā’—where the conclusion is opposed to what we know of the Meru from the scriptures. The following is an example of the annulment of the conception of the Probans as adduced—(1) ‘Water and Air are hot, because their touch is different from that of Earth, like Fire’—where the fact of the touch of Air being different from that of Earth is opposed to our perception; and so on.

that the Sound is heard ; for instance, when wood is being cut, the sound of the cutting is heard after the conjunction of the wood and the axe has ceased.

“ This Probans—‘ because it is manifested by Conjunction’—is no other than the *Inconclusive* ; inasmuch as it has been found that *non-eternal* things also are so manifested ; for example, the jar (which is manifested by the conjunction of light).”

There is no force in this contention ; as in the reasoning (cited by us as the example) what is meant to be proved by *manifestation by conjunction* is only *continuity of existence* ; that is to say, what is meant by the proposition is not that sound is *eternal, everlasting*, but that it *continues to exist*, it *stays* ; so that the Probans cannot be said to be ‘ inconclusive’ ; for nothing *that does not stay* is ever found to be ‘ manifested by Conjunction’ [and if it were so found, then alone could the Probans be regarded as ‘ inconclusive’].

The *Sūtra* cannot mean that what constitutes the ‘ belatedness’ of the Probans is the reversing of the order of the reasoning-factors ; as the power (of the factors) is such ; that is to say, by merely being stated last (after the other factors have been stated) the Probans does not lose the character of ‘ Probans’, which consists in ‘ similarity to the Example’ ; and so long as it does not lose the character of ‘ Probans’, it cannot be called a ‘ Fallacious Probans.’ Then again, the ‘ reversing of the order of the Factors’ has been mentioned as a Clincher, called ‘ Inopportune’ (under Sū. 5-2-11) ; so

Var : P. 178. that if the same were meant by the present

Sūtra also, there would be a needless repetition. “ But that *reversing of factors* which constitutes the ‘ belatedness’ of the Probans consists in the fact that it is adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down ; and certainly this is not the same as the Clincher ‘ Inopportune’ [which consists in the whole reasoning being stated at a single stretch, in which the Probans is stated

last, instead of coming just after the statement of the Proposition].” What you mean is that (while in the ‘Inopportune’ reasoning, all the factors are put forward at a single stretch, but in an improper order,) what happens in the ‘Belated’ Probans is that it is adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down to the position of an unproved conclusion; so that the latter cannot be the same as the Clincher.* But in this case it behoves you to point out by what it is ‘levelled down.’ “It is levelled down by the non-mention of the Probans.” If the ‘levelling down’ is due to the non-mention of the Probans,—in what way does this constitute any defect *in the Probans*? “It is certainly a defect of the Probans that it is adduced last.” That it is stated last is not the fault of the Probans; it is the fault of the speaker; as a matter of fact, by itself the Probans cannot prove anything; its doing so is dependent upon its being adduced by the reasoner; so that the fault lies with the reasoner, and not with the Probans; specially as the Probans remains efficient (also when adduced afterwards),—as has been explained (in the *Bhāṣya*).

Thus then, we conclude that the Sūtra cannot mean that the ‘belatedness’ of the Probans consists in the reversing of the order of the reasoning Factors,—nor in its being adduced after the Proposition has been levelled down.

० न निग्रहस्यानन्तरं is the correct reading in both places. The difference between the two is as follows—In both there is a reversal of order among the Factors; but in the case of the Clincher, the person, by his own accord, propounds the entire reasoning in a topsy-turvy order, mentioning the Probans last; while in the case of the Fallacious Probans what happens is that when the first party propounds the reasoning, he puts it in an incomplete form, not mentioning the Probans at all;—but his opponent questions him as to how the proposition is proved by his reasoning,—which question brings down the proposition to the level of an unproved assertion, by showing that the reason that would prove it has not been adduced,—whereupon the first party, adduces the *Probans*; this belated propounding of the Probans constitutes the fallacy of ‘belatedness; and in this case the intervening question of the opponent is necessary; while in the Clincher, there is a spontaneous perversity on the part of the reasoner, who puts the Probans last.—*Tāṭparya*.

Lecture (3).

CASUISTRY.

(Sūtras 10—17)

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 55, L. 6 to L. 8].

Next we proceed to describe *Casuistry*.

Sū. 10.

CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN OPPOSING A PROPOSITION BY ASSIGNING TO IT A MEANING OTHER THAN THE ONE INTENDED. (Sūtra 10).

It is not possible to cite specific examples in connection with the general definition; they will be cited along with the definition of the several kinds of *Casuistry*.

Vārṭika on Sū. 10.

[P. 178, L. 14 to L. 16].

Casuistry consists &c. &c.—says the Sūtra. A certain proposition having been put forward (by the first party), containing a word with a wide signification, which conveys more than one meaning,—if opposition is offered to it by imposing upon it a meaning entirely different from that intended by the person (propounding the proposition),—this constitutes *Casuistry*.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (11).

[P. 55, LL. 8-9].

The division of *Casuistry* is as follows—

Sūtra (11).

IT IS OF THREE KINDS—(a) VĀKCHĀLA, VERBAL CASUISTRY, (b) SĀMĀNYACHCHĀLA, GENERALISING CASUISTRY, AND (c) UPACHĀRACHCHĀLA, FIGURATIVE CASUISTRY.—Sūtra (11).

Vārṭika on Sū. 11.

[P. 178, LL. 16—17].

It is of three kinds—This is meant to restrict the number of the particular kinds of *Casuistry*; and as in other cases,

* The sequence is thus explained by the *Parishuddhi*—When the disputant finds that his reasoning is vitiated by a fallacy, and he finds himself unable to remove the fallaciousness, he, still desperately trying to snatch victory to himself, puts forward

so here also, these three kinds include all the several kinds of Casuistry.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (12).

[P. 55, L. 11 to P. 56, L. 13].

From among these—

Sūtra (12).

(A) VERBAL CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN ASSUMING A MEANING OTHER THAN THAT INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED BY A WORD,—WHEN THE MEANING (INTENDED) IS NOT DEFINITELY SPECIFIED.—*Sūtra (12).*

For instance, when the proposition is put forward in the form—‘*navakambalo’ yam nāṇarakalaḥ*,’ where what the speaker means is that ‘the young boy is one whose blanket is new,’ the compound word ‘*navakambalaḥ*’ being equivalent to the expression ‘*navak kambalo yasya*,—though this latter uncompounded expression sufficiently clearly defines the particular idea desired to be conveyed, the same is not done by the compounded word ‘*navakambalaḥ*’ (which is ambiguous, being capable of affording more than one meaning);—and what the Casuist does is to assign to the compounded word a meaning other than the one intended by the speaker, and expounding the compound as ‘*navak kambalāḥ yasya*’, takes it to mean that the young boy is one who has nine blankets, and says—‘you say that the young boy has nine blankets’;—having thus imposed upon the man an idea that he never intended to convey, he proceeds to oppose the assertion by showing its absurdity—‘this boy has only one blanket, where are the nine blankets?’ Thus this is a case of Casuistry which is urged on the occasion of an ambiguous word being used; and being based upon a word, it is called ‘Verbal’ Casuistry.

This Casuistry is to be met by urging the necessity of the Casuist himself pointing out the peculiar circumstances favouring his own interpretation of the ambiguous word; for instance, the word ‘*Navakambalaḥ*’ is ambiguous,—signifying ‘one who has a new blanket’ and also ‘one who has nine blankets’; under the circumstances, when you take it to mean

improper answers—of which there are two kinds—Casuistry and Futile Rejoinder. The former comes first, as though wrong in sense, it is verbally and apparently right, while *Jāti* is more absurd, as it involves the contradiction of one’s own assertions.

'one who has nine blankets' (and then turn to me and say that the man has only *one* blanket, and not *nine*), this is hardly fair; as it is necessary to point out the peculiar circumstances that favour either of the two possible significations,—from the statement of which peculiar circumstances it would be known that the word (in the context in question) expressed that particular meaning;—as a matter of fact you have no such peculiar circumstances that you could urge (in favour of your own interpretation); so that what you have brought against us is a false and futile attack.* Further, the connection of a word with its denotation is well known in the world to consist in the conventional restriction of a certain word having a certain denotation—in the form that 'of such and such a verbal expression such and such is the denotation'; and this conventional restriction is found to be general (wide) in the case of general terms, and particular (specialised) in the case of particular terms; and whenever these words are used, they are used according to previous usage, and never in a way in which they have never been used before; the use of a word again is only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of its meaning, and it is only when the meaning has been comprehended that there follows any activity (as resulting from the hearing of that word). Thus the use of words being for the sake of bringing about the comprehension of its meaning, the exact usage of the general term is determined by the force (of circumstances); i. e. when such expressions are used as—'take the *goat* to the village,' 'bring *butter*', 'feed the *Brāhmaṇa*'—every one of these words ('goat' 'butter' and 'brāhmaṇa') is a general or common term, and yet it is applied, in actual usage, to particular individuals composing what is denoted by that term; and to what particular individuals it is applied is determined by the force of circumstances; the term is applied to that particular individual (goat, for instance) with which it is found possible to connect the direction of the particular activity (of *taking to the village*, for instance); it being absolutely impossible for the entire generality (of *all goats* f. i.) to be connected with the direction expressed by the words ['take to the village,'] [no one man at any one time could take to a village all the goats that there are in the world, all of which are denoted by the general term 'goat']. Similarly the term under discussion,—'*navakantalaḥ*' is a general term [as it has two significa-

* The Puri MS. reads '*abhiyoga*' for *niyoga*.

tions]; and as such, when it is used it has to be taken as applied to that to which it has the capability to apply, under the circumstances;—so that when it is addressed in regard to a person having only one *new* blanket, it has to be taken as signifying 'one who has a new blanket'; and under the circumstances, the *possessing of nine blankets* being found impossible, the word cannot signify 'one who has *nine* blankets'. Thus when you assign to your opponent's word a meaning that it cannot possibly convey, your attack must be regarded as entirely futile.*

Vārṭika on Sū. 12.

[P. 178, L. 17 to P. 179, L. 10.]

'When the meaning is not definitely specified' &c.—says the Sūtra. What is said to have its meaning *not definitely specified* is that word or sentence which, as actually heard, is general (wide in its scope); as an example of a *sentence that is general or ambiguous*, we have—'this boy is *navakambala*' [which means 'the boy has a *new* blanket' and also 'the boy has *nine* blankets']; and an example of the general or ambiguous *word* we have the word '*ashvaḥ*' [which when taken as a *noun*, denotes the *horse*; and when taken as a *verb*, denotes 'you have become large', '*ashvaḥ*' being the First Preterite, second person, singular form of the root '*shva*'].^o

An objection is raised—"It is never possible to speak of anything by means of an unspecified or general term; as in actual usage no such word is ever used whose denotation is not specified. In fact nothing can be spoken of by means of an unspecified term; nor is it right to use any such term; whenever any expression is used,

* At the time that the exact denotation is fixed by convention for the first time, it is not said to pertain to any particular individual; the denotation fixed is entirely generic in its character; and it comes to be applied to particular individuals only through the force of such circumstances as the particular context in which the term is used, the particular person using it, the particular person to whom is addressed, the particular time and place at which it is used, and so on. So that when the speaker has used a general term on a particular occasion and under particular circumstances, his exact meaning can be easily determined; and the fact that the word has a vague generic denotation is not his fault; the fault lies with the original convention that fixed that denotation; and as this convention is fixed by persons other than the particular speaker who uses the word, he cannot be blamed for making use of such a word: blaming him for it is altogether unfair.—*Tātparyā*.

it always brings about the comprehension of a particular thing; and any indication by it of a generic thing would be absolutely improper."

By no means, we reply. The use of a generic term and the denoting by it of generic things is quite possible, when the term is used by itself, and there are no such specificatory conditions as a particular context, &c. That is to say, when such a sentence as ' *Shvēṭō dhāvāfi* ' is pronounced without reference to any context, &c., the person merely hearing it thus pronounced is naturally confused [as to the exact meaning of the sentence—whether it means ' *Shvā iṭō dhāvāfi* ', ' the dog is running from here, ' or as meaning ' *Shvēṭah* the white-skinned man, suffering from leucoderma, *dhāvāfi* ', ' washes ']; and when there is this confusion, he assigns to it a meaning that was not intended by the speaker, and then opposes the statement. Similarly in the case of an ambiguous word.

The *Sūtra* has introduced the term ' *Arṭha* ', ' *meaning* ', with a view to preclude the *word*; as Casuistry always pertains to the *meaning* of words, and not to the *words* themselves; for instance, in the case in question the Casuist cannot offer his opposition in the form ' the *word* that you are using is not *navakambala* .'

The meeting of Casuistry is in the following manner:—Whether the opposition is offered knowingly or unknowingly,—in either case it is highly improper; that is to say, if the casuist actually knows what the term ' *navakambalaḥ* ' means (in the particular context), and yet he urges that ' the boy is not *navakambala* ', then he urges something entirely foreign to the subject, thus becoming subject to the Clincher of ' *Arṭhāntara* ', ' Irrelevancy '; for he comprehends one meaning and urges an altogether different meaning;—if on the other hand, he offers the opposition without knowing what the word actually means, he becomes subject to the Clincher of ' Ignorance .'

Sūtra (13).

(B) GENERALISING CASUISTRY CONSISTS IN THE URGING OF AN ABSURD SIGNIFICATION, WHICH IS RENDERED POSSIBLE BY THE USE OF A TOO GENERIC TERM—(Sūtra 13).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 56, L. 16 to P. 57, L. 10.]

When one man says—‘Oh, this Brāhmana is endowed with learning and character’, and another replies—‘learning and character are quite natural to a Brāhmana’,—the latter assertion is met by opposition, by assigning to the word (‘Brāhmana’) a meaning other than the one intended,—that is by assigning to it an entirely absurd meaning;—this opposition being in the following form—‘If learning and character are natural to the Brāhmana, then they should be found in the delinquent Brāhmana* also; as he also is a *Brahmana*’.

That word is called ‘too generic’ which, while applying to the thing desired to be spoken of, also over-reaches it; e. g. the *Brahmanahood*—which is denoted by the term ‘*Brāhmana*’—is sometimes found to be concomitant with ‘learning and character’, and sometimes it is found to over-reach it, i. e. not concomitant with it. And as the opposition offered is based upon this ‘too generic’ character of the term used, it has been called the ‘*Generalising Casuistry*.’

This Casuistry is to be met by pointing out that what the speaker (of the second sentence) means is not to propound a reason (for what the previous speaker has said with regard to a particular Brāhmana being endowed with learning and character), but only to make a *reference* (i. e. a *representation* of what has been asserted in the previous sentence); as the second assertion is meant to be mere praise (of the *particular* Brāhmana mentioned in the preceding sentence); so that there is no room for the assigning of the absurd signification. For instance, when one says ‘corns grow in this field’, another man may say ‘in this field even seeds do not have to be sown,’—it is

* The Brāhmana who has not gone through the rites and ceremonies essential for all Brāhmanas is called a ‘*vr̥ṣṭya*’ ‘delinquent.’

certainly not meant that seeds are not to be sown in the field; and yet what is said clearly is that they are not necessary; and by this the field, which is the receptacle of the growing corn, is praised; so that the assertion 'seeds do not have to be sown in this field' is meant to be a *reference* to the particular field with a view to praise it; and though the growing of the corn depends upon the seeds, this is not what is meant to be expressed by the sentence. Similarly in the case in question, by the assertion 'learning and character are only natural to the Brāhmaṇa' what is meant is that the particular Brāhmaṇa possesses learning and character, and not that he possesses them *because he is a Brāhmaṇa*; what is meant to be expressed is not the *cause* (of the man's possessing learning and character); the assertion is a reference to a particular object, which it is meant to eulogise; the meaning being that 'it is because the man is a Brāhmaṇa that the causes bringing about learning and character have become effective'; so that when the man praises the particular object, he does not deny the operation of causes leading up to the result (that makes the object worthy of that praise). Thus it is not right to offer opposition to the assertion by assigning to it an absurd signification.

Vārṭika on Sū. 13.

[Page P. 179, L. 13 to L. 17.]

Generalising Casuistry &c.—says the Sūtra. A word is said to be 'too generic' when it over-reaches what is intended to be spoken of. Example: 'The Brāhmaṇa is endowed with learning and character';—the Opponent opposes this statement by urging that 'the fact of being a 'Brāhmaṇa' cannot be the cause of the possession of *learning and character*. This opposition is met by showing that the assertion means something entirely different,—being meant to be a praise, and not the statement of a cause. And further, this opposition also is open to the two-fold objection (urged above in connection with first kind of Casuistry, at the end of the *Vārṭika*)—based upon its having been urged knowingly or unknowingly (in either case the opposition being subject to a Clincher).

Sūtra 14.

(C) A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE SECONDARY (FIGURATIVE) DENOTATION OF WORDS, IF IT IS OPPOSED BY A DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF WHAT IS ASSERTED (ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PRIMARY DENOTATION),—THIS CONSTITUTES FIGURATIVE (OR SHIFTING) CASUISTRY.* *Sūtra* 14.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 57, L. 12 to P. 58, L. 3.]

By the term '*dharma*' in the *Sūtra* is meant that property of the word which consists in its use in accordance with its primary denotation; but sometimes [when the primary denotation is found inapplicable] this property (usage) becomes subject to option (in the shape of a second denotation); and this secondary usage consists in using a word, which has been found to have one primary denotation, in a sense different from that denotation;—and when a statement is made in accordance with this secondary denotation, we have what has been called in the *Sūtra* '*dharmavikalpanirḍeśha*'.† E. g. When the statement is made 'the platforms are shouting', (which is

*The meaning of the *Sūtra* is not quite clear; the translation is in accordance with the explanation given by the *Bhāṣya*; according to the *Vārṭika* (on Sū. 16, below), the term अवयवविपर्यय here means 'the denial of the presence of the thing'; and this suggests to the mind a very much simpler interpretation of the *Sūtra* itself: 'when the statement is made in regard to the *वचन* property, of a thing, if this is opposed by the denial of the *thing* itself, we have the Shifting Casuistry'. This appears to be more in keeping with what follows in the next two *Sūtras*; and it is also supported by the *Vārṭika* (P. 180, L. 13) where it says that in the Shifting Casuistry what is denied is the *object* 'the thing,' *dharmin*. Though this statement, not being found to be in keeping with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, has been twisted by the *Tātparyā* and the *Parishuddhi* to mean something totally different.

The explanation of the *Sūtra* provided by the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* is as follows: '*Dharma*' stands for one of the two denotations of a word—primary or secondary;—*śasya*, 'of that'—*viridhokh kalpoh*, 'more than one alternative meaning'—*yaṣṭra*, 'in which'; *nirḍeśhē*, *vādyuktashabḍa-saṁ* i. e., 'the words used by the first party being such as admit of more than one meaning';—*arṭhasaḍbhāvēna*, *śāṅkhyaika!ara-oritṭyā* *śāṅkhartha!atātparyoprayukṭavākyē*, *apararṭṭyā* *arṭhāntara!atātparyakalpanayā* *pratiśhēdhoḥ*,—the statement declaring the existence of a thing by one denotation, if the existence of that is denied in accordance with the other denotation,—it constitutes figurative casuistry.

† The words of the *Bhāṣya* are '*śasya nirḍeśhē*', 'when there is a statement of that'—i. e. of the secondary meaning; but as the statement is not of the meaning, the *Tātparyā* has taken the words to mean '*śena*'—'*dharmavikalpēna*'—'*nirḍeśhē*'—'*vākyē*'; so that the meaning is 'when there is statement in accordance with the secondary meaning.' The *Parishuddhi* remarks that all this twisting of the words of the *Bhāṣya* has been done with a view to reconcile the *Bhāṣya* to the *Vārṭika*. But we fail to see much difference between the two.

made on the basis of the secondary meaning of the term 'platforms', which here stands for the *men* on the platforms);—and it is opposed by a denial on the basis of the primary meaning [*i. e.* taking the word as if it had been used in its primary denotation],—this denial being in the form 'Certainly it is the men seated on the platforms that are shouting, and *not the platforms themselves.*'

"But in this case, where is 'the assumption of a contrary meaning' [which, according to *Sāṅkhya* 1-2-10) is a necessary condition in all Casuistry]?"

It consists in assigning to the word a meaning different from that with reference to which it has been used; *i. e.*, the word having been used in reference to its secondary meaning, the Opponent assigns to it the primary meaning;—and as this Casuistry pertains to the figurative or secondary signification of words, it is called 'Figurative Casuistry.'

What is meant by '*upachāra*', 'secondary or figurative denotation' is that meaning which is indicated by such causes as association and the like; and we have the *figurative use* of a word only when there is such a meaning indicated by association &c. [so that figurative significations cannot be had recourse to at random].

This third kind of Casuistry is met in the following manner:—Whenever a statement is made, a concurrence with, or denial of, the words used, and their significations, should be in accordance with the intention of the person making that statement,—and not at random, according to one's own wish.* It is well known in ordinary parlance that a word may be used either in its primary direct sense or in its secondary figurative sense; and when such usage is generally accepted,† if a certain word is used, the concurrence with it, or the denial of it, should be in keeping with the speaker's intention, and not at random; so that when the speaker uses a term in its primary sense, the concurrence with, or denial of, his statement should be in reference to that sense of his words, and not in reference to any sense that the Opponent may choose to impose upon it; similarly if he uses the term in its secondary sense, it is this sense that should be concurred with or denied. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a term

* The *Tātparya* takes *वदतः* to mean *वदन्ना*, *by trick*. But the ordinary meaning of *वद* appears to be more suitable. The sense is that you should concur with, or deny, the statement in the form and in the sense in which it is made by the speaker, and you are not to impose your own reading or your own interpretation on it.

† The Puri MS. reads *विहिते मतेन*

in its secondary sense, and his Opponent denies it in reference to its primary sense,—then this denial becomes a mere arbitrary denial, and it cannot be regarded as an opposition to the first party.

Vārṭika on Sū. 14.

[P. 179, L. 20 to P. 180, L. 5].

A statement being made etc. etc.—says the Sūtra. What the term '*ḍharmavikalpanirḍḍeshā*' means is that a word has a twofold signification—the primary and the secondary; *e. g.* the word 'platform' primarily signifies a *structure reared up by bringing together pieces of wood*; but when (as occurring in the statement 'the platforms are shouting') that primary signification is found to be incompatible by reason of the impossibility of the action of *shouting* belonging to the *wooden structure*, the word is applied to the *persons seated on the structure* (to whom the *shouting* is applicable); and this forms the 'secondary' signification of the word. Such is the ordinary method of using words; now if one were to oppose the statement made by attributing to it a meaning at variance with the said method,—it would constitute what is called 'Figurative Casuistry.'

This form of Casuistry also is open to the aforesaid retort of having been put up consciously or unconsciously &c. (see end of *Vārṭika* on Sū. 12).

Sūtra (15).

[An objection is raised]—

"FIGURATIVE CASUISTRY IS ONLY VERBAL CASUISTRY; AS IT DOES NOT DIFFER FROM IT."

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 5 to L. 7].

[An objection is raised]—"Figurative Casuistry does not differ from Verbal Casuistry; as the assigning of a different meaning (from the one intended by the speaker) is common

“to both. For instance, in the example cited,—in the statement ‘the platforms are shouting,’ the word (‘platform’) intended to be taken in the secondary sense of *the persons* occupying the place (on the platform) is assumed to have the primary sense of the *place* itself; and the opposition offered is based upon this assumption.”

Vārtikā on Sū. 15.

[P. 180, L. 8 to L. 9].

“Figurative Casuistry is regarded to be the same as Verbal Casuistry, because of there being no difference between the two. In what does the non-difference consist? It consists in this, that, just as there is assumption of a different meaning in the case of Verbal Casuistry, so is there also in the case of Figurative Casuistry.”

Sūtra (16).

[Answer]—

IT IS NOT SO; AS THERE IS A DIFFERENCE
IN IT.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 9 to L. 11].

[The answer to the objection urged in the preceding *Sūtra* is that] Figurative Casuistry is not the same as Verbal Casuistry; as in the former, *the denial of the presence of the thing* constitutes a difference. “Difference from what?” From the mere assumption of a different meaning (which is found in Verbal Casuistry); as a matter of fact the ‘assumption of a different meaning’ is one thing, and the ‘total denial of the presence of the thing denoted’ is something entirely different.

Vārtika on Sū (16).

[P. 180, L. 9 to L. 13].

The *Sūtra* points out that the reason that has been urged in the preceding *Sūtra*—‘because there is no difference’—is one that is *unknown*,—*i. e.* untrue. “Why is the reason untrue?” Because in the case of one (*i. e.* Figurative Casuistry) what is denied is the existence of the denoted

Nyāya 532.

thing,—the meaning of the denial being that *there are no such things as shouting platforms*;—while in the other case (*i. e.* in the case of Verbal Casuistry) the presence of the *thing* itself is admitted,—the possession by the boy of the blanket being accepted,—and what is denied is only the blankets' *property* of 'numerousness'; so that in one case* the *thing* is denied, while in the other the *property*; and this fact constitutes a tremendous difference.

Sūtra (17).

IF THE TWO WERE TO BE REGARDED AS NON-DIFFERENT ON THE GROUND OF SOME KIND OF SIMILARITY,—THERE WOULD BE ONLY ONE KIND OF CASUISTRY.

Bhāṣya.

[P. 58, L. 13. to L. 16.]

What the Opponent in *Sūtra* 15 has done is to accept the twofold division of Casuistry and to deny the third kind; this denial being on the ground of some sort of a similarity (between the third and the first kinds). But just as this reason (the presence of some sort of similarity) serves to set aside threefoldness, so ought it to set aside twofoldness

* Both editions read नन. The *Parishuddhi* supplies the correct reading—ननन.

The following explanation by the *Tātparyā* is noteworthy:—In the sentence 'the platforms are shouting', the *shouting* is predicated of the *platforms*, whereby the *shouting* is the predominant factor and *platform* the subordinate factor; that is why the secondary figurative usage applies to the 'platform', and not to the *shouting*;—hence when the Casuist offers his opposition in the words 'the platforms certainly do not shout', what is denied is the *shouting*, the predominant factor. This is what is meant by the *Vārṭika* saying that the *thing itself* is denied. In the case of the statement 'this boy is *narakambala*'—the '*narakambala*' is predicated of the boy; and what the Casuist denies is not the entire '*narakambala*', but only the qualifying part of it '*nava*.' So that in the former case the entire predicate, and in the latter only a part of the predicate, is denied. This constitutes the 'tremendous difference.'

The *Parishuddhi* remarks that the above explanation has been provided by the *Tātparyā* in view of the fact that what the words of the *Vārṭika* apparently mean is not quite right. It is not true that in one case it is the *thing* that is denied, and in another the *property*; because the *shouting* is as much a *property* of the platform, as the *numerousness* is of the blanket.

also; as there is some sort of similarity between these two (first and second kinds) also. If the mere presence of some similarity cannot do away with the twofold division, then it should not do away with the threefold division either.

Vārṭika on Sū. 17.

[P. 180, L. 17 to P. 181, L. 2.]

If the two etc.—says the *Sūtra*. “What is the meaning of this *Sūtra*?” The meaning is that sheer incongruity sets aside the twofold division also, which division is admitted by the Opponent. “By what reasoning do you make out that the twofold division is admitted?” When it is asserted that ‘Figurative Casuistry is the same as Verbal Casuistry,’ it is implied that the *Generalising Casuistry* (the second kind of Casuistry) is something different (from Verbal Casuistry). And (if the twofold division is set aside, and all Casuistry is held to be of one and the same kind; then) the specification becomes entirely useless; that is to say, if the opinion held by our opponent is that all Casuistry is of one and the same kind, then, in that case, the specification (made in *Sūtra* 15)—that ‘Figurative Casuistry is the same as Verbal Casuistry, because there is no difference’ [which puts forward the non-difference of only two out of the three kinds]—becomes entirely meaningless.

“But in what way could all kinds of Casuistry become regarded as one only?”

If the presence of some sort of similarity were to establish identity, then there would be only one kind of Casuistry; as
 there is some sort of similarity among all the
 Var. P. 181. three kinds, they should all become of one kind only; as there is some sort of similarity among all of them.

“What is that similarity?”

The similarity consists in the ‘opposing of the assertion’ and in the ‘assuming of a different meaning,’—these two conditions being present in all kinds of Casuistry, [as declared in *Sū. 1-2-10*].

LECTURE (4).

[Sūtras 18—20.]

Defects of Reasoning due to the Incapacity of the Reasoner.

BHĀṢYA ON SŪ. 18.

[P. 58, L. 17 to P. 59, L. 3.]

Next to Casuistry—

(Sūtra 18.)

FUTILE REJOINER IS THAT OBJECTION WHICH IS
TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF MERE* SIMILARITY AND
DISSIMILARITY. (Sūtra 18.)

When a certain reasoning has been put forward, the objection to it that *follows, takes birth* (jāyaṭē)—is called 'Jāṭi', 'Futile Rejoinder.' This objection is in the form of opposition, an attack, a denial,—on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. That is to say, when the Probans put forward by the first party is one that is intended to prove the conclusion through its *similarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *dissimilarity* (to that Example);—or when the Probans put forward is intended to prove the conclusion through its *dissimilarity* to the Example,—and an objection is taken on the basis of its *similarity* to it;—we have what is called 'Jāṭi' (Futile Rejoinder),; because it comes up—is born—as an opponent (to the original reasoning).†

* The *Nyāyadūṣṭravivaraṇa* explains that Futile Rejoinder is that which is urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *only*,—i. e. irrespective of any idea of invariable concomitance; in fact, it continues, 'similarity and dissimilarity' do not enter into all cases of Futile Rejoinder; as is clear from the definitions and examples provided under Adh. 5; it makes a Futile Rejoinder when no notice is taken of invariable concomitance. This is what has led the modern Logicians to define Jāṭi, Futile Rejoinder, simply as 'asaṭ uttaram', 'wrong answer', i. e. an answer which is either incapable of shaking the opposite view, or which is vitiated by self-contradictions.

The *Tātparya* has an interesting note. It is not always reprehensible to put forward a Futile Rejoinder; for instance, when a man, upholding the authority of the Veda, is met by a series of arguments against its authority, and at the spur of the moment he does not find proper answers to these arguments, he is fully justified in urging what is really a Futile Rejoinder, if he feels that by so doing he will stave off the atheistic tendency of the audience produced by his opponent's arguments. But in other cases a Futile Rejoinder is urged only unknowingly.

† In view of the real nature of several Futile Rejoinders—which are not urged on the basis of a similarity or dissimilarity to any Example at all,—the *Vārtika* says that when the *Bhāṣya* talks of similarity or dissimilarity to the Example, it is only by way of illustration. As there are several Futile Rejoinders that are urged on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity to other things also.

Vāṛṭika on Su. 18.

[P. 181, L. 4 to L. 11.]

Futile Rejoinder is that &c. &c.—says the Sūtra. By speaking of the ‘*objection taken on the basis of similarity*,’ and of the ‘*objection taken on the basis of dissimilarity*,’ what is meant is that it is urged against the right view expounded by the first party;—the sense being that when the arguments in support of a view have been propounded, there is a *stand made against* that view; and this *standing against* is as if it were an opponent set up against it.

The Sūtra should be taken as it stands, and not as indicating the ‘*similarity and dissimilarity to the Example*’ (as the Bhāṣya has taken it). “Why do you lay stress on this?” Because we wish to make the definition provided by the Sūtra applicable to all cases of Futile Rejoinder. As a matter of fact, every kind of Futile Rejoinder becomes included only when we take it as it stands,—taking it as indicating ‘*similarity*’ and ‘*dissimilarity*’ to anything (not necessarily to the *Example* only). If a definition does not include all that it is intended to include, it is regarded as defective [and this would be the case with the definition provided by the Sūtra if it were interpreted according to the Bhāṣya; as, in that case, it would not include all those cases of Futile Rejoinder which are urged on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity to things other than the *Example*]. It is only by way of illustration that the Bhāṣya should be taken as speaking of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example*; the sense being that, just as objection is taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example*, so it is urged also on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity of other things [and it should not be taken as restricting the definition to only such objections as are taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity *to the Example* only].

Sūtra (19).

IT IS A CASE OF CLINCHER WHEN THERE IS MISAPPREHENSION, AS ALSO WHEN THERE IS INCOMPREHENSION.* (Sū. 19.)

Bhāṣya.

[P. 59, L. 5 to L. 8.]

'Misapprehension' is that comprehension which is either wrong or reprehensible.† The man who misapprehends things becomes defeated; and 'Clincher' consists in this defeat. It is a case of 'incomprehension' when, the subject being one on which something has to be said, if the person does not say anything; that is, for instance, if he either does not oppose what has been sought to be proved by the other party, or does not meet the objections that have been urged against himself.

The non-compounding (of the words '*vipratīpaṭṭih*' and '*apratīpaṭṭih*', whose compounding would have made the Sūtra terser) is meant to indicate that these two are not the only Clinchers [there being several others, as described in detail in Adh. V, all which become implied by the use of the particle '*cha*'].

Vārṭika on Sū. 19.

[P. 181, L. 12 to L. 19.]

It is a case of Clincher etc.—says the Sūtra; when a thing really exists, or is described, as different (from the man's own idea of it), there is either 'incomprehension' or 'misapprehension'. There are two kinds of 'incomprehen-

*The *Parīkṣadhī*, not satisfied with the Sūtra as it stands, takes it as implying the following generalised definition:—'When a controversy has been started, any action that is indicative of either party's ignorance constitutes a *Clincher*.' It further says that Clincher is treated of last, as it puts an end to all controversy; no further discussion can proceed when once one of the parties falls into a Clincher.

† A misapprehension is called simply 'wrong', when the subject-matter is something too subtle to be grasped by an ordinary intellect; it is called 'reprehensible' when it pertains to something gross, an ordinary thing quite within the range of ordinary minds.—*Tātparyā.*

sion'—(1) that non-cognizance in which the predominating element consists of what the other party has said [when, for instance, the man fails to comprehend the proofs adduced by the other party, or the objections urged by him], and (2) that non-cognizance in which one's own part forms the predominating element [when, for instance, the man fails to find arguments for meeting the objections urged by the other party].

"It is possible for a Clincher to be urged even where the man has put forward a sound argument; how then can Clincher be said to be indicative of 'misapprehension' or 'incomprehension' [as the reasoning being a sound one, it should be taken *ipso facto* to have been urged with full knowledge and due comprehension of the issues involved]. That is to say, it may so happen that a man supports his contention by a perfectly sound argument, and yet when his opponent meets him with a Futile Rejoinder, he becomes confounded and fails to find the proper answer to that rejoinder;—how can this be said to be a case of either 'misapprehension' or 'incomprehension'?"

Even in such a case there would be (a) 'incomprehension' and (b) 'misapprehension' consisting in the man (a) *not comprehending* the soundness and strength of his own arguments, and (b) in his regarding his own sound arguments as unsound.

Bhāṣya on Sūtra (20).

[P. 59, L. 8 to L. 17].

A question arises—"Example has been described as of one kind only; are Futile Rejoinder and Clincher also each of one kind only? Or are these of diverse kinds, like *Doctrine*?"

The answer to this is provided in the following Sūtra.—

Sūtra 20.

THERE IS A MULTIPLICITY OF FUTILE REJOINDERS AND CLINCHERS, OWING TWO THERE BEING SEVERAL AND DIVERSE VARIETIES OF BOTH. (Sū. 20).

Nyāya 538.

As 'Objection taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity' can be of several diverse kinds—there must be several varieties of Futile Rejoinder. Similarly as 'misapprehension and incomprehension' are of several diverse kinds,—there must be several varieties of Clincher also. The term '*vikalpa*' stands for *several varieties* or *diverse varieties*.

As examples of the diversity of Clinchers (defined in Sū. 5, 2. 1—24)—the Clinchers of *Ananubhāṣaṇa*, *Ajñāna*, *Apratibhā*, *Vikṣēpa*, *Mañānujñā* and *Paryanuyojoyoṣkṣaṇa*, are indicative of *incomprehension*; while the rest are indicative of *misapprehension*.

Thus have *Pramāṇa* and other categories been (a) 'mentioned' (in Sū. 1.1.1) and (b) 'defined' in the order of their mention; and they will (in the next four Adhyāyas) be (c) 'examined' in accordance with their definitions. Thus is the threefold function of the Scientific Treatise to be regarded as duly fulfilled.

Thus ends the first Adhyāya of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtra*.

Vārtika on Sū. 20.

[P. 182, L. 1 to L. 11.]

There is a multiplicity, etc. etc.—says the *Sūtra*. This *Sūtra* is meant to indicate how many kinds of Futile Rejoinder and Clincher there are; and what is meant is that, inasmuch as objections taken on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity are several and diverse, there are many kinds of Futile Rejoinder;—and inasmuch as incomprehension and misapprehension are several and diverse, there are many kinds of Clincher. As regards the question—as to which kinds of Futile Rejoinder are urged on the basis of similarity, and which on the basis of dissimilarity,—and as to which kinds of Clincher are indicative of misapprehension and which of incomprehension,—all this should be found in their proper places, where they are described in detail in connection with their detailed definition (in Aḍh. 5).

Nyāya 539.

Thus have Pramāṇa and the other categories been 'mentioned' and 'defined.' And the 'Examination' of these, in accordance with this *mention* and *definition*, will follow.

'In this first *Aḍhyāya* have been described—(a) the main theme of philosophy (embodied in Sū. 1.1.1.), (b) the process of metempsychosis (described in Sū. 1.1.2), (c) the cessation of metempsychosis by Knowledge (described in Sū. 1.1.2), and (d) the mention and definition of the several categories (described in the rest of the *Aḍhyāya*).

Thus ends the first *Aḍhyāya* of Uḍyotākara's *Vārṭika* on the *Nyāyasūtra-Bhāṣya*.

THE VĪRAMIṬROḌAYA BY MIṬRA MISHRA.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The work here translated is one which, though ordinarily called a 'treatise on Dharmashāstra' is really an Encyclopaedia dealing with all important subjects related to the four 'ends of human existence'. It is divided into twenty-two sections, called 'Prakāsha'. It is not confined to what used to be called the '*Vīramiṭroḍaya*' till the publication of the entire work was begun under the supervision of Babu Govindāḍāsa of Benares, in the 'Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series'; which is only one of the many sections of the '*Vīramiṭroḍaya*', the extent of which has been computed to be nearly 1,50,000 'couplets'. The work was written under the patronage of Vīrasimha Deva, King of Orchha in Bundelkhand, a contemporary of Akbar.

It is proposed to translate the whole of this work here; and we are beginning with the section on *Paribhāṣā* or 'Conventions' relating to Dharma. The text from which the translation is made, and to which the page-numbers refer, is that published in the 'Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares.'

G. J.

INTRODUCTORY VERSES.

I.—INVOCATION.

I salute the God with the elephant's head, with eyes like the lotus, the beloved of Shiva, born of the body of Pārvaṭī ! By the flow of the ichor issuing from his vermillion-reddened cheeks he washes off, like dust, the mass of obstacles in the path of the host of devotees attached to his feet; and he constantly bears over his head a swarm of black bees, as if it were a mass of hair'. (1)

'I bear in my heart the God of the elephant-head, with smiling face! He bears on his spotless cheeks a swarm of black bees; imparts all desirable things to one who fosters the virtue of serving his feet;—He is the receptacle of mercy, the very essence of the Vedas, and yet beyond the reach of these'. (2)

'May the Goddess Sarasvatī pour over me her benign influence; it is She alone who can help me to navigate this vast Ocean of the Shāstras;—She who is worshipped in their heart of hearts by Nārada and the other great sages, and who, by the effulgence of Her body, subdues even the brightness of mercury.' (3)

'When Shiva is engaged in his sprightly dance, the Gangā on His head flows forth with great force all round; the sound proceeding from her splashing waves suppresses the loud rumblings of the drum beaten by Bhṛṅgi;—and the partial disc of the moon on His forehead strikes against the other half of the disc in the sky, and has its mass of nectar ruffled and bubbling over;—May this lunar disc destroy the heap of my sins!' (4)

'May the son of Nanda fulfil your desires! He is worshipped with a shower of flowers by the gods whenever He goes out in the morning; He inflames in their minds of the

cowherdesses the emotion of love by means of glances beaming with affection; with a cane in His hand, He leads before him the herd of cattle; He has a complexion dark like the cloud full of water; and entertains Himself on the banks of the Yamunā.’(5)

II.—AN ACCOUNT OF THE ATUHOR’S PATRON.

‘In the Ocean of the dynasty of the King of Kāshī was born the Moon, in the person of Mōḍinimalla, who was like an ocean of joy to his people and the befriender of destitute Brāhmaṇas. After him was born King Arjuna, ressembling Arjuna in valour, which was capable of demolishing the groaning armies of enemies.’(6)

‘This blessed King, the shining jewel in the royal dynasty of the Bundēla country, brought under his sway, without much effort, the whole Earth, and carried on the administration of his kingdom in a wonderful manner; his greatness was immeasurable, by reason of the qualities of bravery and liberality; he was a bounteous donor, of pure heart; and he washed the entire horizon with the nectar-waves of the ocean of his fame.’ (7).

‘From him was born the crest-jewel of the assembly of Kings, King Malakhāna, who, with his overtly magnificent bravery, killed his enemies in battle; he had his faith centred in the sacred feet of Viṣṇu, and had his difficulties removed by the worshipping of the lotus-feet of Gaṇēsha.’ (8).

‘His son was Praṭāparudra; he pleased Shiva by his constant worship; he was an ocean of mercy to those who sought shelter; he became the king of many kings.’ (9).

‘From him was born King Maḍhukara, ever merciless against inimical heroes; unfathomable was the greatness of his excellent qualities; like mount Himālaya was his steadiness; so lovingly attached was he to Lakṣmī the goddess of

wealth, that having embraced him, She never thought of her separation from his forefathers.' (10).

'This heroic king, of excellent fame, having his feet saluted by hosts of Kings, was initiated to the sacrificial altar of the battle-field; he subdued the Moon with the brightness of his fame, just as the initiated Sacrificer drinks the Soma-juice at sacrifices; and having kindled the fire of his valour, he constantly offered therein, by means of the ladle-like sword, the lives of his host of enemies.' (11).

'Great indeed is the King Maḍhukarasāha; he is like the Sun (*dinakara*) in that his splendour is ever resplendent; like the Moon (*himakara*) in that he is the receptacle of charming effulgence; like the elephant's trunk (*karikara*) is his hand, in that it is ever bestowing gifts, just as the elephant's trunk is constantly shedding ichor.' (12).

"O King, whose lotus-feet are ever saluted by hosts of Kings! these are the Kings of the Southern countries, these of the East, those others of the North, and these from the West;—all these having bright jewels gleaming on their heads, are bending down their heads in obeisance to you;"—the ushers at the gate of this king constantly addressed to him these words, ever in a flurry of awe and always having their hands joined in respectful attendance.' (13).

'To this king was born the son, Vīrasimha;—the great King whose glorious majesty controls through his sceptre the entire circle of the Earth, in the same manner as the potter turns his wheel with a stick; the sword drawn by him performs feats of flashing gyrations in all directions; the wide spreading creeper of whose fame has crossed the oceans and is expanding on all sides.' (14).

'King Vīrasimha, the ornament of the world-famous dynasty of Bundela Kings, covers the directions with his fame, which adorns the heavens and which constantly surpasses the effulgence of the necklace of resplendent crystals;

he deprives his enemies of all their strength, while strengthening his own relations along with hosts of the learned and the wise.' (15).

'While King Virasimha is scattering showers of gold, what is all the eulogium bestowed upon the charities of Bali, Karna and Parashurāma? What too are the wordy descriptions of the untarnished fame of the Kurus and the Pāṇdavas? The dark clouds also, during that time cease to sprinkle their rainy showers!' (16).

'The heroic King Virasimha, the best of Kings, when proceeding to give away gifts with his hands, made a judicious distribution of grass, water and gold as follows: gold he gave to those who sought it of him; grass he made over to those spots on the earth which had been occupied by the palaces of his enemies; and water he gave to the eyes of the wives of those Kings who were inimical to him.' (17).

'Thinking in his mind that when king Virasimha comes to the earth, with his unequalled generosity, every one of the following things (known for its generosity) would have its heart broken in two, the Creator made the Kāmadhēnu an aminal (without intelligence); He made the Chintāmaṇi an inanimate stone; and the Kalpadrūma was made to have its body consist in wooden fibres.' (18).

'The Creator prepared the ever beautiful soil of manifold generosity; therein he placed a seed in the shape of magnanimous self-respect; wisely watering this with the flow of deep devotion, He brought about on this Earth, the Desire-fulfilling tree in the shape of the wise King Virasimha.' (19).

'This moon (that I have created) will, most likely, vie with the Shining Moon of Fame belonging to the heroic King Virasimha, the ornament of the world,—this latter moon having destroyed all sin, with its effulgence spreading on all sides and ressembling the beautiful Ocean of Milk;—having thought thus, the Creator, under the pretext of the dark mark,

has besmeared the face of His own moon with soot and has made him to wander about in several directions.' (20).

'The mighty stream of his glorious fame has, by means of its splendour, effulgent like the sheen of the mighty serpent Shēṣa, subjugated the shining moon; throwing up deep ripples, it flows in hundreds of directions; it is as a mere streamlet flowing from this mighty river that we have the Gaṅgā; the Narmadā is a mere streak of its waters; and so also are the Kāverī, the Sarayū and the Chandra-bhāgā.' (21).

'The wives of the enemies of King Virasimha, the best of Kings, continuously impart the following instruction to their children: Always serve this King of unsullied fame; and never follow the path of your fathers; always keep yourself free from all wrong to him; his sword is so ruthless, O child. (22).

'His son is the heroic and blessed Jukārasimha; really great with his world-famed excellent qualities,—the gold-complexioned youth who has completely over-topped the meritorious and valorous deeds of many a grown-up King; he is a veritable lion in battle: and when, during a battle, he wields his flashing sword, his enemies, with straining necks, simply have their eyes transfixed on him.' (23).

'The Maidens of the Quarters are constantly singing his fame, which is as brilliantly pure as a string of crystals and as the bright light of the moon, under the pretext of the humming of the bees in the bowers situated on the shores of the four great oceans.' (24).

'He has irrigated the earth with the water of tears flowing from the eyes of the widows of kings inimical to him; he has emptied the treasuries of all his enemies; and his charities have surpassed the fame of Karna and others;—in what way then can any resemblance to Jukārasimha be found anywhere?' (25).

‘May Jukārasimha, the mighty ruler of the Earth, the only one that is capable of bearing the burden of the world-wide sovereignty, live for a hundred years,—he whose fame, by its brilliance; has suppressed the Kailāsa, the God Shiva, Snow, the Himālaya, the Mood, pearls, the water of the Milky Ocean, and the mighty ocean-born Elephant of Indra!’ (26).

‘Jukārasimha, who got the kingdom, was the elder brother of one whose son was the next King, the blessed Vikramārka, the ocean of good qualities. His son is King Narasimha-deva. With the exception of the great King Virasimha, did even the mighty Indra ever enjoy such an unbroken swell of royal supremacy?’ (27).

III.—AN ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR’S FAMILY.

‘The high-famed Hamsa-Paṇḍita, who had his mind fixed upon the two feet of Kṛṣṇa, and who was a great friend of the entire twice-born caste, was born, like a sun, to gladden, like the lotus, the Brāhmaṇa family inhabiting the Gopāchala hill.’ (28).

‘He was born in the *Dṛabara* family; and having lived a happy life, he became famous on the earth as the great *Hamsa Paṇḍita*; he was full of wisdom, ever wise in his discretion,—having studied the entire Veda and having performed all sacrifices?’ (29).

‘Born for the sole purpose of performing sacrifices and such religious acts; being endowed with all that is good, and an ornament to his family,—was the great Brāhmaṇa Parashurāma Mishra, the son of Hamsa Paṇḍita; and his magnificence was great, ennobled as it was by his humility.’ (30).

‘His intelligence was as sharp as the tip of the Kusha-grass; his excellent qualities made him famous; he learnt the whole Shāstra from his teacher named Chāṇḍishvara, who was expert in the performance of all acts laid down in the Shruti and Smṛitis; with all this learning he was so strong in *Mīmāṃsā* that he always defeated his disputants, and became the foremost of famous men.’ (31).

‘His son is the blessed and learned Mītra Mishra, the receptacle of good qualities, who, with the water of his charities, has brought into existence an Ocean; he is the very Kalpadruma (the ever-ready bestower) of all that is good; young Brāhmaṇa boys sing, all over the earth, in all quarters and semi-quarters, his great fame, which is as bright as the light of the moon and as pure as snow, the God Shiva and the Ocean of Milk.’ (32).

‘The wise Mītrasēna, supremely blessed, with his wisdom well known, always polite, took away (it would seem) aptitude from Brahmā, depth and steadiness from the Ocean, generosity from the Celestial Tree, sweetness of speech from Bṛihaspati, fortitude from Yudhiṣṭhira, and all that is good from Indra.’ (33).

‘He was generous himself, and inspired others with generosity; he was always full of mercy, exercising control over himself; prosperous, without jealousy; steady, he was famous as an exponent of all the Shāstras studied by him; he appreciated the real purport of several *Nātakas*, *Sāttakas* and *Prakaraṇas*; and in disputations he had always defeated all frivolous disputants; and as such his fame was sung by all learned men! (34).

‘In the reciting of mantras he was all tongue; in the constant making of gifts he was all hand; in trusting he was all heart; in the assembly of Kings he was always an ornament; he was the touch-stone of learned men; like a basin of water to his (creeper-like) fame; he became the receptacle of the great affection of the blessed King Virasimha?’ (35).

‘With his intellect he churned the ocean of several compilations; and listened to and ascertained the sense of the Vedas, along with their auxiliaries, the *Pañja*-text, the *Krama*-text and also their *Upaṇiṣads*; having done all this, he has composed, for the benefit of others, as ordered by King Virasimha, this blessed *Viramīśrodaya*, which expounds the true

nature of Duty, Prosperity and the other ends of human existence? (36).

‘Henceforth learned men need not cultivate the acquaintance of numerous books; as not one of them contains all that one should wish to know; may they study only this work of mine, without letting their mind turn towards anything else; as in this work there is to be found all true doctrines regarding the subjects of Dharma and Adharma.’ (37).

‘The learned Miṭra Mishra, with his resplendent intelligence, is going to compose his *Viramītroḍaya* after having learnt the Vedas and pondered over their several commentaries and glossaries; and also having studied the Purāṇas eighteen in number; and having acquired unequalled proficiency in Poetry, Grammar and the Science of Exposition.’ (38).

‘King Virasimha, gave away to Brāhmanas several heaps of gold rivalling the Golden Mountain, and having his greatness enhanced by their blessings, he appointed Miṭra Mishra, the receptacle of good qualities. Miṭra Mishra, the ornament of Brāhmanas, having studied, with his unequalled intelligence, the opinions of several sages, and having also pondered over similar compilations, is now going to set forth his own compilation dealing with *Dharmashāstra*.’ (39).

IV.—THE LIST OF THE SEVERAL SECTIONS COMPOSING THE ENTIRE COMPILATION.

(1) In this compilation, the first section deals with the subject of *Paribhāṣās*, or *Conventions*; after that comes the section on (2) *Samskāra*, or *Sanctificatory Rites*; then on (3) *Āhnika*, *Daily Duties*; after that (4) *Pūjā*, *Worship*, (5) *Pratiṣṭhā*, *Consecrations*; then (6) *Kājadharmā*, the *Duties of a King*; (7) *Vyavahāra*, *Legal Proceedings*, (8) *Shuddhi*, *Purification*; then in due order have been composed the sections on (9) *Shrāddha*, *After-death Rites*, and (10) *Tirthas*, *Places of Pilgrimage*; after this (11) *Dāna*, *Charity*,

and (12) *Vraṭa*, Observances; then (13) *Samaya* Proper Time, (14) *Jyauṭiṣa*, Astronomy and Astrology; (15) *Shānṭi*, Propitiatory Rites; (16) *Karmavipākā*, the Fruition of Deeds; after this (17) *Chikitsā*, Medication; (18) *Prāyashchitta*, Expiatory Rites. After this comes the (19) Miscellaneous section on *Prakīrṇa*, which deals with several subjects; then comes the section on (20) *Lakṣaṇa*, Definitions and Descriptions; from which the distinctive features of all things are learnt; and then on (21) *Bhakti*, Devotion, and (22) *Mokṣa*, Final Release. All these twenty-two sections of *Dharmashāstra* have been written by the learned Miṭra Mishra, under the order of King Virasimha.

V.—LIST OF CONTENTS OF THE SECTION ON CONVENTIONS.

The first Chapter of this Part treating of Conventions deals with the Sources of Knowledge of Dharma; and in this chapter, we have the description of (1) '*Vēda*,' (2) of '*Purāṇa*,' (3) of '*Smṛiti*' and (4) of the '*Vēdāṅgas*' in due order; then (5) the authority of the '*Āgamas*' is fully discussed; (6) then comes the explanation of the comparative authority of Direct Declaration and the rest. In the second chapter we have (1) the description of *dharma*s in general; (2) then the *dharma*s peculiar to certain persons, and certain Yugas; (3) then the *dharma*s as affected by certain causes; (4) after this the 'prohibited countries' are described, and also, along with these, the exact nature of *dharma*; and lastly, (5) there are explained all those several subjects which are useful to all men;—all this has been explained in this work by the learned Miṭra Mishra, with a view to propitiate the learned.

CHAPTER I.

*The Sources from where we can derive correct Knowledge
of Dharma.*

Section (1).

The Sources Explained.

Manu (2.6) has thus laid down the sources from which we can derive the correct knowledge of Dharma.

“The entire Veda is the root of Dharma; so also are the ‘Smṛiti’ and ‘Disposition’ and ‘Usage’ of men learned in it and also the ‘self-satisfaction’ of Good men.”

Here the word ‘*Vēlaḥ*’ stands for the entire collection of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas; according to the declaration of Āpastamba that ‘the Name *Veda* applies to the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa’. ‘*Entire*’—including all that is inferred on the strength of ‘Indicative Power’, ‘Syntactical Connection’, ‘Context’, ‘Position,’ ‘Name,’ and also all that is assumed through ‘Transference or Extended Application.’ Or the word ‘*entire*’ may be taken as setting aside the notion that “the source of knowledge of Dharma consists only in the *three Vedas*, and not in the Aṭharva Veda; as Āpastamba has distinctly made the following declaration—‘We are going to describe the Sacrifice, and it is enjoined *by the three Vedas*.’” So that what the text of Manu means is that, even though the Aṭharva Veda does not say anything pertaining to purely sacrificial matters bearing on the *Agnihotra* &c., yet, inasmuch as it deals with such subjects as the propitiatory rites of the *Tulāpuruṣa* and the rest,—which are ‘Dharmas’ belonging in common to all castes,—this last also should be regarded as a source of our Knowledge of Dharma. The mention of ‘*dharma*’ here implies *adharma* also; it is necessary to point out the exact nature of *adharma*, with a view to make it clear what it is that constitutes the impurity of the mind obstructing the attainment of the knowledge of truth, and which, on that account, should be avoided.—‘*Not*’

the means "providing true knowledge.—'Of men learned in it—learned in the Veda; this qualifying word is meant to indicate that the authority of Smṛiti and the rest belongs to them, not independently by themselves, but only in so far as they are based upon the Veda.—'Smṛiti'—the *Dharmashāstra* compiled by Yājñavalkya and other sages.—'Disposition' consisting of the thirteen qualities of—obeying the Veda, being devoted to God and Father, Gentility, not causing pain to others, Freedom from jealousy, freedom from cruelty, friendliness, agreeable speech, Gratitude, affording protection to those seeking refuge, sympathy, and calmness,—as described by Hārīta. [The difference between this 'disposition' and the following 'usage' consists in this, that] the word 'disposition' mentions the authoritative character of the passive qualities, like, non-jealousy and the like, which do not imply any activity, while the word 'usage' refers to the active qualities, those that imply actual activity; so that there is no tautology.—'Usage'—e. g. the tying of the bracelet at marriage.—'Of good men'—in some cases when there arises a doubt as to whether this or that is *Dharma*, the exact nature of *Dharma* may be ascertained on the strength of the satisfaction that is felt, in favour of one or the other, in the minds of such people as have their minds saturated with the purity derived from Vedic study and right behaviour;—such is the explanation given by the *Kalpaṭaru* (the *Kṛīya-kalpaṭaru* of Lakṣmīdhara); this explanation has also the support of the *Taittīrīya*, which, having put forward the question of doubts in connection with the character of *Dharma*, goes on to say—'the Brāhmaṇas who may be there, impartial, learned, truthful, with mind bent upon *Dharma*—the way in which such Brāhmaṇas act in that way shouldst thou act.' or we may construe 'usage', 'āchārah' with 'sūdhānām', 'of good men' (and not with 'śaḍvidām'); so that *Dharma* can be known also from the usage of such men as, though not learned in the Vedas, are yet free from all defects; for

instance, among Shūdras of the better class, for the son, the usage of his father is certainly a means of knowing what is Dharma.—‘*Self-satisfaction*’—(when taken by itself, apart from ‘good men’)—is an authority only in cases of option (where both alternatives are equally supported by the other authorities); and then also only for the man himself, and not for other persons.

So also Yājñavalkya (1.7):—“Shruti, Smṛiti, the usage of good men, that which is agreeable to one’s self, desire born of right determination,—this is what has been declared to be the source of Dharma.”

Desire born of right determination—is that desire which arises from a determination that is not contrary to the Scriptures; e. g. such desires as that ‘I shall not drink water apart from eating’; or it may be taken to mean that desire which arises from a determination or knowledge which is of the right sort, i. e. which is free from all taint of passion &c.; e. g. the desire to help a Brāhmaṇa; this is what has been referred to by Manu by the word ‘disposition’, and is here referred to by the qualification ‘born of right determination’; such is the explanation given by the *Kṛītyakalpāṣṭaru*. Here also the term ‘*dharma*’ is meant to include *adharma* also.

Section (2).

Shruti—Veda.

Of the several sources of Knowledge of Dharma, *Shruti*, *Veda* proper, consists of six factors—(1) Direct Injunction, (2) Direct Prohibition, (3) Descriptions, (4) Mantras, (5) Names and (6) the Upaniṣads. (1) Of these the Direct Injunction provides the Knowledge of Dharma by expressing what is known as the incitement to activity towards a certain act; e. g. the words—‘desiring prosperity, one should sacrifice the animal dedicated to Vāyu’; these words speak of the relation of an animal with a deity, which leads us to infer that there is a sacrifice in which there

is such relation ; and the denotation of the words consists in the inciting to activity towards this sacrifice ; that is, it incites the reader to undertake that action in which the animal is sacrificed to Vāyu. (2) The Direct Prohibition provides knowledge of Dharma by laying down prohibition or cessation from activity ; *e. g.* ‘one should not eat the flesh of animals killed with poisoned arrows.’ (3) Descriptions are of two kinds—extolatory and deprecatory ; of these the former helps us to know *Dharma* by indicating that excellence the indication whereof is required by the Injunction (for the purpose of attracting men towards the action laid down therein) ; *e. g.* the description contained in the sentence ‘Vāyu is the eldest deity’ provides the praise of the action of sacrificing to Vāyu ;—and the Deprecatory description helps in the knowledge of *Dharma* by providing the deprecation that is required by the Prohibition ; *e. g.* the passage ‘the tear that was shed became silver’, which serves to decry the giving of silver, which is prohibited by the words ‘silver should not given on the grass.’ There are some *descriptions* which, even though expressing mere praise, also serve the purpose of settling doubtful points,—thereby acting as a direct source of the knowledge of *Dharma* ; *e. g.* in the making of the altar, one is told to ‘put in wet pebbles’, and there being a doubt as to the particular liquid with which the pebbles are to be wetted, we are helped to settle this doubt by the subsequent Description of Butter provided by the words ‘Butter is vigour itself’ (which makes it clear that the pebbles are to be wetted with butter). (4) Mantras—such as ‘*džousya žvā žc.*’ help in the knowledge of Dharma by bringing to our minds certain details and accessories connected with the action to be performed [for instance, the Mantra quoted indicates the *Deity* to whom the particular offering is to be made.]

(5) Names—such ‘Jyotištoma’ and the like—help in the knowledge of Dharma by serving to specify that action which is expressed by the verb in the injunctive sentence, as being

the instrument in the accomplishment of that activity which is enjoined by that sentence [the injunctive word '*yajēta*' enjoins the *bhāvanā* or activity in the form 'one should bring about a desirable result by means of the *sacrifice*,' where the *sacrifice* is the instrument, and the name—'*Jyotiṣh-toma*' for instance, that might occur in the same context—serves to specify which particular sacrifice is meant]. Those meaningless syllables that are found in connection with Sāma-recitation, help in the knowledge of Dharma by providing the means of keeping time in the singing. (6) The *Upaniṣads* help by providing us with the knowledge of Brahman as a self-sufficient entity, which puts an end to all kinds of troubles. All this has been explained in detail in the original (Mīmāṃsā) works dealing with the subject.

Says Yājñavalkya—

'The four Vedas, along with the Purāṇas; Nyāya (Science of Reasoning), Mīmāṃsā (Science of Exigetics); the Dharma-Shāstras (Legal Science) and the six subsidiary Sciences—these constitute the fourteen foundations of Knowledge and also of Dharma'.

'*Purāṇa*'—stands for the Brahma-Purāṇa and the rest to be described below;—'*Nyāya*'—the science of reasoning dealing with such subjects as the Instruments of Knowledge and the like, promulgated by Gauṭama and others.—'*Mīmāṃsā*'—stands for the Science of Exigetics with special reference to the performance of sacrifices, as propounded by Jaimini, as also that promulgated by Bāḍarāyaṇa with special reference to Brahman.—'*Dharmashāstra*'—is the legal science as expounded by Manu and others.—'The subsidiary Sciences'—are Phonetics, Rituals, Grammar, Lexicography, Prosody, and Astronomy. The four Vedas along with all these form the 'fourteen foundations'—i.e. sources—'of knowledge', of Action and Brahman, as leading to desirable results in the shape of Heaven &c. and Final Release;—and 'also

of *Dharma*'; i.e. it is only by means of these that *Dharma* can be correctly known.

[In regard to the necessity of acquiring a correct knowledge of *Dharma* from the proper sources] *Āṅgirā* says as follows :—

‘Any action that one might perform, through a mere freak of his desire,—without due knowledge of what is done—is like the playful deeds of children ; and all such acts are entirely useless.’

‘Without due knowledge’—that is, without such knowledge as can be obtained only by means of the Scriptures, says the *Kṛītyakalpataru*.

In the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* we have the following :—

‘The subsidiary sciences, the four Vedas, *Mīmāṃsā*, the extensive *Nyāya*, *Dharmashāstra*, *Purāṇa*,—these are the fourteen Sciences. The *Āyurvēda* (Science of Medicine), *Dhanurvēda* (Archery) *Gāṇḍharva* (Music),—these three with the *Arthashāstra* (Political Science) as the fourth, along with the aforesaid fourteen, constitute the Sciences, which thus, are only eighteen in number ?’

Here we have the number of Sciences laid down as *eighteen*; and of these, *fourteen* pertain to *Dharma* and four to visible worldly things ; and as these latter also indirectly provide a knowledge of *Dharma*, the statement that they pertain to visible things of the world does not go against *Yajñavalkya*’s declaration that these sciences provide knowledge of *Dharma* also.

cognition is produced, its cognition follows in due course. Specially as it is not the qualifying factor itself that is the cause of the qualified cognition; it is the cognition of the qualifying factor that is the cause; so that even after the moment at which the qualifying factor is destroyed, its cognition would be present there; and this would be sufficient for the purpose of bringing about the qualified cognition. (2) In fact what appears in the unqualified cognition—*vyavasāya*—is '*jñāna*', as well as the generic character of '*jñānaṭva*'; so that in the *anuvyavasāya* 'I have the perception' the cognition is qualified by the generic character of '*jñānaṭva*' (which is ever existent); and the Self is qualified by the cognition. (3) This explanation is not satisfactory; for, as the *Āloka* rightly remarks, the cognition of the cognition can never be *unqualified* or *non-determinate*; as all the causal factors leading to qualified cognition are present in the case. (4) The last and the most satisfactory explanation is as follows:—As a matter of fact, whenever a cognition is apprehended, it is always by means of a qualified cognition; for the cognition of cognition is always of the nature of *anuvyavasāya*; and we know that an *anuvyavasāya* is always brought about by the *vyavasāya* which is qualified or determined by its object; so that in the case of *anuvyavasāya* there are present all the causal factors necessary for qualified cognition. In fact every cognition has a dual character, being partly determinate and partly non-determinate; that which apprehends the qualifying factor is determinate, and that apprehending the mere cognition *per se*, is non-determinate. In 'I see the jar,' the *seeing* by itself is non-determinate; while the '*seeing of the jar*' is determinate.

The 'dual character' of cognitions just mentioned brings us to the well-known division of Cognition into *Savikalpaka* or Determinate, Concrete and *Nirivikalpaka* or Non-determinate, Abstract.

Of these the Abstract, *Nirvikalpaka* Cognition is that which is entirely devoid of all *vikalpa*,—i. e., free from all idea of the name of the thing cognised, of the category or genus to which the thing belongs,—in fact of everything that would in any way specify the thing; it is cognition of the thing merely as *something*, in a vague general sort of way.

The word '*vikalpa*' or '*kalpanā*' stands for all that specifies or limits the scope of a cognition. These Kalpanās or qualifying adjuncts have been classed under five heads (Nyā. Mañj. p. 93)—(1) genus, (2) quality, (3) action, (4) name and (5) substance. When we cognise the animal before our eyes as the 'cow', i. e. as belonging to the genus 'cow', our cognition is qualified by the notion of *genus*; when we know the same animal as *white*, our cognition is qualified by the notion of a *quality*; when we see it as *walking*, our cognition is qualified by the notion of an *action*; when we recognise it as bearing a definite proper name, our cognition is qualified by the notion of that *name*; and lastly, when we know it as covered by a cloth, our cognition is qualified by the notion of the *substance*, cloth.

What proof is there of there being such an abstract or non-determinate cognition?

Kumārila Bhatta has pointed out that it is a matter of common experience that whenever we look upon a thing, the first cognition that appears in our mind is only in the vague form—'I perceive something';—this vague cognition being exactly like the cognition that the new-born infant has when its eyes fall upon anything; and it is only after this undefined cognition has appeared that it is followed by the defined concrete cognition 'I see the cow.' All the older philosophers have contented themselves by relying upon our own experience only as the proof for Abstract Cognition. But we find that the *Tattvachintāmaṇi* p. 817, &c., seeks to provide regular arguments in support of this view.

The first perception that we have in the form 'this is a cow' is a qualified cognition—*i. e.*, the cognition of the individual animal as characterised by a definite class-character; and as such it must be held to be produced by the cognition of that qualifying class-character 'cow', which latter cognition in its turn, is produced by something else; just as the Inferential cognition, which is the cognition of the 'Subject' as qualified by the Probandum, is produced by a previous cognition of that Probandum. That cognition of the qualification (*f. i.* the specific class-character) also cannot be regarded as a *qualified cognition*; as any such postulate would involve an infinite regress; and also because as a matter of fact cognition apprehends the class-character, pure and simple, without any idea of its either qualifying anything else, or of itself having any other qualification; and thus being a purely unqualified qualification, it must be regarded as '*nirvikalpaka*', 'abstract' or 'non-determinate'; specially as when we perceive the cow, all the notion that we have is that it is a cow—*i. e.* it is characterised by the class-character 'cow'; and there is not the slightest conception of anything further in regard to this class-character. Thus the conclusion is that in a case where there is no cognition of any qualifications—and where there is nothing that could bring about such a cognition,—*e. g.* in the case of the cow, we have nothing, at the time that we see a particular cow, to help us to know any particulars of the entire genus 'cow'—the cognition that we have in this unqualified form cannot but be regarded as 'abstract.' And as every cognition that is brought about by another cognition, must be a qualified cognition, the unqualified cognition must be held to be a *cognition not brought about by another cognition*; and this is our definition of *Perception*, which includes Abstract Cognition under the category of 'Perception.' In regard to every cognition, it has been held that, *as cognition* it is 'abstract'; it becomes 'concrete' only when we come to its object,

which, if qualified, makes the cognition 'concrete', and if unqualified, makes it remain 'abstract.' And further, as every *anuvyavasāya* or representative cognition is the product of a previous cognition, the object must appear therein as the qualification; so that, inasmuch as every cognition must be followed by the corresponding representative cognition, it follows that while every cognition, so far as the first cognition is concerned, may be either 'abstract' or 'concrete',—it must, so far as the representative cognition is concerned, be 'concrete.' Even the ordinary cognition of the cow, is 'abstract' in so far as the conception of the class-character 'cow' is concerned; but in itself—in the form 'this is a cow'—it is 'concrete', as its object is the individual animal *qualified* by the particular class-character. It is on account of this admixture of the two characters of 'abstract' and 'concrete,'—both of which may be attributed to one and the same cognition—that those two have not been held to constitute distinct 'species'; as all *species* must be mutually exclusive.

The existence of Abstract Cognition having been proved, the Logician proceeds to discuss the question of what forms the object of that Cognition. The *Nyāyamāñjarī* (p. 97 *et. seq.*) points out the difference of opinion that there has been on this subject, among the several philosophers.

(a) The Bauddhas have held that what is cognised by the Abstract Cognition is only the '*svalakṣaṇa*', the 'specific individuality' of the thing; (b) others have held the *sum-mum genus* '*Sattā*', 'Being', to be the object of Abstract Cognition;—(c) others again hold that Abstract Cognition apprehends only the *verbal form* of things.

Such being the diversity of opinion, the truth, according to the Logician, is that as every Concrete Cognition is held to follow upon the corresponding Abstract Cognition, there must be some correspondence, some similarity, between what is apprehended by them. Proceeding from this standpoint we must reject the views indicated above. (a) Firstly, the

'specific individuality' of things cannot be regarded as the object apprehended by Abstract Cognition ; as when this is all that is apprehended by the Abstract Cognition, how can the notions of 'community' or class-character, come in, all of a sudden, into the corresponding concrete cognition ? (b) Nor secondly could we accept 'Being' to be apprehended by Abstract Cognition ; because as before, when the Abstract Cognition apprehends only 'Being' in general, how can the resulting concrete cognition become specified, all on a sudden ? (a) Lastly, the verbal form of a thing cannot be held to be apprehended by Abstract Cognition ; as it is absolutely impossible for any *verbal* form to be apprehended by a cognition brought about by the instrumentality of the Eye. The conclusion therefore is that what is apprehended by the Abstract Cognition is the same object that is apprehended by the corresponding Concrete Cognition ; with only this difference that while the Concrete Cognition is accompanied by a verbal expression,—which appears in the representative Cognition 'I perceive the cow',—the Abstract Cognition is entirely devoid of any verbal expression. And just as the Concrete Cognition apprehends sometimes a substance, sometimes an action, and sometimes a quality,—exactly so does the Abstract Cognition also, with only the one difference just pointed out,—*viz.* the Abstract Cognition is free from all verbal expression, which however is inseparable from the Concrete Cognition.

Such is the view of the older Logicians. But from the *Taṭtvachinṭāmaṇi* we learn that the chief difference between Abstract and Concrete Cognitions lies in the fact that while the latter apprehends its object along with its qualifying adjuncts, the former apprehends the object *per se*, by itself, independently of its qualifying adjuncts. The *Taṭtvachinṭāmaṇi* (p. 824) divides qualifying adjuncts into two classes—which it calls (1) *viśeṣaṇa* and (2) *upataksaṇa*. We lay stress upon this distinction as in course of our study of Indian Philosophy, this distinction will

come up in many places; in some cases the whole argument turns upon the question as to whether a certain property is a '*vishēṣaṇa*' or an '*upalakṣaṇa*'.

That which is ever co-existent with the thing, and is inseparable from it is its *Vishēṣaṇa*; while that which is not always co-existent with it, but is found to be so at some time or the other is its *Upalakṣaṇa* (Taṭ. Chi. p. 834). So that *Vishēṣaṇa* is the property or attribute of a thing, while *Upalakṣaṇa* is only an adventitious adjunct. For instance, the tower of the Muir College is its *vishēṣaṇa*; but the presence of the All-India Hockey Games is an *upalakṣaṇa*.

There are two other Cognitions which also the Logicians include under 'Perception'. One is the Intuitive Cognition that trained and advanced mystics have of things beyond the reach of the senses. These 'visions' cannot be dismissed as all false; for they are vouched for by persons of unimpeachable veracity; and yet they cannot be accounted for by any of the ordinary means of cognition. The Logician includes these under 'Perception' brought about by the contact of the internal organ of the Mind, through its faculty of 'intuition', *Pratibhā*. Says the *Nyāyamañjarī* (p. 105)—

'This Cognition is brought about by the instrumentality of the mind-organ, accomplished by the practice of meditation.'

The reach of the mind is not restricted, and when meditation is duly practised, its latent faculties become so far developed that its intuitive perceptive powers cease to be trammelled by the limitations of the physical body; so that its perceptive powers function unimpeded, and provide the perception of things, not perceptible by the physical organs under normal worldly conditions.

The second kind of cognition which the Logician includes under 'Perception' is *Pratyabhijñā*, Recognition. The exact character of Recognition is discussed in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* (p. 458 *et seq.*) and also in the *Tattvachintāmaṇi* (p. 839 *et seq.*).

Recognition appears in the form—‘This is that same man whom I saw yesterday’. The question arises—Does this conception consist of two cognitions or of a single cognition? The Logician’s answer is that there is a single cognition in this, though, what it apprehends is of a mixed character. This Recognition is brought about by the sense-organ—the Eye in the case cited—as aided by the impression left on the mind by the previous sight of the man; and what is apprehended is the object, the man, as qualified by the two points of time, past and the present. Nor is there anything incongruous in this. If the past time were apprehended as the *present*, or *vice versa*, the cognition would have been wrong; what happens however is that the *past* is apprehended as *past*, and the *present* as *present*—the cognitions meaning ‘the man I see now, in the present, is the man whom I saw in the past;’ and there is nothing wrong in this. As to how past things can enter into a present cognition, the *Nyāya-mañjarī* cites a graphic example: When a man is eating mangoes, after he has eaten a few—25 *f. i.*—he has the idea ‘I have eaten 25 mangoes’, or ‘I am now eating the 25th’; both these conceptions must contain the idea of the twenty-four fruits already eaten, which are not present at the time of the cognition; as without the idea of these 24, the man could not have the notion of either 25 or of the 25th.

The *Tattvachintāmaṇi* (p. 839 &c.) deals with the nature of Recognition more minutely.

That Recognition is brought about by sense-contact is a fact that cannot be denied; and as such it has every claim to being called ‘Perception’. As for the element of ‘that’—‘that I saw yesterday’—this is presented to the mind by remembrance; and this, being in contact with the mind as its qualifying factor, may be regarded as ‘Perception’. The again, *because* the Recognition is related to the present

time, that does not preclude all possibility of its being related to the past time; if it did, then there would be no possibility of our ever forming any conception of things related to several points in space.

Proceeding to analyse the notion of 'that' Gangēsha Upādhyāya offers three explanations:—(1) when we perceive a thing, we cognise it always as related to the present time; similarly when we come to *remember* it we remember it as related to the past time; and it is in this latter form that we speak of the thing as 'that'. Even though the Cognition and the Remembrance both apprehend the same object, yet it is spoken of as 'that' only in Remembrance, and not in Cognition, in which latter it is always spoken of as 'this'; hence that which is referred to by the pronoun 'this' in connection with the Cognition is the same that is referred to by the pronoun 'that' in connection with the Remembrance; and so far as their *object* is concerned, there is no difference between Cognition and Remembrance.

(2) The second explanation of the notion of '*that*' is that it serves to signify the *past* character of that same qualification which is signified by 'this' in the conception 'this is the jar'; and even though this *qualification* has never been cognised as *past*, yet there is nothing incongruous in its being *remembered* as such; it is true that what has been cognised is the qualification as 'this,' pertaining to the present,—but we shall be justified in assuming that the impression left upon the mind by this cognition is in the form of 'that'; and after all Remembrance follows from the Impression.

(3) The third explanation is that in the Remembrance of '*that jar*,' what appears to consciousness in that connection, *with the present time*, is that which is qualified by the notion of 'that;' as what brings about the Remembrance is—not only the impression left by some past cognition, but,—the impression as aided by certain circumstances and accessories, appearing at the present time, and contributing to the idea

of *present time* that appears in the Remembrance and consequent Recognition 'this is that same man.' Every reasonable man has to admit the fact that Remembrance and Recognition apprehend past time along with the *present*; if it were not so, no inference would be possible. When we infer the presence of fire from smoke, what happens is that when we see the smoke issuing, we are reminded of all the smoke that we have seen in the past, and found to be invariably concomitant with fire; and then taking this remembrance along with the smoke seen now,—we have the *recognition* of the smoke as that which has, in the past, been found to be concomitant with fire; and from this follows the inference that *there is fire in the place*.

duality, there would still be scope for Sense-perception, as this may be regarded as pertaining to the *practical* reality of things. And as between two mutually contradictory cognitions—*viz*: the Sense-perception in the form ‘I am a man’, and the Scriptural assertion ‘the Self is all-pervading and eternal like Ākāsha’—both can never be regarded as absolutely true, it becomes necessary for us to regard the one as *absolutely*, and the other as only *practically*, valid; specially as it would not be right to regard either as absolutely *invalid*. Under the circumstances, if we could possibly regard the Scriptural passages laying down absolute non-duality as only *practically* valid, then alone could we regard ordinary Sense-perception as *absolutely* valid. As a matter of fact however, we cannot attribute mere *practical* validity to the said Scriptural passages (as for *practical* purposes, the reality of duality cannot be denied); and so we are forced to the conclusion that the said passages are *absolutely* valid, and the Sense-perceptions in question are only *practically* so. This is a conclusion which we leave to the intelligent and the learned to judge.

Says the *Opponent*:—“In the case of the *Panchaḍasha-rātra* sacrifice (a sacrifice extending over fifteen days), we find that in view of the first day’s sacrifice, which is called “‘*Agniṣtuṣṭ*’, the *Subrahmaṇyā* verse to be employed is the *Āgnēyī*, which is indicated by the name ‘*Agniṣtuṣṭ*’ (this name containing the word ‘*Agni*’ indicates the verse whose name is ‘*Āgnēyī*’, which is derived from the word ‘*Agni*’); but as regards the sacrifices of the other fourteen days, we find it directly laid down that the *Subrahmaṇyā* to be employed is the *Aindrī*; and under the circumstances, what we do is that, as regards these latter sacrifices we reject the authority of the former *indication by the name* of the ‘*Agniṣtuṣṭ*’, and admit the ‘*Aindrī*’,—on the ground that while the former applies to the single sacrifice of the *Agniṣtuṣṭ*, the latter applies to fourteen sacrifices, and it is certainly the more reasonable course to sacrifice the

“authority of the lesser number to that of the larger. By
 “exactly the same process of reasoning, we find that it is
 “only right that we should sacrifice the authority of the
 “direct signification of the Vedic passages declaring Non-
 “duality, in favour of so many cognitions as—(1) the Sense-
 “perception of Duality, (2) the Inferential Cognitions based
 “upon this Perception, (3) the Vedic passages laying down
 “sacrifices and other rites, and (4) the passages laying
 “down the worshipping of *qualified* deities (both of these
 “latter passages presupposing Duality). In connection with
 “this we have the following declaration:—‘When *one*
 “cognition is found to be contrary to *many* cognitions, it
 “is regarded as invalid; as we find in the case of the
 “*perception of the shell-silver and the like.*’ ”

This is not possible, we reply; because in the example that
 you bring forward (of the *Panchadaharāṭra* sacrifice), we have
 the authority of one (which applies to only one case) sacrificed
 in favour of another *which applies to many cases*, while in the
 case in question, you seek to reject the validity of *one*
 in favour of the *many* (and not of that which *applies to*
many); hence the two cases are not analogous; as a matter
 of fact we find that in the case of the notion of the identity
 of the Self with the Body (a notion regarded as wrong,
 by the Logician also), even though this notion is sup-
 ported by the authority of ordinary Sense-perceptions, In-
 ferences and Verbal Cognitions (though from unauthoritative
 sources), yet the means of knowledge pointing to the Self
 being something different from the Body is accepted as the
 more authoritative; and the reason for this is that these latter
 could not be applied to anything else. Exactly in the
 same manner, finding that the passages speaking of *Non-*
duality cannot be applied to anything else, we shall be fully
 justified in regarding them as more authoritative than Or-
 dinary Sense-perception, &c. Specially as in reality, there
 is no contradiction between the two sets of cognitions; be-
 cause *firstly* the passages declaring Non-duality pertain to the

final stage of True Knowledge, while ordinary Sense-perception, &c., pertain to the Illusory Stage;—and secondly while the former are for the *Knowing* or *Wise* person, the latter are for the *Ignorant*.

Objection:—"Even though, in view of the above arguments, greater authority might not attach to
 Page 30. "Sense-perception, by its very nature, yet it cannot be denied that it forms the very basis of Inferential and Verbal Cognitions, and as such is possessed of greater authority. What is meant by Sense-perception being such a basis is that it apprehends, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, all that is needed by Inferential and Verbal Cognitions. In fact, we have many instances where a means of cognition, apprehending only a part of what is needed by another cognition, is regarded as its basis, rejecting it in case it happen to be contrary to itself; for instance,—(1) the inference of the omnipresence of the jar is based upon the organ of vision (in so far as unless we see the jar we can have no inferences with regard to it), and yet inasmuch as we actually see the jar to have a limited existence, the said inferential cognition is rejected (though the Eye perceives only one factor of the Inference); (2) the inference of the cleanliness of the human skull is rejected by the Scriptural cognition of its uncleanness, though this latter cognition pertains to only one factor of the Inference—*viz*: the Major Term; (3) the inference of the omnipresence of the Mind is rejected by another inferential cognition that we have of the substratum in which the Mind is contained. Thus when we find that inferential cognitions are rejected by other cognitions, even when these latter appertain to only a few of the factors needed by the former,—then it is no wonder that they should be set aside by those contrary cognitions that apprehend all that is needed by them. Then as regards the Eye and the other Sense-organs, and the Witness or Perceiving Soul presiding over them, though it is quite true that they do not apprehend

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“either Words, or Verbal Cognitions or the validity of these,—
 “yet these also must be regarded as the basis of Verbal Cog-
 “nition; inasmuch as they belong to the same category as
 “the Ear (which apprehends the words) and the Witness
 “(who has the Cognition and the notion of validity). Just as
 “we find that the scriptural cognition of the uncleanness of
 “the human skull is more authoritative than, and rejects, the
 “inferential cognition of its cleanliness,—this latter cog-
 “nition being based upon (supposed) Scriptures pointing to
 “such cleanliness; and this is the case because of the Scriptural
 “cognition of uncleanness belonging to the same category
 “(of ‘Scriptural cognition’) as the latter Scriptural cognition
 “(of cleanliness). It might be argued that the sense-organs
 “also are cognisable by Inference only; and hence there is a
 “mutual inter-dependence between Inferential and Sensuous
 “Cognitions. But the aid of Inference is not needed for the
 “actual appearance of Sense-perception, at least in the form in
 “which there is no cognition of the organ of that perception.
 “Whereas it is for the very appearance of Inferential and
 “Verbal Cognitions that the aid of Sense-perception is
 “necessary.”

Reply:—There is no actual incongruity between the authoritative character of the Sense-perception, and the fact of its being rejected by the Inferential or Verbal Cognition based upon it. That is to say, the Inferential or Verbal Cognition does not reject that form of the Sense-perception upon which it is based;—inasmuch as what they reject is the *essential* reality of Sense-perception, while what they are based upon is its *practical* reality; as certainly the essential reality of the perception of *smoke* does not form an essential factor in the circumstantial causes leading to the inference of fire. This has been thus declared in the following verse:—
 ‘Both of us (the Vēdāntin and the Logician) are agreed that the origin of Inference consists in a previous conception of the relationship of invariable concomitance; and as for the question of the *actual reality* of this origin,—which is not an

essential element in its character,—any discussion as to that would be profitless, (*Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*).

Then again, if the mere fact of one cognition apprehending what the other stands in need of were to make the former the *basis* of the latter, and were, on this ground, to reject this latter,—then, in the case of the misconception ‘this is silver’, and its rejection by the notion ‘this is not silver’, we would find that for the appearance of the latter,—i. e. in order that the latter may reject the *silver*,—the previous conception of silver is necessary; and as such the said misconception would be regarded as the *basis* of the subsequent cognition rejecting it; and being the *basis* of this latter, it would (according to you) be capable of setting aside that of which it is the basis; and as such how could there ever arise any such cognition as ‘this is not silver’?

Says the *Opponent*:—“Even though the cognition ‘this is silver’ pertains to an object that is denied by the subsequent cognition, and as such may be regarded as forming the basis of this latter, yet it is not the *validity* of that cognition that can be regarded as forming such basis. Specially as the cognition of a negative entity need not originate in a *valid* cognition of its counter-entity; as any such origination would lead to much confusion; and also because, as a matter of fact, we often find cognitions of negations appearing from mere *misconceptions* of their counter-entities. Hence it must be admitted that it is much simpler to regard the cognition of the negative entity as proceeding from the *cognition* of its counter-entity. And thus there would be nothing to stop the appearance of the cognition (‘this is not silver’) contrary to the previous cognition (‘this is silver’).”

Reply:—The same reasoning may be applied to the case in question: That is to say, the inferential cognition has its origin in the mere cognition (sensuous) of the ‘Subject’, and this origination does not necessarily involve the *validity* of this latter cognition.

Objection :—"As a matter of fact, one cognition can be regarded as the basis of another, only when the validity of this latter depends upon that of the former, both for its own accomplishment and for the rejection of its contraries ; as we find in the case of Cognition and Remembrance. In the case of the misconception of silver and its subsequent denial, we do not find this to be the case ; and as such in this case, one could not be regarded as the basis of the other."

Reply :—If such were the conditions for one cognition being the basis of another, then the cognition of 'invariable concomitance' would not be the basis of Inferential Cognitions. As it often happens that though the existence of fire is *inferred* from a misconception of *smoke* (while what is actually present is a mere *fog*), yet, by chance, fire is present in the place.

Objection :—"In reality, one thing must be regarded as the basis of another, when the two are so related that the latter can never appear without the former. And thus the misconception of silver in the shell would certainly be the basis of the subsequent right conception 'this is not silver' ; but this does not imply necessarily that the misconception is more trustworthy than the subsequent conception. Because the mere fact of being the basis does not make any conception non-trustworthy ; the trustworthy character of a conception depends upon its being able to stand the test of examination ; and this examination consists first, in finding out if the conception in question is compatible with other conceptions, and if, in the resultant activity, it is in actual agreement with the real state of things—and secondly in ascertaining that it is absolutely free from any sort of disagreement from other conceptions or resultant activities. These two conditions we do not find present in the case of the misconception of shell-silver.

"In the case in question however we find that these conditions

P. 31. "are fulfilled by Sense-perception, which there-

"fore must be regarded as trustworthy. We have
 "the conception, 'the jar is'; and this is actually found to
 "be followed by activities pertaining to the jar (and thus the
 "first condition of the aforesaid test is duly fulfilled); and
 "we also find that it is absolutely free from such sources of
 "mistake as extreme distance and the like (and thus the
 "second test is also fulfilled). In the same manner, in regard
 "to the Scriptural text speaking of the identity of the *Jiva*
 "and *God*, we find that it is incompatible with other Scriptural
 "texts speaking of the two being different; and also with the
 "actual direct cognition of the cognising Selves,—this latter
 "cognition being such as is found on examination to be free
 "from discrepancies, and as such not to be rejected, And
 "even on finding after examination a certain cognition to be
 "free from discrepancies,—if we were to have no trust in it,
 "then there could be no trusting any conception at all; for
 "instance, we would have no trust in any of the following:—
 "(1) the conception that the Veda is not the work of a
 "human author; (2) the idea that the inferential argument
 "put forward by the Vedantin is free from fallacies because
 "of our not finding any such etc. etc.; (3) every one of the
 "conceptions put forward in the various *adḥikaraṇas* of
 "*Vēdānta-Sūtra-bhāṣya*; (4) the idea that a certain concep-
 "tion or statement is in keeping with the premises with
 "which the discussion was started. And under such circum-
 "stances, we could not come to any definite conclusion with
 "regard to the validity or invalidity of any Cognition at
 "all."

Reply.—The 'test' or 'examination' of a certain cogni-
 tion consists in its being found to be in conformity with the
 resulting activity, and in its being free from all incongrui-
 ties of such activity, as also from other discrepancies;
 and what this 'test' proves with regard to the validity of the
 cognition is that it is absolutely incapable of being rejected

(or negated) with regard to the object cognised *at that particular time and place* ; just as smoke proves the existence of fire at the time and place that it is perceived. Consequently, all that your examination and test would prove would be that like all other ordinary conceptions, the conception of the identify of the Self with the Body is valid and incapable of being denied, *during the time that we are dealing with the mere practical reality of things in the world* ; and under the circumstances, why should this stand in the way of the inferential and scriptural cognition of the *absolute unrejectibility* (i.e., reality) of things? For these reasons, we conclude that our theory affords the necessary explanation for all ordinary beliefs, and ordinary cognitions, true as well as false, as also of the popular conception of difference between God and the Jiva, and so forth—all of which appertain to the region of practical existence. And thus it is only reasonable that the universe should be regarded as *unreal* (in the absolute sense of the term].

Objection :—“ If Sense-perception be rejected as invalid, “ then the knowledge of invariable concomitance (necessary “ for all inferential knowledge) would have to be rejected ; “ and this would set aside the reality of all inferred things, “ and reject the validity of all Inferential cognitions ; because “ the validity or invalidity of the subject of inferential cognition is dependent upon the character of the cognition of concomitance, and that of the inferential cognition. If it were “ not so (i. e. if the validity and invalidity of the inferred “ thing did not depend upon those of the premises and the “ conclusion) then, there would be a likelihood of the following “ absurdities :—(1) The absolute or the practical reality of “ Fire would be proved by means of Smoke misconceived with “ regard to fog, and thus having a merely *apparent* reality ; “ (2) the absolute reality of fire would be proved by means “ of the Smoke that has merely an *apparent* reality ; (3) “ the absolute reality of the Universe would be proved by

“reason of its not being rejected as unreal with regard to
 “the *practical* state of things; and (4) the absolute reality
 “of the difference between God and Jiva would be proved by
 “reason of the two being possessed of mutually contradic-
 “tory properties.”

Reply :—Up to this point all that your objection means is that the conception of a certain invariable concomitance (*i. e.* of the premises) proves the conclusion with regard to the Subject, the character of whose existence (in the point of Reality or Unreality) is similar to that of the concomitance itself. And this is what we also accept by all means; as there is nothing except Brahman that is absolutely beyond rejection. As a matter of fact, however, in the case of Inferential Cognitions, it is not necessary that the character of the Subject of the conclusion should be similar to that of the invariable concomitance or premises. Because we find many instances, where correct inferential cognitions are brought about, in regard to the Subject qualified by the Probandum, by a wrong or invalid *Probans*; as for instance,—(1) according to the Mīmāṃsaka, true verbal cognitions are produced by Letters, which however are unreal, in so far as they are conceived of as qualified by *shortness and length* which in reality belong to the *Sounds*, and not to *Letters*, which are eternal and all-pervading;—and conversely (2) in the case of the jar, in which the odour is yet to appear (after baking), we *infer* the existence of the odour (which, for the time, must be regarded as unreal), from the premiss based upon the fact of the jar being of the Earth,—a premiss that is quite true and real; (3) the *unreal* reflection leads to the inference of the *real* reflected object. It might be argued that, in the last case, the premiss that we have is real—being as it is, in the form that ‘there can be no reflection without a reflected object.’ But if we were to admit of such ‘concomitances’, then the Ākāsha would also have to be regarded as invariably concomitant with the Universe, as there can be no Ākāsha without the Universe; and certainly this would not be admissible.

Says the Opponent,—“In the case of the reflection, what “we infer is the fact of its being *preceded* by the reflected “object; and this is inferred from the fact of the reflection “being an object of such negation as is due to the
 Page 32. “negation of the Reflected Object; and certainly “this is a *Probans* as devoid of mere *apparent reality* as the “Object itself.”

But what do you mean by one negation being *due* to another? It cannot mean that it produces, or is produced by, this latter; because there can be no such causal relationship between two negations. So all that it can mean is that one is invariably concomitant with the other; and thus the Probans of your inference would consist in the fact of the reflection being the object of negation with which the negation of the reflected object is invariably concomitant; and this reason has already been shown to be faulty and inconclusive, with reference to *Ākāśha*, &c. Hence it must be admitted that the existence of the reflected object is inferred from the *Reflection* itself. Specially as it has been shown above that it is not necessary for the existence of the Subject of the inference to be of the same character as that of the Probans or Reason leading to that inference.

The above reasoning also serves to set aside the following theory:—“In the case of verbal cognitions also the existence “of the denotation of the word must be of the same character “as that of its *capability* (to be construed along with the “sentence in which it occurs); specially because it is absolutely necessary that the existence of this *capability* must “be of the same character as the meaning of the sentence “(and the meaning of the sentence is only that which is made “up of the meanings of the component words). Under “the circumstances, when the *capability* of words would be “rejected as *unreal*, how could there be any *reality* in the “meanings of the Vēdānta texts (composed of those words)?”

This reasoning has no force; because in the case of the Vēdānta texts, there is no rejection (as *unreal*) of the *capability*

of the sentence,—this *capability* only consisting in the non-rejection of the meaning of the sentence regarded as one corporate whole.

Says the Opponent:—"Even then, according to you, the "Vēdānta text, the cognition derived therefrom, and its "validity, being all unreal,—how could you establish the absolutely *real Non-duality*?"

Answer :—For the reality of the object denoted by a word, it is not a necessary condition that the word and the cognition derived therefrom should be real. As in the case of the assertion 'this is silver' (with regard to a piece of shell) made by an untrustworthy person, you also hold that there is *reality* in the assertion (Verbal) and also in the misconception produced by it,—and yet you regard the object expressed by the assertion to be *unreal*. Then again, even though the validity of the cognition may be unreal, it does not necessarily follow that the object of that cognition is unreal.

Objection :—"The validity of the cognition being unreal, "the object cognised must also be unreal; as we find in the "case of the cognition of the shell-silver; similarly in the case "in question also the validity of the cognition (derived from "the Vēdānta texts) being unreal, the object therein spoken "of (*i. e.* Non-duality) should also be unreal."

Reply :—As a matter of fact, the unreality of the validity of a cognition cannot be regarded as the ground or reason for the unreality of the object cognised; because we have no rejection (as unreal) of any object in the case of Non-determinate cognitions, which are different in character from Misconceptions as well as Right Cognitions. [*I. e.* even though the non-determinate cognition be false, there is no falsity of the object, as there is no conception of any definite object in this case]. What is a sure indicator or reason of the unreality of an object cognised is that form of invalidity in the cognition which consists in its conceiving of the object as what it is not. And certainly there is no such contrary conception in the case of the Cognitions derived from the Vēdānta texts.

Says the *Opponent* :—"If there be an unreality in that " validity (of a cognition) which consists in the non-rejection " of its object, then certainly, this object itself would also be " unreal."

Reply :—In the case of the Vēdānta texts, the Unreality of that validity which consists in the non-rejection of the objects spoken of by them, is not due to the rejection or denial of these objects ;—because there is no possibility of any valid means of knowledge that would so deny them ; specially as the object mentioned by the Vēdānta texts consists of the denial of the reality of *all things*, [and we cannot conceive of any means of knowledge whereby we could reject this universal denial]. What the aforesaid 'Unreality' of validity is due to is the denial of the peculiar *relationship* of the objects as borne to the words denoting them. And hence even though there be an unreality of that validity which consists in the non-rejection of the objects,—this does not necessarily imply the unreality of the objects themselves. Because in the case of a qualified object, it is quite possible that while one section (the qualification *f. i.*) is unreal, the other is quite real ; as for instance, in the case of the *man with a stick*, even though we may deny the existence of the stick, that does not imply the denial of the man.

End of section (13)—Wherein it is shown that no absolute validity belongs to Perception.

Section (14).

[Sense-perception is capable of being sublated by Inferential Cognition.]

In fact, an Inferential Cognition, which has the power of setting aside its contrary, becomes a sublator of even sense-perception (if this happens to be contrary to it).

"But," says the Opponent, "if direct Sense-perception " were to be set aside by Inferential Cognitions, then we " would have the whole elaborate system of interpretation " propounded in the Mīmāṃsā-shāstra rejected from its very " foundations. Because—(1) the direct cognition, afforded " by the Direct Assertion 'the priest should recite while

“touching the Uḍumbara post’, would be set aside by the
 “Inference of another Direct Vedic Assertion from the Smṛiti
 “declaration that ‘the whole of the Uḍumbara post should be
 “covered up with cloth’; (2) the direct signification of the
 “Assertion ‘the Gārhapatya fire should be worshipped with
 “the *Aindri* verse’ would be set aside by the Inference
 “of the fact of the verse in question—‘*Kaṣṭhā cha nāṣṭa-*
 “*rīrasi nēndra saśchasi dāṣukhē*’—pertaining to Indra
 “as indicated by the presence herein of the name of
 “Indra; and (3) the direct signification of the sentence ‘the
 “sacred grass employed (at the Shyēna sacrifice) consists of
 “the *Shara*’ would be set aside by the Inference of a Vedic
 “text laying down the use of the *Kusha* Grass,—this inference
 “being based upon the General Injunction (as to the use of
 “*Kusha* at all sacrifices).”

There would be no such thing; as the two cases are by
 no means analogous. What do you mean by bringing
 forward the case of these *Adhikarāṇas*? Do you mean that
 in these cases, the Inferential cognition, would set aside
 the sensuous Cognition of the three Vedic Sentences?
 Or, that they would set aside those Vedic sentences which are
 the objects of sensuous Perception? It could not be the
 former; because there being no actual opposition between
 the Inferences and the Sentences, any enquiry as to whether
 the one sets aside the other cannot rightly form the subject-
 matter of any serious dissertation. Nor do we admit of the
 existence of any such opposition [and it is only when the
 sensuous Perception is contrary to the Inferential cognition
 that the latter sets aside the former]. Consequently in this
 case your objection would be against something that we do
 not hold; and as such you would be open to the charge of
Niranuyoḍyānuyoja, ‘Objecting to what need not be objected to’.

For this same reason too the second interpretation of your
 position is not tenable. Because even though we
 P. 33. have the support of the scriptures to the view
 that all Indirect Indications are set aside by Direct Asser-

tions found in the Veda,—yet these scriptures would not in any way be contradicted by the fact of such Indirect Indications (and Inferences based thereupon) setting aside sensuous Perception (as it is only the Vedic assertion that may never be set aside). And certainly the word or sentence (of the Veda) cannot be regarded as identical with the sensuous Perception that we may have of these ; in fact as regards Verbal Cognition, we have already laid great stress upon its being the most authoritative form of cognition. Thus then, you will see that it was sheer foolishness or your part to have put forward the incompatibility of the aforesaid *Mīmāṃsā Adhikaraṇas* with our view.

Says the *Opponent* :—“ If sensuous Perception were set “ aside by Inferential Reasons, (and not *vice versa*), then the “ inference of the *coolness of fire* could not be set aside by the “ direct Sensuous Perception of its *heat* ; nor would the “ inference of the momentary character of the Self be set “ aside by the direct recognition of its permanent character. “ In fact in both these cases it would be the Inferences that “ would set aside the direct cognitions.”

In the case of the fire, the sensuous cognition (of fire being hot) is made stronger by reason of its being compatible with the nature of the effects produced by the fire ; and in the case of the Self, the cognition of its permanence is supported by scriptural passages ; hence being thus strengthened, the two cognitions in question are made capable of setting aside the inferential cognitions to the contrary. As a matter of fact, it is a sensuous Cognition that has not been duly tested which is weaker, or less valid, than a thoroughly tested inferential cognition ; as for instance, the cognition of the sky as *blue* (as *seen* by the Eye) is less valid than the inferential cognition of the sky being *colourless*. Hence there can be no likelihood of a hopeless confusion as to all means of knowledge becoming mixed up with the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* form of Inference.

Objection:—"If Inferential Cognition were more valid than Sense-perception then, whenever we would see an animal, it would be right and correct to regard it as *horned* also, as notwithstanding the fact of our *seeing* no horns, the presence of horns would be inferred from the presence of the *animal-character*; as it would be very much simpler to regard the *presence of horns* as invariably concomitant with the *animal-character*, than to regard it as concomitant with such indefinite characters as those of the Cow, the Deer and such other horned animals; because we can form no all-comprehensive conception of all such animals. And this reasoning lending special support to the inference of the *presence of horns*, this Inference would become more valid than the sensuous cognition (whereby the horns are found to be absent). This greater validity would be due to the fact that the only strength or force that the validity of an inferential cognition has consists in its being supported by corroborative reasonings, as we find in the case in question. And in this manner, in all cases we could go on inferring the presence of certain characteristics from the presence of some general property and character; as in all such cases the inference would have the support of some reasoning or other bearing testimony to its simplicity and validity. And it is only this testimony which, according to you, makes the Inferential Cognition capable of setting aside sensuous Perception. Thus there would be no fixity even to the *practical* state of things. As the only objection that there is to rejecting the *practical* reality of things is that such rejection would be contrary to a fact of Sense-perception. [Hence when the rejection of Sense-perception would be only desirable, there would be no objection to the rejecting of the *practical* reality of things also]."

Reply:—Not so; because any inference of the *presence of horns*, which, by the very nature of the animal concerned, would be an impossibility, could never reject the Sensuous Perception (of the absence of horns); and as for the reasoning

pointing to the concomitance of the *horn* with the *animal-character*, it will be shown by yourself that it is fallacious; and so it is quite possible for both of us to admit of a restriction or limit. (under which alone would sensuous Perception be rightly regarded as sublated by Inferential Cognition). No person for a moment holds that any validity attaches to an Inference that is supported by fallacious reasonings. Thus it is only right to hold that a sensuous Perception is sublated by an Inferential Cognition which is supported by sound and valid reasonings.

End of Sec. (14).—wherein it is shown that Perception may be sublated by Inference.

Section (15).

[Perception may be sublated by Verbal Cognition also.]

In fact Sensuous Perception is also set aside by such Verbal Cognition as has its validity fully tested and established.

“But”, says the Opponent,—“if Sensuous Perception were “sublatable by Verbal Cognition, then it would not be “right for Jaimini to have regarded the *Arṭhavāda* passage—‘therefore during the day smoke alone is seen of “fire’,—and the Mantra ‘Aḍiṭi is heaven, &c.’—as contrary “to facts of Sensuous Perception, and then to have taken “them, on this same ground of contradiction, as indirect or “figurative descriptions, and as such not objectionable. Nor “again, would it be considered right for him to have taken “the words ‘*prasṭaraḥ*’ and the like, in the sentences “‘*yaṇjamānaḥ prasṭaraḥ*’ &c. &c., in their indirect figurative “signification, under the Sūtra ‘*Tatsiddhijāṭi-sārūpya* &c. &c.’ “(*Mimāṃsāsūtra* I—iv—Aṣhikaraṇas 12 to 17). [As in these “cases also it is only the incompatibility of the direct signi- “fications of the words with Sensuous Perception that makes “us take them in their indirect significations.] Thirdly, “the Vēdāntin also takes the words ‘*taṭ*’ and ‘*tvam*’ (in the “sentence ‘*tuṭṭvamasi*’) in the indirect figurative sense,

“simply for the sake of making the interpretation compatible with well-recognised facts of Sense-perception; and “there would be no need for this if Sensuous Perception “were set aside by Verbal Cognition, which therefore would “be more authoritative, and as such would not need the said “compatibility; in reality the fact of the Sensuous Perception “being contrary to the signification of the sentence would “deprive the said Perception of all validity.

“It might be argued that, —‘in the case of the sentence “‘*ṭaṭṭvamasī*’, in the interpretation that we have adopted, there “is no abandoning of the direct primary meaning; as the “meaning that we accept is the one that is indicated by the “presence of many marks indicative of the sense of the sentence “—these marks being in the form of such peculiarities of the “context as the *beginning* and the *end* of the section in which “the sentence occurs. [And so in this case there is no “abandoning of the direct signification in view of any fact “of Sense-perception.]”

“But if it is so in the case of the Vedantic interpretation “of the Vedic sentences, then in the case of the sentence “*yajamānaḥ praśtaraḥ*’ &c., also, we find such marks indicative of the sense as the *apūrvatva*.* And a single mark “being rightly indicative of the sense of a sentence, the other “marks would be regarded as merely descriptive (and as such “having no direct bearing upon the sense of the sentence). “So for instance, according to the Vedāntin, if the *non-difference* “(of all things from Brahman) were proved by Sense-per- “ception, the scriptural passages pointing to such non- “difference should be regarded as merely descriptive. This “is enough for you; and there is no use for multiplying “further arguments.”

Reply:—In the case of the Arthavāda passages— (1)
 P. 34. ‘During the day, the smoke alone &c.’ (2) ‘*Aḍiṭi*
 is heaven’, and (3) ‘*Yajamānaḥ praśtaraḥ*’ &c.—
 the greater validity of Sensuous Perception is established by

* i. e. the fact of the identity of the *yajamāna* with the *praśtara* not being cognisable by any other means of knowledge.

the fact of its having been fully tested and found to have such supports as those of (1) *vākyaśhēṣa*, the subsequent words of the sentence, (2) the corroboration of other means of knowledge, and (3) the fulfilment of useful purposes ; and hence as regards the *practical* state of things, the passages in question, being found to have their direct significations contradicted by the said facts of sensuous Perception, come to be taken in their indirect meanings. But though this is so in the case of the Arṥhavāḍa passages cited, yet, as regards the Vedānta passages speaking of Non-duality, these are never found to have their meanings contrary to any well-tested form of cognition ; and as such these latter are quite capable of being taken in their direct significations. All that the testing of Sensuous Perception and such other forms of cognition does is to establish their truth *as regards the practical state of things* ; and certainly this merely *practical* truth is not set aside by any Vedānta scriptures. What these scriptures do set aside is the *absolute* validity of such ordinary cognitions ; and certainly these cognitions are never found, on testing, to have any such *absolute* validity ; so that there is no incongruity. In the case of the aforesaid Arṥhavāḍa passages, on the other hand, it is the *practical* validity of sensuous Perception that is set at nought by their direct significations ; and hence on account of this incongruity they have to be taken in their indirect significations. Thus there is a difference between the case of the Vedānta texts and the Arṥhavāḍa passages cited above.

Then again, it has been asserted that—"if validity attached to Sensuous Perception, then the Vedāntin could not be led, by the contradiction of such Perception, to take the words ' *tuṭ* ' and ' *tvam* ' in their indirect significations." But this is not right ; because in the case of the sentence ' *taṭtvamasi* ', we have recourse to indirect signification, not because of its incongruity to any Sensuous Perception, but for the following reasons :—(1) As a matter of fact we find that the import of the sentence is one

impartite whole, as indicated by the six * 'indicatives of import', and also by the analogy of other Vedānta passages; and such an import we find impossible to get at unless we have recourse to the indirect significations of some of the words. (2) We know that God (denoted by the word '*īś*') is omniscient, and the Jīva (denoted by the word '*jīva*') is limited; and under the circumstances to speak of the two as identical would be absurd, unless we took the words as having meanings other than those directly signified. And thus we find that recourse is had to the indirect signification, solely for the purpose of getting at the one indivisible fact that forms the import of the sentence. In fact in all cases of indirect interpretation we find that the chief motive that leads men to have recourse to it, is to get at the true import of the sentence.

Says the *Opponent*:—"In that case the Vedānta text would come to be taken in its secondary signification."

What do you mean by a sentence being taken in its secondary sense? (1) Does it mean that its expressed meaning is abandoned and another meaning accepted? or (2) that it is taken in a sense not expressible by it at all? In the case in question the former explanation would not apply; because we do not renounce the idea of the identity of the *Paramātmā* and the *Jīva*, at any rate so far as co-extensiveness is concerned,—and it is this idea alone that is expressed (by the sentence '*īśajīvamasi*').

Nor would the second explanation be applicable; because the form of indirect signification that we admit of in the sentence in question is that which renounces, and at the same time does not renounce entirely, the direct primary signification; and hence even though we do abandon one part of the directly expressed meaning, yet it is only another part of this same meaning that is accepted as forming the import; exactly as we have in the case of the

* These six 'indicatives of import' are (1) *Upakrama*, Beginning (2) *Upasamhāra*, End (3) — *Abhyāsa*, Repetition (4) *Apūrva*†, Newness, (4) *Phala*, Result (5) *Ārthavāda*, Praise or Dispraise and (6) *Upapaññi*, Reasoning.

sentence 'So' *yandēvadattaḥ* 'this is the same Devadatta.' In fact in the case in question all that is meant by the signification being 'secondary' or 'indirect' is that out of the qualified thing that is directly denoted, the qualification is rejected, and the thing by itself alone is accepted as forming the denotation. This has been thus declared by Vāchaspati Mishra: "The sentences, '*Yajamānaḥ prastarah*' &c. are taken as expressive of their secondary meaning, because they are all subordinate to other sentences;—as regards the Vedānta texts describing non-duality, they are not subordinate to any other sentences, and as such their signification must be non-secondary or primary." In the '*Shabara-Bhāṣya* also it has been thus declared:—"In an Injunction, the signification of words cannot be said to be *secondary*." We shall show later on how the sentences '*Yajamānaḥ prastarah*' and the like cannot be taken in their direct significations, on account of such reasons as *Apūrvatva* and the like which point to their true import.

Says the *Opponent*:—"What leads a certain sentence to "be taken in its secondary signification is not the fact of "its being subordinate to another sentence, but the fact "of its being opposed to other forms of right knowledge; "and so also what makes a sentence to be taken in its primary "signification is the fact of its not being opposed to the "other forms of right knowledge, and not the fact of its not "being subordinate to something else. Because as a matter "of fact, we find—in the case of such ordinary sentences as " 'this cow giving a large quality of milk should be purchas- "ed', and in the Vedic sentence '*Prajāpati* wept, and "from the weeping was produced silver, &c. &c.'—that even "though the sentences are subordinate to other sentences, "yet they are taken in their primary signification, simply "because they are not found to be opposed to any other forms "of right knowledge; and we do not have recourse to any "indirect meanings, as we have in the case of the sentences

* *gajamānaḥ prastarah*’ and the like. And conversely, we find, in the case of the sentence ‘one should sacrifice with the Soma-juice,’ that even though it is not opposed to any other form of right cognition, yet we do not accept it in its primary meaning,—*firstly* because if we do not accept the two words ‘*somēna*’ and ‘*yujēṣa*’ to be co-ordinate (*i. e.* if we do not interpret the two words as ‘*Somēna yājēna*’), then we make the interpretation open to the fault of ‘threefold contradiction’; and *secondly*, if we do accept the two as co-ordinate, then the meaning becomes opposed to a fact of Sense-perception (as the *Soma* is not actually seen to be the *sacrifice* itself); and consequently, in order to guard against these absurdities, we accept the secondary signification of the word ‘*Somēna*’, taking it to mean ‘*Somavafā*’—the sacrifice at which *Soma* is employed.

“Similarly, in the case of the Sūtra—‘Now then there should be an enquiry into the nature of Brahman’—wherein we have an injunction for the enquiry,—as also in the Shruti sentence ‘seek to know That,’—we accept the word ‘*Jijñāsa*’ to indirectly indicate the *enquiry*, in order to establish the syntactical connection of the injunction, without contradicting any other forms of right knowledge; and so also in the case of the sentence ‘all this is Brahman’ &c., we admit of the secondary signification (for the sake of avoiding the contradiction of other forms of right knowledge). And as the whole of this sentence is accepted as indirectly indicating *Brahman* only, which is not directly expressible by all the words,—it would not be right to deny the indirect secondary signification. There are two circumstances that justify our having recourse to the secondary or indirect signification of sentences—*viz.* (a) if the direct signification makes the syntactical connection impossible, or (b) if the direct meaning of words fails to give the required import of the sentence; and these conditions are fulfilled in both cases—*i. e.* when the sentence in question contains an injunction, as well as when it does not.

“As for the sentence quoted from the *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, “what it means is that there can be no indirect signification in the case of an Injunction, only for lending predominance to the Arthavāda passage.

“For these reasons, Sensuous Perception cannot be held to be sublatble by Verbal Cognition.”

To the above the following reply is made :—The Opponent apparently does not understand things : What
Page 35. is meant by a sentence being taken in its primary signification is that it expresses a meaning that directly forms its import,—and not that it expresses what is directly denotable by it; and similarly what is meant by its being taken in the secondary signification is that it has an import other than what is expressed by the words,—and not that its meaning is got at by what is called the Indicative Process (of *Lukṣaṇā*). Thus then, in the case of the Vedānta passages, even though we have recourse to the indirect indicative process of signification, for the purpose of bringing about the due comprehension of what forms their true import,—yet this does not mean that the direct primary meaning of the passages has been renounced; as we have already explained. Similarly, in the case of the sentence ‘one should sacrifice with the Soma-juice’, its true import of the qualified injunction (that of the *sacrifice with the Soma-juice*) does not rest in the qualification (*Soma-juice*) alone; and hence even though we have recourse to the Possessive Indication (taking ‘*Somēna yajēta*’ as equivalent to ‘*Somavāṇa yāgēna* etc.’), yet, as the primary meaning is not *wholly* abandoned, the sentence cannot be regarded as being taken in its *secondary* meaning.

Then, as regards the word ‘*Jijñāsā*’ (in the Sūtra ‘*athāto Brahmajijñāsā*’), some people hold that the *knowledge as desired* is indirectly indicated by the root ‘*jñā*’; while others deny this fact; but even though there is this difference of opinion, yet when we come to consider the signification of

the desiderative affix 'san', the upholders of both opinions are equally obliged to admit of an *indirect* indication in which a certain factor of the *direct* signification is renounced. And thus though there is a renouncing of the direct signification, yet as the desired sense of 'Injunction' is accomplished all the same, we do not regard the expression as taken in its secondary meaning. Then again, even though we may have recourse to indirect indication in the case of a word,—this recourse being necessitated by the fact that without such indication the comprehension of the sentence in which that word occurs would not be got at,—yet that does not mean that the whole sentence is thereby taken in its secondary signification. Because the meaning of the sentence thus comprehended, not being subordinate to anything else, cannot but be accepted as *primary*. In a case however, where the meaning of the sentence is comprehended as subordinate to something else, the sentence would certainly be accepted as taken in its secondary signification.

Then again, the *import* of the *sentence* is something wholly different from that of the *word*. As for instance, in such sentences as '*sainḍhavamānaya*,' ('*gṛṅgāyām vasaṭi*') and the like, though the import of the *sentence* is one only (that of *bringing something*), yet the imports of the words are diverse (the word '*sainḍhava*' being at one time taken as denoting *salt*, and at another, a particular kind of *horse*, and so forth); and conversely, in the sentence '*viṣam bhukṣva*', even though the import of the words is one only (the *eating of poison*), yet the import of the sentence is diverse (the sense of the sentence when addressed by a friend being wholly opposed to that when it is addressed by an enemy).

Thus then, in the sentences—(1) 'the cow giving much milk should be purchased', (2) 'Prajāpati wept &c.', (3) 'all this is Brahman',—we have recourse to secondary signification; because the *first* sentence is subordinate to the Injunction that *the cow must be purchased*, and as such it cannot but be

taken as indirectly indicating the *excellence* of the cow;—the *second* sentence is found to be subordinate to the Injunction that *silver should not be placed on the grass, and the sacrificial gift should be given in gold*, and so the sentence is taken as indicating the *excellence* of gold indirectly through the deprecation of silver;—and the *third* sentence being found to be subordinate to the Injunction of *calmness* contained in the sentence ‘*ṣajjalāniṣi śkāṇṭa upāsiṭa*’, and so it is taken as indirectly indicating that form of *excellence* of the worship which consists in its being very easily accomplished.

Thus then, we have set aside the view that we have recourse to the indirect or secondary signification only when the direct or primary signification is contrary to other forms of right cognition. Because we do not find any such contradiction in the above-explained case of the sentence, ‘the cow giving much milk &c.’, where however we have the indirect indication of *excellence*. And we conclude that in all *Arṭhavāḍa* passages, we have recourse to the indirect signification, only for the purpose of bringing about the due comprehension of its real import. But the only difference is this : if that comprehension of the *Arṭhavāḍa* passage which appears before the indication of the excellence of the allied Injunction happens to be contrary to a certain other valid form of cognition, then it is rejected (as false),—as in the case of the *Arṭhavāḍa*, ‘*Prajāpati cut out his own fat &c.*’; and it is for this reason that such *Arṭhavāḍa* passages are regarded as having some sort of an indirect or secondary signification. In a case however where the *Arṭhavāḍa* is found to express something already known by other means of knowledge, it is regarded as merely *descriptive* (and not as *Injunctive*)—as for instance, in the sentence ‘*Agni is the medicine for cold.*’ And in both these cases the *Arṭhavāḍa* passage is not regarded as authoritative or valid; because the *validity* of a cognition consists in its making known something that is not rejected by other cognitions, and which is not already known by other means of knowledge;

and this *validity* we have seen is not present in the two kinds of *Arthavāda* just noticed. But there are many *Arthavāda* passages which neither contradict other forms of cognitions, nor have their subject-matter already known; and as such passages fulfil the necessary conditions of *validity*, they are regarded as ‘*Bhūṭārthavāda*’; as for example the sentence ‘Indra raised his thundervolt against Vṛiṭṭra.’ This is what has been explained under the *Dēvoṭāḍhikaraṇa* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*.

Says the *Opponent*:—“If such be the case, then, in the “case of such sentences as ‘*āḍiṭyo yūpaḥ*’, and the like, as “the indirect Indication would be accepted only for the “purpose of the due comprehension of the meaning of the “sentence,—the meaning thus got at could not be regarded “as *secondary*.”

Certainly, it could not be regarded as *secondary*, if the meaning of the sentence finally got at were that *the sacrificial post is like the sun*. As a matter of fact, however, the meaning of the sentence, though got at by indirect signification, is subordinate to the Injunction that the *Animal is to be*
P. 36. *tethered to the post*; and hence the sentence ‘*āḍiṭyō yūpaḥ*’ cannot but be regarded as indirectly indicating the mere *excellence* of the post; and this indicated meaning would certainly be only *secondary*; but this *secondary* character of the meaning would not be due to any figurative use of the word ‘*āḍiṭiyah*’. It is this that has been shown under the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* ‘*Tatsiddhi &c.*’ (I—iv— 12 *et, seq.*), where in connection with all the passages cited, the author has shown the various methods of secondary signification, to which recourse is had for the sake of the due comprehension of other sentences appearing among those cited. As for the indirect indication of the excellence of the sacrifice in connection with which the *Arthavāda* passage occurs, this indication is found in all *Arthavāda* passages; and as such this indication is also present in the sentences cited under the *Sūtra* ‘*Tatsiddhi &c. &c.*’ also. And thus we find that there can

be no incongruity in regarding these sentences as having *secondary* meanings. And consequently it follows that the case of these passages is by no means analogous to that of the Vedānta passages asserting *non-duality*.

Then, the Opponent has quoted the authority of the *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, to the effect that we cannot have recourse to the secondary meaning of the Injunction, for the sake of getting at the primary meaning of the *Arthavāda*.

But this assertion of the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* is scarcely consistent; as we find that in the case of the Injunction. 'pratiḡrihñyāt' 'one should accept'—occurring in connection with the *Aśva-praṭigraha Iṣṭi*—the word *pratiḡrihñyāt* has been interpreted to mean 'pratiḡrāhayēṭ', ('should make to accept', i. e. 'should offer'); and this interpretation is possible only by assuming that the sense of the *causal* is got at by indirect indication, in accordance with the *Arthavāda* passage occurring in the context. In view of this the sentence quoted from the *Shabara-Bhāṣya* must be taken to mean that, in an Injunction, which is a sentence with a definite import, there is no other predominant factor save the meaning of the sentence that is comprehended.

Thus then, it is fully established that even though the Vedānta passages are taken in their indicated significations, yet the meanings thus got at are not necessarily *secondary*; and hence they are fully capable of setting aside sensuous Perceptions.

END OF SECTION (15).

Section 16.

[Sensuous Perception is sublated by Inferential and Verbal Cognitions, because it the forerunner of these ;—this being in accordance with the *Apachchhēḍanyāya* of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, by which that which follows is more powerful than that which goes before.]

Then again, Verbal Cognitions must be regarded as more authoritative than Sensuous Cognition, also in accordance with the *Apachchhēḍanyāya*. That is to say, in the *Adhikarana* of the *Mīmāṃsā* dealt with under the *Sūtra*—‘*paurvāparyā pūrvaḍaurbalyam prakriṣṭaḥ*’ (6-5-54), it has been shown that the sacrifice,—at which all the belongings of the sacrificer have to be given away, which is laid down as to be performed in expiation of the anomaly incurred in the line of priests passing out being broken by the *Pratiharṭri* priest,—is set aside in favour of the sacrifice at which no gifts have to be given, and which is to be performed in expiation of a similar breaking of the line by the *Udgāṭri* priest ; and the reason given for this is that the passing of the *Udgāṭri* comes after that of the *Pratiharṭri*. In accordance with this law, it is only right that Sensuous cognition, which is the forerunner of all forms of cognition, should be sublated by Verbal Cognition.

Says the *Opponent* :—“ When the breaking of the line by “ the *Pratiharṭri* occurs after that by the *Udgāṭri*, it is only “ right that the sacrifice with all gifts laid down for the “ former should make room for the sacrifice without gifts “ laid down for the latter ; and the reason for this is very “ simple :—whether the breaking be done by the *Pratiharṭri* “ alone, or by both the *Pratiharṭri* and the *Udgāṭri*, occurring “ either simultaneously or one after the other,—there is “ always room for the performance of rites in connection “ with the passing of the *Pratiharṭri*, even after the perform- “ ance of that in connection with the *Udgāṭri*. Otherwise “ (i. e. if the prior performance of the sacrifices in connection “ with the *Udgāṭri* did not mean the mere postponement

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“of the other), we would be rejecting the authority of the Vedic injunction that, ‘if the Praṭiharṭṛi should break the line one should give away all his belongings.’ It is for this reason that in the *Adhikaraṇa* under the *Sūtra*—“*vipraṭiṣṭhāṇā vikalpaḥ syāt*”—it has been said that “if the breaking of the line should be by the two priests simultaneously, then there should be an option (as to the performance of the expiatory rites in connection with the one or the other). Then again, in the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the passage—*Yadyudgātā jaghanyaḥ syāt punaryajñe sarvāvśasandīḍyāt, ahetarasmin, &c.*’ it has been said that in case the breaking by the Udgātṛi should occur after that by the Praṭiharṭṛi, the sacrificer should, at first, perform the rites without gift in connection with the former; and then during the second course of the Jyotiṣṭhoma that he has to perform, the gift that he gives in accordance with the Injunction ‘he should give what he was going to give during the first course,’ is not in the form of the 1,200 gold pieces ordinarily given at the Jyotiṣṭhoma sacrifice, but in the shape of *all his belongings*; because it was this form of gift that he was going to make during the first course, in consideration of the breaking of the line by the Praṭiharṭṛi; and the reason for this course is that the desire that had arisen in his mind for giving away all this in connection with the breaking by the Praṭiharṭṛi has not been removed from his mind; and thus we find that the performance of the expiatory rites in connection with the break by the Praṭiharṭṛi is not set aside absolutely, but only temporarily postponed, to be done in another course of the sacrifices. In this connection, we find the statement in the *Tuṭṭikā* that ‘the performance comes in during the other course.’ Then again, in a case where the two breaks occur in their natural order, the performance of the sacrifice without gifts being performed before that at which all one’s belongings have to be given away, there is no incongruity at all; just as in the case of the berry, there

“is no incongruity in the appearance of the two colours, *green* and *red*, in their natural order of sequence. It has been said under the *Apachhēḍāḍhikaraṇa* (in the *Shāstrāḍipikā*) that—‘all that is meant by a conditional injunction is that, even though the main sacrifice should have been otherwise performed, prior to the appearance of the stated conditions, it should, on the appearance of those conditions, be performed in accordance with that conditional injunction. For these reasons we conclude that the law of the *Apachhēḍa* is applicable to only those actions for the performance whereof there is always some room left.

“If however we were to apply this law to the case in
 Page 37. “question, then, all Sensuous cognitions being
 “sublated by the Vedānta scriptures, there would be
 “no room at all for Sensuous Perception as a valid means of
 “knowledge.”

To the above we make the following reply :—You say that in the case of there being no breaking by the *Uḍgāṭri*, or in that of the breaking by both the *Uḍgāṭri* and the *Pratiharṭri* occurring simultaneously, and also in case of the breaking by the *Pratiharṭri* coming after that by the *Uḍgāṭri*,—there is room for the performance of the sacrifice with all one’s belongings as the sacrificial gift, during the second course of the *Jyotiḥhloma*;—well, in the same manner, for Sensuous Perception also there will be room for validity, in regard to the *practical* state of things. And just as in the case of the sacrifices there would be an incongruity if both were to be performed during the same course, so, in the same manner, in the case in question also, Sensuous Perception and the Vedānta texts could not both be valid and true with regard to the *absolutely real* state of things. It is for this reason that it has been rightly declared that, ‘it is by the law of the *Apachhēḍānyāya* that the texts describing Brahman as qualified and phenomenal are set aside by those speaking of It as unqualified and transcending all phenomena’. In this connec-

tion we have the following declaration by Ānandabodhāchārya :—‘Like the assertion *this is not a snake*, the Vedic text as a means of cognition sets aside the preceding forms of cognition, (1) because it refers to the real state of things, (2) because it comes after the other forms of cognition, and (3) because it is free from discrepancies.’

Says the Opponent :—“(1) As regards the first of these “three reasons, in a case where the Vedic text would be “contrary to the other means of cognition, the fact of its “referring to the real state of things would not be admitted by “your Opponent, and as such the Reasoning would be *Asidḥa*, “‘unknown’, ‘not accepted’. (2) As regards the second reason, it is found to *fail*, or to be ‘proving the contrary’, in a “case where a misconception follows after the right cognition “(where the mere fact of the misconception coming last “does not make it true). It fact we often meet with cases “where even that which has gone before sets aside that “which comes afterwards,—as for instance, the *Sūtra* “‘*na kṛvā sēt*’ (Pāṇini) is set aside by the previous *Sūtra* “‘*mṛṇamṛṇidagūdhakushaklisharadivasah*. (3) Then as regards the third reason—freedom from discrepancies—this “may be explained as being due to some meaning of the texts “other than the direct one held by the Vedantin. As a summing up of all these we have the following verse :—‘(a) The “fact of the text referring to the real state of things is not “so recognised by all parties,—(b) the fact of its coming “afterwards fails to prove the conclusion,—and (c) freedom “from discrepancies is otherwise explicable; consequently “none of these reasons is capable of proving the superior “authority of the Vedic text’.”

Reply :—(1) Inasmuch as the validity of Sense-perception and other forms of cognition is only *practical*, whereas that of the Vedic text is *absolute*,—and as such, there being no actual contradiction between the two,—it is easily proved that the Vedic text refers to the real state of things. (2) Further,

what we mean by one cognition *appearing after* the other is such *appearance* as is not sublated by another cognition; this form of appearance is not possible in a case where the misconception appears after a right notion, as this misconception is always set aside by a subsequent cognition; so this reason does not fail to prove our desired conclusion. Then as regards the case of the two Sūtras of Pāṇini that you have cited, even though in the actual reading of the text the Sūtra 'na kṛvā sēt' appears later, yet as a matter of fact this can not but be regarded as meant to precede the other Sūtra; because until the kṛvā, which would come in as a matter of course, has not been precluded by the Sūtra 'na kṛvā sēt', the reassertion of the kṛvā that we have in the Sūtra would be impossible and meaningless. Because when we have an exception to the exception to a general rule, it is the general rule that remains intact. (c) Similarly, the absence of discrepancies too is not otherwise explicable; as the validity of a text is accepted only with reference to its real import (and not to any and every sense that might be got out from it).

Thus we find that it was through sheer ignorance that the Opponent asserted that the case of the sublation of Sense-perception by Verbal Cognition is not amenable to the law of the *Apachchhēda-Nyāya*.

END OF SECTION (16).

Section (17).

[The Inferential Cognition of 'Unreality' cannot be relegated to the category of such apparently absurd notions as that of Fire being cool.]

Says the *Opponent*:—"If even such an Inference as has "been rejected by Sense-perception (and is thus open to the "fallacy of Bādha) were to be accepted as proving its conclusion, then we might also regard it as rightly proving "that *fire is not hot*; and thus there could never be any talk "of the fallacy of 'Kālāṭyayāpuḍiṣṭa or Annulment.

"It might be argued that—' in this inference of the fire being *not hot*, we would have the fallacy of *Annulment* distinctly present, as the *Probandum* is the *negation of heat*, while this *heat* is universally known to reside in the *Subject*, Fire, in which the presence of that negation is desired to be proved.'

"But in this way, in the case of the inference of fire being not hot also, if the absence of heat or presence of coolness were regarded as being predicated of any *particular* fire, then there could be no *Annulment* in this case either ; as there would be other fires, than the one of which the coolness would be predicated, in which the *heat* might reside without in any way vitiating our conclusion.

"Then again, it might be urged that—' we have the *Annulment* of an inference only in a case where the contrary Sense-perception is specially strong in its validity (as we have in the case of the *heat* of fire),—and not in case where it is not so strong,—as in the case of the *reality* of the world ; and so in this case there could be no *annulment* of the Inference by Perception.

"But as a matter of fact, even in the case of the Inference of Unreality we find that we have exactly the same reasons for regarding the contrary Sense-perception to be specially strong, as we have in the regard to the Perception of the heat of fire ; and the Inference of the Unreality of the world is exactly in the same position—open to the same arguments for and against—as that of the fire being not hot.

"It might be said that—' for the upholder of Unreality it is only desirable that the inference of Unreality should be similar to the Inference of the negation of heat, with reference to the particular substratum in regard to which it is cognised.' But even though this similarity might be granted, on account of *heat* and *absence of heat* being in the form of a positive and a negative entity respectively,—yet no such similarity would be admitted when the inference

"would be with regard to *coolness*; because *coolness* is not
 "mere *absence of heat*. Hence it becomes necessary for you

Page 38. "either to deny the fact of *Annulment* being a fal-

"lacy in Inference, or to point out what difference
 "there is between the Sense-perception of *reality* on the
 "one hand, and that of the *presence of heat*, or that of the
 "*character of not being the sacrificer*, on the other.

"It might be argued that—'the validity of the Percep-
 "tion of heat in fire is acknowledged, after due exami-
 "nation, by both parties, while that of the Percep-
 "tion of *reality* is not so admitted; and this makes a great
 "difference between the two cases.' But there is no reason
 "to deny the fact that the validity of the Perception of *reality*
 "also is universally admitted; specially as the possibility of
 "due examination is equally present in both cases."

To the above we make the following *reply*:—There is a
 great difference between the two cases, for in the case
 of the Perception of *heat* &c., the Verbal and Inferential cogni-
 tions are distinctly contrary to the sensuous cognition; for
 instance, the fact of a certain person not having the character
 of the sacrificer, and also of the presence of heat in fire, which are
perceived, both are such as pertain to the *practical* state of things;
 and in the same manner, the Verbal cognition of a certain per-
 son having the character of the *sacrificer*, and also the Inferen-
 tial cognition of the absence of heat in fire,—both of these also
 pertain to the *practical* state of things; and thus both sets
 of cognitions equally pertaining to only the *practical* state of
 things, it is but right that the two latter cognitions should
 be sublated by the two former sensuous cognitions. Such,
 however, is not the case with the Perception of *reality*; as
 this *reality* that is perceived is only *practical*; and the *Un-*
reality that is sought to be proved by Inference is not con-
 trary to this *reality*, as what is meant by it is the denial of
 the *absolute reality* of things (and not mere *practical* reality);

and so the Inferential cognition of such Unreality cannot be regarded as sublated by the sensuous Perception of mere *practical* reality.

Says the *Opponent* :—“ What do you mean by this ? (1) “ Do you mean that, inasmuch as the inferential cognition “ of *Unreality* pertains to the actual *absolute reality* of things, “ it can only sublate other cognitions, and can never itself “ be sublated ? (2) or, that the inferential cognition pertaining “ to the *absolute* reality of things, while the sensuous cognition “ pertains to their mere *practical* reality, the subject-matter of “ the two cognitions is entirely different, and hence there being “ no contradiction, one need not sublate the other ? Then “ again, in this latter case, (a) do you mean to say that the In- “ ferential cognition apprehends the absence of the *absolute* “ reality of things (which reality is not apprehended by the “ sense-organs), without having apprehended their *practical* “ reality, which is known by means of the Sense-organs ? (b) “ Or is it that the Inferential cognition apprehends the absence “ of *absolute* reality, after the thing has been cognised, in its “ *practical* reality, by the Sense-organs ? You could not “ hold to this last view (b) ; because it would not be right to “ assert that the cognition that apprehends the negation of a “ thing apprehended by another cognition does not sublate “ this latter cognition. Nor again could you hold to the other “ view (a) ; because if the Inferential cognition were to reject “ something which has not been previously cognised by the “ senses, then it would be open to the charge of containing “ the absurdity of denying something that is not known, and “ for which therefore there is no chance of being asserted ; “ i. e. it would be regarded as ‘ striking in the air ’ ; “ and also because this would impart a sort of an absolute “ reality to the object of Sensuous cognition (which the Vedantin “ will not allow). [This disposes of the *second* of the two “ alternatives set forth in the beginning]. Then as regards “ the *first* of those two alternatives, that too can be “ maintained ; because an Inferential Cognition, which would be

“indirectly contrary to the Sensuous Cognition that forms its very basis, could never be accepted as having an object that has any *absolute* reality.”

No weight attaches to the above arguments, we reply ; as there is nothing objectionable in either of the two alternatives set forth. As regards the *first* view, it would not be impossible to accept the absolute reality of the object of Inferential cognition under the circumstances. Because in the case of the cognition of shell-silver, we find that the cognition ‘this is silver’ does not set aside the cognition that ‘this is not silver’ ; and this leads us to the conclusion that it is only a well-tested cognition that can be accepted as setting aside another cognition ; and the ‘testing’ too of a cognition consists, among other things, in finding out if it is compatible with the activity that it arouses in the perceiving agent ; and such a testing would be impossible until we admitted the fact of the cognition (and its concomitants) not being absolutely rejected, at least as regards the *practical* state of things ; and hence this cognition (sensuous or otherwise) could set aside only such other cognitions (inferential or verbal) as would seek to reject its validity *as regards the practical* state of things ; and it could have nothing to say to the Vedānta texts declaring Non-duality (as these pertain to only the *absolutely* real state of things),—as we have already explained before.

Then as regards the second alternative set forth by the Opponent, the Inferential cognition could not be objected to on the ground of denying something that does not exist ; because though there may not be a possibility, then and there, yet it may turn up at some distant point of time (and as such the denial of such a possibility would not be like striking in the air). Some people (Vedāntins) seek to meet the objection in question by asserting that there is a possibility of the reality of all objects of sensuous cognition being asserted, on account of the fact of the absolute reality of the Self being well-known (and the Self is an object of sensuous cognition),

[and so the sublating by the inferential cognition would not be open to the aforesaid charge]. But this is not right; as the '*prasakṭi*' or *possibility* of a certain thing being asserted does not consist in the mere cognition of the thing sought to be denied by the *pratiṣṭhā* or *sublation*; in fact it consists in its being known as the substratum of denial; and as a matter of fact, the Self can never be the substratum of such denial. For this reason, what the Vedantin has to do is to show that there is a remote '*possibility*' of the thing denied being asserted.

Or, even granting that there is no such '*possibility*', — as a matter of fact, it is only in the perception of the negation or absence (of a certain thing) that this '*possibility*' is necessary, for the purpose of imposing a relationship (pertaining to which would the negation be perceived); in the case of *verbal* and *inferential* cognitions, however, where would there be any necessity for such a '*possibility*'? The denial would not be meaningless, in the absence of this '*possibility*'. As there would always be present a definite purpose in the shape of the cessation or avoidance of evil.

Nor would there be any chance for an *absolute* reality attaching to the object of Sensuous cognition; as what the Inferential cognition (of Unreality) would apprehend would be the absence or negation of that absolute reality which would pertain to that object (which therefore could never be regarded as absolutely real).

Thus then, we find that there is nothing objectionable in our stand-point. Thus has this been summed up in the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya*:—'The scripture taking its refuge in *absolute* non-duality, does not fear any contradiction by Perception, upon which it might be based.'

Says the Opponent:—"Arguing analogously to your
 Page 39. "argument, the *non-hot* character of fire may be
 "regarded as *absolutely* real; and hence the Inferen-
 "tial cognition of such character would not be sublated by the

“perception of the *hot* character, which would be only *practically* real. And similarly in the case of the sentence—“the sacrificial post is the Sun,”—the solar character of the *post* being regarded as *absolutely* real, the direct meaning of the sentence would not fear any contradiction by the perception of its non-solar character (which would have only a *practical* reality).”

No such thing is possible. In the first place, what is the meaning of the assertion that the *non-hot* character of fire may be regarded as *absolutely* real? If you mean by this that there is, in *absolute* reality, no heat at all,—then this comes to be a mere statement of the Non-duality of things; and as such quite acceptable to us in all its bearings. If however, it be meant that there is no heat, even in the *practical* state of things,—then, inasmuch as this declaration would have a strong sublator in the form of the sensuous Perception of *heat*,—a Perception which is duly tested and found valid in view of the activities set up by it,—you could not establish the *absolute* reality of the said *non-hot* character.

Thus we have shown that the Inferential cognition of Unreality is by no means similar to the Inference of fire being cool.

The above argument may also be applied to the case of the *Sun* and the *Sacrificial post*,—the denial of the difference between the two being regarded as either *absolutely* or only *practically* real; as a matter of fact, we find that the passage in question is subordinate to another passage, and as such can not be taken as asserting the actual non-difference between the *Sun* and the *Post*; and specially as such an assertion would be contrary to a well-tested fact of Sense-perception, the sentence is taken in its indirect signification, as containing the mere praise of the *post*. This explanation serves to set aside the view that the case of the Vedanta texts is similar to that of the sentence ‘the sacrificial post is the Sun,’—a

view that has been just expressed by the Opponent, in the sentence "the solar character of the post being, &c. &c."

It might be argued that—"inasmuch as the Vedānta texts "would only point out what has already been established by "Inference, they would be merely *descriptive* or *repetitive* in "their character (and would not have the character of true "*means of knowledge*, which affords knowledge of something "not otherwise known); just like the Vedic sentence,—'fire "is an antidote for cold'—which is merely descriptive of the "fact of the existence in fire of the power of removing cold, "a fact already known by other means of knowledge."

But as a matter of fact, Inferential cognition depends upon the intellectual capacity of each man; and as such it never has an equal force of application for all men. Consequently the mere fact of a certain thing being apprehended by the Inferential cognition of such limited application, is not sufficient ground for regarding the Vedic text pointing to the same thing, as merely *descriptive*. This has been thus declared by Vāchaspati Mishra, under the Sūtra '*Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt*' (Brahma-Sūtra 2-1-11):—'A certain fact proved by people clever at inferences is turned upside down by people who are cleverer than them.' As regards the Vedic sentence quoted as an example—'fire is the antidote for cold'—the fact of fire being an antidote for cold is universally known by two such means of knowledge as Sense-perception and Presumption; and as such the case of this sentence is in no way analogous to that of the Vedānta texts.

Thus it is established that the Inferential cognition of the *Unreality of the World* is in no way analogous to the Inference of fire being cool.

Section (18).

[Refutation of the argument that Perception cannot be sublated by Inferential reasonings.]

Then again, the greater validity of a cognition depends upon its being well-tested, and not either on its being the

basis for other cognitions, or on its being direct or immediate; because we find that Sensuous Cognition (which is immediate, and which forms the basis of other forms of cognition) is actually amenable to rejection by Inferential and Verbal Cognitions. For instance, (1) the direct Sensuous Cognition of silver (in the shell) is set aside by Inferential Cognition, and also by the cognition afforded by the assertion of a trustworthy person; (2) the Sensuous Cognition of the sky as *blue* is set aside by the Inferential Cognition of the fact of the sky being colourless; (3) such sensuous (visual) cognitions as 'I am fair', 'I am in this house,' and also the cognition of the Moon having a disc of the size of about six inches, and so forth, are all set aside by scriptural texts and by Inferences; (4) the Cognition—'the conchshell is yellow', 'sugar is bitter' and the like are set aside by Inferences and Trustworthy Assertions.

Says the *Opponent*:—"As a matter of fact, it must be admitted that a misconception pertaining to direct Sensuous Cognition is set aside by the same kind of cognition only. Otherwise if mediate (Inferential) Cognition were capable of setting aside immediate (Sensuous) misconceptions, then the attempt of the Vedantin to prove that the cognition obtained from the Vedanta texts is immediate and direct, would be absolutely unnecessary [as even when mediate, it could set aside the immediate misconceptions with regard to the reality of the world]."

To the above the following reply is made:—What occurs in the case of an ordinary misconception is this: A man sees something lying on the ground,—he *sees* that it is a snake—then he hears a trustworthy assertion 'this is not a snake'; now this assertion does not bring about the absolute cessation of the ignorance and its ramifications shrouding his mind; all that it does is to indicate that the conception of the snake was wrong, and thereby it sets aside the idea of that conception being right, and also the idea of the object of that

conception being real; and it is in view of these facts only that the assertion 'this is not a snake' is regarded as *setting aside* the misconception. And as for the idea of the misconception being right and its object being real, its being mediate or direct,—this does not require an immediate or direct Cogni-

tion to reject it. Specially as no one ever has an
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immediate cognition of the *validity* of cognitions, which is implied either by its not being brought about by a defective instrument, or by its having its object not sublated by any subsequent cognition;—nor is the reality of the object of any cognition immediately perceptible; as such reality also would be implied by its not being negated by any person, at any point of time or place. For this reason then, it is only proper that these (the validity of the cognition and the idea of its object being real), should be set aside by *mediate* or indirect cognitions. Thus then, being set aside, even though the misconception of the silver would be present in its own form, yet, as it would not be capable of accomplishing the work of a piece of silver, it would be regarded to be as good as non-existent, and would for this reason be spoken of as 'rejected'. And in this we see nothing objectionable.

Says the *Opponent*:—" (1) The misconception 'this is silver' is set aside by a subsequent direct Perception got at "through (inferential) reasons, and not by these reasons "alone. (2) The misconception 'I am fair' is set aside by the "stronger sensuous cognition appearing in the form *the body* "is *mine* (where a distinction is made between the *I* and "the *Body*). (3) As regards the conception 'I am in the "house', this is not a wrong conception; as the *jīva* being "atomic in its nature, it is quite right to speak of it as *in the* "house. [And thus in none of the above cases do we find "an immediate cognition set aside by a mediate cognition]."

Reply:—So long as the *sensuous* cognition of the *silver* (with regard to the *shell*) and of the *Self* (with regard to the *Body*) is present in all its force before the mind, there would

be no chance for the appearance of any sensuous cognition (to the contrary, that would set aside the previous misconception),—until a certain amount of reasoning had made it capable of being set aside.

It might be argued that—‘in the case of the conception ‘I am fair’, the application of *fairness* to *I* is figurative, based upon the fact of the *body* being related to the *I*, and the *fairness* to the *body*; just as with regard to a piece of cloth besmeared with mud, we have the notion that the ‘cloth is dirty’ (the dirty colour belonging to the mud which is applied to the cloth).’ But the two cases are not exactly similar; as in the case of the cloth we are distinctly cognisant of the cloth being something different from the mud, while there is no such definite idea of the *Self* being different from the *body*; in fact in this latter case what we have is a distinctly erroneous surmise of identity. Thus then, in the case of the conception ‘the water is hot’, if we have a definite ‘idea of the distinction between the *water* and the *fire* (to which the heat belongs)’—as we have in the case of the *mud* and the *cloth*—then we must regard the expression as figurative; while if there is no such idea of distinction between the two—just as there is none in the case of the *Self* and the *body*—then, the expression must be regarded as an erroneous surmise of identity; and as such this should be quite capable of being set aside by *reasoning*. Hence the expression ‘water is hot’ would serve as an instance in support of our argument.

Lastly, it has been argued that the notion—‘I am in the house’—is a right one (on account of the *Jiva* being atomic in its nature). But this also is not right. Because as a matter of fact the *Self* is all-pervading in its nature,—as asserted in the text ‘He is all-pervading and eternal, like *Ākāśa*’; and then to speak of it as ‘*limited*,’ as being within the limits of a house, can never be right. Nor is the *Jiva* atomic; because as a matter of fact we find that we can experience pleasures and pains in the head and in the foot at one and same time; and if the *Jiva* were atomic, it could

not reside in two such remote localities as the head and the foot. Nor can we regard the simultaneous experiencing of pleasure and pain at the two places as a mere misconception. As we have no reasons for denying the truthfulness of a fact that is universally recognised as true. We shall explain all this in detail later on.

Says the *Opponent*:—"The Vedantin holds that the "*sensuous* cognition of the *sky as blue* is set aside by the "*inferential* cognition of the *sky as colourless*. But this is "not possible. Because there is no Reason that can "lead to the said *inferential* cognition. The fact of the *sky "being of the largest dimension*, and that of *its being non-produc-* "*tive of any substance* are regarded as such 'Reasons'. But "none of these facts is recognised by the Vedantin. Ano- "ther fact put forward as the 'Reason' is the fact of the sky "being *intangible*; but this is found in *Darkness* also; and as "such makes the Reason too wide. Another 'Reason' put "forward is the fact of the sky being a material substance "other than Earth, Water and Air; but this Reason would "be absolutely useless—not pointing to the Desired Conclu- "sion. Thus then it cannot but be asserted that the "idea of the sky being blue is set aside by the *Sensuous* "Cognition, by the Witnessing Self, of the *colourlessness* of "the sky. It might be argued against this that the "Self being incapable of cognising colour (which is cognised "by means of the Eye), It could never be cognisant of the "*absence* of colour. But as a matter of fact, we find that "though the Eye is incapable of perceiving the ghost, "yet it is quite capable of perceiving the *absence* of the ghost. "But apart from this, our Opponent also admits of the fact "of the *Witness* being cognisant of *Darkness*, which he regards "as coloured. Then again, even though the sky is "invisible (being cognisable only by the Ear, through Sound), "yet, as in the case of Air, its *colourlessness* can be perceived "by the Eye; and so in the case in question we have the

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OF

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BY

G. THIBAUT.

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NOTE.

The translation of *Vivaraṇapramēyasaṅgraha* was being done by our late lamented colleague, Dr. Thibaut. The last instalment was printed in *Indian Thought*, Vol. III, ending on page 120. His duties at Calcutta—as Registrar of the University and latterly as Professor of *Ancient Indian Culture*—left him no time to go on with the work. Before leaving for home in April last, he told me he was now in a position to resume his work for ‘*Indian Thought*’; and I was looking forward to his important contributions. All that hope however has now gone for ever. I have therefore thought it fit to finish *Varṇaka I*, and thus enable our subscribers to have the translation bound up as Vol. I. I wish I could go on with this translation; but my hands are full of other work; and I must forego, however unwillingly, the privilege of completing this important treatise on *Vedānta*. I have the satisfaction however that the volume as it stands presents a complete explanation of “*Ādhyāsa*,” which forms the essence of the *Ādvaita Vedānta*, from which the rest of its doctrines follow, more or less, as necessary deductions.

MUIR COLLEGE,

Allahabad,

GANGANATHA JHA.

Feb. 26th, 1915.

The Bauddhas and the senile Prābhākaras assume that in the Self, the characters of the *Agent* and the *Enjoyer* and also Attachment and Aversion and Pleasure and Pain are self-illuminated. But this is not right. For (a) if the said characters of the *Agent* and the rest are of the nature of 'substance', then, rather than postulate the quality of 'illumination' in them, it would be much simpler to assume that they are rendered cognisable by the illumination of the Self itself ;—(b) if, on the other hand, the said characters are of the nature of 'quality', then it is not possible for them to be possessed of the further quality of 'illumination'; as a quality cannot possess another quality. "But it is the very character of *Agent* &c., that constitute qualities in the shape of 'Illumination'." In that case it would not be possible for them to be produced in their own accidental substratum; just as the light of the Sun is not produced in any substratum. Nor will it be right to urge that, inasmuch as the characters of the *Agent* &c., in themselves, are not different from 'illumination', they must be self-illuminated. For their 'illumination' may be explained as being due to the light of the eternal Self.

"We grant that the characters of the *Agent* &c., are cognisable by the witnessing Self. Even so, they are *real*."

Certainly not, we reply. The witnessing Self cognises right as well as wrong cognitions; and hence cognition by it cannot prove anything as to the object cognised being real or unreal. In fact, if all objects were regarded as real, that would go against the Shruti text, which declares the Self to be "free from attachment"; and further, such texts as '*Indro māyābhīḥ* &c.', declare that all worldly characters are *unreal* [and the character of *Agent* is a 'worldly character'].

All this goes to prove that what the supplementary texts—such as 'not large' 'not small', 'It is not born, It does not die'—do is to point to the two entities denoted by the terms 'That'

and 'Thou', which are of the nature of pure Consciousness, and which, in reality, are entirely free from all phenomenal modifications,—the indication of these entities being necessary for the due comprehension of the Great Text ('That thou art'); and these texts do not describe the 'cessation of *adhyāsa*.' "This means that the desired unity is postulated by the Great Text, on the basis of what are denoted by the terms 'that' and 'thou', which are mentioned in the subsidiary texts, and which, by their very nature, are free from all phenomenal modifications; so that even though there is no indication (in these texts) of the cessation of *adhyāsa*', there is no incongruity; and under the circumstances, how could there be even an indirect implication (by the texts) of either 'cessation of Nescience' or its 'manifestation'?" Our answer to this is as follows:—When there arises the recognition of truth, in regard to *Unity*, it does so, while at the same time, setting aside its contraries in the shape of Nescience and the *Adhyāsa* resulting therefrom, a fact which we find in the case of the recognition of the real truth in regard to the *shell* [which sets aside the Ignorance in regard to the shell as also the false notion of *silver* in regard to it]. "But in the case of the shell, what sets aside the *adhyāsa* (of silver) is the negative cognition 'this is not silver' ". It is not so; what the negative assertion refers to is the *real* silver (and not the *imposed* or *mistaken* silver), as we have already explained above, in the section on '*Akhyātivāda*'. What really happens in that case is that the negation of 'silver' strikes at the desire for activity (tending to the acquiring of the silver) on the part of the person who is seeking after *real* silver; and because it does this, it is figuratively regarded as destructive of the *Adhyāsa*. The direct cause of the removal of *Adhyāsa* consists in the *recognition of the Shell*; as we have already explained in the section dealing with '*Anirvachanīyakhyāti*', while considering the question of the sublation (of cognitions). It will not

be right to argue that—"What the *cognition of the shell* does is only to make known the real character of the shell; it does nothing to remove the *adhyāsa*";—because what is already implied in something that is accomplished does not require any further effort; for example, when the goldsmith is weighing gold in the balance, what his hand does is only to raise the balance; but there occurs the lowering of one pan, which is already implied by, and follows from, the raising of the balance, so that for that another operation of the hand is not needed; in all sciences it is well-known that things that necessarily follow from other things do not require a separate effort. "In a case where the sublation of a previous cognition is due to a verbal assertion,—*e. g.* when the cognition of 'silver' in regard to the shell is sublated by the assertion 'this is not silver',—this assertion refers to the real silver; while the assertion 'this is shell' has no power to set aside the *adhyāsa* (of *silver*); so that in this case it may be that the recognition of the cessation of '*adhyāsa*' follows necessarily from the said sublation [and hence no special effort is needed for it in this case];—but in a case where the sublation is done by Perception, how can the recognition of the cessation of *Adhyāsa* be regarded as following necessarily from something else?" Our answer to this is as follows:—In such a case, the absence of the *imposed (mistaken) silver*, being directly perceived, cannot be regarded as cognised by means of Non-apprehension; in fact neither the *imposed silver* nor its *absence* is capable of contact (with any sense-organ); for as for the mistaken silver, inasmuch as it exists only in the idea of the man, it can have no existence prior to that idea; and as such it could not come into contact with a sense-organ (before it is cognised); and, so long as the *imposed silver*, which is the counter-entity of its *absence*, is incapable of contact with a sense-organ, its *absence* or *negation* also can never be in contact with a sense-organ. So that, as in the case of sublation by verbal assertion, so

also in that of sublation by Perception, the real character of the shell having been recognised by means of a sense-organ, the cessation of the mistake or *adhyāsa* follows as a matter of course. Analogously, when the identity of the Individual Self and Brahman has been recognised either by means of Verbal Assertion or by Direct Apprehension, the Cessation of Nescience and its products follows as a matter of course ; so that this cessation does not fall within the scope of the subject-matter of the *Shāstra* ; hence it is far more reasonable to regard it as the purpose, and not the subject-matter, of the *Shāstra*. And though the direct purpose of the Science of Reasoning consists in the removal of the doubts bearing upon the philosophy of *Vedānta*,—and the acquiring of the Knowledge of Brahman is the result of the *Vedānta* itself,—yet the *cessation of Adhyāsa*, being the result of that Knowledge, forms an object of men's desire ; and hence it is only right to regard this *cessation of Adhyāsa* as the purpose of the *Shāstra*.

XLVIII.

[The phrase 'acquiring of the Knowledge of Brahman' means the definite cognition of the nature of Brahman by means of the functioning of the Internal Organ, in accordance with Instruments of Right Cognition.]

The Opponent asks—"What do you mean by the 'acquiring' of the Knowledge of Brahman,—which you describe "as the 'result' of the *Vedānta* itself'? In ordinary "experience, what is 'acquired',—as for instance, a "Cow—is some such accomplished entity having a positive "character of its own as has not been already attained ; and "never such as is either always attained—*e. g.* the man's "own nature—or is one that has no positive character of "its own, being an absolute non-entity,—*e. g.* the 'man's "horn'. As for 'knowledge', while it exists, it always "resides in the knower and illumines its object ; and it is "always conceived of as such ; so that by its own character,

“and also by the way in which it is conceived of, it is something that is always *attained*, got at, (by the Agent); under the circumstances how can there be any *acquiring* of it (through the Vēdānta)?”

Our reply to this is as follows:—*Knowledge* consists only in the functioning of the Internal Organ through an Instrument of Right Cognition; and when by means of this knowledge the true nature of a thing is definitely cognised, this is called the ‘acquiring’ of that Knowledge. In the case of such

P. 100. ordinary things as the Jar and the like, it so

happens that as soon as the knowledge of these has come about, it at once, by its very coming into existence, brings about the definite cognition of its object; but the knowledge of Brahman does not lead to the definite cognition of its object in the same quick manner; and this for the reason that the object of this latter knowledge is obscured by absolute incapacity due to incomprehension and misapprehension. What is meant by ‘incomprehension’ is that the Mind is *incapable* of that concentration or one-pointedness which is essential for the comprehending of the identity of the Individual Self and Brahman; and what is meant by ‘misapprehension’ is the massive disposition towards mistaking the Body and such other things (to be the Self). “But as a matter of fact we have never found in experience that when a certain thing has been apprehended by means of such Instruments of Cognition as are conducive to direct perception, there is any absence,—due to the two deficiencies of the Mind,—of definite cognition by means of that perception”. This is not right, we reply. When such things, as fresh pepper for instance, which have never been seen in the city of Benares, are brought over from remote countries to that city,—even though one actually sees them with his eyes, definite certainty in regard to them does not arise, on account of want of belief in the possibility of the presence of such a thing at that particular place. Similarly, even

though the knowledge of Brahman may have been brought about by means of the scriptures, it remains obscured by reason of defects in the Mind, and it is only after it has been helped by deliberation that it leads to the definite comprehension of its object. "But as regards Deliberation, if this is a means of Cognition, then it must be regarded as an independent Instrument (and not merely as an auxilliary to Scriptures); while, if it is not a means of Cognition, it can serve no useful purpose (in the bringing about of any cognition); so that it is not possible for it to be regarded as an auxilliary to any Instrument of Cognition." This is not so, we reply. As a matter of fact, Deliberation *by itself* is not an Instrument of Cognition, and as such (by itself) it cannot bring about the definite comprehension of anything; yet this fact does not make it absolutely impossible for it to aid other Instruments of Cognition; for it takes the form of considering the probabilities and improbabilities pertaining to the exact nature of the Instruments of Cognition, their capacities and the objects of Cognition. It is for this reason that Logicians have declared that Deliberation or Cogitation serves as an aid to the Instruments of Cognition.

XLIX.

[The Opponent raises objections against the utility of Deliberation. The utility of Deliberation, they argue, is incompatible with the intrinsic self-validity of Cognitions].

"Well, if Instruments of Cognition stand in need of Deliberation, that goes against your doctrines. For in regard to cognitions, the *Sāṅkhyas* hold the view that their *validity* as well as *invalidity* are both intrinsic; according to the Logicians both are extrinsic; their *invalidity* alone is intrinsic, say the *Bauddhas*; and the *Vēdāntins* declare that it is the *validity* of Cognitions that is intrinsic.

“Now, the view of the *Sāṅkhyas* is not right; for what does it mean? Does it mean that both validity and invalidity belong to the same individual cognition? or that validity belongs to one and invalidity to another cognition? It cannot be the former; as that involves a self-contradiction. Nor can it be the latter; as there is nothing to determine which particular cognition is valid and which invalid; for the character of ‘cognition’ belongs equally to both; and according to one who regards Cognitions to be valid, no other determinant can be possible.

“Nor again can both validity and invalidity be extrinsic (as held by the Logician); for in that case, at the moment that any particular Cognition appears, it would, for some time, remain devoid of both *validity* and *invalidity*; this certainly is not what is known to be the case in ordinary experience.

“Now, it may be urged that (these two views having been excluded) the Bauddha view is the right one;—viz: that invalidity is intrinsic, and validity extrinsic, in cognitions. But this also is not tenable. Does the *extrinsic* character belong to the *production* or to the *recognition* of the ‘validity’? It cannot belong to its *production*; for cognition, produced by means of the Eye and such other causes, being momentary, it could never continue sufficiently long to allow of the extrinsic ‘validity’ being *produced* in it. ‘But the Cognition having been brought about by the causes of the Cognition, after sometime *Validity* is produced in it by reason of a certain efficiency in the said causes;—this is what is meant by the *production* (of *Validity*) being *extrinsic*. If this were not possible, then how is it that *Validity* is concomitant with *efficiency* (of the Cause)?’ This is not right; as the said notion of concomitance may be explained as being due to the absence of such defects as impede *validity*. It will not be right to urge against this explanation the objection

“that the concomitance (of Validity) being with the presence
“of *Efficiency*, if we attribute it to the *absence of defects*, it
“would be attributing it to something to which it does not
“belong (with which it is not co-existent). Because ‘efficiency’
“is nothing more than ‘absence of defects’; for instance,
“in the case of Sense-organs and such other things, we do not
“find any ‘efficiency’ apart from the ‘absence of defects’;
“even if some sort of a positive efficiency were found, it
“would only be one that serves to remove a defect, and thus
“brings about the ‘absence of that defect’; so that the said
“concomitance can, with every reason, be regarded as with
“the ‘absence of defect’ (and not with the efficiency). And as
“it is only after the cessation of defects (from its cause) that
“the *validity* of a cognition is accomplished, the concomitance
“of ‘validity’ with ‘efficiency’ must be through the ‘absence
“of defects’; and not directly with the ‘efficiency itself.’
“—Well then, in that case we may regard ‘the absence of the
“obstructing defect’ as the *cause* of ‘Validity,’ on the basis
“of the fact that it is with this ‘absence’ that ‘Validity’
“is concomitant.—That also will not be right, we reply; for
“in that case it would not be possible to regard the *defect*
“as the *obstructor* (of Validity); as one thing can be reason-
“ably regarded as the obstructor of another only when
“it is found that the former steps in and renders the pro-
“duction of the latter impossible, even though there is
“present a cause fully efficient to produce that thing; and cer-
“tainly the *defect* cannot step in when there is ‘absence of
“defect’ [and this ‘absence of defect’ is a cause efficient
“to produce ‘Validity’]. From all this it follows that the
“*extrinsic* character of the ‘Validity’ cannot pertain to its
“*production*. As for the *recognition* of ‘Validity’,—how
“could that also be *extrinsic*? The ‘Validity’ of a cognition
“consists in its being capable of apprehending its object
“(in its true form); and is this *capability* known from the
“cognition of its being produced by efficiency? or from

“ finding that it agrees with (is compatible with) effective action (to which it gives rise)? The former alternative cannot be accepted ; it would mean that even when the Jar may be known, unless it is known that the said cognition of the Jar has been brought about by an efficiency, it cannot be known that the cognition is *capable* of apprehending its object ; so that there could arise no activity in regard to the Jar ! ‘ But it may be that the required activity arises afterwards, when it does become known that the cognition has been brought about by an efficiency.’ That cannot be ; for just like the *cognition of the Jar*, the *cognition of that cognition being born of an efficiency* would be absolutely ineffective until there is a further cognition asserting the Validity of the latter cognition ; and so on and on there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. This same reason would be equally applicable against the second alternative [that the Capability of the Cognition is known from finding it to be compatible with effective action]. The following explanation may be put forward—‘ In the case of the cognitions of Eating, &c , being the means of *satisfaction* (of hunger), &c., we find that though their validity is recognised only when it is known that the said *Eating*, &c., do actually bring about an effective action in the form of the satisfying of hunger, &c., yet so far as the cognitions of the resulting *satisfaction*, &c., are concerned, their validity is recognised by itself (and not through the knowledge of any effective action) ; for the simple reason that there is no further effective action ; so that there is no infinite regress at all.’ But this is not right ; because [the reasoning urged can be met by the following counter-reasoning]—the cognition in question of the means of satisfaction &c., must be regarded as valid by itself,—because it is cognition—just like the cognition of the result (satisfaction ; which cognition is accepted to be self-valid) ;—specially as the contrary view is negated by the undesirable inter-

“dependence that it involves ; that is, the recognition of
 “validity is dependent upon the cognition of the fact that
 “the effective action of the man acting up to the cognition
 “in question is in keeping with that cognition,—and the
 “activity of the man in accordance with a particular cognition
 “is possible only after he has been convinced of the validity
 “of that cognition. ‘ But it is possible that, even before
 “the validity (of the cognition) has been duly ascertained,

Page 102. “the Agent has recourse to an action, for the

“very purpose of ascertaining that validity [as
 “for instance, on perceiving silver, the man stoops to pick it
 “up, just to make sure that what he has cognised as silver
 “is really silver] ; which shows that there need be no mutual
 “interdependence.’ This may be so in the case of *doubtful*
 “cognitions ; but how could there be any activity for the
 “ascertainment of validity in the case of such ordinary and
 “frequent cognitions as those of the Jar and such other well-
 “known things,—in whose case there is no uncertainty at all ?
 “‘ In the case of gold-testing we find that a certainty as to
 “its being real gold comes about,—not merely by the first
 “cognition of it, but—only after there come about four such
 “cognitions (as that ‘ this is gold ’), following upon the four
 “actions of close examination, rubbing (on touch-stone),
 “heating and cutting ;—which shows that it cannot be denied
 “that the validity is purely extrinsic.’ This is not true ;
 “for in the case cited what the second and subsequent cogni-
 “tions do is only to set aside such doubts as there may be
 “in regard to (*i. e.*, obstructing) the validity of the first
 “cognition ; and they do not tend towards the ascertainment
 “of that validity. From all this it follows that the validity
 “of cognitions must be regarded as intrinsic or self-sufficient,
 “in the sense that in its *production* as well as in its *recogni-*
 “*tion*, it is independent of any indicators other than what
 “brings about the cognition ;—while as regards the *invalidity*
 “of cognitions, inasmuch as it is *produced* by defects in

“the cause of the cognition, and it is made known (indicated) by the subsequent sublation of the cognition,—it must be regarded as *extrinsic*. ‘But the invalidity of Cognitions cannot be produced by anything outside the cognition itself; as *invalidity* is nothing more than *negation of validity*,—being just like the *prior negation of validity*.’ This is not true; as the reason just forward is ‘unknown,’ not admitted by all parties; as a matter of fact the name ‘invalidity’ is given to *Ignorance, Doubt* and *Misconception* (and not to mere *negation of validity*); as has been declared by the revered Kumarila Bhatta—‘Invalidity is threefold, as consisting in misconception, ignorance and doubt;’—here what is meant by the term ‘ignorance’, is the cognition of something other than the real thing; as the same author speaks of it (in another place) as the cognition of another thing. Now certainly all these three cannot be mere *negations*. Even though cognitions are possessed of intrinsic validity, yet there can be nothing incongruous in their becoming *invalid* by reason of defects (in their cause); just as even though fire is intrinsically *hot*, yet it is found to be *cool* when its *heat* is suppressed by means of incantations. If you ever entertain a doubt as to the *invalidity* of cognitions being *intrinsic*, how could you explain the activity that results from even invalid cognitions, until the recognition of the presence of defects in their origin [when alone the said activity ceases] ?

“It is in view of all this that the theory is accepted (by the Vedāntin) that it is *validity* that is *intrinsic* in cognitions. Such being the case, if the Vedāntin now asserts that ‘Brahman Knowledge’ stands in need of Deliberation, why should it not be regarded as involving the ‘abandoning of tenets’ on his part ?”

L.

[Deliberation is not incompatible with the self-validity of cognitions. It operates effectively towards the accomplishment of the Knowledge of Brahman].

To the above arguments of the Opponent we make the following reply:—The arguments put forward do not affect our position. Because all that Deliberation does is to remove the obstacle in the way (of True Knowledge). Though in reality Brahman is self-luminous, and Word (in the form of scriptures) is perfectly capable of bringing about the direct cognition of Brahman,—yet it is quite possible that there may be obstacles (in the way of the requisite Knowledge of Brahman), in the shape of (a) past sins, (b) contrary functioning of the Mind, (c) total inapprehension of the subject, and (d) misapprehension of It as consisting in the Body, the Sense-organs and such other things (as are not Brahman); and on account of these obstacles an unshaken direct cognition (of Brahman) fails to appear. Now of the obstacles, (a) past sins are wiped out by the due fulfilment of the duties pertaining to the life-conditions of the man;—(b) the contrary functionings of the Mind are checked by the practice of calmness, self-control, &c.;—(c) the total inapprehension of the subject of the Unity of *Jiva* and *Brahman* is set aside by Deliberation, which consists of cogitation and pondering;—and (d) Meditation brings about that one-pointedness of the Mind which removes all misapprehension and renders the Mind capable of apprehending the subtlest of subjects;—then

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finally becomes accomplished that unruffled direct cognition (of Brahman) which is brought about by means of the Word (of the scriptures). That the word of the Upaniṣads is the means of bringing about the direct cognition of Brahman is indicated by the nominal affix in the word '*aupaniṣadam*' ('described in the Upaniṣads') which appears as the epithet of Brahman in the passage—'I am asking about that person described in the Upaniṣads';—where what the nominal affix means is that *it is only by means of the*

Upaṇiṣads that the said person can be rightly known. Then again, the cognition of Brahman, which (being self-luminous) is directly (immediately) cognisable, cannot be indirect or mediate; hence the conclusion is that at the very outset the cognition (of Brahman) arising from Word is *direct*; and this same cognition becomes fixed and steady on the removal of obstacles. Or, just as the direct contact of the sense-organ brings about Perception, and then again, with the aid of impressions left by the previous cognition of that thing, it brings about the *recognition* of that same thing,—exactly in the same manner it may be that Word, at the very outset brings about the *indirect* cognition of Brahman, and subsequently, being helped by the removal of the above-described obstacles, it brings about the second cognition, which is *direct*. Nor need the *indirect* cognition of the self-luminous Brahman be necessarily a misconception; for (in ordinary experience) we find that even though a certain person's cognition is itself self-luminous, yet the cognition that other persons have of that cognition is only inferential, which is *indirect*. In this manner even though at the very outset Word does bring about the cognition—direct or indirect*—of Brahman, it remains as good as *not brought about*, by reason of its not having acquired the position of an unruffled direct cognition; and when contemplation and meditation are duly practised, as a result of these the knowledge of Brahman becomes duly steady, and thence comes to be spoken of as having been *acquired*.

[Against this process, the Opponent raises the following objection]—“If such be the case, then, inasmuch as the “final result appears after meditation, this meditation should “be regarded as the principal factor, and hearing and contemplation should, in that case, be only auxiliaries to “meditation, and should, as such, have to be regarded as “subordinate factors.”

*The presence of वृ indicates the correct reading to be वराहवरीवृ; which also appears to be required by the context.

It is not so, we reply; for the simple reason that as a matter of fact, meditation can never be the means by which cognition is actually brought about. There is no such means of cognition as 'Meditation'; hence Meditation, by itself, could never be a cause in the bringing about of any cognition. *Hearing*, on the other hand, consists in the ascertaining of the import of the potency of words; and as such being a special feature of Word, which is a Means of Cognition, the said Hearing itself may be looked upon as the 'means'; so that it is the *hearing* that should be regarded as the predominant factor. Contemplation and Meditation, on the other hand serve only to remove powerful obstacles, and serve to bring about certain effects on the Mind, which help in the accomplishment of the result; so that these (Contemplation and Meditation) should be regarded as subordinate auxiliaries to the final result. Contemplation sets aside the inapprehension of the subject and thereby removes all doubts from the Mind; and Meditation sets aside all misconception and brings about the one-pointedness of the Mind. *Steadiness* (Self-control), &c, as also Sacrificial Performances, serve as indirect auxiliaries; and as such come in useful as constituting the entire process (whereby Brahman-Knowledge is obtained). Among these latter again, Steadiness, &c., are the more intimate auxiliaries; as it is these that serve to remove such visible defects as the contrary functionings of the Mind and Sense-organs, which obstruct the capacity for right *Hearing*; while Sacrificial Performances are only remote auxiliaries, inasmuch as these serve to remove only the Unseen (supernatural) defects. From all this we conclude that in the bringing about of the unruffled direct cognition (of Brahman), the principal cause is *hearing*, as aided by the aforesaid auxiliaries, which help in the process (of that cognition being obtained). That *Hearing* however, which, prior to the operation of the auxiliaries, brings about either only *indirect* cognition, or an *unsteady* direct cognition, may be regarded as subordinate to *Medita-*

tion ; and this would not militate against our tenets ; as the *Hearing* that we insist upon regarding as the predominant factor, is only that which brings about such *direct* Brahman-Knowledge as serves to put an end to all metempsychic troubles.

LI.

[The purpose of Brahman-Knowledge consists in the removal of evil.]

Says the Opponent—"The Knowledge of Brahman cannot
P. 104. "be regarded as putting an end to metempsychic
"or worldly troubles ; because as a matter of fact
"we find that worldly troubles continue even when the said
"knowledge has been attained."

This is not right ; because it is a fact fully established by the scriptures that whenever there is direct cognition of truth, there is cessation of all *Aḍhyāsa* or Illusion from its very root, and where there is no such cognition, there is no cessation of Illusion. "But the cognition of truth, even though contrary to *Aḍhyāsa*, may not entirely remove it ; just as the mere cognition of the Self as distinct from the Body &c., even though opposed to *Aḍhyāsa*, does not entirely destroy it." This can not be ; as the two cases are not analogous ; the cognition of truth is contrary to the Root-Ignorance (the Ignorance that lies at the root of all Illusion) ; which is not the case with the cognition of the Self merely as different from the Body &c. "In that case the Root-Ignorance having been destroyed by the Cognition of Truth, the Body should fall away forthwith." Not so ; as it is possible for the Body &c., to continue for a while, by the force of the impressions or momentum set up Ignorance and its effects. "But such impressions are known to exist only in the case of Cognition and in that of the revolution of wheels ; and not anywhere else." It is not so ; for we do find impressions in the case of Smell and such other things also. "As a matter of fact, on the removal of the Flower, what still produces the notion of smell is, not any *Impression*, but, the subtle flower-particles, such as subsist in every flower."

Even so, it will have to be admitted that at the time of Universal Dissolution, there remain the *impressions* left by all the effects that had appeared during the closing cycle. Those persons who will not admit these should be met by the following inference—‘the final destruction of the effects must be due to impressions,—because while being something other than the destruction of impressions, it is a destruction, like the destruction of Cognitions (which is brought about by impressions).’ “But this inference would be annulled by the well-known fact that impressions are possible only for actions and Cognitions!” Well, if that be so, then, inasmuch as Nescience and its effects are also only mistaken *cognitions*, they could, as *cognitions*, give rise to Impressions. “It may be that, even though the witnessing Consciousness, pertaining to Nescience &c., is eternal, yet the *vṛitti* relating to the wrong cognition qualifying that Consciousness is transient, and hence the said Impression may be possible; but even so, how can the *direct cognition* of Duality arise from *Impressions*, which are productive of *Remembrance* only?” What we say in reply to this is that Impressions are a defect attaching to that Consciousness which is the cause of the direct cognition of worldly phenomena; just for instance, as Dimness affecting the eyes, which are the means of direct perception, becomes the cause of direct cognition in the form of misconceptions. It will not be right to argue that “pure Consciousness cannot be the substratum of Impressions”;—because Consciousness can be the substratum of Impressions in the same manner as it is the substratum of Nescience. Then again, even though Impressions are effects, they do not require a constituent cause, being, in this respect, like Destruction; specially as it is only positive products—with the sole exception of Nescience and Impression—that require constituent causes. So that, even though in other cases Impression must subsist in its own constituent cause, yet, in the case in question, it is quite possible for it to subsist in Consciousness, which is not its constituent cause.

The postulating of Impressions does not necessarily imply the denial of ' *Videhamukti* ', ' Deliverance during Life ' ; for the said Deliverance is accomplished at the exhaustion of such Karmic forces as have been set going, when Impressions cease by reason of the recollecting of True Knowledge. " But Nescience having ceased, and there being no constituent cause for Impressions, how could the Body &c. continue without a constituent substratum ? " Well, in that case, ' Deliverance during Life ' may be explained as arising on the acquiring of True Knowledge—the taint of Nescience (and the consequent connection with the Body &c.) continuing till the exhaustion of the active Karmic forces ; and when the obstruction of these Karmic forces has been removed, even the slight taint of Nescience ceases entirely, by the force

P. 105. of True Knowledge.

From all this it follows that the purpose of the Vēdānta texts consists in the acquiring of that Knowledge of the Unity of Brahman which puts an end to all metempsychic troubles. Though there are certain Vēdānta texts which lay down the worshipping of Brahman with attributes, yet these should be taken merely as a side-issue, a bye-activity,—like the laying down of the milking vessel (which is laid down as a sub-subsidiary, helping in the main action of the Sacrifice) ; and hence these also should be taken as pointing out that same *absolute* Attributeless Brahman which is spoken of (in these texts) as the object of worship. And as regards the qualities that are laid down as objects of worship, they serve the useful purpose of helping in the comprehending of the true nature of Absolute Brahman,—by the method of assuming a character (for It, hypothetically) and then rejecting it (as unsuitable ; and thus by the process of elimination, getting at the *Absolute*, free from all attributes). And before the said attributes have been actually rejected, the Brahman qualified by them may be taken as one whose worship is laid down for the accomplishing of certain ordinary results (and not of the highest result of Deliverance).

“If the injunction of worship, based upon the wrong imposition of qualities on Brahman, is only for the purpose of bringing about (by the process of elimination) the due comprehension of the nature of Brahman, by the person seeking Final Release,—then in that case (these injunctions being for the purpose of the seeking after Final Release), persons entitled to worship would be just these persons who are entitled to Final Release ; just as in connection with the *Darśha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, we have the text ‘the fetching of the water should be done with the milking vessel’ ; and the person entitled to the use of this ‘milking vessel’ is the same who is performing the *Darśha-Pūrṇamāsa*.”

This does not affect our position. In the example cited, it being a fact that the fetching of water is possible only for one who is entitled to the performance of the *Darśha-pūrṇamāsa*,—it follows that the injunction of the ‘milking vessel’ to be used if cattle is desired is also meant for those who are performing the *Darśha-pūrṇamāsa*. In the case in question however, the injunction (of worship) may be taken as referring to persons not necessarily seeking Final Release ; as it is possible for these persons also to comprehend, by means of the texts concerned, what is imposed upon Brahman ; so that in this case it does not necessarily follow that the persons entitled to the worship are the same as those entitled to Final Release.

“It may be that those Vēdānta texts that lay down the worshipping of the qualified Brahman help in the bringing about of the comprehension of the true nature of Brahman ; but the same cannot be said of those texts that lay down the worshipping of the Prāṇas and such other things.”

Not so ; as these latter also ultimately lead to the same end, through the purification of the internal organ (accomplished by means of the worship of the Prāṇas &c.),

Thus then, we conclude that Brahman forms the *subject-matter* of all Vēdānta texts ;—their *purpose* consists in the

removal of evil by means of the attaining of Knowledge of Brahman ; so that of the Science of Vedānta also, those same are the Subject-matter and Purpose.

LII.

[That the subject-matter and purpose of the Vedānta are as described is implied by the first Vedānta-Sūtra ; as the Potential affix always denotes the means of accomplishing a desired end.]

Says the Opponent—" All that the first Sūtra lays down "is the fact that an enquiry (into the nature of Brahman) "should be held ; how is it then that you are now putting "forward in connection with the Inquiry into Vēdānta, "a subject-matter and a purpose that are not even mentioned "in the Sūtra ?"

Our answer to this is as follows :—The said purpose and subject-matter are actually implied in the Sūtra (even though they are not mentioned in so many words). We shall show later on that all injunctive affixes—the Injunctive, the Imperative and the Potential—denote the means of accomplishing a desired end. So that when the first Sūtra stands in the form—' for the purpose of knowing Brahman, the Vedānta texts *should be pondered over* '—what the potential affix (in the term 'should be pondered over') denotes is the fact that what is expressed by the Verbal root (to 'ponder'),—*i. e.* the *pondering* or *reflection*—is the means of accomplishing some sort of a desirable end, in general ;—and when the question arises as to what particular desirable end it is that is accomplished by means of the said *reflection*, it is Final Release that comes to be regarded as that end ; for the simple reason that it is the desire for Final Release that distinguishes the person undertaking the said Reflection or Inquiry ; just as (in the case of sacrificial performances) Heaven &c. come to be regarded as the end to be accomplished [by reason of the fact that it is desire for these that distinguishes the man undertaking the performances]. And as for the 'Knowledge of

Brahman',—it being the direct result of the *Reflection* expressed by the verbal root,—and also the direct means of bringing about Final Release,—it comes in as an intervening agency; just as *Apūrva* (being the result of Sacrifices and the cause of Heaven) does in the case of sacrificial performances.

The Opponent (Prābhākara) raises an objection—"The Injunctive affix signifies, not the *means of accomplishing a desired end*, but only *injunction or command*; as it is only this latter that cannot be cognised by any other means of cognition; so that the injunctive affix urges the person addressed to the undertaking of what is denoted by the verbal root: and it goes on to imply that what is denoted by the verbal root is the means of accomplishing the desired end."

There is nothing in this view; as there is no possible incongruity (for the avoiding of which such an implication or presumption would be necessary). That is to say, in the absence of the fact that what is denoted by the verbal root is the means whereby the desired end is accomplished, (a) would the form of the Injunction itself be impossible? or (b) would its urging power be impossible? (a) It could not be the former; as in the case of the obligatory and occasional duties, we have the injunction in its complete form, even though there are no results. (b) In the second case, when the Injunction urges the agent, does it do so through the desire for results, or by itself? If the former, then the urging might be done by the *desire* itself; and what would be the use of the Injunction? Specially as in the case of perceptible things, we find the *desire* doing the *urging*, independently by itself. If it be the latter, then the Injunction would, like the force of the stream, forcibly urge forward a person who may not have any desire at all for the result (accomplished by the action to which he is urged); and such *urging* (of persons without desire) would be possible even in a case where what is denoted by the verbal root is not the means of accomplishing any desired result at all! Otherwise it may be possible that the force

of the stream also would be urging (the drowning man) towards an action leading to a desirable result !

“ Even though the Injunction alone may not presuppose the connection between the result and the action signified by the Verbal root,—yet, when the Injunction becomes recognised by a person desiring the result, it does certainly come to establish that connection.”

Not so ; as even so there would be no incongruity, even in the absence of such a connection. For instance, even though the desired result were not one to be accomplished by the action expressed by the verbal root, there would be nothing in the way of the desire for the said result being the qualification of the person entitled to undertake the act ; because in the case of such offerings (the *Agniḥōtra* f. i.) as are laid down to be made ‘as long as one lives’, the qualification of the performer consists in *being alive*, which certainly is not something accomplished by the act of *offering*. “ But even though this may be so when the qualification concerned is one that is not capable of being accomplished ; yet in cases where the qualification—in the shape of the result—is such as is capable of being accomplished, the result cannot be a qualification unless it be capable of being accomplished by means of the act denoted by the verbal root.” This is not right ; for when you speak of ‘capable of being accomplished’, does it mean ‘capable of being accomplished *by what is signified by the verbal root* ?’ Or merely ‘capable of being accomplished’ in general ? If it is the former, then what is presupposed and what presupposes being the same, it involves the absurdity of a thing resting in itself. If it is the latter, then is the fact of Heaven being capable of being accomplished known directly from words ? Or is it only implied ? It cannot be the former ; as there is no word expressing the idea. Nor can it be the latter ; as there is nothing that could imply it ; inasmuch as we do not see anything that would be inexplicable except on the basis of Heaven being regarded as

something to be accomplished. “Well, if Heaven were not something capable of being accomplished, it could not have any connection with persons desirous of it.” Even so, Heaven could not be a qualification of the person entitled to the performance of the act,—on the strength of which we could assume the fact of its being capable of being accomplished by what is expressed by the verbal root. Then again, when one says ‘*Dēvaḍaṭṭa* has a dry stick’, the *stick* is the qualification of *Dēvaḍaṭṭa*, and *dryness* is the qualification of the stick,—so when it is said ‘one desiring Heaven is entitled to the performance of actions’, the *desire* is the qualification of the person entitled, and *Heaven* is the qualification of the Desire. “But even Heaven may, through the Desire, be regarded as the qualification of the person.” Even so, it does not follow that Heaven is accomplished by means of the act denoted by the verbal root. For example, in the case of the sentence ‘one desirous of study should live on alms’, even though the *study* is something *to be accomplished*, and it enters into the qualification of the person entitled to perform the act referred to, yet it is not recognised as something capable of being accomplished by *living on alms*, which is the act denoted by the verbal root ‘(*charēṭ*)’. “But we also find the contrary to be the case in such sentences as ‘desiring riches one should serve the king’.” Well, in that case (what we

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would urge is that), it is extremely difficult to determine how *Heaven* and *desire for it* can serve the purpose of qualifying the Agent; for in the first place the term ‘desiring heaven’ does not preclude the non-connection of the Agent with the Injunction of the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa*; as the preclusion of this non-connection is already accomplished by the force of the obligatory Injunctive word itself;—nor can the term be taken as precluding the connection of other things (than the *Darśhapūrṇamāsa*); for if persons not desiring heaven were to be precluded from the

Darshapūrṇamāsa Sacrifices, this preclusion would be incompatible with the obligatory character of the Injunctive word; specially as the Obligatory Injunction is something entirely different from the Optional Injunction. "But these objections cease to apply if we take the preclusion to be of both, the connection of others and the non-connection of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*." It is not so; for though it is true that the obligatory injunction is expressed by the passage laying down the *lifelong* sacrifice, while the optional injunction is expressed by the passage speaking of 'desiring Heaven',—yet in reality there is no difference between the two injunctions,—as it is easily recognised that it is the same *Darshapūrṇamāsa* along with its subsidiaries that figures in both Injunctions. Then, as for this distinction between 'obligatory' and 'optional', that may be explained as bearing upon the difference in the character of the person entitled to the performance. Nor will it be right to argue that—"if the *desire for heaven* is not a qualification for the Agent, the term 'desiring heaven' would be absolutely futile." For, just as in the case of the passage 'holding the stick the priest recites the *Praīṣa* mantras', we find that the priest reciting the *Praīṣa* mantras having already been spoken of elsewhere, all that this passage does is to speak of the *stick* as the qualification of the Priest, the sense being—"when the Priest recites the *Praīṣa* mantras he should hold a stick",—in the same manner, the term 'desiring Heaven' may be taken as pointing to the Heaven as the qualification; as has been declared by Pārthasārathi—"as the result to be accomplished is what is desired, the term *desire* must be taken as referring to that; how a mere qualification can be the predominant factor in a sentence has been shown in the case of the term *holding the stick*'. Even if the term 'desiring heaven' is taken merely as pointing to the *result* (and not as qualifying the Agent), the real character of the Agent would be recognised

by implication. For instance, the fact of the Sacrifice being the means of accomplishing Heaven having been made known by the Injunctive and other affixes, the Agent, by himself, realises that the action mentioned is the means of accomplishing something that he desires, and thus comes to recognise himself as entitled to the performance of that action. Thus in this manner the term 'desiring heaven', pointing to the result, becomes capable of being construed along with the sentence speaking of the means of accomplishing that result. And this is possible only if the Injunctive, the Potential and other affixes denote the fact of a certain act being the means of accomplishing something desirable, and not when they denote mere *Injunction*. Hence *Injunction* cannot be accepted as forming the denotation of the Injunctive and other affixes.

Other writers hold that what is brought about by the Injunctive and other affixes is the cognition of the relation of cause and effect between Heaven and the action denoted by the verbal root. Their position may be summed up as follows :—

“ What is expressed by the injunctive sentence is the
 ‘ Injunction as along with (qualified by) the subject-matter
 “ and the Agent. The subject-matter is the *sacrifice*, the
 “ person desirous of heaven is the *Agent*; and with a view
 “ to render the Injunction effective, we presume the mutual
 “ relation of Action and Doer to subsist between these (the
 “ Agent and the subject-matter),—without which relation,
 “ as the subject-matter would not be put into action by the
 “ Agent, the Injunction would not be effective. Thus then,
 “ just as in the case of the man *holding the stick*, it is found
 “ that that which is connected with the *man holding the stick*
 “ is also connected with the *stick*,—in the same manner
 “ when the *Sacrifice* would be related to the *urged Agent*
 “ *who is desirous of heaven*, it would become related also to the
 “ Heaven, which is a qualification (of the Agent). This

“ *relation* cannot be any other than that of the ‘ Primary and Secondary ’ (the Principal and Subordinate). So that “ *Heaven* being the predominant factor, the *Sacrifice* becomes
 P. 108. “ related to it as the subordinate factor, and it
 “ follows that there subsists between these two the
 “ relation of cause and effect (the *Sacrifice* being the cause
 “ and *Heaven* the effect). ”

There is nothing in this theory. For in the manner described, there might be a connection of the *Sacrifice* with even such qualifications of the Agent as *living, burning of the house* and so forth’. “ Let there be this connection—what is the harm ? ” Well, if there were such connection, the question would arise—does this *being alive* become connected as the subordinate factor in regard to what is denoted by the Verbal root ? Or as the predominant factor ? If the former, then, it would come to this that the *being alive*, which is a qualification of the Agent entitled to the obligatory *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, being subsidiary to this sacrifice, would have to be connected also with the *Saurya* and other ectypes of it. That the *Saurya* sacrifice, laid down in the sentence ‘ one desirous of Brahmic glory should offer the rice to Sūrya ’, is an ectype of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* is made clear by the force of the injunction of the ‘ offering ’ ;—this being so, in view of the ‘ law of transferences ’ that ‘ the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype ’, the subsidiary details of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* become applicable to the *Saurya* ;—and inasmuch as *being alive* is as much a detail as any other, this also becomes connected with the *Saurya* ; and thus the meaning of the injunction of the *Saurya* would be that ‘ one should offer the rice to Sūrya throughout his life ’. “ But inasmuch as the *Saurya* has been laid down for the person having a particular desire (that for Brahmic glory), this precludes the possibility of the connection of such details as pertain to an obligatory act ; so that the said incongruity cannot arise ? ” This is not right ; because the con-

ditions of the obligatory and optional acts should all be as applicable to the Ectype as to the Archetype (in view of the general law of Transference).

If, on the other hand, the *being alive* becomes connected (with the denotation of the Verbal root) as the predominant factor,—then, in that case, being the predominant factor, the *being alive* should be looked upon as *something to be accomplished*, just like *Heaven*. From all this it follows that the term ‘desiring Heaven’, which speaks of a particular result, becomes connected with the injunctive word, in virtue of the fact that every injunctive word in general signifies the means of accomplishing something desirable.

Another objection is raised—“If the Injunctive affix “signifies the means of accomplishing a desirable end, then “there should be no instrumental ending in the sentence “‘*Jyotiṣtomēna yajēta*’; as the instrumental is laid down “as to be used only for the signification of such *instrumentality* “as is not already signified by conjugational or nominal or “verbal affixes [and in the case in question the desired “instrumentality is *ex-hypothesi* already signified by the “conjugational injunctive affix in ‘*Yajēta*.]”

This objection does not affect our position. Even though the injunctive affix (in *Yajēta*) expresses the instrumentality of ‘sacrifice’ in general,—which is what is denoted by the verbal root ‘*Yaj*’ (in ‘*Yajēta*)—yet, it does not signify the instrumentality of the *particular* sacrifice *Jyotiṣtoma* (for the signifying of which we require the instrumental ending in ‘*Jyotiṣtomēna*’]. Thus there need be nothing incongruous in the fact that the means of accomplishing a desirable end is denoted by the injunctive affix.

Now, when the *Sūtra* stands in the form—‘one who desires Final Release should reflect upon the *Vēdānta* texts’—what it signifies is the fact that *Reflection* is the means of accomplishing a desirable end *in general*; but it follows from

this that *Final Release*, which is a particular kind of *desirable end*, is the final purpose of that Science of Reflection. And the term ‘*Brahmajñāsa*’, serves to point out also the subject-matter of that science. Though in reality the *subject-matter* of the Science is dealt with in a later chapter (called the *Samanvāyādhya*), and the *Purpose* in the Fourth Chapter,—yet it becomes necessary to indicate these in the opening Sūtra also ; as a due understanding of these is necessary before one undertakes the inquiry embodied in the Science.

Thus then the purport of this section is that, inasmuch as this Science has a subject-matter and a definite purpose, people should undertake its study.

—:o:—

END OF CHAPTER I.

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NOTICE OF MANUSCRIPTS.

I

Anvikṣanayaṭaṭṭvaboḍha—by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya—Palm-leaf. 94 Leaves. Containing the first three *Sūtras*—‘*Trisūtri*’—of an original Commentary on the Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama. Dated 392 of the ‘Laksmāṇa Sena’ Era.

This is a voluminous and extremely illuminating commentary on the Sūtras written by the Author after he had finished his Commentary upon Udayanachārya’s ‘*Parishuddhi*’ on Vāchaspati Mishra’s ‘*Nyāyavārṭikaṭāṭṭparyatīkā*’. The writing of an independent commentary on the original Sūtras appears to have been the custom of several old writers on Nyāya. Udayanācharya, after writing the *Parishuddhi*, wrote his *Ṭaṭṭvaboḍhi*—otherwise called ‘*Nyāyaparishīṣṭa*’—on the *Sūtras*; [this has been commented upon by Vardhamāna separately]; Vardhamāna, after having written his commentary on Udayana’s works, wrote the *Anvikṣānayaṭaṭṭvaboḍha*; and I am told, Jayanta Bhatta also, after writing the *Nyāyamañjari*, wrote an elaborate Commentary on the Sūtras, called *Nyāyakalikā*.

Vardhamāna was a Brāhmaṇa of Miṭhilā, the son and pupil of Gaṅgēsha Upādhyāya, the author of the *Ṭaṭṭvoachinṭāmaṇi*. Every one of Vardhamāna’s works contains the following verses :—

यस्तकतन्म तपत्रसहस्ररश्मि-
गङ्गेश्वरः सुकचिकर काननेन्दुः ॥
त आत्मजः प. रचीत्य निबन्धमि-
म्याकाशवत्कृति दे सुवर्धमानः ॥
म्यावाग्भाजपत. त्य मीमांसापारङ्ग वने ।
गङ्गेश्वराय गुरवे पित्रेऽन्नमवते नमः ॥

He is the author of the following works—(1) *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśha*—Commentary on Udayana’s ‘*Parishuddhi*’; (2) *Prakāśha*—on the Nyayakusumanjali; (3) a Commentary on the *Ālmaṭaṭṭvavivēka*; (4) Commentary on Udayana’s

Nyāyaparishīṣṭa; (5) Commentary on *Nyāyalīlavatī*; (6) Commentary on the *Kiraṇāvalī*; (7) *Anvikṣāṇayaṭaṭṭva-boḍha*; (8) Commentary on Shri-Harṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khāḍaya* [Gokulanātha Upādhyāya in his *Khaṇḍanākuthāra* refers to this work—वर्धमानेन विवृतं शङ्करेण च विस्तृतम् श्रीहर्षवचन-व्याख्यासारमा . . . लिख्यते].

II

The same bundle contains a fragment of a Commentary on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* by Keshava Mishra, the author of the *Tarkabhāṣa*. The Commentary is concise and clear; and confines itself to explanation pure and simple.

NOTICE OF BOOKS.

The Indian Literary Year Book and Authors' Who is Who, Edited by Prof. N. Mitra, M.A., and Published by the Panini Office, Bahadurganj, Allahabad—Price, Rs. 2.

We notice with great pleasure the publication of a useful book of reference, which was a great desideratum. Thacker's *Directory* is not only too costly and too bulky for ordinary use; it does not also serve the purpose which the book under notice does.

We are glad that we have now in print a collection (if not at present a very large collection) of the names of Indian Authors and their principal works, of Periodicals, News Agencies, Libraries and Reading Rooms, Scientific Associations, Printing Presses, Booksellers and Publishers, and also the full texts of the Newspapers Act of 1908, the Indian Press Act of 1910, the Indian Copyright Act of 1914, and the Indian Copyright Regulations of 1914. In fact it is a veritable *Vade Mecum* for the book-trade.

So far as we have been able to see, the present publication is as accurate as it is useful. The inevitable printers' devil, however, has still got his fair share. (*E. g.* 'His Majesty's Life in the Highlands' for 'Her Majesty's'). Some information is

out of date ; but very little. *E. g.* Dr. Bhandakar is, to the best of our knowledge, no longer a Professor at Poona, and Prof. Yogendranath Samaddar is at Bankipore now and not at Hazaribagh ; the *Comrade* of Delhi is now extinct.

These faults do not however materially detract from the value of the book, and we hope that in coming years it may improve and prosper, as all useful publications are destined to do.

A. J.

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NO. 7

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VĀTSYĀYANA'S BHĀṢYA AND UDYOTAKARA'S
VĀRTIKA.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH
COPIOUS NOTES FROM VĀCHASPAṬI MISHRA'S *Tātparyatīkā*
AND UDAYANĀCHARYA'S *Parishuddhi*.

BY
MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA GAṄGĀNĀṬHA JHĀ, M.A., D. LITT.

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ADHYĀYA II.
Daily Lesson I.
Section (1).

Detailed Examination of Doubt.
[Sūtras 1—7.]

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 60, L. 1 to L. 11.]

After this proceeds the *detailed examination* of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories. And, inasmuch as every definitive cognition has been declared (in Sūtra 1-1-41) to consist in the 'ascertainment of the real character of a thing after duly *deliberating* over the two sides of the question,' (whereby *deliberation* or *Doubt*, is made the precursor of all Definite Cognition)—it is Doubt that is examined first of all.*

Sūtra (1).

“NO DOUBT CAN ARISE EITHER FROM THE CERTAIN COGNITION OF PROPERTIES COMMON TO SEVERAL OBJECTS, OR FROM THE CERTAIN COGNITION OF CHARACTERS BELONGING TO ONLY ONE OF THE OBJECTS.”†

(a) “As a matter of fact, Doubt arises from the *cognition* of common properties, and not from the *properties* only‡;—
“ (b) or again, as a matter of fact, we do not find any Doubt arising from the mere cognition of the property and the things possessing that property;—i.e. no Doubt is found to

* The *Vārtika* gives further reasons for beginning the *detailed examination* with Doubt, even though the *enunciation* has begun with *Pramāṇa*.

† Sūtras 1 to 5 embody the *Pārvapakṣa* view—which traverses the explanation of Doubt provided in Sū. 1-1-23.

‡ This opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya* is a little obscure. The words of the *Sūtra* apparently mean that ‘Doubt does not arise from the *cognition* of common properties’; while the *Bhāṣya* represents the sense to be that ‘Doubt arises from the cognition of common properties.’ The explanation given in the Footnote (in the *Vizianagram Series* Edition) is in itself a forced one: but it would be acceptable if it did not make this opening sentence identical in sense with what follows as the fourth alternative explanation provided by the *Bhāṣya* in L. 8 below. Both the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* have felt this difficulty. The former characterises this first statement of the *Pārvapakṣa* as ‘*Yatāhshruṭi uṣṭhanam*,’ and the latter remarks that the statement is made regardless of the explanations that have been provided under Sū. 1-1-23. The real explanation is as follows, as is made clear in the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

The present Sū. I contains three statements—I *वृत्तान्तवर्गीयवशात् न संशयः* (this denies the first statement in Sū. 1-1-23, viz. *वृत्तान्तवर्गीयवशः संशयः*); this is interpreted by the Bhā. as representing the four *pārvapakṣas*:—(a) taking *उपपत्ति* of Sū. 1-1-23 to mean mere *presence* or *connection*, and denying that mere presence of common properties gives rise to Doubt, which only arises when these properties are duly recognised; (b) taking *उपपत्ति* to mean *cognition*, and denying that any doubt can arise even from the recognition of common properties in only one of the two things that enter into the doubt; (c) taking *उपपत्ति*—*definite ascertainment*; and (d) stating the objection in a different manner from (c). II. *अनेकवर्गीयवशात् न संशयः* (this denies the *अनेकवर्गीयवशः* of Sū. 1-1-23, which containing the same term *उपपत्ति* is open to all the four *pārvapakṣas* that have been urged above. III. *अविवक्षितवर्गीयवशात् न संशयः*

"arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things*';—(c) or it is not possible for any Doubt to arise from the cognition of common properties, when the thing (in regard to which the common properties are perceived) is different (from that in which the common properties are perceived); e.g. when the cognition (of common properties) appears in regard to one thing, for instance *Colour*, the Doubt cannot arise in regard to another thing, for instance *Touch*;—(d) or lastly, from *Adhyavṣāya*,—which stands for *conviction, certain cognition*,—there cannot arise *Doubt*, which stands for *uncertain cognition*; as in this case there would be no affinity between Cause and effect (which is essential).

"These same objections apply also to the view that Doubt arises *anēkaḍharmādhyavṣyāt*, i.e., from the conviction of the properties of several things.

"Nor does Doubt ever arise from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things; on the contrary, from such cognition there arises the *certain cognition* of that one thing."†

Vārṇika on Sū. (1).

[P. 183, L. 4 to P. 185, L. 3].

Introductory.

It has been declared in the *Bhāṣya* [Trans. P. 11] that—'the Science of Reasoning proceeds by three processes, by *enunciation*, by *definition* and by *examination*';—of these the *Enunciation* and *Definition* (of the Categories) have been explained under the foregoing *Adhyāya*; next to follow is their *Examination*. Inasmuch as the *Definition* of the Categories has followed the order in which they were *enunciated*, the same order should be observed in the *Examination* also; so that the categories should be examined in the same order; and as the first category to be *enunciated* and *defined* was *Pramāṇa*, it would be only right to begin the *Examination* also with the same. Though thus the opening of the present

* This thing (which is seen) and that thing (which is remembered); एषं विदेहि

एवम् एतद् विदेहि एतद् एवम् एतद् एवम्—says *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† This alternative takes 'anēka' as equivalent to 'anyatara', 'one of the two similar things'.

Aḍhyāya should be the occasion for starting the *Examination* of the *Pramāṇas*, the Sūtra skips over these, and proceeds with the *Examination of Doubt*. “Why should there be a change in the order?” Doubt is the first to be *examined*, because it is the principal accessory of all *examination*; as is clear from the definition that the Sūtra (1-1-41) has provided of Definitive Cognition as the ‘ascertainment of the real character of a thing after due *pondering over the two sides of the question*’ [where it is shown that *pondering*, i.e. Doubt, stands at the base of all cogitation]. “But it has been declared (in the *Bhāṣya*, Text P. 48, L. 10 to 13) that it is not necessary that every Definitive Cognition should proceed after due pondering over the two sides of a question; and it has been added that in the case of Discussion the definitive cognition is arrived at by means of the arguments in support of the two sides of the question; and that in the case of a Scientific Treatise, it is arrived at without any (Doubt) at all. So that the present enquiry forming part of a scientific treatise, there is no reason why it should begin the section on *Examination* with *Doubt*; specially as it is only in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning that enquiry is preceded by Doubt.” It is quite true that Doubt is not a necessary factor in all Definitive Cognition; but it is a necessary element in all enquiry; the Definitive Cognition may or may not be preceded by Doubt, but enquiry must always be preceded by Doubt. What the *Bhāṣya* has said in regard to the absence of Doubt in Discussion and Scientific Treatises is only with reference to the two parties to the discussion; the sense being that in regard to matters dealt with in the Science there is no doubt in the minds of the two controversialists, both of them (being learned and hence) quite certain as to the doctrines of the Science;* and

* The *Tātparyā* adds—‘It is only when the two persons are fully learned that they have no doubts in regard to what is contained in the *Śāstra*; but when the discussion is held between two students, or between a student and his tutor, there is certainly room for doubt; in which case the investigation is preceded

as regards the Science itself, of course there is no room for doubt; as the matters it deals with are such as are fully ascertained by the writer and are not open to doubt. For instance, in the course of discussion (on the eternality of words) the controversialists proceed to examine whether the arguments in support of eternality or those in support of non-eternality are the stronger of the two ; and in the Science also there is enquiry as to the effectiveness or otherwise of the arguments that are adduced (in support of a certain doctrine);

Var : P. 184.

and for the ascertaining of this there has to be a Doubt. So that all enquiry being preceded by Doubt, and the entire process of Examination being dependent upon Doubt, it is *Doubt* that is *examined* first of all.

Now Doubt is a cognition of the nature of uncertainty in regard to the exact nature of a thing. It might be urged that this involves a contradiction in terms,—that which is *Cognition* being asserted to be of the nature of *uncertainty* involving a contradiction [*cognition* always standing for definite *certain* cognition]. But this would not be true ; as such an argument would show that the objector does not grasp the true nature of Cognitions : as a matter of fact, by itself *Cognition* is absolutely vague and abstract ; so that when it appears in connection with an object, all that happens to it is that it becomes defined and concrete ; and it does not necessarily follow that it apprehends the true nature of that object.

This Doubt having been defined (in Sū. 1-1-23) as 'that wavering Judgment arising from the cognition of common properties &c. &c.',—the following exception is taken to that definition.

by doubt.' The *Parishuddhi* remarks—In the *Shāstra* the Investigation is for the benefit of the Pupil ; and the Pupil certainly has his doubts. In discussion also it is true that the parties are *certain* as to their conclusions ; but they also have their doubts as to the comparative strength and weakness of their arguments ; and this is ascertained by Investigation.

“No Doubt can arise, &c. &c.”—says the Sūtra. The objection herein urged is against what is directly expressed by the words of the definition (provided in Sū. 1-1-23).*

[The sense of the objection is as follows]—“(a) Doubt arises, as a matter of fact, from the *Cognition* of a common property, and not mere-

ly from the common property; what becomes a cause of Doubt is that common property *which is cognised*.—(b) Or, no Doubt is found to arise from the mere cognition of the property and the things possessing that property; for instance, where do we ever have any Doubt following from the cognition of a property and the things possessing it, which is expressed in the conception that ‘I perceive a property common to these things’?†—(c) Or no doubt arises where the two things are different; that is to say, no Doubt arises in regard to one thing when what is perceived is a totally different thing ‡.—(d) Or the *Cognition of common property* cannot be the cause of Doubt, as a cognition partakes of the nature of *certainly*, which is absent in *Doubt* [and certainly what is *certain* in its character cannot be the cause of what is *not-certain*]. (e) These same arguments hold good in regard to *the cognition of the properties of several objects*. §(e.1) No doubt can arise with regard to things perceived and not perceived (*e. g.*, the *post* and the *man*); it cannot arise with regard to what is perceived, because what is perceived is known with certainty; nor can it arise with regard to what is not perceived, for the simple reason that it is not perceived. §(e.2) It is not right to assert that Doubt arises from ‘the

* This, says the *Tātparyā*, has been added because the objections urged do not, at all lie against the definition that has been deduced by the *Bhāṣya* from the words of the Sūtra.

† For instance, when the observer perceives the *man* and the *post*, and also their common property, *tallness*—no Doubt arises.

‡ *E. g.* When what is perceived by the eye is the *post*, there can be no doubt in regard to *Man*.

§ The *Vārṭika* adds four further items to the *Pārvapakṣa*.

" cognition of common properties'; as it often happens that
 " even when there is ' cognition of common properties,' no
 " Doubt arises; that is to say, Doubt is not found to appear
 " even when the ' cognition of common properties ' is present ;
 " as for instance, when we cognise, in Sound, the character of
 " *being a product* (which is common to Sound along with
 " many other things), there does not arise any Doubt at all
 " [on the contrary, there appears the *certain* conviction of its
 " non-eternality]. (e.3) Nor will it be right to assert that*
 " what is meant is that Doubt arises *only* when there is
 " " cognition of common characters ' [and not that whenever
 " there is such cognition Doubt must arise];—this will not
 " be right ; for as a matter of fact Doubt is found to arise
 Var. P. 185. " otherwise also; for instance, Doubt arises
 " when on finding mutually contradictory
 " properties co-existing in the same thing, one fails to com-
 " prehend the real character of that thing ; as we find in the
 " case of the ' neutralised ' probans. (e.4) Lastly, the
 " property which subsists in only one thing cannot be called
 " ' common'; and (in the case of Doubt, with regard to Man
 " and Post, for instance) the property (*tillness*) is perceived
 " as subsisting in only one thing (the Post;) and certainly that
 " which subsists in only one thing cannot be called ' common.'

Sūtra (2)

(f) " NOR FROM THE COGNITION OF DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS,
 OR FROM THAT OF UNCERTAINTY."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (2)

[P. 60, L. 13 to P. 61, L. 2.]

(1) " Doubt does not arise either from ' diversity of
 " opinions ' only, or from ' uncertainty ' only ; in fact Doubt

* The reading in lines 19—21 of the Text is not quite satisfactory in either of the two editions. The Benares edition reads 'अवधारणम्' in line 19 as well as in l. 21 ; the *Bib. Ind.* edition reads 'अवधारणम्' in l. 19, and 'न अवधारणम्' in l. 21. The right reading apparently is simply 'अवधारणम्' in l. 19 (as read in the *Bib. Ind.* edition) and 'अवधारणम्' in l. 21 (as found in the Benares edition).

“ appears in a man who knows of the ‘diversity of opinions’;—
 “ similarly it appears in one who is cognisant of the
 “ uncertainty.’* (2) Or, how could any Doubt arise from
 “ the certain cognition of the fact that ‘some people think
 “ that the Soul exists, while others think that it does not
 “ exist? Similarly,† in regard to the ‘uncertainty of per-
 “ ception’ (which has been held in Sū. 1-1-23, to be a cause
 “ of Doubt). What happens in the case of *uncertainty* is
 “ that the observer duly recognises that there can be no certainty
 “ as to the thing being *perceived* (actually cognised as pos-
 “ sessed of a certain character) and also that there is no
 “ certainty as to its being *not perceived* (actually cognised
 “ as *not* possessing a certain character); and when each of
 “ these facts is duly cognised, there can be no Doubt‡

Vārṭika on Sū. 2.

[P. 185, L. 6 to L. 7.]

“ The arguments put forward above serve also to preclude
 “ the view that Doubt arises from the cognition of *difference*
 “ of opinions and from that of *uncertainty*. Doubt arises from
 “ the *cognition* of difference of opinion and from that of un-
 “ certainty, and not merely from ‘difference of opinion’ and
 “ ‘uncertainty.’

Sūtra (3).

(g) “ ALSO BECAUSE IN A CASE OF DIVERSITY OF OPINION
 THERE IS CERTAINTY OF CONVICTION.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (3).

[P. 61, L. 4, L. 6].

“ That which you regard to be a case of ‘diversity of
 “ opinions’ is a case of *certain conviction*; it represents the
 “ certain conviction of two persons in regard to two opposite
 “ ideas [one man being *certain* of the *existence* of the Soul

* The *Bhāṣyachandra* says that this *Pūrvapakṣa* emanates from one who does not rightly comprehend the meanings of the two terms ‘*vip-aṭipatti*’ and ‘*anyavas-tā*’ as contained in Sū. 1-1-23, and hence denies the fact of Doubt proceeding from these.

And here also in the *Bhāṣya*, the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (1) proceeds on the basis of the term ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ being taken to signify mere *presence*, while that in (2) is based upon ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ signifying *cognition*.

† *अप्राप्ति* gives better sense—and is found in the Puri Mss. as also in three other Mss.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* interprets ‘*upalabdhi*’ as means of cognising a thing as possessing a character, and ‘*anupalabdhi*’ as a means of cognising it as not possessing it. So that in cases of uncertainty all that the observer feels is that there is neither any proof nor disproof of a certain fact; and what this means is that the man will have no idea at all, and not that he will have a doubt.

“ while the other is *certain* of its *non-existence*, each man
 “ having a firm conviction in regard to his own opinion,
 “ which is contrary to the opinion of another person.]. So
 “ that if Doubt arose from ‘diversity of opinions,’ it would
 “ arise also from ‘certain conviction’ (which is absurd).

Vārṭika on Sū. (3).

[P. 185, L. 8.]

“ As there is certainty of conviction in the case of what
 “ you call ‘diversity of opinions,’ it is not a case of ‘diversity
 “ of opinions’ at all [That would be a case of real ‘diversity
 “ of opinions’ where the two opinions are held by the same
 “ man, and not when they are held by different men; as
 “ when one man holds that Soul exists and another holds
 “ that it does not exist; and it is only in the former case
 “ that the man would be in *doubt*].

Sūtra (4).

(h) “ FURTHER, BECAUSE UNCERTAINTY ITSELF IS QUITE
 “ CERTAIN IN ITS UNCERTAIN CHARACTER [NO DOUBT
 CAN ARISE FROM IT] ”.

Bhāṣya on Sū. (4).

[P. 61, L. 8 to L. 10.]

“ *No Doubt can arise*—this has to be added to the Sūtra.
 “ The meaning is this:—If the *Uncertainty* (that has been held
 “ to be the cause of Doubt) is, in itself, quite *certain*, then,
 “ inasmuch as there is *certain*—it would not be a case of
 “ *Uncertain’y* at all; so that there should be no Doubt possible.
 “ If, on the other hand, the *Uncertainty** is not quite certain
 “ in its own character, this would mean that it is not a real
 “ *Uncertainty* at all, being not certain in its uncertain
 “ character; and in this case also no Doubt should arise.”

Vārṭika on Sū. (4).

[P. 185, Ll. 10-11].

“ Inasmuch as every *Uncertainty* must be *certain* in its
 “ own character, there can be no real *Uncertainty* at all (from
 which Doubt would arise).

* The printed text reads ‘*vyavasāhā*’, but the sense requires ‘*avyavasāhā*’.

Sūtra (5).

(f) "LASTLY, DOUBT WOULD NEVER CEASE ; INASMUCH AS THE PROPERTY (WHOSE COGNITION GIVES RISE TO THE " DOUBT) CONTINUES TO EXIST."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (5).

[P. 61, L. 12 to 14.]

" You hold that Doubt arises from the cognition of a common property; now on this theory Doubt should be absolutely persistent;* for inasmuch as the cognition of the common property (which is the cause) does not cease to exist, there should be no cessation of the Doubt (which is the effect). As a matter of fact, even while one is pondering over a certain thing (the Post, for instance), this thing does not cease to be known as possessing the (common) property (Tallness for instance, whose perception may have given rise to Doubt); in fact it always retains that property [so that when the cause is there, the effect, in the shape of the Doubt, must be there also].

Vārtika on Sū. (5).

[P. 185, Ll. 13-14.]

" Such causes as the 'common property' and the like being persistent in the thing, Doubt should be eternal; such is the meaning of *Sūtra*."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (6).

[P. 61, L. 14 to P. 64, L. 6.]

To the above detailed Objection (embodied in *Sūtras* 1-5), the following is the reply briefly stated (in one *Sūtra*)—

Sūtra (6).

WHEN DOUBT IS HELD TO ARISE ONLY FROM SUCH COGNITION AS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED (IN Sū. 1-1-23) AS NOT APPREHENDING THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF ANY ONE OBJECT,† —THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF EITHER THERE BEING

* I. E. It should continue even when the distinguishing feature of any one thing would be clearly perceived.

† Though this is a qualification of Doubt, it may be regarded as qualifying the Source of Doubt also—*Bhāṣyachandṛa*.

NO DOUBT AT ALL, OR OF THERE ARISING A DOUBT THAT WOULD BE UNCEASINGLY PERSISTENT.* (Sū. 6).

There arises no such contingency as that no Doubt should arise, or that (when arisen) the Doubt should never cease.†

“How so?”

(a) Well, it has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (*Bhāṣya* P. 60, L. 2) that ‘what is the cause of Doubt is the cognition of the common property, and not the common property itself’;—and this is quite true. “Why then is not this

Bhā. P. 62. fact clearly mentioned (in the Sūtra)?” For the simple reason that this is already implied in the term ‘*viśhēṣāpēkṣaḥ*’; ‘in which the definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting’ (Sū. 1-1-23). By the ‘*apekṣā*’ of the ‘specific character’ is meant the *wanting to know it*;‡ and this is real and effective (and possible) only while the specific character is *not perceived*; and when the *Sūtra* does not use the term ‘*samānādharma-pēkṣaḥ*’, ‘wanting the cognition of the common property’; this omission means that there is *no wanting* of the cognition of the common property; and this *no wanting* would be possible only when there is direct cognition of the common property; so that by the force of this (omission of the *wanting of the cognition of the common property*), it is implied that there is *cognition of the common property*, from which cognition the Doubt arises. § As a matter of fact however, the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is set aside by the presence of the term ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ itself in the Sū. (1-1-23): What the Sūtra says is that Doubt arises from the ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ of the common property; and there can be no *upapaṭṭi* of a thing apart from the *cognition of its existence*; for a common property whose existence is not cognised would be as good as *non-existent*. Then again [even granting that the term ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ denotes mere *presence*, and not *cognition of existence*], a term that expresses an object also generally denotes the

* The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* explains the term ‘*viśhēṣāpēkṣaḥ*’ of this Sūtra to mean ‘depending upon such peculiar circumstances as the non-realisation of the difficulties caused by the remoteness of the object (and such other conditions which obstruct the correct perception of it)’.

† संशयानुपपत्तिरनन्तरा is the correct reading as found in both Puri MSS. ‘Doubts of any one kind cannot go on appearing unceasingly’—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ I. E. ‘The absence of its Knowledge’—says the *Bhāṣya-chandra*.

§ This answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* proceeds on the admission that the word ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ in Sū. 1-1-23 means *presence*—the meaning assigned to the term by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. The real answer however is that the term ‘*upapaṭṭi*’ itself means *cognition*; and this answer follows in the next sentence.

cognition of that object; *e. g.* when in ordinary parlance people say, 'fire is inferred from smoke', what this assertion is understood to mean is that 'Fire is inferred from the *perception of smoke*'; and why is it so? Simply because fire is inferred only when one has perceived the smoke, and not while he does not perceive it; and yet in the said assertion, we do not find the term 'perception', though everyone admits that that is what the assertion means; from which it is clear that the person who hears and understands the said assertion admits that a term expressing the *object* also denotes the *cognition of that object*. Similarly in the case in question, the term 'common property' may be taken to denote the *cognition* of the common property.

(b) It has been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa* (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, Ll. 5-6) that—"No doubt is found to arise at the time that the observer has the idea 'I perceive a property common to these two things', wherein there is an apprehension of the property and the things possessing it."*—But what is here asserted refers to what is perceived before (the appearance of Doubt),—the idea present in the observer's mind (at the time that Doubt appears) being in the following form—"I am perceiving now a property that is common to two things known to me (perceived by me before),—and I am not perceiving any property that belongs to any one of them specifically,—how may I find some such specific property whereby I may be certain as to one or the other?"—and certainly a doubt in this form does not cease merely on the perception of a common property bringing to the mind that property and the thing possessing that property.

(c) Thirdly, it has been urged (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 6) that—"Doubt with regard to one thing cannot arise from the certain conviction with regard to another."—This could be rightly urged only against one who holds the view that mere certain conviction with regard to one thing is the cause of Doubt [and we do not hold any such view†].

* The printed text spoils the passage by wrong punctuation :—It should read as—
चर्चयन्तु सति चर्चयन्निप्रपद्ये संशयः नाव इति The Puri MS. 'A' reads 'उपलब्ध' instead of 'उपलभते' as in the printed text, and this is more in keeping with the form in which this statement has appeared in the *Pūrvapakṣa*—*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, Ll. 5-6. Puri MS. 'B' reads as in the printed text.

The Tātparya has explained चर्चयन्निप्रपद्ये as equivalent to चर्चयन्तु; the *Bhāṣya-chandra*, construes thus—'यथा' 'यस्य ज्ञातव्यं' 'उद्दिष्टा' 'संशयकारकोपपत्ते' 'व्यतिरेकस्य' 'संशयः' 'अवधान' इ 'you have assumed that the Doubter's direct apprehension is the cause of Doubt and then urged that &c. &c.'

† Our view being that Doubt arises regarding a thing with specific properties, when what is perceived is only a thing as possessing properties common to more than one thing.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

(d) Fourthly, it has been urged (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L 8) that—"(From the certain cognition of common property. Doubt cannot arise) as in this case there would not be that affinity between cause and effect (which is essential)*"—But what constitutes the 'affinity' between cause and effect is only the fact that the presence and absence of the effect are in accordance with the presence and absence of the cause; and further, when between two things it is found that if one comes into existence the other also comes into existence, and if the former does not come to existence, the latter also does not come into existence,—then the former is called the 'cause' and the latter the 'effect'; this is what Bhā. P. 63. constitutes another affinity' or 'homogeneity' (between cause and effect); † and certainly there is this 'affinity' between Doubt and its cause (the perception of Common Property). ‡

(e) The above reasoning also serves to answer* the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument urged in (*Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 10), that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things.

(f) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū. 2) that—"No Doubt can arise from the Cognition of either diverse opinions or uncertainty."—Now our answer to this is that, (as regards the case of *Diverse opinions*) when the Doubt appears, the idea present in the observer's mind is as follows—"From two contradictory statements I find the thing to be possessed of contradictory properties,—and I do not know of any specific circumstance attending it,—nor do I

* The certain cognition of common property apprehends the *presence* of such property; while Doubt apprehends the *absence* of such property; and no affinity is possible between two such heterogeneous cognitions;—this is the meaning of the *Pūrvapakṣa-Bhāṣyachandra*.

† According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, these are two *affinities* pointed out here as expressed in the translation. It may however be simpler to take the *second* as only explanatory of the *first*; the only *affinity* consisting in the fact that the presence and absence of the one are in accordance (simultaneous) with the presence and absence of the other; that is to say, the affinity consists in the fact that when one comes into existence, the other also does the same &c. &c.

‡ The *Vārṭika* does not accept this view of 'affinity'; according to it the homogeneity between Doubt and its cause in the shape of the Cognition of common property consists in the fact that in both the Cognition of specific properties is wanting. The *Tatparyā* adds that according to the view expressed in the *Bhāṣya*, the case of all *eternal* causes would be excluded; as they never come into existence and cease to exist.

perceive any such, whereby I could be certain with regard to one or the other of the two properties,—what specific circumstance could there be, whereby I could become certain with regard to one or the other'?—And such being the well-known form of the Doubt brought about by the *Diversity of Opinions* (as helped by the non-cognition of special conditions), it cannot be rejected simply by reason of the comprehension (by the third party) of the diversity of opinions.* 'The same holds good also with regard to what has been urged against Doubt arising from the 'uncertainty in regard to perception and non-perception'. † [In this case also the particular form in which the Doubt appears makes it clear that it arises from the *cognition of uncertainty* as helped by the non-cognition of special circumstances. And this Doubt also cannot be rejected merely by reason of the cognition of uncertainty].

(7) It has been urged (in Sū. 3) that—"Because there is certainty of conviction in the case of Diversity of opinions (no Doubt can arise from this latter)."—Now what is held to be the cause of Doubt is the Cognition of that which is denoted by the term 'Diversity of opinions,' this Cognition being wanting in the conception of any specific character (favouring any one of the opinions); and certainly it is not fair to discard the view merely by thrusting a different name (to what is meant by 'diverse opinions'); that is to say, the term 'diverse opinions' stands for *contradictory assertions with regard to one and the same thing*; what gives rise to Doubt is the Cognition (by the third party, the enquirer) of such assertions, as helped by the non-cognition of any special circumstances (in favour of one or the other); and it cannot cease to give rise to doubt merely by your giving to it a different name; so that this argument of the Pūrvapakṣin can only delude the ignorant.‡

* विमतिवचनवचय gives no sense. The Puri MSS. reads विमतिवचनवचयविमति. The meaning is that the presence of Doubt in the mind of the observer, the third party, is not incompatible with his comprehension of the fact that these two persons hold, two different opinions on this point. विमतिवचनवचयः सचरतिवचनवचयः विमतिवचनवचयः अतयेविमतिवचनवचनोति दुर्बलस्य दम्भतिवचनवचनवचन न निवर्तयितुं यत्नः—*Bhāṣyachandāra*.

† 'Perception' here stands for 'proof in support' and 'non-perception' for 'proof against'; there is 'uncertainty' in regarding these when the observer does not find either; and this certainly gives rise to Doubt—*Bhāṣyachandāra*.

‡ It is true that the individual upholder of each of the Diverse opinions has a certain conviction on the point; there is however no such conviction in the mind of the third party, who only hears these opinions expressed, and cannot find any special circumstances in favour of either.

(h) It has been urged (under Sū, 4) that—"Because uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character (it cannot give rise to Doubt)."—Well, in arguing thus it is admitted that there is such a thing as the 'Cause of Doubt,' and also that it is of the nature of 'uncertainty' essentially; all that is done is to give it a different name 'certainty,' (without denying the thing itself,—and this name can apply to the said thing only in a sense different from its natural signification [*i.e.*, *Uncertainty* can be called 'certainty' only in the sense of *fixity*, *definiteness*, and not in the sense of *freedom from doubt*]; and this assumption of a different name also is absolutely futile; for a *certainty* can never be 'uncertainty', being as it is, *fixed* in its own (certain) character.* So that the assertion made by the Opponent does not deny the fact that Doubt is produced by the fact of perception and non-perception pertaining to both existence and non-existence (of the thing with regard to which the Doubt arises), as accompanied by the fact of a specific circumstance in favour of either not being available;—and in so far as the said *uncertainty* is fixed in its *uncertain* character, it does not lose its own character; hence the 'uncertainty' is admitted by (the Opponent's own assertion).—Thus it is found that even though a different name is assumed, it does not prove anything different (from the conclusion to which exception is meant to be taken).

Bhā. P. 64.

(i) It has also been urged (in Sū, 5) that—"Doubt would never cease, as the property continues to persist".—But as a matter of fact, Doubt is produced, *not* merely by the *common property*, etc. (whose persistence would make the Doubt persistent), but by the *cognition of the common property*, as accompanied by a *remembrance of the specific characters*, (as shown under Sū. 1-1-23); so that there is no possibility of the Doubt being unceasingly persistent.

(j) Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 10) that—"Doubt never arises from the cognition of the properties of any one out of two things".—This objection is not well taken; for it has been distinctly

* Some Mss., the Puri Mss. among them, read उद्वेगः कस्य न भवति instead of उद्वेगः कस्य उद्वेगः न भवति; the former gives better sense; and is also supported by the *Bhāṣyachandāra*, which construes the passage thus—उद्वेगः कस्य न भवति उद्वेगः—उद्वेगः न अत्र उद्वेगः—उद्वेगः हेतुनाह अत्र न भवति and adds the explanation—'when a thing is endowed with its own character, it cannot at the same time be said to be not endowed with it'.

stated (in Sū. 1-1-23) that Doubt is that wavering judgment which is *wanting in the cognition of the specific character of a thing*; and as the 'specific character' can only consist in the 'property of one out of two things', when there is a cognition of such property, there can be no 'wanting in the cognition of the specific character' [and as such it would not be a Doubt at all].

Vārtika on Sū. (6).

[P. 185, L. 15 to P. 188, L. 4.]

The reply to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is given in the next Sūtra—'*When Doubt is held to arise etc. etc.*' [The sense of the reply may be thus explained]—The objection is not well conceived; as it is clear that the objector has not understood the meaning of the original Sūtra (1-1-23).

For instance—(b)* it has been urged that—"No Doubt follows from the cognition of the property and the things possessing that property"; and for this objection there is no basis at all; as it is clear that the sense of the *Sūtra* has not been grasped: We do not say that the cognised property (whose cognition is held to give rise to Doubt) is that of

Vār. P. 186.

the *thing* cognised; in fact, the idea in the mind of the observer is to the effect that—"I now perceive a property that is common to the things, Post and Man, *which I have perceived previously*". This same explanation also serves to set aside the objection taken by the Opponent [in *Vārtika*, P. 185, L. 2 (E 4) above] that—"the property subsisting in one thing only cannot be called *common* etc."

(c) Secondly it has been urged that—"The cognition of one thing cannot produce Doubt in regard to another thing."—This also is baseless; for the simple reason that the view that is controverted has never been held by us. Some people offer the following answer to the objection under

* The *Vārtika* does not accept the interpretation of Sū. (1), which in the *Bhāṣya* we have marked as (a).

reference—"I do not mean that the other thing that produces Doubt may be any object in general; what I mean is that it is a *particular kind of different thing*; and to the question as to what is the peculiarity of that 'particular kind of different thing'—our answer is that its peculiarity consists in its possessing the property perceived; so that our meaning is that when a property is perceived, there arises Doubt in regard to that particular thing which possesses that property";—and they proceed to point out that there is no such peculiarity in the case of *Colour* and *Touch* (where one is not a property possessed by the other) [and these two things are what have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣa* Bhāṣya P. 60, L. 6].” But our opinion is that this is not an answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument.* Why? Because even so the thing does not cease to be 'another thing', what we mean is that the thing possessing the property is as much 'another thing' in comparison to the property, as *Colour* is in comparison to *Touch*; so that the explanation proposed does not do away with the objection that 'the cognition of one thing cannot produce Doubt in regard to another thing.'

Our answer to this objection also is the same as before—that the view controverted is not held by us at all: We do not hold that the cognition of one thing (the property) produces doubt in regard to another thing in the shape of the thing possessing that property; what we do hold is that from *the cognition of a thing possessing a common property* there arises Doubt with regard to *that same thing*, in so far as concerns its specific distinctive features (not perceived at the time).†

* The reading परवचनः । तच्च of the *Bib. Ind.* edition is not right; the Benares edition supplies the reading अयम् न परिहार इति परवचनः.

† The translation follows the reading of the Benares edition दर्शनाद् विवेकः; the *Bib. Ind.* Edition reads दर्शनद्विवेकः, which means—'the Doubt arises with regard to that same thing which is not perceived at the time as possessing its distinctive features'. The sense of the argument is the same in both cases.

(d) The next argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa* has been urged on the basis of *want of a affinity* (*Bhāṣya* p. 60, ll. 9-10);—but as a matter of fact there is affinity (between the cause, the *cognition of a thing*, and its effect, *Doubt*) in this that both are wanting in the apprehension of the specific character of anything: just as the specific character of a thing is not apprehended by the *perception of common properties*, so also it is not apprehended by Doubt also. By the statement—that ‘the presence of the effect follows from the effect of the cause’—the *Bhāṣya* should be understood to mean that the said character or relation subsists between the cause and effect,—and not that the requisite ‘affinity’ (in the particular case in question) consists in that fact; as the character would apply to *all effects* (and not specifically to the particular effect in question)—there being no effect whose presence ever follows except in the presence of the cause.

(e) ‘*The above reasoning*’, says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 63, l. 2), ‘*also serves to answer the Pūrvapakṣa argument that no Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of several things*’;—that is to say, the answer that has been given in connection with the case of Doubt arising from the *cognition of a common property* applies also to the case of Doubt arising from the *cognition of the property of several things*.

(e (1) The next argument of the *Pūrvapakṣa* (put forward in the *Vārṭika*) is that—“no Doubt can arise with regard to things perceived and not perceived”. This is not right; as it is clear that it proceeds from ignorance: We do not say that Doubt appears with regard to one thing, when what is definitely perceived is an entirely different thing; what we do mean is that when a thing is apprehended in a general vague form, there arises Doubt, the essence whereof lies in the fact that it does not definitely apprehend the specific character of any particular thing.

(e 2) It has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, in the *Vārṭika*) that—"It often happens that even when there is cognition of common properties, no Doubt arises." This also is not right; as it shows that the *Pūrvapakṣin* does not understand what is meant by 'common properties' (in the present connection). The character of *being a product* (cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is not a 'common property'.
Vār : P. 187.

in the sense in which this term has been used here; the term 'common property' has been used here in a totally different sense; what is meant by a property being 'common' (in the present connection) is that it subsists in the thing intended and also in things other than those homogeneous to that thing, and certainly the character of *being a product* cannot be called 'common' in this sense.*

(e 3) Next it has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin* in the *Vārṭika*) that—"It is not right to assert that Doubt arises only when there is cognition of common properties, as Doubt is found to arise otherwise also." This is not a right objection; as in the first place the case cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is not admitted by us to be one of Doubt; and secondly, the restriction objected to (that it is *only* when there is cognition of common properties that Doubt arises) is not accepted by us. That 'Doubt arises from the perception of mutually contradictory properties subsisting in the same thing' is also not admitted by us.† This same fact—that we do not mean to imply any *restriction* (as to Doubt arising *only* from the cognition of common properties)—also serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* objection that Doubt is often found to appear from

* In the case of the Post and Man, the property of 'tallness' that is perceived is one that subsists in the Post, as well as the Man—the latter being entirely unlike the former; in the case of *being a product*, it is found in Sound and only in things that are like it; or else it would not be a true *probans* in proving the non-eternality of Sound; just as *Tallness* cannot be a true *probans* in proving a thing to be a man or a post.

† As all that happens in this case is that there is no certainty of conviction in regard to any particular thing; and there is no *doubt* as to its being 'this or that'; because the idea of the second thing does not necessarily come in; and yet this is an essential factor in all *doubt*.

one's failing to comprehend the real character of a thing. As a matter of fact, we do not admit of any such restriction as that Doubt arises *only* from the cognition of common properties, and from no other causes; as we have stated (under Sū. 1-1-23) that Doubt arises also from such other causes as the cognition of 'anēkaḍharma', (several properties of several objects).

(f) This same answer also meets the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument (urged in Sū. 2) that—"Doubt cannot arise from the cognition of diversity of opinions, or from that of uncertainty." We do not hold that Doubt arises either from 'diversity of opinions' alone, or from 'uncertainty' alone; nor do we hold that Doubt arises from 'uncertainty' all;—in fact all that we have asserted (in Sū. 1-1-23) is that the 'uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions,' is a qualifying condition to what have been mentioned in the preceding words of the Sūtra (as the causes of Doubt); so that the 'perception and non-perception' are the cause of Doubt only as qualifying the preceding words, and not by themselves. This is what is clearly stated in the *Sūtra* (1-1-23) itself.

(g) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣa* (Sū. 3) that—"In a case of Diversity of Opinion there is *certainty of conviction*." Our answer to this is that a difference of names does not alter facts; you apply the name 'certainty of conviction' to what is generally called 'Diversity of Opinion,' on the basis of an entirely different fact; but that does not make it cease to be 'Diversity of Opinion'.* And so long as it is a case of 'Diversity of Opinion,' it remains a source of Doubt.

* It is called a case of 'Diversity of Opinion' on the ground of its being recognised by an independent observer as representing the different views held by different persons; the *Pūrvapakṣin* applies to this the name 'certainty of conviction' in reference to each of the opinions as held and expressed by its own exponent. It is true that in this latter sense we can call each opinion 'certain conviction', but that does not alter the fact that it is a case of 'Diversity of Opinion' for the uninterested third party.

(h) It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in Sū. 4) that—"Uncertainty itself being quite certain in its uncertain character, there can be no uncertainty at all." But this is not right; as it involves a self-contradiction. That is to say, you say that 'there is no uncertainty', and yet you add that 'uncertainty is certain in its uncertain character'; this certainly involves a clear self-contradiction. Then again, it has to be borne in mind that the mere assigning of a different name, on the basis of a different fact, cannot do away with the real character of a thing; whether you give a different name to a thing or not, the thing itself remains what it is.*

(i) It has been urged (in Sū. 5) that—"Doubt would never cease, inasmuch as the property continues to persist." This objection also is not well taken; as it shows that the meaning of the *Sūtra* (1-1-23) has not been understood. The *Sūtra* does not mean that Doubt arises singly from each of the factors mentioned—'Common Property' and the rest; what it does mean is that it arises from the cognition of common property, as accompanied by the remembrance of specific character, when there is uncertainty attaching to perception and non-perception (i. e., from all the factors collectively); and such being the case there is no possibility of there being either no Doubt at all, or an unceasingly persistent Doubt.

Var. P. 188.

Lastly, it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (in the *Bhāṣya*, P. 60, L. 19) that—"No Doubt can arise from the cognition of the property of either one of the things." This objection also is not well conceived; for the simple reason that (according to us also) no Doubt can arise from such cognition; in fact no Doubt ever arises from the cognition of the property of only one of the two things; such a cognition always brings about certain conviction in regard to that thing.

* So that you may call *uncertainty*, 'certainty'; but that does not do away with the *uncertainty* itself; and all that we hold is that 'uncertainty' gives rise to Doubt.

Sūtra (7).

WHEREVER THERE IS DOUBT, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF
THE AFORESAID QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.—(Sū. 7).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 64, L. 8 to L. 10.]

Wherever the Investigation carried on is preceded by Doubt,—either in a scientific Treatise or in a Controversy— the Opponent will try to deny the very existence of the Doubt (in the manner of the above *Pūrvapakṣa*); and in that case he should be met with the answer (detailed above).^{*} It is for this reason that, as pertaining to all Investigations, *Doubt* has been examined first of all.

Vārṭika on Sū. (7).

Wherever there is Doubt &c.,—says the *Sūtra*. What is the sense of this *Sūtra*? The sense is that it would not be right for a disputant to deny the existence of Doubt in regard to the point under discussion [as that would not lead him to the obtaining of the truth that he seeks]; in fact [he himself should take the Doubt as it stands; and] if his Opponent should try to show that there can be no Doubt in regard to the point at issue [in which case the Opponent will naturally make use of the *Pūrvapakṣa* arguments detailed under *Sūtras* 1 to 3],—he should then meet him with the *Siddhānta* arguments (detailed under Sū. 6). It is this instruction that the *Sūtra* is meant to impart to the pupil.†

* The *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* remarks that this advice applies to the case of the examination of every one of the sixteen categories;—the examination of *Pramāṇa* also is preceded by the doubt as to whether there are 2 or 3 or 4 *Pramāṇas* and so forth; in regard to every one of such Doubts, the *Pūrvapakṣin* may try to deny the very existence of Doubt; and then he is to be met in the manner explained here.

† The *Parishuddhi* offers another interesting explanation of this *Sūtra*. It takes it to be a sort of an explanation provided for the *Sūtra* undertaking to enter into a thorough examination of *Pramāṇas* and a few other categories only, and omitting such others as *Prayojana* and the like. The *Sū.* is taken to mean that a thorough examination is called for only in regard to matters in regard where to there are doubts. As a matter of fact the nature of *Prayojana* and the other categories, whose examination has been omitted, is fully known to all—from the learned philosopher down to the mere cowherd; so that no thorough examination is necessary in their case. Then again, the method of examination employed in regard to *Pramāṇa*, &c. may be applied to these other categories also; this is what the seventh *Sūtra* means—“Whenever there is any doubt in regard to any category we should employ the method of examination which consists of questions and answers.”

The *Bhāṣyachandra* remarks as follows—“The *Sūtra* is meant to be an advice to the Pupil to the effect that it is not right to deny the existence of Doubt as a

Section (2).

Detailed Examination of Pramāṇas in General.

[Sūtrās 1—19.]

Bhāṣya.

[P. 64, L. 10 to L. 13.]

Next follows the detailed *Examination of Pramāṇa*.*—*Sūtra* (8).

“PERCEPTION AND THE REST CANNOT BE REGARDED
 AS INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION, ON ACCOUNT
Purvapakṣa. OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONNECTING THEM
 WITH ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME.”—
 (Sūtra 8).†

“The character of Instrument of Cognition cannot belong
 “to Perception, &c., as it is impossible to connect them with
 “any of the three points of time; that is to say, it is not
 “possible for them either to precede or to synchronise
 “with or to follow (the *objects* cognised).” ‡

preliminary accessory of all Discussion; the sense being that, inasmuch as Doubt is such an accessory, whenever any Discussion is started, one should not meet it with the preliminary objection that the very Doubt, on which the Discussion proceeds, is not possible; the right course is to supply answers to the questions raised. This advice being summed up in three verses:—The dull ignoramus and the man who has reached the highest pinnacle of wisdom, these two persons are happy; persons falling between these two extremes always suffer. (1) The man whose mind is in doubt is beset with difficulties at each step; freedom from Doubt represents highest bliss; this being the form of the Supreme Self. (2) For these reasons, you should listen to all theories, and then having raised questions in regard to these, you should enter in to the discussion with qualified persons and thereby ascertain the truth. (3).

* In the case of Doubt, it was necessary to alter the order in which the categories had been mentioned in Sū. 1-1-1; because Doubt forms the starting-point of all investigations. Among the rest of the categories, there is no reason for dealing with any of them out of its proper place; so the Author now takes up the examination of *Pramāṇa*. There again, he begins with the examination of the character of *Pramāṇa* in general, before proceeding with the particular *Pramāṇas*. The *Pramāṇa*, in general, may be defined as the Instrument of Cognition; and these instruments are Perception and the rest.—*Tūtparyā*.

† The Sūtra denies the very existence of *Pramāṇas*, on the ground that they do not prove the existence of these objects at any point of time—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ The *Tūtparyā* thus sums up the *Purvapakṣa* embodied in Sūtras 8-11 :—This *Purvapakṣa* emanates from the *Māḥyanika* Bauddha, and may be explained as follows :—Though our firm conviction is that nothing in the world can bear any investigation,—so that so far as we ourselves are concerned, *Pramāṇa* also is a subject that cannot bear any examination,—yet we proceed to show that *Pramāṇas*, as accepted by other people are untenable; and this we shall show on the basis of those same *Pramāṇas* that are held by those same people; and thus it is a fault of the *Pramāṇas* themselves that they melt away by their own inner contradictions. The argument against *Pramāṇa* may be thus formally stated—Perception and the rest cannot be

Vārṭika on Sū. (8).

[P. 188, L. 9 to L. 15.]

Next comes the turn of *Pramāṇa*; and this we now proceed to examine. "What is there to be examined in this connection;" * In the first place, it is necessary to examine the very possibility (existence) of *Pramāṇas*; there arises a doubt in our minds as to the very existence of *Pramāṇas* as such, because we find in them properties indicative of both existence and non-existence, and we do not perceive in them any specific properties that would distinguish them from *Pramāṇya* and the other categories.

The Opponent denies that there is any doubt as to the existence or non-existence of *Pramāṇas*, and proceeds to elaborate the *Parvapakṣa* view (that there is no such thing as '*Pramāṇa*') :—

"*Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Pramāṇas, as etc. etc.*—that is to say, *Pramāṇas* do not *Purvapakṣa*. "serve their purpose (of proving the existence "of their objects) at any of the three points of time."

Bhāṣya on Sū. (9).

[P. 64, L. 15 to L. 17.]

"What has been stated above in a general way is next explained in detail (by the *Purvapakṣin*)—

Sūtra (9).

"IF THE PRAMĀNA EXISTS ALREADY BEFORE (THE OBJECT), THEN PERCEPTION CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY THE

regarded as *Pramāṇa*, because they cannot prove or indicate the presence of their objects at any point of time,—anything that does not prove its object at any time is not regarded as *Pramāṇa*, for instance, the conception of Hare's Horas;—Perception, &c., are such—therefore they cannot be regarded as *Pramāṇa*."

It is interesting to compare this statement of the *Mādhyaṃika* view with the Vedānta new expressed in *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, Trans. Vol. I Para. 79.

* All parties admit of certain *Pramāṇas*, for the establishing of their own views; as in the absence of *Pramāṇas*, no view can be established. A man who has no view of his own to establish cannot be regarded either as a wise man, or as an investigator. So that what *Pramāṇas* must be known to all intelligent man; what is there to be examined in this connection?—This is the meaning of the questioner.—*Tatparyā*.

CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGAN WITH THE OBJECT,"—
(Sū. 9.)*

"Perception is the Cognition of such objects as Odour and the rest; if this Perception (*Pramāṇa*) exists already, and Odour, &c., come into existence *after* it, then the Perception cannot be said to be produced by the contact (with the "sense-organ) of those things, Odour, &c." †

Vārṭika on Sū. (9).

[P. 188, L. 18 to L. 2]

"If the *Pramāṇa* exists already, &c. &c.—says the Sūtra—"the Perceptual Cognition cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object; so that what has been declared in the Sūtra (1-1-4) becomes stultified; that is to say, if the cognition (Perception) exists already, before the Object, then the contact of that object cannot be its cause; and this would be contrary to what has been declared before—that 'Perception is Cognition produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object' (Sū. 1. 1. 4)."

Sūtra (10).

"IF THE PRAMĀṆA COMES INTO EXISTENCE AFTER (THE OBJECT), THEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION CANNOT BE DEPENDENT UPON PRAMĀṆAS*—
(Sū. 10).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (10).

[P. 65, LL. 2—3].

"While the *Pramāṇa* does not exist, by whose instrumentality would the thing be *cognised*, and thereby become the *object of cognition*? It is only when a thing is cognised by the instrumentality of *Pramāṇas*, that it comes to be known as '*pramāṇya*', *object of cognition*.

* The meaning of the Sūtra is as follows—As a matter of fact, *Pramāṇa* is an Instrument, and the Instrument is a particular kind of substance accompanied by a certain action or operation; neither the *operation* alone nor the substance alone can be called 'Instrument'; if then, this substance, along with the operation of bringing about the cognition, is already there, before the object has come into existence,—then the said cognition cannot be regarded as brought about by a contact with that object.—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† I. E. The Substance can have no connection with the operation (which is absurd)—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*. Puri MS. A. has a lacuna here: it omits from *Bhāṣya*, P. 64, L. 11 to P. 66, L. 8.

Vārtika on Sū. (10).

[P. 189, L. 2 to L. 4]

*“ If the *Pramāṇa* &c.—says the *Śūtra*. That is to say, “ this would involve the absurdity that a thing may be “ called ‘ object of cognition ’ without being operated upon “ by *Pramāṇas*. As a matter of fact, the *object of cognition* “ cannot come into existence, cannot attain its true character, “ except with the help of *Pramāṇas*; but (if the *Pramāṇa* “ were to come into existence *after* the object) the existence “ of the *object of cognition* could not be dependent upon *Pra-* “ *māṇas*.”

Sūtra (11).

“ IF THE TWO COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN, INASMUCH AS EACH COGNITION IS RESTRICTED TO ITS OWN OBJECT, THERE CAN BE NO SEQUENCE AMONG COGNITIONS.”† (Sū, 11).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 65, L. 6 to L. 11]

“ If it be held that the *Pramāṇa* and its *Object* both “ come into existence at the same time,—then, inasmuch “ as all cognitions pertain to their own particular object, “ it would be possible for them to come into existence “ at the same time; and therefore, *inasmuch as each* “ *cognition is restricted to its own object, there can* “ *be no necessity of sequence among cognitions*. As a matter “ of fact, all these cognitions are found to appear with “ regard to their objects, one after the other; but this “ sequence would not be necessary (if the cognition and its “ object were to appear at the same time). And further,

* Though the existence of a thing, by itself, does not depend upon *Pramāṇas*, yet its existence as *object of cognition*, as *Pramāṇya*, depends entirely upon the operation of the *Pramāṇas*; a thing cannot be the *object of cognition* until that cognition has come about, and the cognition can come about only by the operation of the *Instruments of Cognition*.— In this *Sūtra*, ‘ *Pramāṇa* ’ stands for the Instrument along with its operation; and ‘ *Pramāṇya* ’ for the object as bearing the operation. Hence the meaning is that unless the Instrument, along with the operation of *Cognition* exists beforehand, there can be no possibility of the ‘ object ’ bearing that operation. [That is, a thing cannot be ‘ *Pramāṇa* ’ in the absence of ‘ *Pramāṇa* ’].—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

† ‘ Cognition ’ in this *Sūtra* stands for ‘ *Pramāṇa* ’, which as explained before, stands for the means of cognition, and also the cognition itself.

“ [even if such sequence be not considered essential] this
 “ simultaneity of cognitions would contradict what has been
 “ declared (under Sū 1-1-16) to the effect that ‘ the presence
 “ of the Mind is indicated by the non-simultaneity of cogni-
 “ tions.’

“ The aforesaid are the only three possible alternatives in
 “ regard to the existence (or relation) of *Pramāṇa* and its *Ob-*
 “ *j. ct*; and every one of them has been found to be untenable;
 “ so the conclusion is that Perception and the rest cannot
 “ be regarded as ‘ *Pramāṇa*’.”

Vārttika on Sū. (11).

(P. 189, L. 8 to L. 10).

“ *If the two were simultaneous &c.*—says the *Sūtra*. If
 “ Cognitions (*Pramāṇas*) and their Objects were to synchro-
 “ nise, then cognitions would have to be held to appear
 “ simultaneously; and this would be against what we actually
 “ find to be the case;—cognitions are, as a matter of fact,
 “ always found to appear one after the other. Further, such
 “ a view would also involve self-contradiction: it would be
 “ contrary to what has been declared in regard to ‘ non-
 “ simultaneity’ of cognitions being indicative of the Mind
 “ (in Sū. 1-1-16)”.

Bhāṣya.

Siddhānta.

[P. 65, L. 11 to P. 66, L. 19].

The answer to the above is as follows:—

* *As a matter of fact between what is called the ‘cause
 or instrument of apprehension’ and what the ‘object
 of apprehension’, there being no restriction as to the former
 coming into existence either before, or after, or simul-
 taneously with the latter, we take each case on its own
 merits, just as we find it, and assert accordingly (either
 precedence or sequence or simultaneity of the one or the other).*
 That is to say, in some cases the Cause of Appre-
 hension appears first, and then its object; e. g. in the case
 of the apprehension of things coming into existence while

* We have here certain passages printed in thicker type;—see in this connection our note on Sū. 16, below. The whole of the italicised portion occurs as a *Sūtra* in the *बृहदारण्यक* attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyachandā* also appears to regard this first passage as a *Sūtra*.

the Sun is shining [in which case the sunlight, which is the cause of the perception, is already there, when the things are coming into existence]*;—in other cases the Object appears before and the Cause of its apprehension afterwards; e. g. when the lamp (just lighted) illumines, and makes perceptible, things already in existence;—in other cases

Bhā P. 66. again the Cause of apprehension and its Object come into existence together; e. g. when the apprehension of fire is brought about by means of smoke. † Now 'Pramāṇa' is the name of the *cause of apprehension*, and 'Pramēya' that of the *Object of apprehension*; so that (as shown above), there being no restriction as to exact precedence or sequence or simultaneity between the two, we have to take each case just as we find it.‡ So that there is no ground for the entire denial (of Pramāṇas) (which you have put forward); specially in view of the fact that you yourself admit the (efficiency of) *Pramāṇas* in general (in the shape e. g. of your own words) and then go on to deny the efficiency of all particular *Pramāṇas* §

||Secondly, as the grounds on which the names ('Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya') are based pertain to all three points of time, the name also should be accepted as such. That is to say, it

* The printed text puts the stop wrongly after *प्रकाश* it should be after *उत्पद्यमानानां*; the Puri MSS. reads *प्रकाश उत्पद्यमानानां*, which gives better sense.

† The apprehension of fire synchronises with the apprehension of smoke.

‡ 'Such is the sense of the Sūtra'—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*; and from this it appears that the passage containing the term *vibhāḡavachanam* constitutes a Sūtra.

§ *কল্প বিবরণ* of the printed text appears difficult to construe. What the *Purvapakṣin* has done is to take no account of the particular facts of each case and has roundly denied the efficiency of all *Pramāṇas* promiscuously; so that the correct word would appear to be *কল্পবিবরণ*. The mistake may be due to the mis-reading of *কল্প* for *কল্পক*; *ক* and *কল্প* being very nearly alike in Marthili and Bengali characters. But the *Bhāṣyachandra* accepts the reading *কল্প বিবরণ* and supplies a reasonable explanation; which has been adopted in the translation. It remarks that the passage points out an inconsistency (*vyāghāṭya*) on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. He denies all *Pramāṇas*, but certainly accepts his own word embodying this denial as a very valid *Pramāṇa*.

||The italicised portion occurs, as Sūtra in the *বৃত্তান্ত* attached to Puri MS. B. The *Bhāṣyachandra* remarks—This refers to the following argument of the opponent—"There are four kinds of basis for the application of verbal names; these being—1) the presence of *Genus* i.e. this is a 'Cow' 'this is a *Brāhmaṇa*' &c.; (2) Presence of *Quality*; 'the cow is white', 'the *Brāhmaṇa* is patient'; (3) Presence of certain things; 'the *Brahmana* has a stick'; and (4) Presence of action; 'this is a doer', 'this a *cogniser*' and so forth. So that the name 'Pramāṇa' also must have for its basis the actual presence of the action of apprehension at the same time; and it is therefore not right to say 'the *Pramēya* is apprehended by the *Cogniser*, by means of the *Pramāṇa*.'—The answer to this, given in the *Bhāṣya*, is that the application of the name is not based upon the actual presence of the action at the time; it is based upon the *potentiality* of the thing to bring about the action; e.g. we speak of

has been urged (in Sū. 10) that—"if the *Pramāṇa* be held to come into existence *after* the *Pramēya*, then, at the time that the *Pramāṇa* is non-existent, (*i. e.* not actually bringing about the apprehension at that time) the object could not be called '*Pramēya*'; as it is only when an object is actually apprehended at the time by means of *Pramāṇa* that it is known as '*Pramēya*'" *;—but as a matter of fact, the application of the name '*Pramāṇa*' is due to the fact of what is so named being the *cause of apprehension* (*i. e.* being endowed with the potentiality of bringing about the cognition), and this fact pertains to all three points of time; for instance, [when we give the name '*Pramāṇa*' to the cause of apprehension] we make use of either of the three expressions 'this has brought about the apprehension (therefore it is *Pramāṇa*)', or 'this brings about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāṇa*)'; or this *will* bring about the apprehension (hence it is *Pramāṇa*); so that the grounds of the naming pertaining to all three points of time—past, present and future—, the name also should be taken as pertaining to all points of time.† So that when we apply the name '*Pramāṇa*', what is meant is that the object *has been apprehended* (in the past) by its means, or that the object *is apprehended* by its means (in the present), or that the object *will be apprehended* by its means (in the future); similarly when we apply the name '*Pramēya*', what is meant is that it *has been apprehended*, or that it *is apprehended*, or that it *will be apprehended* by its means. Such being the case, an object can very well be known as '*pramēya*' when we have such ideas as 'the apprehension of this thing *will* be brought about by the *right cause* [*Pramāṇa*, when it comes into existence]', 'this *will* be apprehended', and so forth. If this applicability of a name on the basis of the possibility of the requisite operation at all three points of time is not admitted, then much of ordinary usage would be impossible. That is to say, if one were not to admit the

the 'cook' though he is only *going to do the cooking*; or we say 'the cook is bathing', where even though the *action* present is that of *bathing*, yet the name applied to the man is 'Cook'. This 'potentiality' consists in the mere form of the thing concerned, as aided by the necessary accessories.

*विज्ञातवन्ति प्रमाणे is the reading of all manuscripts but one, as also of the two Puri MSS. ; we have adopted this; specially as वन्ति प्रमाणे of the printed text does not give good sense.

†And when in defining '*Pramāṇa*' we have said that it is *what actually brings about the cognition*—it is only by way of an illustration; and we do not mean to restrict the name *pramāṇa* only to what actually at the time brings about Cognition—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

application of names as described above, for him no such expressions would be possible as—‘bring a *cook*, he *will do the cooking*’, ‘bring in a *wood-cutter*, he *will do the cutting*.’

Further, the assertion (made in Sū. 8) that—‘Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of Cognition, on account of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time’—apparently denies all ‘Pramāṇa’ entirely;—the person making such an assertion should be asked—what do you mean to accomplish by this denial? Do you mean to set aside the possibility or very form (of the Pramāṇas, Perception, &c.)? Or, to make known their impossibility or absence of any form? If the former, then the possibility or form of the Pramāṇas is admitted [as it is only what exists that can be *set aside*],—and the possibility or form being there, Perception and the other Pramāṇas cannot be denied entirely. If, on the other hand, the denial is meant to make known their impossibility, then the denial itself becomes endowed with the character of ‘*Pramāṇa*’ (Instrument of Cognition, being that which *makes known* things);* as the denial becomes the cause or instrument of the Cognition of the ‘impossibility of Pramāṇas.’

[Even knowing this inconsistency, the Opponent asks]—“What then?”. The answer comes in the next Sūtra].

Vāṛṭika on the Sīdḍhānta-Bhāṣya.

[Page 189, L. 10 to P. 191, L. 16.]

The answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows :—

‘Between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with, the latter’—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 65, L. 12);—which means that what has been put forward as the Probans in the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument [*viz. impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time*—Sū. 8, *i. e.*, the impossibility of their making things known at any point of time] is open to the fallacy of being *asīdḍha*, ‘unknown,’ ‘not admitted by all parties.’

* लब्धं ब्रह्म ; the reading of all Mss. save one, gives better sense than लब्धब्रह्म :

Further, the *Pūrvapakṣin* has stated his proposition in the form—‘Perception and the rest are not instruments of Cognitions’; and this statement involves a contradiction in its own terms; as the proposition can only mean that ‘Perception and the rest do not indicate the existence of their objects’; and this involves a self-contradiction * (self-stultification) on the part of the *Pūrvapakṣin*. How? Well, to call them ‘Perception and the rest’ and then to say that ‘they do not indicate the existence of things,’ certainly involves a self-contradiction; just as when one makes the assertion ‘this thing is not known,’ to call it ‘this thing’ and then to say ‘it is not known’ involves a self-contradiction; † in the same manner there is self-contradiction when you call them ‘perception, &c.,’ and then assert that ‘they do not indicate the existence of things;’ how else (i. e., if they do not indicate the existence of things) can they be called ‘Perception, &c.’? Certainly the names ‘Perception’ &c. are meaningless unless there is an indication of the existence of things.

Then again [what the *Pūrvapakṣin* does is to deny a certain character, that of *being Pramāṇa*, in regard to Perception &c. ? and] when you deny a certain character to Perception, &c., it means that these ‘Perception &c.’ themselves you admit; that is to say, when you say that ‘Percep-

* *अव्यक्तं च व्यक्तं*: as found in Bib. Ind. edition is the correct reading; not *अव्यक्तं च व्यक्तं*: as in the Benares edition.

† The ‘self-contradiction’ meant by the *Vārtika* is that between calling them ‘Perception and other *Pramāṇas*’ and saying that they do not indicate the existence of things.’ The *Tātparya* explains the ‘*vyāghāṭa*’ differently:—The *Pūrvapakṣin* apparently puts forward an inference to prove his proposition that Perception, &c., cannot be regarded as *Pramāṇa*; in putting forward this inference, he *ipso facto* admits the fact of inference being a *Pramāṇa*; and this is certainly not in keeping with the proposition he sets himself to prove. An inference can prove a conclusion only after it has itself acquired the position of a *Pramāṇa*. The proposition makes this impossible;—how then can an inference, under such circumstances, prove anything. This is how the *Pūrvapakṣin* has stultified himself. This also comes in the *Vārtika* later on, top of P. 190. This is the *Vyāghāṭa* deduced by the *Bhāṣya-chandra* also.

tion and the rest are not possessed of the character of *Pramāṇa*,^{*} you do not deny the 'Perception, &c.' themselves; what you deny is only their particular character, that of *being Pramāṇa*. *

"But inasmuch as an abstract quality can never subsist by itself, Perception, &c., themselves are denied; that is to say, when we say 'Perception and the rest are not possessed of the character of *Pramāṇa*,' the 'character of *Pramāṇa*,' is an abstract quality; and being an abstract quality, when it is denied, this denial implies also the denial of the things possessing that quality."

Even so, the 'self-contradiction' does not cease: You have got to prove the non-existence of Perception, &c.,—the meaning of your proposition being that 'Perception &c. do not exist'; now by what are you going to prove this? If Perception and the rest do not exist, there is nothing else that can prove the said non-existence. [It is only by means of *Pramāṇa* that anything can be proved; if there are no *Pramāṇas* nothing can be proved].

Further, your denial of some particular *Pramāṇas* would imply that you admit other *Pramanas*; when you say that 'the character of *Pramāṇa* cannot belong to *Perception and the rest*', it is clear that you admit *Pramāṇas* other than Perception and the rest; if this is not what you mean, then the specification by name,—'the character of *Pramāṇa* does not belong to *Perception and the rest*'—becomes entirely meaningless; if you do not admit of *Pramāṇas* other than 'Perception and the rest', then what is the meaning of the specification ('to Perception and the rest') that you have in your assertion—'the character of *Pramāṇa* does not

* For instance, when you say 'this boy is without the waterpot,' you simply deny his possessing the waterpot, and you admit the existence of the Boy himself. So that from the form in which the *Pūrvapakṣin* states his proposition, it would seem that he does not absolutely deny the existence of Perception and the other *Pramāṇas*.

belong to *Perception and the rest*? If (with a view to escape from this predicament) you were to make your assertion in the general form—‘there are no *Pramāṇas*’,—then this would involve another self-contradiction: you assert that ‘there are no *Pramāṇas*’ and yet you are propounding explanations and arguments!*

[If then the *Pūrvapakṣin* were to say—‘Yes, we do admit of *Pramāṇas* other than ‘Perception and the rest,’ what harm is there in that?—our answer would be]—That other *Pramāṇa*, which you admit, will also be open to the charge of not being ‘connected with the three points of time’; so that the objection that you have urged (in *Su.* 8) against ‘Perception and the rest’ would apply to that other *Pramāṇa* also; for that which does not make things known at any of the three points of time,—how can that be called a *Pramāṇa*? This objection will apply with equal force to your *Pramāṇa* also.

If next you admit that what you are denying is only the *character* (of ‘being *Pramāṇa*’) [and not the very existence of ‘Perception and the rest’] this would mean that you admit the existence of ‘Perception and the rest’ as apart from their character of *being Pramāṇa*,—just as when one denies the presence of the ‘King’s man’, he may admit the presence of the *man*, apart from the character of *belonging to the King*;—and in that case, when you will be asked to describe the character of these, ‘Perception and the rest’, you will tumble on the same objections and the same ‘self-contradictions’. On the other hand, if you do not admit of ‘Perception and the rest’ as distinct from the ‘character of being *Pramāṇa*’, it behoves you to explain the precise signification of the Genitive ending (in ‘*pratyakṣādinām*’) and, that of the nominal affix (in ‘*prāmāṇyam*’); that is to say,

* Explanations and arguments are intended to make things known; and this is exactly the function of ‘*Pramāṇas*’.

if the 'character of being *Pramāṇa*' is not something different from 'Perception and the rest,' then what is the sense of the Genitive in '*pratyakṣādinām*'? It has, in fact, to be admitted that when you make the assertion '*pratyakṣādinām prāmāṇyam nāsti*' (with the word '*pratyakṣādinām* with the Genitive ending), whether you take it as a denial ('the character of *being Pramāṇa* does not belong to Perception and the rest'), or as an affirmation (the character of *not being Pramāṇa* belongs to Perception and the rest),—in either case what is denied or affirmed must be a *character* (and not the things themselves; or else the Genitive ending would be meaningless); and if this is admitted, then it becomes necessary to describe the form of 'Perception and the rest' as apart from their 'being *Pramāṇa*'; and as soon as you proceed to describe it, you render yourself open to the very same objections (that you have urged against us). Exactly the same holds good regarding the use of the Nominal affix (in '*Prāmāṇyam*').

Further, the *Pūrvapakṣin* has (in Sū. 8) put forward (as his reason) *the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time*; and this is not co-substrato (with the Subject of his Proposition); as (by the said expression) the said *impossibility* subsists in the term '*ṭraikālyāsidḍhēḥ*', the *asidḍhi*, 'impossibility', apparently belongs to '*ṭraikālyā*,'—and *not* to the *Pramāṇas* [which form the *subject* of the Proposition, and as such should possess what is put forward as the Probans or reason for proving something with regard to them]. If (with a view to escape from this difficulty) it be explained that—"What is meant by the term *ṭraikālyāsidḍhēḥ* is that the *Pramāṇas* do not serve their purpose at any of the three points of time"—*,—then the Probans becomes entirely superfluous, being already implied by the Proposition itself: the meaning of your proposition also is only this that 'the

* This is precisely the interpretation that the *Vārṭika* itself has put upon the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument embodied in Sū. 8.

so-called *Pramāṇas* do not serve their purpose',—and this is exactly the same as that 'the *Pramāṇas* do not serve their purpose at any of the three points of time' (which, according to your second explanation is what is meant by your *Probans*, '*traikālyasiḍḍhēh*').

[The *Vārṭika* now proceeds to explain the passages of the *Bhāṣya*].—It has been declared (*Bhā.* p. 66, l. 6) that—*It is only when apprehended by means of Pramāṇa that it is known as 'Pramēya'*; the meaning of this is that the denial put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣin* cannot stand, as the name pertains to all three points of time; that is to say, the circumstances that form the basis of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' are such as pertain to all three points of time'—'*Pramāṇa*' being the name of that by which a thing *will be* known, or *is* known, or *has been* known, and '*Pramēya*' being the name of the thing that *will be* known, or *is* known or *has been* known. It is only when such is admitted to be the case that an object can be spoken of as a '*Pramēya*,' 'object of cognition,' even when we have such conceptions as—'this thing will be known,' 'the apprehension of this thing will be brought about by the right causes',* ; on the other hand, if such is not admitted to be the case, the said usage would be absolutely impossible; so that the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is found to be open to the objection of being contrary to usage. Specially as for one who does not admit the possibility of such names as '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' pertaining to all three points of time, such ordinary expressions as 'bring the cook, he *will* do the cooking' would be entirely incongruous (as explained in *Bhā.* P. 66, l. 13).

Further,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 66, l. 15)—*the assertion that 'Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Instruments of cognition on account of the impossibility of connecting them*

* The Benares edition reads *हेतुवत्तद्वै*: But the *Bib. Ind.* reading is more in keeping with the words of the *Bhāṣya*, P. 66, l. 11.

with any of the three points of time' apparently denies all *Pramāṇa* entirely;—and what is meant to be accomplished by this denial, in regard to Perception and the rest? Is it meant to set aside their possibility? or to make known their impossibility? "What do you mean?" What we mean is that, if it is meant to set aside the possibility (of Perception and the rest), this is not right; because in the first place such denial would involve a self-contradiction, (as shown in the *Bhāṣya*), and secondly because this explanation would show that you do not understand the exact meaning of a denial: When you say that 'it sets aside the possibility of the *Pramāṇas*', you admit the existence of the *Pramāṇas*; as there can be no *setting aside* of what is an absolute non-entity*; and certainly *Denial* can have no power to make *what exists* an *absolute non-entity*. In fact what a denial does is to make known a certain fact, and not to set aside possibilities; so that what this particular denial also can do is only to make known a certain fact, and it cannot be taken as setting aside the possibility (of *Pramāṇas*). And, in that case, if the Denial *makes known* the impossibility (of *Pramāṇas*), then it itself becomes endowed with the character of a '*Pramāṇa*.'

Sūtra (12).

THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL, AS IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO
CONNECT IT WITH ANY OF THE THREE POINTS OF TIME.
(Sū. 12).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 66, L. 21 to P. 67, L. 2].

[The Opponent having asked—"What is the harm if the Denial becomes endowed with the character of *Pramāṇa*?"—the answer is given by the Sūtra]—The detailed explanation here is the same (as in the *Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra* 8) [*i. e.*, inasmuch as the Denial has become a *Pramāṇa* it becomes open

* The Benares edition and the *Tātparya* both read प्रमाणात्प्रमाणवत्तन्नि...नप्रमाणे निवृत्तिर्भवति

to the arguments that the Pūrvapakṣin has urged against the possibility of Pramāṇas; so that] if the *Denial* [which *ex-hypothesi* is only an instrument of right negative cognition] exists before the thing *Denied*, then, what would be there that would be denied, while the thing denied [*i. e.*, the object of the negative cognition] is not in existence? On the other hand, if the Denial came after the thing *Denied*, then while the Denial is not in existence, the thing could not be 'denied'. Lastly if both the *Denial* and the *Denied* came into existence simultaneously, then as the thing will have been already recognised as 'denied', the Denial would be absolutely futile.

Bhā. P. 67.

Thus then, the assertion (of the Pūrvapakṣin) embodying, as it does, a *Denial*, being (as just shown) found to be impossible,—it becomes established that Perception and the rest are genuine *Pramāṇas*.

Vārtika on Sū. (12).

[P. 191, L. 16 to P. 193, L. 14].

Such being the case (*i. e.* Denial becoming a Pramāṇa),—*'There can be no denial' &c.*—says the Sūtra. The meaning of the Sūtra is that the Denial (embodied in the *Pūrvapakṣa*) is not possible, in connection with all three points of time; so that the putting forward of the Denial by the Pūrvapakṣin involves a self-contradiction; as it has been admitted that the Denial—'Pramāṇas do not serve their purpose'—has the character of Pramāṇa [and the possibility of Pramāṇas having been denied, the putting forward of what is acknowledged to be a 'Pramāṇa' involves a clear self-contradiction].

Objection:—"By urging that 'Denial is not possible, as it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time,' you admit (the force of our argument and contention) that 'as they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time, Perception and the rest cannot be regarded as Pramāṇa'."

This does not affect our position, we reply; as all that we mean by urging this argument is to show that your view involves a self-contradiction on your part; what we are urging is that you are open to the charge that the reasoning

Nyāya Vol. II. 36.

that you have put forward goes directly against your own view; and we do not admit the validity of that reasoning. “What do you mean?” What we mean is

this:—When you assert that ‘what cannot
Vār. P. 192. serve its purpose at any of the three points of time cannot be regarded as a cause’,—by this your own assertion you admit that this Denial (that you are making) cannot be a cause (of any cognition). And thus you come to be in the position of a man who wishes to burn other persons by the fire in his own fingers,—he may or may not succeed in burning others, but he surely burns his own finger!

Further, the Denial that you make,—in the form ‘Perception and the rest do not accomplish their purpose’—is this a denial of the *efficiency* of Perception and the rest? or a denial of their very *existence*? If it is a denial of their efficiency, then this would mean that Perception and the rest are not denied; inasmuch as you deny their efficiency, you have to explain what ‘Perception and the rest’ are; so that you become open to the same objections. If, on the other hand, your denial is of the very existence of Perception and the rest, then please explain what you mean by saying that ‘Perception and the rest *do not exist*’. Do you mean the non-existence of *Pramāṇas* in general? or that of the particular *Pramāṇas* (mentioned)? If the former, then the mention of ‘Perception and the rest’ is entirely superfluous; your assertion should be in the form ‘*Pramāṇas* do not exist’; and in that case, as you would have no *Pramāṇas*, there could be no reasoning in support of such denial.* If, on the other hand, the denial is of the particular *Pramāṇas* (and not of all *Pramāṇas* in general),—then this

* Your denial is in the form ‘*Pramāṇas* do not exist’; every reasoning that you would urge would itself be a *Pramāṇa*; and the very existence of *Pramāṇas* having been denied, the reasoning would have its ground entirely cut off; as it will not be a ‘*Pramāṇa*’ it cannot prove your contention.

would imply that you admit of Pramāṇas other than those mentioned; for unless the existence of Pramāṇa in general is admitted, there can be no room for the denial of a few particular Pramāṇas.

Then again, there are two assertions—(1) ‘Perception and the rest *cannot* be regarded as Pramāṇas because they *cannot* be connected with any of the three points of time,’ and (2) ‘Perception and the rest *should* be regarded as Pramāṇas, because they *are* connected with the three points of time’;—now, do these two assertions mean the same thing or not? If they mean the same thing, then the form in which the assertion should be made would be the latter—that ‘Perception and the rest should be regarded as Pramāṇas, because they are connected with the three points of time’ [as this assertion, being without the two negative particles present in the other assertion in the words ‘*apramāṇyan*’ and ‘*asiddhah*,’ would be so much simpler and briefer]. Further, by what means do you know that the two assertions mean the same thing? If you know this by means of an *Instrument of Cognition* (Pramāṇa), then your self-stultification does not cease; and if you know it by some other means, then that ‘other means’ also would be an *Instrument of Cognition*; and it would be a mere difference in name [when you call them *not-Pramāṇa*]. If, on the other hand, the two assertions have different meanings, then also, we ask—By what means do you know that the two terms—‘because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time’ and ‘because they can be connected with the three points of time’—have different meanings? [Any answer to this question involving, as before, either ‘self-stultification’ or the admission of ‘Pramāṇa’ under a different name].

Further, when you make the statement—“Perception and the rest do not exist,”—the term ‘Perception and the rest,’ co-ordinated as it is with the term ‘do not exist,’ cannot denote the absolute non-existence of Perception and the other

Pramāṇas; as a matter of fact, when the word 'jar,' is co-ordinated with the term 'does not exist' (when we say 'the jar does not exist'), it does not denote the absolute non-existence of the jar; all that it does is to deny, either the connection of the jar with a particular place, the room for instance, or its connection with a particular point of time, or the efficiency of the jar;—and analogously in the case in

question also, when the term 'does not exist' is
Vār P. 193.

used in co-ordination with the term '*Pramāṇa*,' it cannot denote the absolute non-existence of the *Pramāṇas*; all that it can denote is the denial, either of such *Pramāṇas* as are postulated by other philosophers, or of the efficiency of the *Pramāṇas*, or of the existence of the *Pramāṇas* at a particular time;—in either case the existence of the *Pramāṇas* themselves would be admitted; so that being thus admitted, if it were to be held to be the subject of the denial in question, this would be a clear case of self-contradiction.

Further, when you are propounding the non-existence of *Pramāṇas*, how and to whom are you propounding it? Who, too, is the propounder? "We are propounding it to one who does not know it; and the propounder is one who knows it." But how does he know it? If he knows it by means of an Instrument of Cognition, then there is self-contradiction, as *Pramāṇa* is not admitted. If he knows it by some other means, then the difficulty is that you can have no instance (to show by what other means the fact is known) [for an instance, unless it is cognised by means of a valid *Pramāṇa*, is absolutely futile]. There is a further self-contradiction involved in the admission of difference between the propounder and the person for whom the propounding is done: If you know that the propounder is different from the person for whom the propounding is done, you admit the existence of the *Pramāṇa* whereby you know that difference; and this involves 'self-contradiction' on your part. If, on the other hand, you

do not know the difference between the two persons, there is this self-contradiction or absurdity that you cannot explain *how* and *to whom* the propounding is done.

Lastly, when the Pūrvapakṣin lays down the proposition that 'Pramāṇas do not exist,' he should be met with the question—'how do you know that they do not exist'? In answer to this, if he puts forward proofs (*Pramāṇas*), he stultifies himself; and if he does not put forward proofs, he cannot accomplish his purpose.

Thus we find that the more we examine the statement of the Pūrvapakṣin, the more do we find it crumbling away.

Sūtra (13).

BECAUSE ALL PRAMĀṆAS HAVE BEEN DENIED, THE
DENIAL ITSELF CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED.* (Sū. 13).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 67, L. 4 to L. 10].

"Why (can the Denial not be established)?"†—asks the *Pūrvapakṣin*. [For the following reason, we reply]—You have put forward (in Sū. 8) as your reason, 'because it cannot be connected with any of the three points of time'; now if in support of this reason you can cite an Instance, then it behoves you to show (on the strength of perceptual or other valid cognition) that what you have put forward as your Reason (i. e. your Minor Premiss) does hold true in the case that you cite as the corroborative Instance; and if you do this, you cannot deny the character of *Pramāṇa* (Proof) in regard to all Perception and the rest [as at best one such Perception you will have employed to prove the truth of your Reason]. And if Perception and the rest were absolutely no proof, then what you would cite as an Instance would also not *prove* anything [as that also would only be a perceptual or other valid cognition]; so that your reason, in that case,

* Later Commentators—for instance the *Vṛtti* of Vishvanātha and the *Nyāya-sūtravivaraṇa*—do not have this as a *Sūtra*. The *Nyāyasūchinibandha* however cites it as a *Sūtra* and so also the *Bhāṣyachandṛa*, which remarks that this *Sūtra* puts forward another 'self-contradiction' involved in the Pūrvapakṣa stand-point.

† According to the *Bhāṣyachandṛa* this '*Kāṭham*' is an attack on the opponent:—
'How can you reasonably deny all *Pramāṇas*?'.

would be nullified by all Pramāṇas, and, as such, cease to be a proper Reason; in fact, such a Reason would be a “contradictory Reason”;—that having been defined as the ‘contradictory Reason or Probans’ ‘which contradicts a certain doctrine that has been previously admitted’ (Sū. 1. 2. 6); and what is put forward by the opponent in the assertion made by him constitutes his ‘doctrine’; and this assertion is that ‘Perception and the rest do not prove the existence of anything,’; and yet the several reasoning factors [the Premisses &c., which represent Pramāṇas] have been put forward (in the reasoning urged in Sū. 8) with a view to prove (i.e. *make known* to others) your own conclusions.*

If, on the other hand, the Instance (corroborative of the Reason put forward in support of the Denial of Pramāṇas) is not cited (as representing a *valid cognition, pramāṇa*) then you are faced by the difficulty that until you have shown the truth of your Reason, or Minor Premiss, in a certain well-known Instance, your assertion cannot prove your conclusion for you; so that the Denial of the Pramāṇas cannot be established, for the simple reason that the reason or premiss put forward does not possess the character of a really valid ‘Reason’.

Vārṭika on Sū. (13).

[P. 193, L. 16, to P. 194, L. 6].

Because all Pramāṇas have been denied &c.—says the Sūtra. What we ask you is—Do you, or do you not, cite an Instance in corroboration of your Reason, ‘because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time’? If you do cite it, then you stultify yourself: inasmuch as

◊ The statement of the Probans, which is the principal reasoning-factor, embodies facts ordinarily perceived—e. g. ‘because Perception, &c., cannot be connected with any point of time’ represents a number of facts perceived in ordinary experience. Now the proposition is that Perception, &c., do not prove anything; and yet the said Perception—that Perception, &c. cannot be connected with any point of time—has been urged with a view to prove the conclusion. Thus the Reason, as put forward, is entirely of contravention of the Proposition.

The *Vārṭika* in quoting this passage has प्रवचनान् for अवयवानान् and the *Tālparya* explains प्रवचनान् as referring to the *Avayavas*. The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads अवयवानान्

you admit the view that Perception and the rest cannot have the character of Proof (for you¹; what you cite as the instance also cannot prove anything; and as such it would be entirely futile. If, on the other hand, it does prove something, then that is a clear contradiction of what you have asserted before. If then, you do not cite the Instance,—this would mean that it is nowhere shown that what is put forward as the Reason is ever really effective in proving anything; and as a matter of fact, until its effectiveness has been shown in a well-known Instance, the Reason cannot prove anything;—so that, in this case, your Reason would be *nullified by all Pramānas*², and³ as such become ‘annulled’.

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 67, l. 7) says—*Further such a Reason would also be ‘contradictory,’ etc., etc.* What is meant is that when you assert the reasoning—‘Perception and the rest cannot have the character of Pramāṇa, because they cannot be connected with any of the three points of time’—you put forward certain reasoning-factors, embodying facts known by means of one or the other of the Pramāṇas, with a view to *prove* your proposition [and yet your Proposition is that no Pramāṇa can prove anything]. Then again, when you consciously pronounce a sentence, you have recourse to so many factors—*wish to speak, effort, emitting of wind, striking of the palate, &c., motion of the lips* and so forth; similarly when performing the act of walking, you avoid obstacles in the shape of pillars, thorns, snakes and so forth;—now, (everyone of the said factors representing a fact known by means of a Pramāṇa), the said uttering of the sentence as well as the walking would be absolutely impossible, if there were no Pramāṇas at all.

¹ Not being supported by any of those Pramāṇas that are embodied in the citing of the Instance and other reasoning-factors, it could be said to be ‘annulled’—*Tatparya*. It is according to this explanation that ‘*viruddha*’ has been translated as ‘annulled’; the Reason, as described here, does not fulfil the conditions of the ‘contradictory’ Reason.

Sūtra (14).

IF THE CHARACTER OF PRAMĀṆA IN THE CASE OF THE REASONING-FACTORS IS ADMITTED,—THEN YOUR DENIAL BECOMES RESTRICTED TO ONLY A FEW FROM AMONG ALL PRAMĀṆAS, [WHICH WOULD NOT BE RIGHT.]* (Sū. 14).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 67, L. 12 to P. 68, L. 2].

If you admit that the 'character of Pramāṇa' really belongs† to these *Perception and the rest* that are embodied in the reasoning-factors or premises involved in your negative argument (against Pramāṇas, in Sū. 8),—then you will have to accept the 'character of Pramāṇa' also in those *Perception and the rest* that would be embodied in the reasoning-factors that might be urged (against you) by your Opponent; as there would

Bhāṣya P. 68.

be no difference between the two sets of 'premises'. And this would mean that you do not deny all Pramāṇas (but only some of them; for which restricted denial there can be no justification). In the term '*vipratīṣeḍha*' (in the Sūtra) the prefix '*vi*' signifies *affirmation* ('*vipratīṣeḍha*' meaning *vishēṣeṇa prātīṣeḍha*, denial by selection) and not *negation* (*vipratīṣeḍha* in that case being construed as *vigaṭaḥ prātīṣeḍhaḥ negatived denial*);‡ as there can be no sense in such an expression. §

Vāṛṭika on Sū. 14.

[P. 194, L. 8 to L. 17.]

If the character of Pramāṇa &c.—says the *Sūtra*. Your position appears to be that you deny the character of

* It appears simpler to the interpret the Sūtra as—'the Denial does not apply to all Pramāṇas'. But the *Bhāṣya* has made capital out of the prefix नि in निवृत्तिश्च; in view of which the transaction has had to be put in a roundabout fashion; though the sense remains the same.

† The reading of the printed edition नानुपपत्तये is wrong. Both Puri Mss. read नानुपपत्ति, which is the right reading.

‡ If नि signified denial, then निवृत्तिश्च: would mean 'denial of the denial', Denial being the Object of Denial; and this would be absurd as coming from the Purvapakṣin. For purposes of *denial*, one always uses the term 'na'—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ For in that case the expression in the Sūtra—'*na vipratīṣeḍha*' would mean that 'the denial is *not negatived*', which would be the reverse of what is intended by the Siddhāntin. *Bhāṣyachandra*.

'Pramāṇa' to Pramāṇas other than those that are involved in your own assertion;—if that is so, then *all* Pramāṇas are not denied. But (you should bear in mind) that the same reasons that you have for admitting the character of Pramāṇa in the case of the Pramāṇas involved in your own assertion, are also available in the case of those involved in the assertion of your Opponent.

In the term *vipratīṣeḍha* the prefix *vi* indicates that the *pratīṣeḍha*, denial, is *vishēṣeṇa*, by selection, and it does not signify the *denial* of the *pratīṣeḍha*. "What is meant by this?" The meaning is that it comes to this that some Pramāṇas are denied and some are admitted,—you admit those that are involved in the assertion of your Opponent.

Lastly, the assertion that you have made (in Sū. 8) 'the character of Pramāṇa connected with any of the three points of time',—has this assertion the 'character of Pramāṇa' or not? If it has, then, there is self-contradiction on your part; if it has not, then it cannot prove anything at all; and hence becomes futile and meaningless.*

Sūtra (15).

THERE SHOULD BE NO DENIAL (OF PRAMĀNAS AND PRAMEYAS) IN REGARD TO ALL THREE POINTS OF TIME†; AS THEIR EXISTENCE (AS CAUSE AND EFFECT) IS PROVED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENT IS PROVED BY ITS SOUND.‡—SŪ. (15).

* The *Tatparya* remarks that hitherto the *Siddhānti* has been criticising the *Pārvapakṣa*-argument in its details; in this last sentence, it takes the argument as a whole.

† That is, it is quite possible for Pramāṇa and Prameya to be related to each other as 'cause and effect' and also as 'means of Cognition' and 'object of cognition'—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

‡ The word *सर्वत्रापि* is wanting in the text of the Sūtra as found in the *मुद्रापत्र* attached to Puri MS. B. It reads the Sūtra simply as *यथावादीत्यवचरितम्*; the *Bhāṣyachandra* reads the Sūtra as in the printed text.

Bhāṣya,

[P. 68, L. 4 to L. 15].

[An objection is raised at the very outset]—"Why should this be repeated (in the *Sūtra*, when it has already been stated before, in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 65, l. 12)?"*

The answer is that this serves to confirm what has been said before. That is to say, we have stated above (Bhā. P. 65, l. 12) that—'*between the cause of apprehension and the object of apprehension there is no restriction as to the former coming into existence either before or after or simultaneously with the latter, and we take each case on its own merits just as we find it, and assert accordingly*';—and the present *Sūtra* serves to show that this assertion of ours had its source in this *Sūtra*. [By the presence of the *Sūtra*] it is made clear that the Sage (Gauṭama) himself does not admit of any restriction (as to priority &c. between the *Pramāṇa* and its *Pramēya*), and hence firmly rejects the opponent's denial—by asserting that 'the denial in regard to all three points of time is not right.'

Out of the three possibilities (of priority, posteriority and simultaneity), our Author cites the example of one—*In the*

* From what we read here, there appears to be a confusion in regard to the exact position of the *Sūtra* and portions of the *Bhāṣya*. It has been remarked by several writers that the *Bhāṣya* contains certain passages, which form part of an older *Vṛtti* on the *Sūtras*. The editor of the Vizianagram series has made an attempt to indicate some of these passages by printing them in thicker type. The wider aspect of this question we shall deal with in the Introduction. But in connection with the present passage, the following appears to be noteworthy.—The objector asks why this *Sūtra* should be here, when what is herein said has already been said before (in Bhā. P. 65 l. 12, these lines appearing in thicker type). This question would imply that the two assertions—Sū. 15, and the *Bhāṣya*-passage on P. 65, l. 12,—stood on the same level, being the work of the same writer; this also would appear to be the implication of what follows in the *Bhāṣya* on the present *Sūtra* (P. 68, l. 14). But the answer that the *Bhāṣya* gives to the objector's question is that the former statement (of P. 65), has its source or authority in the present *Sūtra*—that is why the fact previously asserted is asserted again. Now what does this mean? It apparently means that the present declaration is a '*Sūtra*,' and the former declaration was '*Bhāṣya*' which derived its authority from this *Sūtra*. This is clearly stated in the *Bhāṣyachandṛa*, which says—'*The Bhāṣya has already shown that there is no restriction as to precedence, sequence or simultaneity among Pramāṇas: and the Sūtra now proceeds to show me of these three methods.*' The whole question is extremely interesting and we shall wait and see to the end of the work, without adopting in favour of one view or the other. For purposes of our translation, we shall accept the text of the *Sūtras* as fixed for us by Vāchastati Mishra in his व्याख्यानमिश्र.

same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound. In the case cited we find that *by means of* the Sound, which comes into existence after the musical instrument, we infer the existence of the musical instrument, which has been in existence prior to the Sound; and here the musical instrument is what is *to be made known*, and the Sound is the *means* by which it is made known [and here the *Pramāṇa*, is posterior to the *Pramēya*];—this refers to a case where the musical instrument being hidden from view, its presence is inferred, and the inference is that ‘the lute is being played,’ or ‘the flute is being blown’,—the particular instrument being inferred by the peculiarity of the Sound. Thus then, here we have a case where we apprehend the ‘object of cognition’ (the musical instrument) which has a prior existence, by means of the ‘means of cognition’ (Sound) which comes into existence after the former.

The Sūtra has cited this one instance (of the posteriority of *Pramāṇa*) by way of illustration; as examples of the other two ways (priority and simultaneity of *Pramāṇa* and *Pramēya*), we may take those that have already been cited above (P. 65).

“Why are not those examples cited here (rather than there?”.

We are only explaining here what has already been stated before (on P. 65). All that we have got to do is to state the facts; it does not make any difference whether it is stated here or on the previous occasion.

Vaṇṭika on Sū. 15.

[P. 194, L. 20 to P. 195, L. 11.]

There should be no denial &c.—says the Sūtra; and on this the *Bhāṣya* says that this is meant to indicate the source (or authority) for what has been asserted in the *Bhāṣya* (on P. 65, L. 12).

“Why then was this *Sūtra* read there?”

It makes no difference, whether the fact is stated here or there; all that is necessary is that the fact should be stated.

One of the methods (of the existence of *Pramāṇa*) is illustrated—*Just as the existence of the musical instrument is proved by its sound*;—of the other two methods the examples

Nyāya Vol. II. 46.

are to be taken as already cited. Just as the previously existing musical instrument is inferred by means of the subsequently appearing Sound,—as when we infer that ‘what is being played upon is the lute’, ‘what is being blown is the flute’; in this case what we perceive is that peculiar character of the sound of the lute and that of the flute, which marks them out as issuing from the lute or from the flute; and when we have perceived that character we cognise the fact that ‘this is the sound of the lute’, ‘this is the sound of the flute’;—and here the musical instrument is something that has an existence prior to that of the sound, which comes only subsequently. An example of simultaneity we have in the case where the perception of smoke gives rise to the cognition of the fire as qualified by that smoke. A example of the priority of the *Pramāṇa* we have in the case where the previously existing Sun renders visible the subsequently appearing things.

Bhāṣya Introductory to Sū. 16.

[P. 68, L. 15 to L. 18.]

The names ‘*Pramāṇa*’ and ‘*Pramēya*’ are applied according to circumstances; such application depending upon certain causes that go to determine the name; such cause or circumstance, in the case in question, consists in the fact that (a) that which is the *means* of bringing about an apprehension is called ‘*Pramāṇa*’, (b) ‘that which is the object apprehended is called ‘*Pramēya*’, and (c) ‘when that which, though itself an *apprehended object*, happens to be the *means* of the apprehension of something else, then that same thing may be called ‘*Pramāṇa*’ as well as ‘*Pramēya*.’ This is the fact brought out in the following *Sūtra*.

Vāṛṭika Introductory to Sū. 16.

[P. 195, L. 11 to L. 17.]

The names ‘*Pramāṇa*’ and ‘*Pramēya*’ are applied &c.—says the *Bhāṣya*. By ‘*Samāvēsha*’ here is meant application.

*The application of these names is dependent upon such causes.

* The Benares edition reads अविशेषः. This is wrong; specially in view of what follows on P. 196, L. 4.

as determine the name; and the cause that determines the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' consists respectively in 'being the means of apprehension' and 'being the object of apprehension'. "But how is it when one and the same thing happens to fulfil both these conditions?"

Well, in that case also,—inasmuch the application of the names depends upon the circumstances mentioned,—as both circumstances would be present, the same thing would be called by both names. In order to bring out this fact we have the next Sūtra.

Sūtra (16).

THE WEIGHING BALANCE, WHICH IS A PRAMĀṆA, [THE MEANS OF ASCERTAINING THE WEIGHT OF THINGS], IS PRAMEYA ALSO, [AS REGARDS ITS OWN ACCURACY]† (Sū. 16.)

Bhāṣya on Sū 16.

[P. 68, L. 20 to P. 70, L. 6.]

The weighing balance is called '*Pramāṇa*' when it is the *means* of bringing about the cognition of the exact weight (of the thing weighed),—in which case the object of cognition is the weighty substance, gold and the like (which is weighed), which therefore is called '*Pramēya*';—but when the gold thus weighed is made the means of testing (ascertaining the accuracy of) another balance, then in the cognition (of the accuracy) of this other balance, it becomes the '*Pramāṇa*', and the other balance becomes the '*Pramēya*'.‡

* All the Mss. of the *Bhāṣya*, except one read प्रमेया; so do also the *Tātparyā* the व्याख्याननिबन्ध, and the *Bhāṣyachandra*. But some Mss. of the *Vārṭika* and all the later commentators read प्रमेयता. With the latter reading the Sūtra means that the character of प्रमेयता also belongs to *Pramāṇas*, as we find in the case of a particular *Pramāṇa*, the Balance. प्रमेयता च भवति, यथा तुलास्ये प्रमाणे दृश्यते; in this case तुलाप्रमाणावयवत् is a compound word. With the reading प्रमेया the construction is तुला प्रमाणावयवत् प्रमेया च भवति, यथा ह्ययं प्रमाणावयवति यथा प्रमेया इति; in this case तुला and प्रमाणावयवत् are not taken as a compound. The purport of the Sūtra is the same in both cases.

† When we are weighing gold, the Balance is a pure '*Pramāṇa*', being the *means* whereby we know the weight of the gold. But when doubts arise as to the accuracy of a balance, then what is done is that a piece of gold, whose weight has

What we have just said (in regard to the application of the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' depending on circumstances) applies to all topics of the *Shāstra*.^{*} For instance, the *Soul* has been prominently mentioned among '*Pramēyas*', because it is an object of cognition; but it is '*Pramāṇi*', 'Cogniser', also, inasmuch as (in regard to the action of *cognising*) it is the independent agent;—similarly *Buddhi*, 'Apprehension', (of Invariable concomitance, for instance) is '*Pramāṇa*', inasmuch as it is the means of cognising things; and yet it becomes '*Pramēya*', when it is itself *cognised*; and it comes to be called mere '*Pramiti*', 'apprehension', when it is neither the *means* nor the *object* of any cognition. Similarly, the conditions governing the application of the names in question may be applied to other particular topics (of Doubt &c.) also.

As a matter of fact the names of the several case-relations or active agencies (*Kāraṇas*) are applied (promiscuously) through varying causes (depending on the character of the things concerned). For instance, when we say 'the tree stands', † ('*vriksaḥ tiṣṭhati*'), the *tree*, (*vriksa*) is called the 'nominative', because in regard to its own action of *standing*, it is 'independent' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Nominative as that which is *svatantra*, 'independent agent'];—when we say 'he sees the tree' ('*vriksam paśyati*'), the same tree comes to be called the 'objective', because it is that which is 'most desired' to be got at by the action of 'seeing' [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Objective as that which is 'the most desired to be got at by the Agent'];—when we say 'he indicates the Moon by (*i.e.* with the help of, *through*) the tree', the same tree is called an 'Instrument', because it is the 'principal means of accomplishment' employed by the person doing the indicating ‡ [and thus fulfills the condition of

been already ascertained by means of a reliable balance, is weighed again in the balance of doubtful accuracy; and if the weights tally, the balance is proved accurate'; so that in regard to its accuracy, the balance becomes an 'object of cognition', '*Pramēya*', the resultant cognition in this case being in the form, 'this balance is accurate'.

* 'In this passage the Author reminds us of what he has already said in the *Bhāṣya* or Sū. 1-1-1'—says *Bhāṣyachandra*.

† The *Bhāṣyachandra* takes *tiṣṭhati* as 'lives'.

‡ The Puri MSS. read *वापकव* for *वापकत्व*; but the latter gives better sense.

Pāṇini's definition as that which is the 'principal means of accomplishment'];—when we say 'he is pouring water for the tree' ('*vrīkṣāya udakam āsiñchaṭi*'), the tree is called the 'Dative', as it is that which is 'intended to be benefited' by the water that is poured [thus fulfilling the condition of Pāṇini's definition of the Dative as what is intended to be benefited by the action];—when we say 'the leaf falls from the tree', ('*vrīkṣat parṇam paṭaṭi*'), the tree is the 'Ablative', as it is 'what remains fixed while there is movement of the other thing',—such being the definition of the Ablative;—lastly when we say 'birds are on the tree' ('*vrīkṣe vayāmsi sanṭi*'), the tree is the 'Locative', being the receptacle (of the birds),—and the 'Locative' has been defined as 'receptacle.'

*From all this it is clear that 'Kāraṇa', 'case-relation' (or 'active agency') is a name given, not to the mere *substance* (as held by the *Mādhvamika*), nor to the mere *action*, but to that which, while being endowed with a particular action of its own, becomes the means of the accomplishment of the other (principal) action; *e.g.* the name 'Nominative' applies, neither to the substance alone, nor to the action alone, but to that which, independently by itself (*i.e.* by its own action), becomes the means of accomplishing the act;—similarly the name 'objective' applies to that which is the most desired to be got at by the action, and not to mere substance or to action; and so with what is the 'principal means of accomplishing', and so on. In these cases we have found that, just as *in point of fact* the names of the active agencies (*Kāraṇas*) are applied, neither to the mere substance, nor to the mere action, but to that which, being endowed with a particular action of its own, helps in the bringing about of some other action,—so also the same follows from the definitions of the 'active agencies'; and as the words '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' also are expressive of active agency (case-relation; '*Pramāṇa*' being the *Instrument* and '*Pramēya*' the *object*, of cognition), they cannot renounce what is in the very nature of 'active agencies.'

* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, we have a Pūrva-pakṣa argument from here down to l. 6 on P. 70; and the Sīdḍhāntin's answer begins on l. 7, with '*Asṭi bhoḥ*';—and then the *Purvapakṣa*-argument again on p. 70, l. 12, with '*So-yamupalabḍhiḥ* &c.';—while according to the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya*, we have here, in the passage beginning with p. 69, l. 10, to p. 70, l. 6, a statement from the Sīdḍhāntā stand point, applying the general principle of '*Kāraṇas*' to the case of '*Pramāṇa* and *Pramēya*';

Vārṭika on Sū. 16.

[P. 195, L. 19 to P. 200, L. 15.]

The weighing balance is *Pramēya* also &c. &c.—says the Sūtra. What is meant is that the weighing balance, which is the means of ascertaining the weight of things, comes to be called '*Pramāṇa*', because it is the *means* by which one comes to know the exact measure of the total weight of a substance; and the same balance, when it has its own measure (of accuracy) ascertained by means of the gold (that has been weighed by another balance), becomes the *object* of a cognition, and hence called '*Pramēya*.'

Vār. P. 196.

The case of the balance has been cited only by way of an illustration; the same holds good in regard to all topics of the *Shāstra*. That is to say, just as the names '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*', so also all the names of '*active agencies*' (case-relations, *Kāraṅkas*) are applied according to circumstances. In support of this view, that one and the same thing can (under diverse circumstances) be called by the names of several '*active agencies*',—the *Bhāṣya* cites an example from ordinary parlance:—In the assertion '*the tree stands*' the tree is called the '*nominative*', as it is independent in regard to its own action of *standing*.

"What do you mean by the '*independence*' of the *tree* in regard to its own action of *standing*?"

What we mean is that it does not stand in need of any other agency. For instance, in its own *standing* the tree does not require the operation of any other agency (save

and against this we have the Pūrvapakṣa argument beginning with p. 70, l. 7, and extending right up to Sū. 18. This latter is the more reasonable interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* as it stands. The *Bhāṣyachandra* in introducing the passage on p. 69, l. 10, which it regards as coming from the Pūrvapakṣin, says that the Pūrvapakṣin puts forward his argument under the apprehension that *Action* alone constitutes '*Kāraṅka*'. But we find the statement asserting distinctly न द्रव्यकारं कारकं न क्रियाकारकम्.

Nyāya Vol. II. 51.

itself). Such is the case when the word 'stands' expresses *absence of motion*; when the same word is expressive of mere *existence* ('the tree stands' being used for 'the tree exists'), then also, inasmuch *existence* always implies the manifestation of the thing, the word in question means that 'the tree exists standing', 'it manifests (itself),'—and here also the *tree* is called the 'nominative' agent;—when however the word 'exists' (i.e. 'stands') is expressive of *connection with a particular house*,—as when Dēvaḍaṭṭa is spoken of as 'being (existing) in the house',—the word denotes neither mere *existence*, nor *absence of motion*, but *connection with the house*; and in this case also, the action being that of *experiencing the connection with the house*,—in which action Dēvaḍaṭṭa does not require the operation of any other agency save himself,—he is 'independent'; similarly when the word 'stands' denotes 'unbroken',—'the tree stands' meaning the 'tree is unbroken'—in that case also, the tree, in its own 'standing', does not require the operation of any other agency, and hence is 'independent'. In the case of such *verbs*, even though the thing may require the operation of some other agency, this agency will be in the shape of its own component parts; e. g. when we say 'the tree stands by its roots', 'the house stands by the pillars', and so on. 'Standing' may also mean *continuity of existence* (lit. being the object of cognitions at two different points of time),—i.e. a thing, perceived at some previous time, may be perceived again at a later time by reason of the presence of other causes of its perception,—then it forms the object of more than one perception appearing at different times; and this is what is meant by its 'standing'; (i.e. being *recognised* as the same thing); and in this action of *standing*, there is needed the operation of such auxiliary agencies as the Eye and the rest (which perceive the thing at different times, and so forth); and such agency is what is called the 'Instrument'; [and yet in this case also the *tree*

would be the 'nominative', as it is the tree *independently* by itself that sets into operation those auxiliary agencies; it is only when the tree presents itself before the Eye that the Eye recognises it as the same tree that had been seen before].

[The Nihilist starts a discussion on this side-issue of *Recognition and Continuity of Existence*].—"All notion of Recognition must be wrong; as we find in the case of the revolution of the wheel and the lamp."*

Vār. P. 197.

you mean by this that—"no single thing can form the object of more than one cognition at different points of time",—then we ask, how do you account for the well-known conception 'that same tree is standing'? Certainly the very first sight of a tree cannot give rise to the conception that 'this is that same tree standing'. "But we do find such a conception of *continuity of standing*, even when the two things are entirely different; *e. g.* when we speak of 'the wheel *continuing* to revolve' and 'the lamp *continuing* to burn', where the notion of *continuity* (or identity), appearing as it does with regard to *several non-continuous* revolutions and lamp-flames, must be regarded as *wrong*; as it apprehends a thing as what apparently it is not; and as the notion of identity and continuity is wrong in these cases, so must it also be in the case of the 'standing' of the tree and such other things." This conclusion cannot be accepted; as there are no proofs for it; you do not put forward any proof in support of the view that there is multiplicity in every tree and such other things that we perceive [*i. e.* that every single tree represents a number of momentary trees

* When a wheel is revolving, all the revolutions are so alike that there is a notion that it is one and the same revolution that is appearing; and this idea of *recognition* is apparently wrong. Similarly when a lamp is burning there is a quick succession of numerous flames—each of which has but a momentary existence; and yet there is an idea that the *same* flame is continuing; this recognition also is wrong. Similarly with all Recognitions. The Bauddha has to lay stress upon this; for if he admits the correctness of Recognition, he will have to admit a more than momentary existence for things.

succeeding one another in rapid succession]*. Then again, as a matter of fact, all *wrong* cognitions are only imitations of *right* cognitions; and therefore you have to point out a case where the cognition of continuity of existence is right† [an imitation of which we have in the case of the tree and such other things]. “What proofs have *you* for the notion that the same thing exists at different points of time?” We have already explained the proof for this on a previous occasion, (*Bhāṣya*, P. 24, *Ṣārṅga*, pp. 66-67), where we have explained that in the case of the cognitions of colour, taste and touch, it is found from actual Recognition that a single object forms the basis of, and is apprehended by, several cognitions. Another proof for the same (continuity of existence) is found in the well-known fact that, being the substratum of the effect the Cause must continue to exist at the time of the (manifestation of the) effect; a thing that is the substratum or receptacle of another thing is always found to exist at the time of the existence of the latter; as we find in the case of the jujube berry lying in the bowl; and as the Cause is the substratum of the effect, it follows that it should exist at the time that the effect appears. You will perhaps say that “the effect is without a substratum”. You mean by this that when the effect comes into existence, it does so only after having completely modified ‡ the constitu-

* In the case of the wheel and the lamp, we actually *see* that the revolutions are different and that the flame is being actually *burnt*; so that it is clear that the notion of sameness is a mistake, due to the similarity in the revolutions and in the flames. There is no such perception available in support of the view that every tree is undergoing momentary destruction.

† This the Bauddha cannot do; as he admits of no right notion of *Recognition*. So that if there is no *right* idea of Recognition, where could there be any *wrong* idea of it?

‡ Both editions read *अप्रतीत्य*, in which case the translation would stand thus—the effect is produced *irrespectively* of the cause. This could not be quite right. The *Tātparyā* supplies the correct reading *प्रतीत्य*, and explains it as *पूर्वभावं विकृत्य*; the sense being that when the Jar comes into existence, the constitution of the Clay has been completely changed; so that the Clay not being present at the time, it could not be held to be the substratum of the Jar.

tion of the Cause, so that what (effect) could subsist in what (cause)? (By virtue of which the former could be held to be the substratum of the former). But it will not be right to argue thus; as there is no instance to corroborate your contention; there is no such case of any effect existing without a substratum as is admitted by both of us, which could form the corroborative instance of your argument. "But exactly the same is the case with your contention that the effect *has* a substratum, in corroboration of which also there is no universally accepted instance."

Your answer that the same objection is equally applicable to my contention is not an answer at all; for it implies that you admit the force of the objection; that is, you evidently admit that there is no example available in support of your contention; and all that you urge is that there is none available in support of our contention also. "But there is self-contradiction." You perhaps mean by this as follows—"When we say that the same holds good in regard to your view, it is not that we admit the absence of examples in support of our view;

Vār. P. 198.

what we mean to do is to urge that there is self-contradiction involved in your reasoning; our meaning being that when you assert that that view is wrong in support of which there is no example, you stultify yourself by rejecting (as wrong) your own view [that *the effect has a substratum*, in support of which there is no example available]." This is not right; as you evidently have not understood the case; it is clear that you have not grasped either our view or your own. As a matter of fact, in our view, it is a well-known fact that the effect has a substratum; *

* That the container and the contained are co-existent in time is a fact vouched for by ordinary experience, which does not stand in need of a corroborative instance; and from that it follows that the cause, being the container, should exist at the time that the effect appears. On the other hand, the view that the effect has no substratum is not similarly vouched for by experience; and as such, it could be established only by reasonings; and in a reasoning you will always require a corroborative instance. So that the absence of such an instance is fatal to your view, and not to ours.

but as for your view, (that the effect is without a substratum) it goes contrary to your own assertion that colour, &c., are *effects* and have a substratum.* You have asserted that 'substance is an aggregate of *bhūṭas*, elements (earth, &c.) and *bhauṭikas*, elementals (colour, &c.)'; so that if you now assert that colour, &c., have no substratum, what would be the signification of the nominal affix in the term '*bhauṭika*,' as applied to 'colour, &c.'? [The only possible meaning of the affix being *bhūṭe bhavaḥ*, *subsisting in the bhūṭas*, and this *subsistence* is now denied]. Then again, your view would also militate against several other assertions of yours, such as—(a) 'the jewel is the *receptacle* of light, as the light follows the motion, the motion-lessness and other modifications of it,'—(b) 'the bowl is the *receptacle* of the jujube berry as it is by its force that the fruit does not fall off,'—(c) 'the sesamum seeds are the *receptacle* of the oil, as it is by their force that the oil does not flow away,' and so forth. Then again, if Colour, Taste, Touch &c. did not subsist in a (common) substratum, then each of them would be an independent entity by itself,—just like so many distinct substances, the sesamum, the kidney-bean, etc.; and each of them should, in that case, be perceived entirely apart from the other (the colour of the sesamum should be perceived as entirely apart from its taste, and so forth); as a matter of fact however, they are never perceived apart from one another; and from this it follows that they are dependent upon (subsistent in) something else (which is their common substratum). Thus then, the conclusion is that what is meant by a certain thing 'standing' may also be that it forms the single common object of remembrance and of the past and present cognitions of it.

* Both editions read कदाचन कदाचिन्मात्रावच्छिन्नम्; and the translation is according to this reading. It would perhaps be better to read कदाचिन्मात्रावच्छिन्नम्. The meaning of the passage would then be that to hold that colour, &c., are effects and yet deny them a substratum would involve a self-contradiction; for it has been held that substance is an aggregate, &c. &c.

The tree is the 'object' as it is what is desired to be got at by the seeing—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 69, l. 6). "In what sense can the Objective be called a '*kāraka*', an active agent" ?* The objective is an 'active agent' in this sense that it forms the object of the action; as a matter of fact, that is an objective which forms the object of the action; and this definition includes even those things which, even though they do not fulfil the condition of being 'the most desired', have the said character.†

What is meant by *kāraṇ*, the *Instrument*, being the *most efficient cause* is that it is the most immediately antecedent (to the action). For instance, in the case of the expression 'he indicates the moon *by the tree*', the sense is that the person sees the moon *immediately after* he has seen the tree; and hence the tree comes to be called the 'Instrument'.

The Dative is that which is intended to be reached by the 'objective'; that is to say, that thing which is intended to be reached by the 'objective' comes to be called the 'Dative';

* That alone can be called an 'active agent', which, in some way, tends towards the action denoted by the verb; the Objective, however is something that is *operated upon* by the action; how then can it be an 'active agent' ?

† The Benares edition wrongly puts the words *तथापि कर्तृत्वमपि विवक्षितम्* under inverted commas. This is not a quotation.

The *Tatparya* adds:—A thing is called an 'object of action' when it bears upon itself the effects of an action not subsisting in itself; and this is exactly what forms the characteristic of the *Objective*. For instance, Devadatta sees a *tree*, the perception of the tree is produced by the action of seeing, which inheres in Devadatta, who is something other than the tree; and it is only in this sense that the perception can be said to have an object (in the shape of the tree); by which it is meant that its own characterisation or specification depends upon that object. So that inasmuch as it is necessary for the Object to have an existence anterior to the action, it can, in this sense, be called an *active agent*, a 'cause of the action'. It is only thus that we can speak of things *modified* and reached as being 'Objectives' of those actions. In the case of such things as cloth and the like, which are brought into existence by the action itself,—such for instance as the action of weaving,—the thing (cloth) cannot have an existence anterior to the action of being brought into existence, [and yet we speak of 'bringing the cloth into existence', where the cloth is the *object*],—and the component parts of the cloth, yarns, have such an anterior existence; so that it is through these parts, that the name 'objective' comes to be applied to the Cloth, indirectly. The definition of the 'Objective' now suggested is applicable to all such cases as—'he jumps over the snake', 'going to the village he avoids the tree-roots'—(where the character of *being desired* is not present). We have to add the qualification 'not inhering in itself', in view of such expressions as 'Chaitra reaches the village', where the action of *reaching* has its effect subsisting in Chaitra also; so that he would have to be regarded as the 'Objective'; but this becomes precluded by reason of the action of *reaching* being one that subsists in himself.

for instance, in the expression, '*vrīkṣāya udakam āsiñchaṭi*', 'pours water for the tree', the 'objective', *Water*, when 'poured', reaches the *tree*; which latter therefore becomes the 'Dative'.*

The *Ablative* is that which remains fixed while something else is moving.† For instance, in the expression 'vrīkṣāt paṭaṭi,' 'falls from the tree,' the tree is called the 'Ablative,' as that which falls is moving, and while that is moving, the tree remains fixed.

The *Locative* is that which is the cause of upholding (i. e., that which upholds or supports); when a thing is contained in (rests upon) another thing, the latter is the cause of the upholding (or supporting) of the former, and hence it comes to be called the 'Locative'. For instance, in the expression '*vrīkṣe vayāmsi*,' 'the birds on the tree,' what is the cause of the counteracting of the force of gravity in the *birds* is their connection with the *tree*, which on that account, comes to be spoken of as the 'Locative.' ‡

Such being the case it is not the Substance only, or the Action only, which is the active agent—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 69. L. 10). What is meant by this is that the term 'active agent' is applied neither to mere Substance, nor to mere Action; one does not apply the name of an active agent to a substance which he perceives merely as a substance pure and simple; nor to

* The *Tātparyā* remarks that the name *सम्पदान* is not significant; as the definition suggested shows that it is not always the receiver of a gift (which is what is signified by the name) that is called '*सम्पदान*'. The definition, it says, has been given in accordance with actual usage, and also in view of Paṇini's definition.

† Construe the passage as (अस्ति चिद्वद् वस्तुनि) अपगच्छति इति च्च अस्तिवद्वे च्च अपदानम्. The footnote reading would be quite contrary to the sense desired to be conveyed.

‡ This is only a particular case where 'upholding' or 'containing' is in the form of 'counteracting of gravity'; it is not the same in all cases; e. g. when we speak of the Substance containing a quality, the quality is upheld by the Substance; but there is no 'counteracting of gravity' in this case. So that the actual definition of the Locative is simply 'that which upholds.'—*Tātparyā*.

an action when perceived merely as an action pure and simple; it is only when one perceives the action in its relationship to a substance, that he comes to speak of them by the common name 'active agent';* the character common to all active agents is that they are the cause (source or basis) of the action; so that when one wishes to speak of only this fact of being the *cause of action*,—and he is not desirous of speaking of the particular form of the relationship to action,—the term used is the common name 'active agent'; when however, one wishes to speak of a particular form of relationship, he employs the particular names—'Nominative,' 'Objective,' 'Instrument' and the like—according as the thing is found to be qualified by such specific and mutually exclusive properties as 'independence' and the rest. Every active agent is *independent* and hence the 'nominative' in relation to its own (subsidiary) activity; and it is only in its relation to some other primary action that each of them comes to be known by the specific Kāraka-names (of 'Nominative,' 'Objective' &c)† This is what is meant by the *Śāstra* when it calls the Kāraka (the active agent) the 'producer', the 'accomplisher';—"of what?"—of the action; and it is according to this principle that the several names (of the Kāra^{ka}s) are employed; hence what is said in the present context refers, not to mere action in general (such as belongs to every one of these agents concerned, individually), but to a primary action (towards whose accomplishment all the agents contribute their activity). In regard to this primary action, one thing may be affording

* The passage should be read as ददा किदाद्रव्यसम्बन्धप्रसक्तम्.

† This is in anticipation of the objection that the Kāraka may be defined simply as that which *accomplishes an action*, or that which is endowed with a subsidiary activity of its own; why then have both these characteristics been emphasised? The sense is that if we defined the Kāraka simply as that only, then, inasmuch as every 'active agent' is independent in regard to its own subsidiary activity, all would be 'nominatives'; while if we combine the two characters we have this advantage that while each is the 'nominative' in relation to its own activity, it is 'objective,' or 'instrumental', &c., in relation to the other primary action.

only a remote aid, while another's aid is more approximate and immediate, while something else may be affording some sort of help in some way or other; and it is in accordance with the character of the aid afforded that the names 'Nominative' and the rest come to the applied. This is what we have already explained on a former occasion.

An objection is raised—"If the application of the Kāraka-name is due to the relation borne to an action, then the word '*pāchaka*', 'cook' (which denotes the nominative agent of the action of cooking) would apply only to one who is actually doing the cooking at that time; and you * could not have such expressions as 'the cook *will cook*' or 'the cook *has cooked*' [as at the time these expressions are used the man is not doing the act of cooking]."

This is not right; as the capacity (of acting) remains at all the three points of time; as a matter of fact, the capacity continues at all points of time; so that even with regard to past and future actions, the nominative-name—"cook" for instance—can be used in connection with the verb in all three tenses—"cooks", "cooked" and "will cook".

"If the capacity remains at all three points of time, then it is not proper to express the three tenses at all; what you mean is that just as the substance is there at all three points of time so is the capacity also; hence just as the three tenses are not used in connection with the substance, so also they should not be used in connection with its capacity; and in that case you could speak of a man as 'he cooks' even when he is not doing any cooking at all [as his capacity of cooking would still be there]; and you should never have such expressions as 'the cook will cook', 'the cook has cooked' [as the capacity being always *present*, it would be wrong to connect it with the *past* or the *future*]."

This does not affect our position at all. As what brings

* The ३ has to be separated from ३

out and manifests the existence of the capacity of a thing is its relation to an action. The word 'action' expresses what is denoted by the verbal root; and that which is the principal accomplisher of that action is the 'nominative' agent; and it is only when this nominative agent is related to the action that he brings out or manifests his capacity. "But what is this *Capacity*?"

The *Capacity* is a property of the nominative agent, which is distinct from that agent and also from the action—such a property being in the form of *power* and of being conversant with the means (of accomplishing the action concerned); and this property is manifested by relationship to an action.* So that the *kāraka*-name ('cook' e. g.) is directly applicable only in a case where all the three factors are present,—the knowledge of the means, the power, and the relationship to the action; as we have in the case of the expression 'the cook is cooking'; in a case however where the relationship to an actual action is not present,—and what are there are only the *power* and the *knowledge of the means*—if the word 'cook' is used, as in the expressions 'the cook has cooked' or 'the cook will cook',—as one of the three factors is absent, such use can only be indirect or secondary.

[The exact nature of words denoting verbal relations having been expounded, the author applies it to the case in question]—The names 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramāṇya' are words denoting active agency (or verbal relations). "How so?" Because they are related to a particular action; just as words like 'cook' and the like are used only in relation to a certain action, so are the words 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramāṇya' also [which signify respectively the *instrument of the action of cognising* and the *object of the action of cognising*.]

* 'Power' and 'knowledge of means' are both essential in the Agent; even though he has the power to do an act, if he does not know the means of doing it, he cannot do it; similarly even though he may know the means, if he has not the requisite power, the action cannot be done by him.

*Bhāṣya.**Introductory to Sūtra (17).*

[P. 70 L. 7 to L. 13.]

The Pūrvapakṣin urges the following argument :—

“ Well, Sir, we admit that the *Kāraka*-names are used “ according to their capacity ; so that Perception and the rest “ are ‘ *Pramāṇa* ’ ‘ Instruments of cognition ’ as they are the “ cause of the action of cognising, and they are also ‘ *Pra-* “ *māṇya* ’, ‘ object of cognition ’, as they are the objects “ of the action of cognising; thus then Perception and the “ rest are *objects* of cognition as well as *instruments* of cogni- “ tion;* as is vouched for by such specific assertions (met with “ in ordinary parlance) as—(a) ‘ I know this *by* Perception ’, “ ‘ I know this *by* Inference ’, ‘ I know these *by* Analogy ’, “ ‘ I know this *by* Word ’, [where Perception &c. figure as “ the *means*],—or (b) ‘ My cognition (which is apprehended) is “ ‘ Perceptual ’, ‘ My Cognition is Inferential ’, ‘ my Cognition “ is Verbal ’, where they are apprehended (as the Object “ of Cognition). So also when these same, Perception “ and the rest, are described by their definitions—*e. g.*, “ ‘ the cognition produced by the contact of the object “ with the sense-organ ’ and so forth—they come to be speci- “ fically *known* [in which case they themselves form the *objects* “ of cognition]. Now the question arises—Is this *cogni-* “ *tion of Perception* &c. brought about by the instrumentality “ of another set of *Pramāṇas*? Or without other *Pramāṇas*, “ independently of all instruments? ‘ What difference “ would that make? ’ [The Pūrvapakṣin explains this “ in the next Sūtra].

Vārṇika—Introduction to Sū. 17.

[P. 200, L. 15 to L. 20.]

“ Well, Sir, &c.,—says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 70, L. 7). When “ the *Pramāṇas*, Perception and the rest, come to be them- “ selves known, they are *objects* of cognition, and as such be- “ come *Pramāṇyas*. And in regard to this we have to consider “ this—Do these, Perception and the rest, stand in need of

* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra*, the term ‘ *pramāṇāni* ’ here stands for (1) *Instruments of Cognition*, and (2) *Cognitions*. Read the passage as कवेद्वानि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रम.ज्ञानि च.

“ the operation of other ‘Instruments of Cognition’, in regard
 “ to their own cognition [*i. e.*, is the Cognition of Perception
 “ &c. brought about by the instrumentality of Pramāṇas
 “ other than Perception &c.]? Or is the cognition of the
 “ Pramāṇas brought about without the help of any Instru-
 “ ments? What if it is so? [The next Sūtra supplies
 “ the answer from the Pūrvapakṣa stand-point.

Sūtra (17).

“ IF THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION ARE COGNISED
 “ BY MEANS OF INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION,—THEN THIS
 “ INVOLVES THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF
 “ COGNITION.”—(Sū. 17).

Bhāṣya on Sū. (17).

[P. 70, L. 15 to L. 17.]

“ If Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition
 “ are apprehended by means of Instruments of Cognition,
 “ then this means that the Instrument by whose means they
 “ are apprehended are distinct from Perception and the rest;
 “ and this involves the postulating of other Instruments of
 “ Cognition (distinct from Perception etc., enumerated in
 “ Sū. 1-1-4); and this means that there would be an infinite
 “ regress, one Instrument of Cognition being apprehended
 “ by means of another, this latter again by means of another,
 “ and so on and on, *ad infinitum*. And it is not right to admit
 “ of such an infinite regress, when there is no justification
 “ for it.”

Vārtika on Sū. 17.

[P. 201, L. 3 to L. 5.]

“ If the Instruments &c.—says the Sūtra. If the Cogni-
 “ tion having the Instruments of Cognition for its object is

* Both editions read, after प्रमाणास्तरेण,—प्रतिद्वयेदि प्रमाणां वाचनं प्रमाणास्तरेण प्रतीति-
 The editors have put this within brackets. The words are superfluous; and appear to
 form a *tippaṇi* on the preceding word ‘प्रमाणास्तरेण’. The student learning from
 manuscript copies found it difficult to understand why the author should use this
 term, and he got the explanation that—“the Pramāṇa that would be the means of
 the प्रविष्टि, of the becoming known, of Perception etc., would certainly be प्रमाणास्तरे,
 in comparison to the said Perception etc.” It very often happens that the scribes
 mistake the *tippaṇi* as part of the text, and insert it as such in the transcript.

“brought about by means of an Instrument of Cognition,
 “then this latter has to be regarded as an Instrument of
 “Cognition entirely distinct from the former Instruments of
 “Cognition, (Perception and the rest). As in such a cognition,
 “Perception and the rest, being the *objects*, could not them-
 “selves be regarded as *instruments*.”

Bhāṣya on Sū. (18).

[P. 70, L. 17 to L. 21.]

“In order to avoid this it might be urged that the cogni-
 “tion of the Instruments of Cognition is brought about with-
 “out other Pramāṇas or Instruments of Cognition, indepen-
 “dently of all instrumentality. But in that case—

Sūtra (18).

“IF (IN THE COGNITION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF COGNI-
 “TION) ANOTHER INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION IS NOT OPERA-
 “TIVE, THEN, JUST AS THE COGNITION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF
 “COGNITION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED (WITHOUT THE OPERA-
 “TION OF AN INSTRUMENT OF COGNITION), SO WOULD THE
 “COGNITION OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION ALSO.”

“If another Instrument of Cognition is not operative in
 “the cognition of Perception et., then there should be no
 “operation of any Instrument of Cognition in the cognition
 “of the Soul and other Objects of Cognition*; as the two cases
 “are exactly alike. And this would mean the total abolition
 “of all Instruments of Cognition”.

In answer to the above *Pārvapakṣa* we have the next
Sūtra.

Vārṭika on Sū. (18).

“If it be held that the apprehension of the Instruments
 “of Cognition is brought about without another set of Ins-
 “truments of Cognition, entirely independently of all Ins-
 “trumentality, then *another instrument of Cognition is not*
 “*operative, &c.*—say the *Sūtra*. The meaning is that just
 “as the Instruments of Cognition are inoperative in regard
 “to their own Cognition, so would they also be in regard to
 “that of the Objects of Cognition.” *

* अतः एतादृशसङ्ख्याद्वयः is the correct reading as found in the Puri Mss.

The answer to the above Purvapakṣa is given in the next Sūtra:—

Sūtra (19).

NOT SO; AS THE APPREHENSION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF LAMPLIGHT. Sū. (19).

Bhāṣya.

[P. 71, L. 1 to P. 72, L. 8.]

Lamplight, being an aid to the act of Perception, is a *Pramāṇa*, an Instrument of Cognition, in the seeing of the visible object; [when *f. i.*, the object is seen with the help of the lamplight]; and yet it is itself also cognised by the instrumentality of another *Perception*, through its contact with the Eye [when, *f. i.*, the lamplight is itself seen];—similarly, knowing the fact that the presence and absence of *seeing* is in accordance with the presence and absence of the lamp, this lamp is *inferred* as the cause of the seeing (of itself as also of other objects) [where the lamplight is cognised by means of *Inference**]; similarly, when we hear the words 'fetch a lamp in the dark,' we cognise the *lamp* by means of *Trustworthy Assertion* (Word). [Just as in the case of lamplight, we find that though it is itself an Instrument of Cognition, it is yet cognised by means of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition]. In the same manner Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also would be cognised by means of Perception, &c. [and not by other Instruments of Cognition]. For instance, in the case of Perception [in which there are the following factors—(a) the sense-organs, (b) the objects perceived, (c) the sense-object contact, and (d) the cognition produced by this sense-object contact] we find,—(a) that the sense-organs are cognised by means of Inference based on the fact of their respective objects being duly apprehended [the inference being in the form—'the sense-organ of the Eye exists, because we have cognition of *Colour*, which could not be possible except by means of the Visual Organ, and so on];—(b) that the Objects are cognised by the Perception itself;—(c) that the sense-object contacts are cognised by

* That is, the fact of the Lamplight being the cause of the seeing is inferred.
—*Bhāṣyachandra*.

means of Inference based upon obstruction * [This inference being in the form, 'the Perception must be due to actual contact of the object with the sense-organ, because we find that there is absence of Perception whenever sense-object contact is absent by reason of obstructions to such contact']; †—(d) that the Cognition produced by the sense-object contact is apprehended, ‡ just like pleasure, &c., through its inherence in the soul as accompanied by a peculiar contact of the Mind with the cognising soul (as encased in the bodily membrane).§ Similarly may every other Instrument of Cognition be analysed [and found to have several factors apprehended by means of one or the other of the four ordinary Instruments of Cognition].

Thus then, [the meaning of the Sūtra is that] in the case of the lamplight it is found that while it is itself visible (*object* of vision), it is also the *means* of the seeing of other visible things, and thus it comes to be called the 'object,' or the 'means' of *Cognition*, according to circumstances; similarly any other thing, though an *object* of Cognition, may also be the means of the Cognition (of something else), and thus come to be called the 'object' or the 'means' of Cognition, according to circumstances. So that the Cognition of Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition also is actually found to be brought about, *not* by a different set of Instruments of Cognition, nor entirely without the aid of all instrumentality.

*The reading of this passage is doubtful; the printed text reads *सन्निकर्षास्त्वावरोधे* the Puri MS. A reads *सन्निकर्षास्त्वावरोधे*; and Puri MS. B reads *सन्निकर्षास्त्वावरोधे*. The two latter do not give any sense. We have therefore adopted the reading of the printed text.

† The Eye and all its auxiliaries being present, if it is found that there is *no* sight, and it is also found that the range of vision is obstructed by a wall is actually seen to intervene between the Eye and the thing sought to be seen, and again it is found that when the wall is not there the thing is seen right,—these facts lead to the conclusion that in every case of *seeing* there is actual contact of the thing with the sense-organ. The *Bhāṣyachandra* formulates the inferences as follows:—(1) 'The Wall is actually in contact with the thing, because it is *seen*,—what is not in contact with the Eye is not seen, as we find in the case of things hidden behind the wall';—(2) 'the Eye is in contact with the thing, because it is the instrument bringing about the perception of the wall,—when even an organ is instrumental in bringing about the perception of a thing, it is in contact with the thing, as we find in the case of the organ of Touch';—(3) 'Sense-organs must be in contact with the object because they are instruments, like the Axe and so on.

‡ That is *perceived*,—says the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

§ The *Bhāṣyachandra* takes *संवेदनविशेषात्* as meaning *संवेदनविशिष्टत्वात्* and as qualifying *आत्मनश्च*; and the last *च* in the sense of emphasis only.

The Opponent might urge that "there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself"; but our answer to this will be that the argument is not right, as the things are really different from one another, and they are only similar in character. What the Opponent means to urge is that—"it is not right to hold that Perception &c. are apprehended by means of Perception &c. themselves, for a thing is always apprehended by means of something other than itself";—but this argument will not be right; as in reality there is difference among the individual things, which however are possessed of a similar character (by virtue of which they have a common name); so that (in the case in question, it is found that) the character of 'Perception' belongs to, and includes, several individuals (*i. e.* particular perceptions); and among these one individual (Perception) could well be apprehended by means of another individual (Perception); and in this there could be no incongruity;—similarly in the case of Inference and the other Instruments of Cognition;—(to take a homely instance) we find that by means of the water brought out (of the well) we have the cognition (inferential) of water in the well itself [Where we have the apprehension of *water* by means of *water* itself]. The same we find to be the case with the cognising Soul and Mind: When we have such cognitions as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', we find that the cogniser (the Soul) is apprehended by himself; and in the case of Mind [so we find that it has been declared that 'the non-simultaneity of cognitions is an indicative of the Mind' (Sū. 1-1-16), which means that the inference of the Mind is brought about by means of the Mind itself;—so that there is non-difference between the *cogniser* and the *cognised* (in the case of the Soul), and between the *means* of apprehension and the *object** of apprehension (in the case of the Mind).

* The printed text reads *वस्तु* which is evidently wrong; the Puri MSS. read *वस्तु*; and this has the support of the *Tīkṣṇya* also; which has the following observations on this paragraph of the *Bhāṣya*—It is not quite right to speak of the Soul as the *objective* of the action of *cognition*; for the objective is that which is on itself the action of something other than itself; the real objective of the cognition 'I am happy' is the *happiness*, and the Soul only appears in the cognition as the illuminating factor. The Mind is certainly an instrument in the cognition of itself and is also the object; yet this does not involve the incongruity of a thing operating upon itself; because it is by its own *existence* that the Mind is the instrument of its own *cognition*; and certainly the *existence* of the Mind is something entirely different from the *Cognition* of the Mind.

The Opponent might urge that in the cases cited the auxiliary conditions are different; but our answer Bhā. P. 72. will be that so it is also in the case of Perception &c. It is true that in the case of the cognising Soul, the Soul does not cognise itself (*i. e.* becomes the *object* of cognition) except under conditions different (from those under which he is the *cogniser*),—similarly the Mind also is apprehended by means of the Mind under entirely different conditions; but precisely the same is the case with Perception and the other Instruments of Cognition; for when Perception &c. are apprehended by means of Perception &c. themselves, we are cognisant of total difference between the two* individual perceptions (the Perception cognised and the Perception by means of which it is cognised).

Then again, there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by Perception &c. If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by Perception and the other three Instruments of Cognition, then there might be some ground for the postulating of additional Instruments of Cognition; but as a matter of fact no one can point out any such thing; for the simple reason that everything, existing as well as non-existing†, is actually found to be apprehended by Perception &c.,—as we find to be the case in ordinary experience.

Vārtika on Sū. 19.

[P. 201, L. 12 to P. 202, L. 20].

Not so &c.—says the *Sūtra*. The lamp-light, being an aid to the perception of such things as the jar and the like, a '*Pramāṇa*'; and yet it is itself apprehended by Perception &c.; and for its own operation, it does not necessitate the operation of any *Pramāṇas* other than Perception and the rest; it is apprehended by means of these themselves. In the same manner the *Pramāṇās* (Perception and the rest) also are apprehended by the same *Pramāṇas*. The case of lamp-light has been cited only as an instance

* The printed text wrongly retains the *व* when all MSS. including the two Puri MSS. have dropped it. The *Bhāṣyachandra* also has no *व*.

† How the non-existent thing forms the object of *Pramāṇas* has been shown in the Introductory *Bhāṣya*, P. 2.

(corroborative of the reasoning). "What is the reasoning (which the instance is intended to corroborate)?"

We proceed to explain the reasonings as follows:—(A) For their own apprehension, Perception and the rest do not stand in need of the operation of other Pramāṇas, because they are themselves the means of bringing about the apprehension of things, *like the lamp*;—just as the lamp, being a means of bringing about the apprehension of things, does not stand in need of the operation of any other Pramāṇa (besides Perception etc.) so also do the Pramāṇas (Perception etc.),—from which it follows that these do not stand in need of the operation of other Pramāṇas;—(B) secondly, because they are endowed with generic and specific characters;—everything that is endowed with generic and specific characters is found to be such as does not, for its apprehension, stand in need of the operation of any Pramāṇas other than Perception and the rest,—as we find in the case of the *lamp*;—(C)

Var. P. 202.

thirdly, because they are objects of cognition,—every object of cognition is such as does not, for its apprehension stand in need of the operation of Pramāṇas other than Perception etc.,—as we find in the case of the *Lamp*;—(D) fourthly, because they are subsistent in something else, and because they are Instruments, like the lamp; similarly the Sense-organs and such like things also, being aids to Perception, are such as do not stand in need of the operation of any Pramāṇas other than Perception etc.

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 71 L. 10) represents the Opponent as raising the objection that "*there can be no apprehension of a thing by itself*". By this our opponent means as follows:—*"If Perception etc. were apprehended by means of the Perception etc., this would mean that a thing is apprehended by means of itself; and this is not right; as the same thing cannot be the instrument as also what is accomplished by that instrument"*. But this does not affect our position at all;

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as the things are really different from one another and they are similar only in character (*Bhāṣya* P. 71, L. 12); that is to say, there are several things that are included in what has been described as 'Pramāṇas', and there would be nothing wrong if one of these several things were apprehended by means of the other; just as from the water brought out of the well we infer the water in the well (*Bhāṣya*, P. 71, L. 16);—that is, having brought out water one understands that the water in the well is also of the same kind; and yet in this case it is not said that the thing (water) is apprehended by means of itself; all that is said is that by means of the thing, which is endowed with the character (of water), we apprehend another thing which also is endowed with the same character (of water). [In the same manner by means of one instrument, which has the character of Perception, we can apprehend another instrument which also has the character of Perception]. Then again, there is no such absolute law that a thing cannot be apprehended by means of itself; as sometimes such apprehensions do happen; as for instance, in the case of Soul, we find that the same Soul is the *cogniser* as also the *cognised*, whenever a person has any cognition in regard to himself.

The Opponent urges that, "in the cases cited the conditions are different" (*Bhāṣya*, P. 72, L. 1.) He means by ~~as follows~~—"when the Soul is the cogniser, the conditions are entirely different from those that are present when it is the *cognised*". Exactly the same, we reply, is the case with the matter under discussion. In the case of the Soul, when one recognises himself—as 'I am happy'—'I am unhappy'—the cogniser-Soul apprehends himself *as qualified by happiness etc.* [so that the Soul is the *cognised* when qualified by unhappiness, and it is the *cogniser* independently of any such qualification];—exactly so in the case of Perception etc., these become the 'object of cognition' only *when*

Nyāya Vol. II. 70.

apprehended by means of Pramāṇas [while when appearing as the instruments whereby something else is apprehended they become 'the Instruments of Cognition'].

Lastly—*there is no possibility of there being anything that cannot be apprehended by means of Perception &c.* (*Bhāṣya*, P. 72, L. 5). If there were any such thing as is not apprehended by means of Perception, then we could accept Pramāṇas other than Perception &c.; but one can never prove that there is any such thing; as every thing, existent as well as non-existent, is apprehended by means of Perception &c. Thus then, the conclusion is that it is by means of Perception &c. alone that the Pramāṇas themselves are apprehended.

Bhāṣya.

Introductory to Sūtra (19 A.)

[P. 72, Ll. 9-11.]

Some people have taken up the example (cited in the preceding Sūtra) by itself, quite detached from any reasonings, —i. e. as proving the conclusion (that Pramāṇas are self-illuminated) by itself, without reference to any particular reasoning; and they have interpreted the Sūtra to mean that just as the lamplight is seen without the light of any other lamp, so also are the Pramāṇas apprehended without other Pramāṇas.* But such an argument—

CANNOT BE CONCLUSIVE; AS IN THE CASE OF CERTAIN THINGS WE FIND THAT OTHER INSTRUMENTS ARE INOPERATIVE, WHILE IN OTHERS IT IS FOUND THAT THEY ARE NOT INOPERATIVE (Sū. 19 A.)†

* This is the argument propounded by those who regard all Pramāṇas to be self-illuminated—i. e. the Vedāntins.

† This appears in the printed text as part of the *Bhāṣya*. But the *Nyāyasamāhāra* and the *Bhāṣyachandā* read this as a Sūtra; and the Puri Ms. of the *Nyāyasamāhāra* as also the Sūtra Ms. D. contains this as a Sūtra. It is only the later commentators that have omitted it from the Sūtras. We treat this as a Sūtra, and in this matter we have always followed the *न्यायसमाहारादयः*; but we number it as 19A, with a view to retain the numbering of the following Sūtras.

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Vārṭika.

[P. 202, L. 20 to P. 203, L. 1]

Introductory to Sū. 19 A.

Other old writers take the preceding Sūtra without reference to any reasoning, and interpret it merely as putting forward an example,—the meaning (according to them) being that—‘Just as the light of a lamp, so the Pramāṇas also, would be apprehended without the help of other Pramāṇas’. Against this view we have the following declaration—*Such an argument cannot be conclusive &c. &c.*

Bhāṣya.

[P. 72, L. 13 to P. 73, L. 7.]

(A) The said fact (of independence of other Pramāṇas), which is deduced from the absence of operation (of other lamps in the case of the lamp illuminating things by its light), has been urged (by the writers referred to) with a view to prove similar independence in the case of the Instruments of Cognition;—but the same fact might be urged (with equal reasonableness) to prove similar independence in the case of the Objects of Cognition also; as there is nothing to distinguish this latter case from the former [*i. e.* just as it is argued, from the case of the lamp being independent of another lamp, that Pramāṇas are independent of other Pramāṇas so may it also be argued, that Pramāṇas also are independent of Pramāṇas,—which would mean that Pramāṇas are not necessary for anything].—(B) Further, it may be argued that so far as the cognition of the *objects of cognition* is concerned, it is found that for the apprehension of such things as the colour of a Dish and the like, one does require the operation of such aids as the light of a lamp [so that the example of the lamp proves the necessity of such aids in the case of the cognition of *object of cognition*]; and the same might be said in regard to the cognition of the Pramāṇas also, whose case does not differ from the former case [The argument would be that just as in the case of the apprehension of *objects of cognition* such aids as lamplight &c. are necessary, so in the case of the apprehension of the Pra-

mānas also, such other aids would be necessary].* [Thus then, the example of the Lamp as interpreted by the said writers being found to support both views—that such other aids are necessary for the apprehension of the *Objects* as well as the *Instruments* of Cognition], unless the said example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), there could be no justification for accepting its force in one case and not in the other; as there is no reason why the force of the Example should be admitted in one case and not in the other.†

On the other hand, if the Example (of the lamp) is taken in reference to a particular reasoning (as we have taken it), it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the objection just mentioned.‡ That is to say, when the example is taken as bearing upon a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion (that of one Instrument of Cognition being independent of other Instruments of Cognition); and under the circumstances, the Opponent cannot very well refuse to accept its force.§ Such being the case, this interpretation is not open to the objection that the Example is not conclusive.

“But if Perception &c. were apprehended by other Perception &c., then there would be an infinite regress.” Not so, we reply, as all usage would be rightly explained on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c. are apprehended (in one case) the *objects* cognised and (in another case) as the *instruments* of the cognition. For instance, when we have such notions ‘I cognise the thing by means of Perception’, ‘I cognise thing by means of Inference’, Perception &c. as the *instruments* of cognition; and when we have such notions as ‘this cognition of mine (which I now cognise)

* According to the *Bhāṣyachandra* the meaning of this passage is as follows :—The colour of the Dish is perceptible by itself, and yet for being illuminated it requires the aid of the Lamplight; so the Pramāṇas also, even though they may be self-illuminated, may stand in need of other Pramāṇas.

† The two Puri MSS. read ‘अप देवे। न मतिवहे दुहान्’ after the word ‘दुहान्’. This is the reading adopted in the translation.

‡ The *Bhāṣyachandra* reads this as Sūtra.

§ ‘अनु’ of the printed text is wrong. The Puri MSS. and the *Bhāṣyachandra* support the reading अनुबुद्धिः.

is perceptual, 'this cognition is inferential', 'this cognition is verbal', Perception &c. appear as the *objects* of cognition;—so that when we actually recognise them thus (differently in the two cases), it becomes possible for us to carry on all business for the purpose of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and Final Release, and also for the purpose avoiding the contraries of these. And as all business and usage can be explained on the basis of the said distinction, there is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress, for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postulate the said infinite regress (of Perception &c.). *

Vārtika on Sū. 19 A.

[P. 203, L. 2 to P. 204, L. 2].

The argument cannot be conclusive &c. &c.—says the Sūtra. There is no ground for accepting the proposition that 'the Pramāṇas are as independent of other Pramāṇas as the light of a lamp is of other lamps' (which is the meaning of Sū. 19, according to the writers referred to),—and rejecting the other proposition that 'the Pramāṇas are as dependent upon other Pramāṇas as the colour of the Dish'. As a matter of fact, it is found that the light of the lamp is not inoperative in the illumining of the colour of the Dish; why cannot the same be said of the Pramāṇas also (requiring the operation of other Pramāṇas)? Secondly, it would be necessary to point out the grounds for admitting the force of the *light of the lamplight* in the case of the cognition of Pramāṇas, and not admitting *it* in the case of the cognition of the *objects of cognition*. Thirdly, you have also to explain your reasons why the *lamplight* is to be accepted as a pertinent example, and not the *Dish*. From all this it is clear that, if not taken in reference to a particular reasoning the example is inconclusive both ways.

* त. चरयेव निबर्तते is the reading of the printed text, as also of the Puri MSS. But दावदेव निबर्तते appears to be the better reading, as noted in the footnote of the printed text.

On the other hand, if the Example is taken in reference to a particular reasoning, it is found to point to a single conclusion, and as such it is not open to the above objection—says the Bhāṣya (P. 72, L. 18). That is to say, if the example of the Lamplight is taken in connection with a particular reasoning, in reference to its illuminating (other things), then it points definitely to a single conclusion, and as such cannot be objected to ; so that it does not become open to the charge of being 'inconclusive.'

*" But if Perception &c. were apprehended by Perception &c. themselves, there would be an infinite regress' (Bhāṣya P. 73, L. 1). That is to say, if Perception &c. are apprehended by means Perception &c. (and not by other Pramāṇas), then these latter would have to be apprehended by another set of Perception &c.; and so on and on *ad infinitum*. And in the event of such an infinite regress, there could be no definite idea of the first Pramāṇa of the series ; on the other hand, if there is a limit to the series, (and the first Pramāṇa of the series is definitely known), then the cognition of this first Pramāṇa would be invalid,—not being known by means of y Pramāṇa [as *ex hypothesi* there would be no Pramāṇa reby this first Pramāṇa would be cognised]".*

Our answer to this is that what has been urged
 et our position.—*As all usage could be ri*
on the basis of the distinction that the said Perception &c.
apprehended (in one case) as the objects cognised and (in another
case) as instruments of cognition—says the Bhāṣya (P. 73, L. 1). The 'object of cognition' is 'Pramāṇa' and the 'instrument of
cognition' is 'Pramāṇa'; and when the Pramāṇa and Pramey
are apprehended, this is enough for purposes of all
in the shape of acquiring merit, prosperity, happiness and
Final Release, and of avoiding the contraries of these,

There is nothing to be accomplished by the infinite regress,
for the accomplishment of which it would be necessary to postu-
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late the said infinite regress (*Bhāṣya*, P. 73, L. 6). Thus then, the conclusion is that it is by means of Perception &c. themselves that Perception and the rest are apprehended, and that this does not involve an infinite regress.*

THUS ENDS THE EXAMINATION OF THE
INSTRUMENTS OF COGNITION IN GENERAL.

* The whole of this discussion is thus summed up in the *Tātparyā—Pārvaṇī* —“Is the apprehension of Perception &c. brought about by means of an Instrument or without any instrument? If the former, is it brought about by Perception &c. or by other instruments of Cognition? If the latter, that would involve the postulating of more Pramāṇas than those vouched for in the Sūtra (1.1.3), and also an infinite regress. If Perception &c. were apprehended by means of another Perception, this would involve an infinite regress. If one Perception were apprehended by means of itself, this would involve the absurdity of the Perception operating upon itself; certainly a sword can never cut itself. So the conclusion is that the apprehension of the Pramāṇas is brought about without the help of any instrument. And if so, the apprehension of Prameyas also might be brought about in the same manner; and there would thus be no need of any Pramāṇa at all.”

Siddhānta—Under the class ‘Perception’ there are a number of individual Perceptions; and one of these can very well be apprehended by means of the other; and in this there would be no necessity of either an infinite regress or any of those contingencies that have been urged in the *Pārvaṇī*.

Section (3).

Pūrāṇa.

The definition of 'Pūrāṇa' is thus given in the *Maṭṣya-Purāṇa* :—

'A Pūrāṇa should have five distinguishing features—It should describe (1) Evolution, the beginning of Creation, (2) Involution, (3) Genealogy, (4) the *Manvanṭaras* or Time-Cycles, and (5) the deeds of several kingly dynasties'.

By 'Involution' is meant *Dissolution*. Purāṇas have been classified in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* as follows—

'Men knowing the Pūrāṇas declare that there are eighteen Pūrāṇas—(1) Brahma, (2) Paṇḍma, (3) Viṣṇu, (4) Shiva, (5) Bhāgavata, (6) Nārada, (7) Mārkaṇḍeya, (8) Agni, (9) Bhaviṣya, (10) Brahmavaivarta, (11) Liṅga, (12) Varāha, (13) Skanda, (14) Vāmana, (15) Kūrma, (16) Maṭṣya, (17) Garuda, and (18) Brahmāṇḍa.'

The extent of these Puranas has been thus described in the *Shrī-Bhāgavata* :—

'(1) The Brahma Purāṇa contains 10,000 verses; (2) the Paṇḍma, 55,000; (3) the Viṣṇu, 23,000; (4) the Shiva, 24,000; (5) the Bhāgavata, 18,000; (6) the Nārada, 25,000; (7) the Mārkaṇḍeya, 9,000; (8) the Agni, 15,400; (9) the Bhaviṣya, 14,500; (10) the Brahmavaivarta, 13,000; (11) the Liṅga, 11,000; (12) the Vāraha, 24,000; (13) the Skanda, 81,000; (14) the Vāmana, 10,100; (15) the Kūrma, 17,000; (16) the Maṭṣya, 14,000; (17) the Garuda, 19,000; (18) the Brahmāṇḍa, 12,000. Thus the whole body of the Pūrāṇas contains 400,000 of verses.'

In the *Maṭṣyapurāṇa*, the number of verses in the *Agni Purāṇa* is said to be 600 more than that mentioned in the Bhāgavata; and that of verses in the *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* is said to be 200 less than that mentioned in the *Bhāgavata*; and yet the total is put down there also as 400,000. This

must be taken as an approximate estimate, not being very far from the correct total. Even in ordinary parlance, we find people saying 'I have got a hundred', even though the exact number obtained is a few more or less. The total of 400,000 as given in the *Bhāgavata* also is to be similarly explained.

Then again, the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* makes up the number of Purāṇas to be *eighteen*, by mentioning the *Brahmāṇḍa* and omitting the *Vāyu*; while the *Brāhmaivārṇa* mentions the *Vāyu*, but omits the *Brahmāṇḍa*; this diversity is to be explained as pertaining to different cycles.

Such well-known Purāṇas as the *Kāshikhāṇḍa* and the like are all included in the *Skanda-Purāṇa*. Says the *Prabhāsakhāṇḍa*—

'The *Skanda-Purāṇa* containing 81,100 verses has been divided by the wise Vyāsa into seven parts:—the *first* part describing the importance of the *Skanda-Purāṇa* is called the *Mahēshvara*; the *second* is called the *Vaiṣṇava*; the *third*, called the *Brāhmaṇa* provides an extensive description of creation; the *fourth* is that which describes the importance of *Kāshi*; the *fifth* describes the *Rēvā* and also *Ujjayinī*; the *sixth* describes the greatness of these two; and this the *seventh* *ṇas*, deals with *Prabhāsa*'.

Those other than these are *Upapurāṇas*, Supplementary or Minor Purāṇas. The *Kārma-Purāṇa*, having enumerated the *Mahāpurāṇas*, goes on to say—'O, Brāhmaṇas, the Sages, after having heard the eighteen Great Purāṇas, have briefly related other Minor Purāṇas'. 'Having heard' and 'related' both have the 'Sages' for their Nominative. These Minor Purāṇas have been thus enumerated in the *Kārma-Purāṇa*—

'(1) That related by *Sinaṭkumāra* is the first; (2) then comes the *Narasimha Purāṇa*; (3) the *Nāṇḍapurāṇa* related

by Kumara is the third ; (4) the *Shivaḍharma* is the fourth,
P. 14. related by Nandīsha himself; (5) the wonderful

Purāṇa related by *Duroṃsas*; (6) then comes the
Nārāḍiya; (7) the *Kāpila*; (8) the *Mānava*; (9) that related
by Ushanas; (10) the *Brāhmaṇḍa*; (11) the *Vāruṇa*; (12)
the *Kālikā-purāṇa*; (13) the *Māhēshvara*; (14) the *Simha*;
(15) the *Saura*, dealing with all subjects; (16) that related
by *Parāshara*; (17) the *Marīcha*, and (18) the *Bhārgava*.'

The *Brahmavaivarṇa* also enumerates the Minor Purāṇas
as follows:—(1) *Sanaṭkumāra* (2) *Nārāḍiya*; (3) *Narasimha*,
(4) *Shivaḍharma* (5) *Duroṃsasi*, (6) the *Kāpila*, (7) *Mānava*,
(8) *Shāṅkara*, (9) *Vāruṇa*, (10) *Brahmāṇḍa*, (11) *Kālipurāṇa*,
(12) *Vāsiṣṭha*, (13) *Māhēsha*, (14) *Sāmba* (15) *Sāura*, (16)
Pārāsharya, (17) *Mūricha*, (18) *Bhārgava*, which propounds
the Dharma in its entirety. These are the eighteen Minor
Purāṇas, given up entirely to the elaboration of the Vedas.'

The '*Nārāḍiya*' and the '*Brahmāṇḍa*' mentioned among
the Minor Purāṇas are different from those of the same name
mentioned among the Mahā-Purāṇas. Inasmuch as these
Minor Purāṇas have all been extracted from the Purāṇas, they
have been included by Yajñavalkya among 'Purāṇas.' Says
the *Matsya Purāṇa*—

'The description of Narasimha that is contained in the
Padmapurāṇa constitutes the Narasimha Purāṇa which
contains 18,000 verses. The importance o
cribed by Kārtikēya constitutes the *Nārāḍya-Purāṇa*.
story told in the *Bhaviṣya-Purāṇa* regarding Sāmba
constitutes, O Sages, what is known as the *Sāmba-Purāṇa*.
Similarly what is known as the *Āḍitya-Purāṇa* is also found
therein. Every Purāṇa that is found to be different from
the eighteen,—know each of those, O great Brāhmanas, to
have emanated from those eighteen.'

'Story'—anecdote, account. '*Emanated*'—came out, was
produced. As examples of such Purāṇas, we have the *Nandī-
kēshvara Purāṇa*, the *Āḍipurāṇa*, the *Dēvīpurāṇa* and so forth.

Section (4).

The Dharmashāstras.

Yājñavalkya enumerates the propounders of the Law in the following passage—

‘Manu, Aṭri, Viṣṇu, Hārīta, Yājñavalkya, Ushanas, Aṅgiras, Yama, Āpastamba, Samvarta, Kātyāyana, Bṛhaspati, Parāshara, Vyāsa, Shaṅkha, Likhita, Dakṣa, Gaṇṭama, Shāṭātapa, Vasiṣtha,—these are the propounders of the Law.’

‘Propounders’—Authors.

Paithīnasi gives the following list—

‘Manu, Aṅgiras, Vyāsa, Gaṇṭama, Aṭri, Ushanas, Yama, Vasiṣtha, Dakṣa, Samvarta, Shāṭātapa, Parāshara, Viṣṇu, Āpastamba, Hārīta, Shaṅkha, Kātyāyana, Bhṛigu, Prachētas, Nārada, Yogin, Bauḍhāyana, Piṭāmaha, Sumanṭu, Kashyapa, Babhru, Paithīnasi, Vyāghra, Satyavrata, Bharadvāja, Gārgya, Kārṣṇājini, Jābāli, Jamaḍagni, Langākṣi, Brahmasambha,—these thirty-six are the compilers of Law.’

P. 16. *Brahmasambha*’—i. e., Brahmagarbha.

Shaṅkha and Likhita supply the following list—‘Smṛiti is the name given to the Law-books; and the following are the compilers—Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Dakṣa, Aṅgiras, Aṭri, Bṛhaspati, Ushanas, Āpastamba, Vasiṣtha, Kātyāyana, Parāshara, Vyāsa, Shaṅkha, Likhita, Samvarta, Gaṇṭama, Shāṭātapa, Hārīta, Yājñavalkya, Prachētas and others.’

Prachētas’ here stands for Prachētas (the an affix having a reflexive sense).

Who are included in the phrase ‘and others’ is thus explained in the *Kalpaṭaru*—‘Budha, Dēvala, Soma, Jamaḍagni, Vishvāmītra, Prajāpati, Nārada, Paithīnasi, Piṭāmaha, Bauḍhayana, Chhāgalēya, Jābāla, Chyavana, Marīchi and Kashyapa.’

Thus then in the passage—‘the thirty-six Smṛitis of Manu and others’—the aforesaid thirty-six authors are meant; because all of the n, without any distinction, have been accepted as authoritative. The ‘laws’ attributed to

'Yogiyājñavalkya', 'Vṛiddha-Manu', 'Vṛiddha-Shātātapa,' Vṛiddha-Vasiṣṭha,' and 'Laghu-Hārīta' are those compiled by the same authors as those enumerated among the said thirty-six; these other books having been compiled by them under different circumstances. This is borne out by what Yājñavalkya has himself declared—'I have composed the science of Yoga' [which shows that 'Yogi-Yājñavalkya is the same as 'Yājñavalkya']; and also by what we find in the work of 'Yogi-Yājñavalkya,' which says—'O Lord, the Bath that you have laid down as to be done with the mantras sacred to the deity Apas'—wherein we find a reference to the Bath laid down by 'Yājñavalkya'.

Similiarly, that 'Vṛiddha-Manu' is the same as 'Manu' and so forth, we learn from what is current among the learned.

As for the Grihya-Sūtras and their Supplements, these belong to a different stratum (of Law); and are as authoritative as Purāṇas. Similarly also the *Viṣṇudharmottara*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*. This is shown by the following passage of the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*, which speaks of *Smṛitis* other than the aforesaid thirty-six—'O, Bhārata, I am going P. 17. to explain to you, the passages found in the eighteen Purāṇas, those found in the other *Smṛitis*, and also from the thirty-six *Smṛitis* of Manu and others.'

And the same work specially mentions by name works as the History of Rāma and the like—

'The eighteen Purāṇas, the History of Rāma, the Laws of Viṣṇu and also those of Shiva, the fifth Veda called *Mahābhārata*, composed by Kṛiṣṇa, the Laws of Sama, and the laws laid down by Manu,—'Jayā' is the name given to all those by the wise ones'.

'*Kūrāṇa*'—Composed by Kṛiṣṇa, i.e. Vyāsa.

The name 'Jayā' given to these means that these are the supreme authority on matters relating to Dharma, the literal

Vīra. 21.

signification of the name being 'that which is superior to all'; and the superiority most compatible with the context would be that consisting in authoritative and trustworthy character.

That this is so is shown by the following passage from the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*, quoted in the *Shrāddhahūlapāṇi*—

'O, best of kings, the chief of Kurus, learn from me the laws that have been laid down for the welfare of the four castes. These are the eighteen Purāṇas, the History of Rāma, of the race of Raghu, the Bhārata, which the wise son of Parāshara composed for the accomplishment of religious merit and worldly prosperity, collating therein the sense of the whole Veda,—and the Dharmashāstra'.

In several authoritative works we find certain quotations referred to as 'so says the *Smṛiti*', 'to this effect we have the following verse',—without mentioning the name of the author of the *Smṛiti*; all such quotations are authoritative, inasmuch as they have been accepted unequivocally by great men; all these should be regarded as included under the term 'other *Smṛitis*' found in the above quotations from the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*. That however which is referred to simply as '*sat-ṭrimśanmatam*' and so forth is not quite authoritative, as it is accepted by only some persons, and also because it is found to be rejected. Such is the opinion of the ; while Vijñānēshvara, Aparārka, Shūlapāṇi and other writers regard such quotations as authoritative; and this is only proper; specially as the *Prayogapārijāta* mentions several other *Smṛiti-writers* besides those enumerated in the above quotations.

Says the *Prayogapārijāta*—

'Manu, Brihaspati, Dakṣa, Gautama, Yama, Aṅgiras, Yogishvara, Krachētas, Shātātapa, Parāshara, Samvarta, Ushanas, Shaṅkha, Likhita, Atri, Viṣṇu, Āpastamba and Hārīta,—these are the propounders of Law; these have been described as the "eighteen Sages", fixed in their austerities.

Jābāli, Nāchikētas, Skanda, Laugākṣi, Kāshyapa, Vyāsa, Sanaṭkumāra, Shantānu, Janaka, Vyāghra, Kātyāyana, Jāṭukarṇya, Kapiñjala, Bauḍhāyana, Kāṇāḍa, Vishvāmītra, Paithīnasi, and Gobhila,—these are the authors of the Minor Law-books. Vasiṣṭha, Nāraḍa, Sumantu, Piṭāmaha, Viṣṇu, Kārṣṇajini, Satyavrata, Gārgya, Dēvala, Jamaḍagni, Bharadvāja, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Ātrēya, Gāvēya, Marichi, Vaṭsa, Pāraskara, Rīṣyashringa, Vaijavāpa,—these twenty-one are called the authors of Smṛitis'. It is by these that the Science of Law was compiled in ancient times'.

These same authors of the Minor Law-books have also been mentioned in the *Moḍanaraṭna*.

Thus have the Smṛitis been enumerated.

The above described '*Smṛiti*' is of five kinds; says the *Bhaviṣhyapurāṇa* :—

'(1) Some Smṛitis deal with visible (ordinary worldly) things; (2) others with invisible (superphysical) things; (3) there are others again which deal with both visible and invisible things; (4) some are based upon reasonings; (5) while the fifth are those that only recapitulate (what has been said elsewhere). All these, with the exception of those dealing with purely visible things are based upon the Veda'.

These several kinds of Smṛiti are thus defined :—

- (1) 'O, son of Garuda, the Smṛitis dealing with ~~visible~~ (ordinary worldly) things are those that describe the *six accessories*, the actual carrying of these into practice, in due accordance with the importance of the business in hand, of the *methods* of Sāma and the rest, singly as well as collectively. (2) That Smṛiti has been regarded by the wise sages as dealing with superphysical things which lays down such rules as that the Morning and Evening prayers should be offered daily,—one should not eat the flesh of the dog, and so forth. (3) The Smṛiti dealing with both physical and superphysical things is that which lays down the holding of the Palāsha

stick and so forth. (4) In a case where it is laid down that when there are two contradictory directions,—*e. g.* when one text lays down *Japa* and another *Homa*—the two courses are to be regarded as optional; [this is an instance of *Smṛiti* based upon reasoning]. (5) When the *Smṛiti* only repeats exactly what has been laid down in the Veda,—we have an instance of the *Smṛiti* doing mere recapitulation; for instance, when it speaks of *renouncing the home*’.

The ‘*six accessories*’—are Treaty and the rest, which shall be described later on.—It is these six accessories singly and collectively, that should be actually put into practice, in due accordance with the business in hand.—Peace, *Sāma*, and the other Methods also have to be put into practice, singly and collectively, in due accordance with the business in hand.—*Texts laying down Japa and Homa*—*e. g.* those that that lay down the *Japa* of the *Gāyatri* till sunrise, and those that lay down the *Homa* as to be done before the Sun rises.—*That which does mere recapitulation*—*i. e.* that *Smṛiti* which lays down what has already been laid down elsewhere; *e. g.* the *Smṛiti* of *Manu* lays down that “*Brāhmaṇa* should go away from his home”,—which merely repeats what has already been laid down in a Vedic text—‘Or, otherwise the *Brāhmaṇa* may go away as a mendicant either immediately after the stage of the Student or after the stage of the Householder, or after that of the Recluse in the forest.’ The *Manuśmṛiti* states this,—*i. e.*, enjoins it.

Section (5).

The *Āṅgas*—Subsidiary Sciences.

On this point *Dēvala* says as follows :—

(1) ‘*Shikṣā*, Phonetics, (2) *Vyākaraṇa*, Grammar, (3) *Nirukṭa*, Etymology, (4) *Chhandas*, Prosody, (5) *Kalpa*, Rituals and (6) *Jyotiṣa*, Astronomy [are the six Subsidiary Sciences].’

Of these, (1) the 'Science of Phonetics' is the name given, in the first place to the treatise composed by Pāṇini, consisting of five chapters, beginning with the words '*aṭha shikṣām vyākhyāsyāmaḥ*', and secondly, to the treatises called '*Prāṭi-shākhya*', which have been composed by several sages, in connection with each Vedic Recension. (2) 'Grammar' is the name given (a) to the work of Pāṇini, beginning with the *Sūtra* '*Vṛiddhirādaich*', (b) to the *Vārtika* by Kātyāyana and (c) to the *Mahābhāṣya* of Paṭaṅjali;—these three writers constituting the 'Trinity of Sages' (the original authorities for Grammar). It is this particular grammar alone which forms the 'subsidiary' to the Veda; as for the other grammatical systems,—those composed by Kumāra and others, for instance—they are purely *traditional* (not *scriptural*), entirely given up as they are to the pointing out of the correct forms of the words of ordinary *human* speech (as distinguished from Vedic words). (3) Science of Etymology is the name given to the work composed by Yāska, which begins with the words—'*Samāmnāyaḥ samāmnāṣaḥ, sa vyākṣāṭavyaḥ*'; 'Glossary' also—which begins with the words '*gauḥ gmā &c.*'—is included in 'Etymology'. (4) 'Prosody' is the name given to the work of Piṅgala, which begins with the words '*ḍhi, shrī, sṛīm &c.*', and which is called '*Chhandovichiṭi*'. (5) 'Ritual' is the name to the *Sūtras* of Bauḍhayana and others. (6) 'Asmy' is the name of the works of Ādiṭya, Garga and others, beginning with the words '*Pañchasamvaṣṭasaramayam &c. &c.*'.

The Vedas—Ṛik, Yajus, Sāman and Atharvan, along with the six Sciences, constitute what is known as 'Veda',—as declared by Dēvala; these are the *sṭhānas*, Branches, of 'Vidyā' or 'Knowledge', as already explained above.

An objection is raised :—" There are several other 'scriptures', known under the names of '*Sāṅkhya*', '*Yoga*', '*Pañ-*

charāṭra’, ‘*Pāshupāṭa*’, and so forth; now, are these any authority for Dharma, or not? If they are, then this fact would militate against the declaration that ‘the authority for dharma are fourteen’. If they are not, then such a denial would go against the beliefs and traditions of a number of irreproachably great and good men.”

The answer to this is as follows :—These scriptures also, when not incompatible with the Veda, are truly authoritative. Says Yogi-Yājñavalkya—

‘There is no other *scripture* apart from the Vedic scripture; every other scripture has emanated from that single eternal Vedic scripture. Inasmuch as the Veda by itself would be difficult to understand, and as the whole of it cannot be studied,—the Sages have composed the several scriptures, drawing their materials from that same Veda. (Thus it is that) Purāṇa, Nyāya, Mimāṃsā, Dharmashāstra and the Vedas along with the six subsidiary Sciences constitute the fourteen constituents or support of Dharma and the Sciences. The *Sāṅkhya*, the *Yoga*, the *Pañcharāṭra* and the *Pāshupāṭa*—all these are *Veda*; they are quite authoritative: and these should not be controverted by reasoning.’

On this last verse, Aparārka remarks—‘Having mentioned the *Sāṅkhya*, the *Yoga* and the *Pañcharāṭra*, the author has said that one should not controvert these by reasonings, which only means that these should not be controverted; it does not mean that these are authoritative.’

But we cannot accept this explanation; as the text distinctly says that ‘they are quite authoritative.’

So also in the *Mahābharaṭa* we find the following—‘In his house there reside the leading *Pañcharāṭras*, who live on what has been offered to the Blessed Lord. He destroyed his enemies and ruled over his kingdom with righteousness; his words were never retracted and his mind never defiled;—where we find the *Pañcharāṭra* highly

spoken of in connection with the eulogium upon the kingdom of Uparichara. The word 'prāpṇam' stands for *naivēḍyam*, what has been offered.

Then again, we have the following passage—'The teacher of the *Sāṅkhya* is Kapila who is described as a great sage; of the *Yoga*, the only knower is the ancient *Hiranyagarbha* himself, none else; he, having all his inner darkness dispelled, is described as the 'Vēdāchārya'; some people call him 'the sage Prāchinagarbha'; Shiva, the untrammelled husband of Uma, the Lord of all beings, Shrikantha, (manifesting as) the son of Brahmā,—expounded the *Pāshupata* philosophy; of the *Pañcharātra*, the expounder is the Blessed Lord himself.'

Bṛihatparāshara also says as follows—'One should recite the Vedas, and also the *Purāṇas* and the *Pañcharātras*; what the Veda is that same are these also; and what these are that same is the Veda. Or, one should perform the worship upon a raised platform, in accordance with *Pañcharātra* rites'.

The *Viṣṇudharmottara* also—'The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the *Pañcharātra*, the Vedas and the *Pāshupata*,—know these to be the five doctrines bearing upon the search after Brahman'.

The word '*Kṛitāṇṭa*' here stands for '*siḍḍhāṇṭa*', doctrine; in accordance with what the *Trikāṇḍī* says in regard to the word *Kṛitāṇṭa* being the name of *Yama*, *Doctrine*, *Destiny* and *Evil Deed*'.

Further, the *Pāshupata* scriptures have to be divided into the 'Vedic' and the 'Non-Vedic'; in view of what the *Karma-purāṇa* says in regard to it.—For instance, it makes Shiva say—'all I propounded with a view to Final Release, the ancient *Pāshupata* doctrine, the most secret of the secret, the subtle essence of the Veda', and then it goes on—'this *Pāshupata* practice should be carried on by all persons desiring Final Release; they should besmear their body with ash and should be free from all desires, so says the Veda';—having thus declared that this one doctrine

of the *Pāshupaṭa* constitutes the very essence of the Veda, it goes on to say—‘there are in this world several other scriptures calculated to delude people; these are opposed to what is laid down in the Vedas, and yet they have been propounded by Myself; these are—the *Vāma*, the *Pāshupaṭa*, the *Soma*, the *Lāṅgala*, and the *Bhairava*; none of these should be followed; being as they are all outside the pale of the Veda’;—where we have the mention of another *Pāshupaṭa* doctrine as being opposed to the Veda.

In the *Vāyusamhitā* also we find the following—‘The Shaiva (*Pāshupaṭa*) scripture also is of two kinds—Vedic and Non-Vedic; the Vedic is that which contains the essence of the Veda, and the Non-Vedic is that which is independent. The independent one is of ten kinds;.....that which contains the essence of the Veda extends a million-fold. The highest *Pāshupaṭa* is that which lays down observances and right knowledge’.

Here also the distinction between the ‘Vedic’ and the
 P. 23. ‘Non-Vedic’ is made quite clear. We find
 above the phrase ‘the Shaiva scripture *also*’; the
 ‘also’ of which indicates the other cognate scriptures of the
Vaiṣṇava, the *Pāñcharātra* and the like—the activities and
 results connected wherewith are similar to those of the *Pāshu-*
paṭa, and which also are of two kinds, *Vedic* and *Non-Vedic*.

That the *Pāñcharātra* and other scriptures are *Vedic* in
 their character is thus declared in the *Kaṇḍharmottara* as
 quoted in the *Hemādri* (the *Chaturvargachintāmaṇi* of Hemādri).

‘The Sāṅkhya, the Yoga, the *Pāñcharātra*, the Vedas
 and the *Pāshupaṭa*—these constitute the five doctrines in the
 seeking of Brahman. These are the road to the ending of
 birth and rebirth, and also to the bringing about of the sover-
 eignty of Heaven. That which extends up to the *Vaiṣṇava-*
dharma has been described as the very essence. Such is the
 entire Vedic path, as described by you’.

The term '*bhāva*' here stands for *sovereignty*; and '*sēṭu*' for *road*. In the *Kārma-purāṇa* we read:—

'The Kāpāla, the Pañcharātra, the Yāmala, the Vāma, the Ārhaṭa—these and several other systems are for the purpose of deluding people.'

But the 'delusive' character here attributed to the *Pañcharātra* refers to the *Non-Vedic* Pañcharātra; because in the same Purāṇa we find the passage—'the several scriptures that are found in this world to be contrary to the Veda and the Smṛitis, the foundation of all these is purely delusive';—where what are referred to are clearly only those that are contrary to the Veda.

As for the Mimāṃsā doctrine that 'where there is contradiction between Veda and Smṛiti, the latter should be rejected' this should be taken as referring to the *Non-Vedic* Smṛitis, in view of the words—'these not being accepted by those learned in the Vedas'; hence it is not necessary to take this doctrine as declaring the unauthoritative (untrustworthy) character of all Agama-Scriptures.

"But if that be so, then, how do you explain the assertion, that 'the bases of dharma are fourteen',—where the exact number of scriptures is laid down as *fourteen* only?"

Our answer to this is that when the text mentions the number as *fourteen*, it is meant to be purely tentative. Otherwise, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Practices of Good Men*, &c. which included among the said *fourteen*, would have to be regarded as untrustworthy. If the *Rāmāyaṇa* &c. be held to have

been included under the '*other Smṛitis*' spoken of in the aforementioned text of the *Bhaviṣya-Purāṇa*,—then the same may be said in regard to the Scriptures in question also.

In the *Sāmba-Purāṇa* we find the passage—'A man who has fallen off from the Veda, and is afraid of having to perform the expiatory rites laid down in the Veda, should, in due course, have recourse to the *Tantra*, for the purpose of

accomplishing Vedic knowledge'.—Again in the *Kurma-Purāṇa* we read—'Amṛshu the high-souled Sāṭvata, the great devotee of Viṣṇu, was addicted to charity, he was the best of archers, was engaged, by Nārada's advice, in the worshipping of Vāsudeva; he propounded the scripture which is followed by lower born persons; the excellent scripture came to be known by his own name, as Sāṭvata; and this scripture, duly propounded, became conducive to the welfare of the low-born'.—The *Shrī Bhāgavata* also says as follows—'the Sāṭvata Tantra was propounded by him, knowing which one becomes a participator in Final Release; it is in accordance with this Tantra that women and Shūdras are entitled to the Vaiṣṇava rites.'—On the basis of these passages some people have asserted that, inasmuch as these texts lay down that only such people as have fallen off from the Veda are entitled to the Agama-scriptures, it means that persons not so fallen have nothing to do with them. But this is not a statement by persons acquainted with logic. Because the texts speaking of those 'fallen off from the Veda' do not lay down such people as the 'Agents' in connection with *Tantra*,—in the way in which the King is laid down as the Agent in regard to the Rājasūya sacrifice; and inasmuch as the texts do not lay down any such Agents, it cannot follow that people other than those mentioned are not entitled to the performance of the acts laid down in the Tantra. What the passages do is to assert that the *Tantra* is for the people mentioned (i.e. those that have fallen from the Veda). So that, just as in the case of the text—'inasmuch as the Veda is not heard by women, Shūdras and low Brāhmaṇas, the Bhārata has been put forward'—even though the *Bhārata* is spoken of as propounded for the sake of Women and Shūdras, yet that does not preclude the title of other persons also to that work,—in the same manner, even in the face of the aforesaid passages, the title of others (i.e. those not fallen from the Veda) also to the Agama-scriptures remains unshaken.

THUS ENDS THE DESCRIPTION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF—MEANS OF
KNOWING—*Dharma*.

End of Chapter I.

“setting aside of a *sensuous* cognition by another *sensuous* cognition (and not by an *inferential* one).”

Reply:—So long as the sensuous cognition that the *sky is blue* remains intact, any cognition of the *absence of colour*—either by the Eye or by the Witness—is absolutely impossible. Hence what sets aside the conception in this case is only a powerful chain of reasoning. Nor would there be a want of proper ‘reason’; as we have the true reason in the following form:—‘(The sky is colourless), because it is the object of a conception which is not qualified by any colour, and whose presence or absence is always in keeping with that of the Eye,—like the conception of Colour’ (Colour itself being regarded as colourless). Nor would this ‘reason’ be

open to the charge of being absolutely ‘redundant’;
 Page 41. as it helps to establish the reasoning that—if the

Sky were a *coloured* substance, it could never, in its *colourless* form, be the object of the conception whose presence or absence is dependent upon the Eye (*i.e.* visual perception). It might be argued that it would not matter at all, if the sky did not form such an object. But it is a universall recognised fact that the sky, at least that much of it as happen to be in close proximity to the observer, is absolutely without colour.

Even if the Sky be regarded as perceptible by the Witness, we cannot avoid regarding it as the object of a conception dependent upon the Eye; otherwise it would be perceptible by the blind also.

It may be urged that—“Inasmuch as, in accordance with the theory of *quintiplication*, each and every substance is composed of particles with all the five qualities of colour, taste &c., the sky also should have in its composition some particles with colour; and this fact would certainly stand in the way of the inferential conclusion with regard to its colourlessness.” But this argument loses

“ all its force if we admit only the ‘ Triplicate ’ theory of the
 “ composition of substances. But as a matter of fact, even
 “ in the case of the ‘ Quintiplication ’ theory, all that is meant
 “ by this theory is that when a certain primary element
 “ comes to be used in the practical world it displays through
 “ ‘ quintiplication ’ only such qualities as it may have possessed
 “ in its *non-quintiplicated* state. And this can not prove the
 “ presence of colour in the sky.

Says the *Opponent* :—“ Even in the case of the miscon-
 “ ception of the snake being set aside by the words ‘ this is
 “ not a snake ’, what actually sets aside the misconception
 “ is not the *word*, but the sensuous cognition (of the thing
 “ as something else). That this is so is shown by the fact
 “ that when the man is told ‘ this is not a snake ’, the answer
 “ that he gives is—‘ do you merely *say* so, or do you
 “ actually *see* it to be so, looking upon it intently and
 “ deliberately ? ”

Reply :—In cases where we have such an answer, it is
 evident that doubts are entertained as to the validity of the
 verbal cognition due to the words ‘ this is not a snake ’ ; and as
 such, *in such cases*, the verbal cognition, being extremely shaky,
 cannot serve to set aside the previous sensuous cognition.
 But in cases where there are no such doubts, it does certainly
 set aside the sensuous cognition. It is for this reason that
 there is no such answer as you refer to, in a case where
 the negating words come from a trustworthy person—one’s
 father for instance ; in which case there is no doubt with
 regard to their truthfulness ; in fact, in such cases the
 person at once admits the validity of the verbal cognition,
 and proceeds to shape his action accordingly.

There is yet another sensuous cognition—that of the
 unity of the burning flame—which is set aside by reasoning.

Objection :—“ This cognition is distinctly found to be
 “ set aside by another *sensuous* cognition ; for instance, when

“ the flame is blown out, and lighted again, we actually *see*
 “ that what has been appearing as one and the same flame
 “ is only a series of several different flames continuously appear-
 “ ing and disappearing. [And so this cannot be regarded as
 “ a case of sensuous cognition set aside by *reasonings*.] And
 “ so also in cases where the flame is not blown out, we find that
 “ it is at times *high*, and at others *low*; and in this we actually
 “ *see* the difference between the two flames; and so it is this
 “ *visual* cognition that sets aside the notion of the flame being
 “ one and the same.”

Reply:—In cases other than that where the flame is blown out and lighted again we cannot rightly assert that we have any such visual cognition of the diversity of the flames, as that ‘this is high and that is low’. Because the notion that people have with regard to the flame is that *the flame that a few moments ago appeared high is now appearing low*,—a notion wherein there is a distinct identification of what was high and what is low.

Thus the recognition of the flame as the *same* is also set aside (by reasoning).

As regards the sensuous cognition of the conch as yellow, by the man whose sight is affected by bile,—and also the cognition of the lunar disc being a few inches in extent cannot find any cognition except mediate or indirect ~~cognitions~~ that could set these aside; and as such we cannot but regard these as instances of sensuous cognition being set aside by indirect cognition (reasoning).

Says the *Opponent*:—“ In all these instances that you have
 “ cited, the operation of the other means of knowledge (Infer-
 “ ence and the rest) comes in only after the Sensuous Cognition
 “ (sought to be set aside by them) has been proved to be
 “ almost as good as false. That is to say, Cognitions are of
 “ two kinds—(1) that pertaining to two alternatives (Doubt-

"ful Cognitions) and (2) that pertaining definitely to only
 "one alternative. This latter again is of two kinds—(a)
 "that which is tainted with the suspicion of invalidity
 "and (b) that which is not so tainted. Of these three
 "kinds of Cognitions those belonging to classes (1) and (a)
 "admit of the operation of all the means of knowledge,—
 "for the simple reason that these do not afford any definite
 "knowledge of their objects, and are open to the suspicion of
 "invalidity. A cognition becomes open to the suspicion of
 "invalidity in two ways—(1) when it is found to have
 "been brought about by faulty organs, and (2) when it is
 "found that in reality there is no such object as forms the
 "objective of the Cognition. For instance, in regard to
 "the trees on the top of the mountain, we have
 "found that they appear small by reason of their great
 "distance (which interferes with the true functioning
 "of the organ of vision); and this leads us to the conclusion
 "that the similar notion of smallness with regard to the
 "Moon, which is at a much greater distance than the tree, is
 "also due to a certain discrepancy in the functioning of the
 "organ of perception. In the same manner, we find that
 "the sky that is close to us is colourless; and this leads us
 "to conclude that the notion of colour with regard to the
 "distant sky is due to the great distance causing a discre-
 "pancy in the organ of perception; all this is ascertained
 "before the operation of any other means of knowledge.
 "In the case of the notion of the conch being yellow, we find
 "that in its very origin it is faulty; and from the moment
 "that it appears, it is open to the suspicion of invalidity,—
 "due to the absolute non-existence of the *yellowness*, proved
 "by the previous and well-ascertained sensuous cognition
 "that the *conch is not yellow*. The case of the perception of
 "the 'hole' in the solar orb, and such other things, may also
 "be explained in the same manner.

“Thus then we find that the notion of the smallness of
 Page 42. “the moon is already set aside by the recognition
 “of the discrepancy due to the great distance,—
 “and the notion of the yellowness of the conch is also set
 “aside by a previous sensuous cognition to the contrary;
 “and it is *after* these have been thus set aside that there
 “appears any chance for the operation of Inference and
 “Verbal Assertion. And so we cannot regard any such
 “Inferential or Verbal Cognitions as setting aside the afore-
 “said notions. As a matter of fact, a cognition is set aside
 “only by that Cognition which shows that the former is a
 “misconception; and in the case in question we find that it is
 “no Verbal or Inferential Cognition that points to the fact of
 “the notion of the smallness of the moon being a miscon-
 “ception; specially as we have found that the Verbal Cogni-
 “tion appears only *after* the notions in question have already
 “been known to be misconceptions.

“As regards the Cognition that is not tainted by any
 “suspicion of invalidity, it affords a definite knowledge of
 “its objective, and as such is quite capable of bringing about
 “an activity of the agent with full confidence; to this class
 “belong the cognitions—‘Fire is hot’, ‘the bedding is
 “something wholly different from the Master of the
 “Sacrifice’, ‘the jar is a real entity’, and so forth.
 “These cognitions do not admit of the operation of any other
 “means of knowledge; nor are they capable of being
 “set aside by any other Cognitions; and the reason for this is
 “that in the case of these we have none of the conditions
 “that favour these contingencies; for instance, (1) there is
 “no previous knowledge of their being brought about by
 “organs tainted by the discrepancies of great distance, &c.;
 “(2) we have no previous idea of the absolute non-existence
 “of the objectives of these Cognitions; (3) nor have we any
 “Cognition of the opposite alternative.

"Then again, as a matter of fact, in the case of certain
 "Sensuous Cognitions, it may be found that they are set
 "aside by reasonings; this would only be in view of some
 "other and more valid Sensuous Cognitions. Just as in some
 "cases it may be that the implied indications of a word are
 "set aside by the indications of context,—but only when
 "this latter has the support of some Direct Assertion; just
 "as in some cases it may be that the authority of the King's
 "minister may be set aside by that of a lower functionary
 "supported by the King. Though all this may be possible,
 "yet even in these cases we cannot admit that the Sensuous
 "Cognition is set aside by Reasoning *alone*, or that the
 "Implied Indication is set aside by the indication of the
 "Context alone; as we find that in other cases just as the
 "Context is supported by Direct Assertion, so also is the
 "Reasoning supported by other Sensuous Cognitions,—con-
 "ditions which cannot be present in *all cases* of contradiction
 "between Sensuous and Inferential Cognitions. For instance,
 "in regard to sacrificial performances, we have the *Smṛiti*
 "injunction—'*āchamēt upaviṣi, &c.*'—laying down such
 "principals as actions in the shape of *āchamana* and the
 "like, as to be performed in case the sacrificer happens to
 "sneeze; on the other hand, we have the Vedic Injunction—
 "'*Ṭakam kṛitvā &c.*'—laying down the *secondary element* of
 "Order in which the *Vedī* is to be built *immediately after*
 "the Veda has been got ready; now, it may so happen
 "that the sacrificer sneezes after having got ready the
 "Veda; and in this case, even though the action of *ācha-*
 "*mana, &c.*, may come in before the making of the *Vedī*,
 "yet this rejection of the Vedic by the *Smṛiti* Injunction
 (for which in this case there are special reasons) would not
 the conclusion that all *Vedic* Injunctions are set
 "aside by those of the *Smṛiti*; similarly with all Means
 "of Knowledge (any stray instance of the rejection of one by

“the other cannot justify the general conclusion that it is “always so rejected).”

Reply:—Even in what you urge, what sets aside the sensuous cognition is *reasoning* pure and simple, which may be stated in the following way;—‘The cognition of the smallness of distant things is wrong, being due to the discrepancy caused by the distance,—as we find in the case of the tree on the mountain-top; therefore the cognition of the smallness of the moon is also wrong.’ And thus we find that the sensuous cognition of the smallness of the moon is set aside by *reasoning*, and not by another *sensuous* cognition. Thus then, while upholding such rejection, you still assert that *sensuous* cognition is not rejected by *Reasoning*; and though you may win your point by this, yet, O foolish man! this would be nothing better than an extremely shortsighted view of things!

In the same manner, the cognition of the yellowness of the conch cannot be said to be set aside by the previous sensuous cognition of the absence of yellowness; because this latter cognition is not present at the time of the rejection. Nor could the rejection be held to be by the remembrance of this previous cognition; because remembrance is always weaker than direct cognition; in fact, the remembrance is of use only in giving rise to the Reasoning. For these reasons it must be admitted that in all the cases under review we have the rejection of sensuous cognitions by Reasonings and Verbal cognitions.

It has been argued above that—“It is not right to infer “the rejectibility of sensuous cognitions by Reasoning, merely from a few instances of such rejection that we may infer “with; as such rejection may be due to the greater authority “of certain other sensuous cognitions upon which the Reasonings may be based.”

But this argument is like striking in the air (objecting to something that has not been asserted); as we have never said that the fact of Reasoning rejecting sensuous cognitions *in all cases* is to be inferred from a few instances of such rejection; all that we have said is that the sensuous Cognitions of the smallness of the Moon and the yellowness of the conch being found to be rejected by Reasoning and Verbal Cognition, whichsoever sensuous cognition should be found to fulfill the conditions present in the case of these, should be regarded as similarly rejectible. Nor is it necessary that in such cases there should always be a sensuous cognition as the basis of the Reasoning or the Verbal Cognition,—in view of which you may explain the rejection otherwise than in the manner held by us. Hence it must be admitted that the notion of the reality of the phenomenal world is as rejectible as the notion of the smallness of the Moon; and the rejection in both cases is by means of Reasonings and Verbal Cognitions based upon Scriptures.

Then again, in the case of the cognition of the smallness of the Moon, the idea of its being due to such discrepancies as those of distance and the like is not present from the very beginning; if such were the case, then, inasmuch as extreme proximity also causes discrepancies in sensuous cognitions, there would be no trustworthiness attaching to any cognition of dimension [as in all cases the knowledge of the absence of discrepancies would, according to you, be present from the very beginning]. In fact, the idea, that the cognition of the smallness of the Moon is due to the discrepancy caused by distance, appears only *after* the cognition has been rejected by reasoning and scriptures. Similarly in the case of the world also, it is only *after* the notion of the reality of the world has been set aside by reasonings and scriptures,—and the world proved to be unreal—that we come to realise that the notion was due to the discrepancies caused by

NOTICES OF BOOKS AND MANUSCRIPTS.

We have discovered, in the library of that great scholar and collector of book-treasures, Babu Govindādāsa, an unique work. It is a manuscript of an original Commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana. It is named 'Bhāṣyachandra'; the author's name we have not yet been able to discover; as the manuscript discovered extends from the beginning of Adhyāya I to about the end of Adhyāya III, so that the final colophon is wanting, and the subsidiary colophons do not mention the name of the author. The commentary is a real 'Commentary'; it explains every difficult word and phrase of the Sūtra and *Bhāṣya*, and does not, in the style of the later so-called Commentaries, leave the difficulties of the original text unexplained, and lead the reader into further confusion by raising further difficulties and discussions. How useful the work is our readers will be in a position to judge from the instalment of the translation appearing in this number, where, it will be found, we have tried to bring in all the useful points brought out by the *Bhāṣyachandra*.

We have showed the work to several competent Pandits; and they are unanimous in saying that it will now become indispensable for every reader of Vātsyāyana. In view of this, and in view of the fact that we have not yet had any reliable edition of the *Bhāṣya* itself, we propose to bring—either in *Indian Thought* itself or in a Supplement to it—a critical edition of the *Bhāṣya*, along with the *Bhāṣyachandra*, and such critical notes as we have ourselves been able to collect in the course of our translation.

The work is not found mentioned either in Aufrecht, or in any one of the manuscript-catalogues that we have been able to examine.

We have much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of Nos. 40, 41 and 42 of the valuable 'Trivandrum Sanskrit Series'

40. *Alaṅkāra Sūtra* of Rājānaka Shri Ruyyaka, with the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* of Shri Maṅkhuka, and the Commentary on this latter by Samuḍrabandha.

The world of Ālaṅkārikas has been under the impression that the 'Sūtra' and the 'Sarvasva' were both the work of one and the same author, Ruyyaka. This turns out to be a misapprehension, as the learned Editor clearly establishes in the Introduction. The commentary on the 'Sarvasva' printed here is believed to be superior to that printed in the 'Kavyamala'.

41. *Āpaṣṭambīya Adhyātmapatala*, with the Vivaraṇa of Shri Shaṅkara Bhagavatpāḍa. The original is the 'Jñānakāṇḍa' portion of Āpaṣṭamba's work on 'Dharma'; but perhaps greater value attaches to the *Vivaraṇa*, which is by 'Shri Shaṅkara Bhagavatpāḍa', believed by the editor to be the *Great* Shaṅkarācharya himself. If that be so,—and the colophon at the end should leave no doubt on the point—the Editor is fully justified in regarding the work as a 'Gem', a 'hitherto unknown work, by which the Trivandrum Series would distinguish itself'. The greatest merit of the work is that it avoids all subtle polemics and concentrates itself upon the practical teachings of the 'Vedānta'.

42. *Pratimānātaka*—of Bhāsa. This is the last of the Series of the thirteen dramas of Bhāsa discovered in Travancore, and published in the Trivandrum series. It is accompanied by a learned Introduction, in which the Editor discusses all the more important questionings to which the publication of these long-lost dramas has given rise.

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